THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

CONTENTS FOR JANUARY

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NINETEENTH CENTURY
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THE SECOND SESSION

A Government which, in spite of important defections, still deserves to be called National faces its second year of office. It is supported in Parliament by an overwhelming and reasonably, but not unreasonably, docile Conservative majority whose members—many of them young men, their vigorous opinions as yet untainted by the depressing experience of too much 'practical' politics—are anxious to see genuine Conservative policies applied to the realities of the situation. It governs, with the assistance of a considerable prestige, a country which realises that its evil plight is to some extent the result of past follies and which is facing courageously a future in which it sees little ground for optimism.

This Government may, if it assists it to do so, look back on a year of office in which its achievements have been eminently satisfactory relatively to world circumstances. It has balanced one Budget, and, despite the American debt payment, is well on the way to balancing another. It has failed to prevent an increase of unemployment, but it has prevented our unemployment figures

rising with anything like the same rapidity as in other countries. It has effected a number of economies which are valuable as far as they go, though their extent is not so wide as to excuse the Government from constant vigilance or from the thoughtful and careful continuance of a programme of economies based on the conclusions of the Conference of Local Authorities, or the Conservative Economy Sub-committees. It has administered an unpopular means test, and has had the wisdom to remodel that test on just and humane principles. It has faced and crushed some ugly unemployed demonstrations, foiling the hopes of international Communism; and—example of the truth of the dictum 'Courage always pays in politics'—it has kept the loyalty of a police force suffering from a severe cut in pay. It has boldly converted a great part of the National Debt, and thus gone far to render possible a reduction in some forms of taxation, though not, perhaps, a reduction of income tax. It has wisely initiated a tariff policy, the benefits of which are already in some places apparent. It has rendered permanent assistance to wheat farming by the quota scheme, protected British vegetables and fruits, and lately has afforded some temporary degree of help to the meat producers by restriction of imports. The results of the Ottawa Conference are not so striking as to fulfil all the hopes of the Empire Free Traders, but they are most creditable as a beginning, and doubly creditable when the difficulties of negotiating any agreement with Mr. Bennett are considered. One may be permitted to regret that no permanent Imperial economic organisation, advisory in character, has been established. In addition to these considerable achievements, two measures—the Children's Act and the Town and Country Planning Act, which may, if wisely and prudently administered, be of some benefit to the country—have been placed upon the Statute-book. This record of achievement, from which foreign policy is deliberately excluded, may give the Government cause for satisfaction; but the present is no time for retrospection. The situation of the country remains deplorably serious: the exigencies of the crisis are unabated. Past successes should inspire the Government to face the future courageously, not to rest upon its laurels.

The Government is a National one, elected in a time of crisis with no party programme and, generally speaking, no hampering pledges. Its only duty is to do its best for the nation, and it has shown already that it will not be deterred from performance of this duty by the resignation of its most prominent members. A Government that has survived the loss of Viscount Snowden and Sir Herbert Samuel need not be unduly solicitous to preserve the support of other individual members, however distinguished. The will of the overwhelming majority of the nation and th

House of Commons must prevail. The 'nationalism' of the Government is more dependent upon its carrying out the national will than upon the arithmetic of its composition. There seems, however, every likelihood that the National Liberals will remain National to the end, and will continue, in the future as in the past, to be guided by facts rather than by dogmas. The strain of continued office is more likely to cause a reshuffle of Ministers than other considerations. Unless a scheme be adopted under which Ministers, especially those who most frequently attend conferences, can be freed from the drudgery of the House of Commons, some such redistribution of portfolios seems inevitable.

The vast and vigorous Conservative majority in both Houses of Parliament is most clearly a factor of the greatest importance in the situation. Neither in numbers, nor in experience, nor in debating power are the small Opposition parties, Independent Labour, Labour, Georgian or Samuelite Liberal, deserving of much consideration. This fact is masked by the large amount of time that is given up to the speeches of members of these parties, but it is equally clearly unmasked when those speeches are heard or read. The Conservatives, who are most fortunate in having, without depending upon it, the support of National Liberals and National Labour members, dominate the political scene both numerically and intellectually. They have hitherto shown a loyalty to the Prime Minister that must surely be most impressive to a man who has lived among the factions and dissents of the Labour Party. This loyalty is given, not only on general grounds, but because members of the House of Commons were elected to support, not a programme, but a Government; to a great extent they have felt bound to entrust their judgments to the keeping of their leaders. Cross-voting by Conservatives is more difficult in this Parliament than in any other. But loyalty certainly does not exclude constructive criticism, a fact that was demonstrated during the passage of the Town and Country Planning Bill, and which will be demonstrated again on the Rent Restrictions Amending Bill and the other measures promised for this session. Moreover, the Government will naturally bear in mind the preponderance of Conservative thought in framing their Indian proposals, when the time comes for the misty ideas of the last few years to be disciplined into draft.

It remains to be recorded that there appears to be, at the moment, a certain restiveness among Conservative back-benchers in the House of Commons, due to a variety of causes. Mr. MacDonald is not a great parliamentarian, and his recent speeches have disappointed his followers. Towards the end of the last session the Government showed a tendency towards 'Olympianism' that smacked of ingratitude, though it was probably rather the

result of fatigue. Conservatives felt that too much attention was paid to the suggestions of Opposition parties and too little to their own. This irritation may be evanescent, but it should not be disregarded. When such able parliamentarians as Sir Robert Horne, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Amery are on the back benches the opinions of the rank and file must be regarded as exceedingly important.

In the country certain tendencies of opinion have latterly become remarkable. Communism is certainly increasing, both among the *intelligentsia* of Bloomsbury and among the poor of the North. The Communist Party is better organised and better supported than ever before. There is no sign of a Labour Party revival; a party which can find no better issue in bye-elections than the means test has little hope of strengthening its position with the electorate. From the unwillingness of the Liberal leaders to inaugurate a national Free Trade campaign we may infer that their very astute advisers are unable to report signs of a Liberal revival in the constituencies. Among Conservatives there is a strong and noteworthy drift to the Right. This feeling nearly resulted in a revolt at the Blackpool Conference. The 'Y.M.C.A.' group and the moderates no longer dominate the party. The Conservative demand is for stronger, bolder leadership than has been given in the past.

In these circumstances the National Government faces its second session. Since the King's Speech was delivered the crisis of the American debt payment, accompanied by a fall in the value of sterling, has arisen. No provision for foreign debt repayment was made in the 1932 Budget; on the other hand, a raidable Sinking Fund was maintained and a raidable Sterling Equalisation Fund established. So far as the budgetary position is concerned, then, the American debt payment made in gold need not cause undue despondency, though it does provide an unanswerable argument for further economies, which are certainly within our power. It appears unlikely that the Lausanne settlement will be completely upset; theoretically, Germany can be asked to continue reparation payments and France debt payments to England. In practice, however, receipt of either is extremely improbable. But England, clearly, cannot be left alone to bear the burden of the war for ever. The problem that confronts Anglo-American statesmanship is to choose wisely between three alternatives—cancellation (or at least drastic reduction) of British payments, collection of money for the payments by a special tax on American imports (a course which would lead to a tariff war, and which, in the long run, would probably not achieve its object), or default. Here is a test of statesmanship as searching as any that has been imposed since 1919.

Can Mr. MacDonald, can Mr. Roosevelt, pass the test? The latter has gained some reputation in the small sphere of New York politics; the former is believed by his friends to be exceptionally skilled in negotiation, though that view of his talents is not universally held either at home or abroad. His enemies suggest that his real talent lies in extracting the greatest possible prestige from a defeat. Were Mr. MacDonald (for it is on him rather than on the Foreign Secretary that the burden will fall) and Mr. Roosevelt left to themselves to solve the problem of debts one might have a fair hope of a solution being found. But, most unfortunately, we are negotiating with a country which is cursed with the most out-of-date, and probably the worst, constitution in the world. The American Senate has equal powers with the President in foreign affairs; so far as one can understand the position, the House of Representatives has also some say in this particular matter. One must reckon with American public opinion; British public opinion is now much less important. Americans are baffling people: no one would care to prophesy their course of action next year or their ultimate reaction to the French default. One can only hope that the excellently drafted British Notes on debt payment will set the tone for the negotiations, but their frigid reception in America gives one cause for the liveliest misapprehensions.

And if two nations, speaking the same language and sharing many ideals, find it so difficult to discuss objectively and fairly a problem of debt, what hope is there for the 'World Economic Conference'? That Conference, it is to be feared, will end with a few pious resolutions on the subject of tariff barriers—resolutions which will be as little regarded as the similar pronouncements of League of Nations economic committees. The gold standard countries are likely to press for a world return to the gold standard, a policy that may be supported by some British bankers (and, apparently, by a section of the British Liberal Party), but which would be disastrous to British industrialists. Influence is being brought to bear upon our Government to pursue a deflationary policy, accompanied by drastic wage reductions But, powerful though these influences seem, they are equally strongly opposed. At Ottawa inflationary policies were condemned, apparently without any adequate consideration. The Treasury refuses to take an interest in bimetallism, that safest method of inflation, on the ground that there is not enough silver in the world to make the experiment worth while. One can only wonder whether the Government estimate of the world supply of silver is really accurate, and whether they do not unduly minimise the amount of silver which a return to bimetallism would extract from the hoards of India and China. Bimetallism will be on

the agenda of the World Economic Conference, but unless our Treasury changes its attitude it will remain there.

Indeed, it is hard to see what the Conference will be allowed to discuss, if America rules out debt questions, and harder still to believe in any useful outcome.

Another Conference is always with us, and its subject is Disarmament. Deplorably, Great Britain seems unable to face the realities of that question. At the present moment peace is maintained in Europe by the armies of France and her allies. It may be a bad peace, but it is better than a modern war. Who can blame France for asking for an alternative security if further armament sacrifices are asked of her, or if Germany rearms? But our attitude towards security remains purely negative. True, we cannot indefinitely extend our European commitments; it is no use asking our people to guarantee an Eastern or a Mediterranean Locarno. But what is our alternative proposal? We would not take M. Herriot's suggestion of a League of Nations Army seriously, and in this we may have shown wisdom. We are doing nothing to remove the causes of war by insisting on Treaty revision; perhaps there is little we can do, but we might at least have followed Mussolini in constantly insisting on the importance of the question. We are not, apparently, trying to secure an alliance of the Great European Powers: England, France, Germany, and Italy. And yet, ultimately, the European problem (which concerns us in a sense in which the Latin American and Manchurian problems, that take up so much Genevan time, concern us not at all) can only be solved by a return to a Great Power mentality and a working agreement between Great Powers to pool their interests and benevolently dominate Europe. Such an alliance could solve the Treaty revision and disarmament problems in a sense favourable to all four countries, each disregarding the ragtag and bob-tail of the little allies. Nor would the small nations have the right to complain of an arrangement that brought them peace, even though it implied a certain curtailment of their prestige. The alliance, moreover, would be an effective barrier against Russian aggression, so dangerous to all European States.

Our Government has not as yet shown that it is thinking on these or on any constructive European lines. We are content to ask for a 'reaffirmation' of peace pacts and to make qualitative and quantitative suggestions for disarmament. The Conference has 'found a formula' on which Germany has returned to its table. It may be that some 'formula' will be 'evolved' for regulating German rearmament, though this is not certain. We may even hope that certain weapons (large battleships, for example, which so many modern naval experts regard as almost

useless, certain tanks and large bombing aircraft) will be abandoned or limited. If so, the result will be magnified and lauded by many enthusiasts. But it will leave the realities of the European situation unchanged.

And war becomes a more serious menace each year that Europe remains disorganised on present lines. There is still time for our Government to make more effective proposals that will save Europe from its present plight, but action cannot be delayed much longer if we are to avert an armaments race between France and Germany that will assuredly end in war.

During the course of 1933 we may expect to hear of the Government's proposals for the new Indian Constitution. They will be submitted to a Joint Select Committee of both Houses, the membership of which, we have surely a right to expect, will reflect the opinion of both Houses. That is to say, we may expect an adequate minority representation of those numerous peers and members who are opposed to all concessions that go beyond the proposals of the Simon Commission. The task of the Committee will be made more difficult by the presence of an unspecified, but probably large, number of Indian assessors. The Committee will ultimately report, and the resultant Bill will be forced through both Houses with the help of the Government Whips. The freedom of Parliament to reject or amend the Bill is largely illusory, for the consequence of successful opposition would be the resignation of the Government. No one would care to consider this at the present juncture, or at any time, unless an alternative Government emerges much more clearly from the rank and file of the Conservative Party. We may expect, however, that the Bill, when it appears, will be as moderate in its proposals as our commitments allow, that the needs of the Indian Civil Service will be given due weight, and that such safeguards as are possible will be provided. To these ends Conservative criticism should be directed. It is true that no safeguards will be of permanent value when the time comes for the British Raj to be confronted in the Federal Assembly by a hostile Congress majority. No hope remains of satisfying the aspirations of Mr. Gandhi! However, we have gone too far for retreat to be possible, and regrets are as unavailing as the hopes of any final settlement of the Indian problem are baseless. The Government solution must be accepted, though it may be modified by criticism in advance, and a new era of Indian government courageously faced.

There will presumably be some development in the Irish situation. It may be that Mr. de Valera will go to the country on the Republican issue. We cannot recede from our position on the annuities, which is that we have a '*de jure*' to receive them. But it seems curious that we have not made it clear to Ireland

that if the financial burden of them is intolerable, as the Irish allege, we should be willing, *in fact*, to reduce or cancel them. The golden rule obliges us to treat Ireland as we hope America will treat us. While Mr. de Valera deals with the question on the plane of 'rights' we cannot concede anything; our attitude to Mr. Cosgrave, asking for our co-operation on the ground of 'needs,' would presumably be different. The continuance of the tariff war reflects little credit on either country.

If a survey of world affairs affords us little reason for rejoicing we may recover a tempered optimism when we turn to our domestic concerns. The overthrow of the Free Trade policy means that to some extent we have escaped from the dominance of world conditions; no one supposes that we can regain our old prosperity without reference to our neighbours' condition, but at least the prices in our internal market are not to be completely identified with world prices. The best service we can render to the world is to build up first our own and then the Empire markets. For the export trades we can do little; but we can do much for our home market if we are sufficiently determined. This is no time to experiment with or to wait for new industrial processes; our present basic industries must claim our attention. Their plight is deplorable, but not beyond remedy.

The time is past when the right of agriculture to first consideration could be questioned. Undeniably, the agricultural problem is by far the most urgent and important of any. Fortunately there is no lack of good-will in the Cabinet, where that most able Minister, Mr. Elliot, can speak for the farmers. Much has been done, perhaps enough has been done, for wheat growers. To render further assistance to them would be dangerous; our climate is not suited for this form of agriculture, and we ought not to plough more grassland in its interest. This should not prevent us giving the most careful consideration to the question of imposing a tax, with Dominion preference, on imported manufactured flour, since excessive importation of this commodity would make the Wheat Quota Act impossible to operate.

The Scottish farmers may be able to make out a case for an oats quota. Certainly the barley growers deserve relief from the crushing tax on beer that is ruining both them and the hop growers. The import of foreign malting barley should be drastically restricted. These subjects will be ventilated in Parliament, and it will be surprising if relief is not afforded. Tariffs have already assisted our vegetable growers; the development of British canning factories has done still more for them and for the fruit growers. There is no reason why the market-gardening industry should not be developed in such a manner as to absorb very large numbers of the unemployed. The

uaker scheme for providing allotments is doing much to instil taste for vegetable growing among the workers of the cities; isely, the Government is assisting this scheme. A more ambitious project has been started by the Catholic Land Association, ho are training urban workers to take up the arduous life of nall-holders. Market gardening, developing out of allotment olding, is the form of agriculture most likely to appeal to the nemployed. A man can practise it upon the outskirts of a town, ith all urban amenities easily accessible; he has not to face the eterrent loneliness of the real country life. It is to be hoped that iose who administer the Town and Country Planning Act will ear these considerations in mind. Colonies of market gardeners id, where the climate is suitable, fruit growers might be estabished, with canning factories, on the outskirts of towns where iere is much unemployment. The Co-operative Societies could ssist mightily in this work. The destruction of useful agricul-ural land by casual factory development along the great roads ould be ended as soon as possible. There seems to be a strong ise for further assistance to this branch of agriculture by more riffs or by quotas. Imports of potatoes should be regulated id the sale of potatoes reorganised under the Agricultural arketing Act.

Something has been done for the meat industry, yet its condi-on is still most serious. Government action has saved us from complete collapse of the market, but now the cumulative effect many years' neglect is making itself felt, and pig farmers, eat farmers, and dairy farmers are deeply apprehensive. More uld be done, even as part of a 'short-term' policy. An indi-enous milk canning industry could be fostered by higher tariffs an are at present imposed, for tinned milk, however regrettably, pears to be a necessity for the slum-dweller. The Government is so far refused to feed His Majesty's Forces on home-produced eat on grounds of expense; they may now have to consider hether that expense would not be less than the cost to the untry of widespread rural unemployment and distress. Very tainly some temporary arrangement must soon be made with e banks to refrain from foreclosing (which forces the farmer to crifice his stock in glutted markets) and to reduce interest on ans.

Meanwhile, we may expect to see the Government pressing iead with a 'long-term' policy. The passage on Agriculture in ie King's Speech was ambiguous; true, little can be done for riculture until wholesale prices have risen, but there is no ason, save lack of faith and lack of courage, why we should not se wholesale prices in this country without much reference to orld conditions. Retail prices need not rise unduly; actions

taken already show that the Government is not afraid of the 'dear food' cry, and Ministers should complete their policy, using tariffs, prohibitions, or quotas as may be advisable in each case. It is satisfactory that the Government realise that 'further plans are necessary to enable agriculture as a whole to take its place in the economy of the nation.'

Marketing of bacon and other pig products will be reorganised this year. A Committee is to report on the reorganisation of the meat industry. The farmer will no longer have to higgle in the market, a sphere in which he is always worsted to-day. These marketing schemes appear to some Conservatives to be an expression of Socialism; but by most of the party they are recognised as a very proper use of the powers of the State to prevent the exploitation of the most valuable section of the population. There will be a wide demand that the present temporary control of meat imports should be made permanent. In order to take the question out of the field of party politics it may be advisable to entrust regulation to an extra-parliamentary commission. If such a commission were charged with the duty, not merely of maintaining prices, but of very largely increasing (perhaps by a stated percentage every year for a term of years) the home production of foodstuffs, the country could be immensely enriched and the number of unemployed substantially reduced.

Finally, we must make up our minds in the near future on the subject of landlordism. Universal peasant proprietorship or land nationalisation are suitable themes for discussion in suburban debating societies; practical men realise that for many years we shall continue the system of landlord and tenant. We must, surely, try to make intelligent landlordism possible. The land tax and the crushing death duties on agricultural land must go; their abolition is a much more worthy object for the next Budget than any remission of income tax. Other reforms, such as the establishment of a *métayer* system, can wait; alleviation of the tax burden is vital if the necessary capital and the necessary leadership are to return to our countryside.

Clearly it is impossible to survey here the condition of our other basic industries. Steel appears to be showing signs of recovery. By tariffs and by a wise monetary policy industries may be and are being assisted. It is to be hoped that they will not be again plunged into ruin by a bankers' policy of deflation and return to the gold standard. The interest of the *rentier* must be sacrificed in the interest of the genuine producer.

Coal, however, deserves particular consideration. At present the industry is suffering from a Quota Act, the fundamental defect of which is not the restriction on output, but the fatalistic and untrue assumption that the maximum possible demand for

British coal is 260,000,000 tons a year. The industry can be saved only by increasing the demand for coal. The recent action of the Persian Government has, one hopes, given the Admiralty cause for thought. We keep, presumably, large fuel supplies for our oil-burning Navy; but what of our mercantile marine? Merchant shipping is becoming daily more dependent on imported fuel; in abandoning the 'coal standard' it has but followed the naval example. When war comes supplies of oil will be brought at the greatest hazard from overseas; if these fail, England starves. The superior advantages, economic and strategic, of coal fuel for *all* vessels are well set forth in Captain Acworth's book *Back to the Coal Standard*. The Government, in view of the national peril, should take immediate steps to encourage o shipping to return to the national fuel.

The railways are being destroyed by oil transport, subsidised by the Road Fund and by the heavy grants to civil aviation. If they were given a chance to compete on equal terms with motor cars the demand for coal would enormously increase. The Road *versus* Rail problem is one which cannot be much longer burked by the Government. No mention of this vital question of coal occurs in the King's Speech. It was raised in debate in both Houses, and it appeared that Ministers were still interesting themselves in the extraction of oil from coal. In this connexion thr coal products deserve consideration : oil derived from coal by hydrogenation, oil derived from coal by low temperature carbonisation, and producer gas. The first product has been conclusively shown by the Rector of the Imperial College of Scien (Mr. H. T. Tizard) to be uneconomic; his letter in *The Tim* of December 10 is unanswerable. Low-temperature carbonisatio may have a sphere of usefulness if the oil be regarded as secondary product. The real future probably lies with produc gas regarded as a substitute for liquid fuel in motor transpo This fuel needs no subsidy; it needs only fair play.

Minor measures, such as the promised Housing Bill, ma alleviate but cannot remove the burden of unemployment. remains with us, and even a trade boom, seemingly distant, w not end it. The forthcoming Bill dealing with Unemploym Insurance will necessarily take this gloomy fact into accou Yet, if we courageously seek to rebuild our shattered ho markets, to restore the beasts and crops to our fields and t trolleys to our mines, we may yet hope. The *morale* of the Brit nation has stood a test almost as severe as the test of war. our statesmen be worthy of the courage of our people, and may face the future without despair.

IDDESLEIGH.

EUROPE: 1933

As we enter the fifteenth year since the Great War and look across the Channel at the state of affairs confronting those who have striven and are still striving for a peaceful, prosperous, and contented Europe it is difficult not to be pessimistic. The whole European continent seems to be writhing in the various distressing symptoms of some terrible disease. Fear and suspicion obsess the people of nations great and small. National ambitions and short-sighted self-interests show themselves on the one hand, with a spirit of discontent and zeal for re-gain prominent on the other. Armaments, comprising the most ingenious and diabolical devices of mechanical science for the destruction of mankind and the handiwork of the human race, are being piled up by some nations, sought after by others, and at the same time condemned with horror by the men and women of whom these nations are composed. The danger of war has been freely spoken of by competent observers, and this ugly phrase has even found its way into the balanced and well-considered leading articles given to the world from Printing House Square. Economic distress of the severest kind permeates the whole Continent from the industrial areas of Northern France and the coalfields of Westphalia to the great Hungarian plain and the Iron Gate of the Danube. Millions are by unemployment reduced to poverty because there is too much plenty; Europe is bristling with tariff barriers, quotas, and every conceivable impediment to a free exchange of goods; and despair is driving people to crime and the poisonous influence of Communism. The Communists, prominent in varying degree in every land, have secured no less than a hundred seats in the German Reichstag; disorder, which has become such a commonplace that it attracts little attention, has now been carried to the very doors of the League of Nations at Geneva; and Soviet Russia urges on the elements of unrest and discontent in her foul endeavour to exploit the misfortunes of Europe to further her policy of World Revolution. The prestige of the League of Nations has recently suffered a severe blow from events in the Far East; and the authority of Geneva was further jeopardised by those who threatened to rearm if their desires were not fulfilled. Now,

fortunately, this last misfortune has for the present been averte by the fulfilment of these desires and the decision of a great natio to rejoin a supreme international effort to reduce the instrument of war. In Europe of to-day, however, there seems to be littl room for application of the straightforward principles of th Christian faith, the foundation on which our civilisation is buil as the vast and complicated system of modern life speeds or becoming more and more involved with every day that passe While the nations are feverishly endeavouring to promote safeguard their own interests by every means at their disposa they are at the same time eager for peace in which to prospe But this desire for peace seems to be very much obscured b national policies which can only lead to war. They want to hav everything both ways, and this they cannot have. The price peace involves some sacrifice of national interests, and there is general reluctance to pay this price. In their anxiety to get rathe than to give, statesmen are losing sight of the simple principle c giving in order eventually to profit; they are failing to realise tha peace cannot be assured until nations are prepared to mak sacrifices in the interests of the continent of which they form part they are ignoring the indisputable fact that the far-sighte Christian virtues of generosity and self-sacrifice, if wisely applied pay in the long run, apart altogether from their moral value Individually the men and women of Europe want peace; collec tively they are heading for war. Indeed, I was recently informe by a high authority, in what is recognised to be probably th best-informed quarter in Europe, that 'he could not see ho another war in the comparatively near future could be avoided

But while it is sincerely to be hoped that the Disarmamer Conference will succeed in laying the foundations of somethin really constructive at Geneva, it may be that Europe's psych logical complex is so deep-rooted that the actual fear of impendir war may be necessary to produce a saner outlook on reality and general attempt to face the obvious fact that sacrifices are nece sary if peace is to be maintained. The two alternatives facir Europe to-day are peace, progress, and economic stability, onl obtainable by a readiness to make sacrifices, or determination all costs to satisfy national demands, involving inevitable war i the future. Disarmament alone, with all the well-devised plar of international ingenuity, cannot ensure peace; nor can th success of the forthcoming World Economic Conference, with th stimulus of Ottawa, and even of previous British and Frenc discussions with Washington on war debts, alone solve Europe economic difficulties. For armaments, war debts, want of cor fidence, and many other factors which are paralysing Euro are to a large extent interdependent, and are largely sympton

of serious malignant trouble in another direction. The cancer to which I refer is to be found in the Treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon, on the basis of which no permanent peace with security can be established, no real international co-operation pursued, and no economic confidence set up with any degree of stability. As long as the deplorable situation arising out of these so-called Peace Treaties is allowed to continue, it seems futile to concentrate singly on the removal of armaments, without making any attempt to operate on the root of the armament trouble; for in this case the removal of armaments can only be temporary, while the state of disarmament reached cannot in these circumstances have anything approaching the desired effect on the other factors with which it is interdependent. Palliative measures of disarmament are no permanent cure for the disease of injustice. But it is necessary to deal more fully with this question of the *status quo*, which may be regarded as the most important issue in Europe to-day—a question, indeed, that must be decided sooner or later as being the pivot on which the whole future of Europe depends.

A mere casual glance at the post-war map of Europe makes it obvious to even the more inexperienced mind that the patchwork settlement of frontiers reached in the Peace Treaties has neither the character nor even the outward appearance of permanence. The arrangement of the Polish Corridor, the status of Danzig and Memel, the frontier settlements of Central Europe, and the large minorities in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Roumania are sufficient in themselves to condemn the work as amateurish, to say the least of it, without taking into consideration such anomalies as the Upper Silesian muddle and other kindred misarrangements. Whether the framers of these treaties were incompetent or merely worn out by the mental stress of the war, or whether they were unduly influenced by bad feeling towards their late enemies, has little bearing on the great questions of to-day; but the results of their deliberations have certainly provided us with a Europe that must be reshaped by some means or other if another war is to be avoided, and if there is to be any hope of successful international co-operation. The first step towards international co-operation, and the security that goes with it, is surely to create a Europe capable of co-operating, but hitherto all efforts in this direction have ignored this simple and fundamental fact. In spite of such obvious danger signals as the proposed Austro-German Customs Union, these efforts have continued to be directed towards an object that is most desirable, although at present unattainable owing to national groupings arising from the *status quo* and to a distinct tendency to drift back to the pre-war system of a balance of power in Europe. Unpleasant though it

may be for some nations to accept this truism, it is a hard a unquestionable fact that international co-operation cannot thri in the atmosphere created by the *status quo*. Any attempt reconcile these two conceptions is to try to get the best out of tw opposite alternatives. When I discussed the various aspects this question with Signor Mussolini during the summer of 19 the Italian Premier entirely agreed with this view and put signature to the following statement:

> The Austro-German Customs Union is an unmistakable sign that t *status quo* is on its way to revive the balance of power in Europe; and t general policy of European co-operation and the *status quo* do not harmoni and cannot long continue to exist side by side. There is a general attem in Europe to-day to have everything both ways, which is impossible. T nations must choose which course lies in their best interests and follow th course. To try to get the best out of two courses which do not harmoni is merely to drift towards trouble. This is one of the greatest obstacles the pacification of Europe. In my opinion, the question of the Poli Corridor and that of the Hungarian frontiers are serious problems whi Europe has to face to-day. The conditions imposed upon the Hungaria by the Treaty of Trianon cannot be regarded as justice; and we in Ita who have friendly relations with Hungary, would like to see something do to improve the position of these close neighbours. Such matters should taken up by the League of Nations, and a genuine attempt made to find solution. I know that neither of these questions is easy of solution, b no solution is possible unless an attempt is made to find one.

The disturbed political atmosphere in Europe to-day is th outcome of the actions and reactions of two contending force and has been accentuated by the great difference in streng between the armies maintained by one group of Powers on t plea of security and that imposed upon another group as precautionary measure, while Reparations, War Debts, and th world economic depression have had their effect. This groupin of nations, which is the direct result of the territorial, armame and financial terms of the Peace Treaties, has taken place a follows. The first group comprises most of the former Entent Powers, together with certain nations which obtained the independence at the Peace Conference, some of the latter havin previously formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Unde this heading come France, Belgium, Poland, and the Littl Entente (Czechoslovakia, Roumania, and Yugoslavia). As mos of these countries have benefited territorially or otherwise as result of the war, they naturally wish to uphold the *status quo*, an are enthusiastic advocates of peace, not necessarily for its ow sake, but because it entails less likelihood of change. The secon group comprises those nations which lost territory as the result o the war, or did not consider themselves fairly treated at the Peac Conference. This heading covers Germany, Austria, Hungary

and, in the second category, Italy, while Turkey and Bulgaria incline to this orientation. All these Powers are naturally in favour of Treaty revision, and to most of them the preservation of peace has been an imposed necessity as a result of restricted armaments rather than a national interest. So, on the one hand, we have a group of Powers eager for peace to safeguard their gains, while, on the other hand, we have another group clamouring for change, and therefore considerably less opposed to war. Then there is Soviet Russia, whose influence affects nearly every country in Europe, and whose internal difficulties may lead to even more comprehensive groupings among the more or less discontented nations. Hence, Europe looks like being once more divided into two opposing camps—namely, the discontented nations of Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Austria, with possibly Turkey and Bulgaria, *vis-à-vis* France, Poland, Belgium, and the Little Entente as defenders of the *status quo*, while the divergence of these two groups may well be intensified by Franco-Italian differences and the struggle of these two Powers for political hegemony in the Balkans. In the settlement of this issue it is possible that Russia may play an important part; for it is impossible any longer to remain blind to the fact that, sooner or later, Russia will recover her position as a great European Power, and that pressure from that quarter will become a significant force with which to reckon. There have already been strong indications of co-operation between Germany and Russia, chiefly owing to the Polish Corridor, and Italy has shown inclinations to flirt politically with Moscow. Hence a serious crisis may in the future arise out of a Russian policy to exploit discontent in Europe with, as its counterpart, a desire among the discontented nations to make use of the internal situation in Russia for the furtherance of their own ends.

Let us now consider the two outstanding problems which during the last decade have given rise to the strongest currents of discontent, leading in turn to the grouping of Powers on this side or that according to their attitude, direct or indirect, towards the issues involved. These problems are the Polish Corridor and the frontiers of Central Europe, especially Hungary, while Italy's grievances regarding her treatment at the Peace Conference and her claim for expansion must be taken into account as having an important bearing on both these questions. It will be noted that Signor Mussolini, in his statement to me, carefully omitted, but just as carefully implied, that the Italian question formed one of the 'serious problems which Europe has to face to-day.' This combination of political questions must receive the most earnest consideration if anything substantial is to be achieved in international co-operation, disarmament, and the establishment of security followed by economic confidence.

The Corridor provides Poland with an access to the sea, principle which must be accepted as forming part of the who conception of Polish independence, but the means used for givi effect to this principle have antagonised Poland's most power neighbour by cutting off from the mainland of the German Rei territory which has for centuries been the cradle of Germ culture. Apart from the immense sentimental value attached Königsberg and the surrounding territory of East Prussia, effect of this action has been practically to kill East Pruss economically. Although the Poles are doing all they can facilitate transit through the Corridor for German traffic, and t is generally admitted, it does not alter the fact that the comm nications between the Reich and East Prussia are under the co trol of a foreign Power, and that a situation has been created wh is not in the interests of peace. Financial reparations can demanded and paid without leaving an aftermath of hatred a revenge, but this is not so with territorial exchanges. Germa roused these feelings in 1871 by demanding Alsace-Lorraine fr France, which helped to lay the foundations of the Great W Ignoring this, the Allied Powers have sowed the seeds of futu conflict by cutting in two what must always remain one of t greatest European Powers. Such action cannot be justified the interests of peace, and if peace is disturbed in Eastern Eurc Poland will be in a very dangerous position with regard to h eastern and western neighbours. The Corridor has gone far join the hands of Germany and Russia, and has placed Pola between two strong and unfriendly States—a situation that sur cannot be in Poland's best interests, when she is feeling her w along a difficult path as a newly restored European Power.

Ethnographically, about 80 per cent. of the population of Corridor is now Polish, and historically the Polish claim see to be somewhat stronger than the German; but it should remembered that in recent years an intensive policy of 'Poloni tion' has been carried out in districts where there was previou a considerable German population, the Polish majority be increased every year by more or less artificial means, and th Polish consolidation is being rapidly effected by internal comn nications with the port of Gdynia. But, while it is true that Corridor is a territory to which the Poles have a strong clai apart from the fact that they are now the possessors, there i more practical side to the question. Poland's most urgent ne is peace in which to consolidate the new Polish State, and fr this standpoint it is difficult to regard the Corridor as other th a dangerous obstruction to Polish national interests. Althou Russia objects in principle to a strong Poland, the Power m directly affected by this new Polish outlet is Germany, wh

political and commercial friendship is more valuable to Poland than this particular access to the sea. If the Poles cannot be friends with the Russians, they must be on good terms with the Germans. As, however, the Poles at present scorn a policy of 'giving in order to benefit later on,' and are unprepared to make sacrifices to obtain German friendship and ensure peace in which to increase their strength, this question remains the most dangerous menace to the peace of Europe and the very existence of the Polish State; and all this in spite of the fact that Western Powers favouring a strong Poland would prefer to see a sturdy State of moderate dimensions rather than a more extended territory with features that constitute a source of weakness.

Although numerous solutions of this very difficult question—some of them grotesquely impracticable—have been put forward from time to time, there seems to me to be only one which might enter the sphere of practical politics later on. This proposal is somewhat on the following lines:

(*a*) Re-establishment of the union of Poland and Lithuania, with an access to the sea at Memel.

(*b*) Poland to return to Germany that portion of the Corridor contiguous to the western side of the Free State of Danzig, including the Polish port of Gdynia, which would be purchased at a price to be settled by arbitration, and be constituted a free port.

(*c*) The Free State of Danzig to be returned to Germany, but Danzig itself to remain a free port with special facilities for Polish transit.

(*d*) Poland to receive special port facilities at the German ports of Stettin, Königsberg, and Gdynia.

(*e*) Germany to guarantee Polish security against Russian aggression. Germany to make substantial concessions to Poland in Upper Silesia.

While a solution on these lines, which would also solve the Vilna question, might have been possible when the peace settlements were originally drawn up, and may be again possible at some future date, it is out of the question at present, owing to the determination of Germany to recover all her lost territory in Eastern Europe, and Poland's equal determination not to part with one single square inch, not to mention strong Lithuanian opposition. Indeed, so violent is Polish opposition to any suggestion of treaty revision that the Poles openly declare that they will fight rather than be deprived of what they regard to be an integral part of Poland; and so vehement are the terms in which all Germany protests against the alleged injustice of the present settlement that there is no doubt whatever in my mind that the

Germans will sooner or later resort to force, if they see no prospect of obtaining satisfaction by peaceful means. Mr. Churchill was undoubtedly right when, referring to Germany, he said in the House of Commons that 'all those bands of splendid youth, with the light of desire to suffer for their fatherland in their eyes, were not looking for status; they were looking for weapons, and when they had the weapons they would ask for restoration of lost territories and colonies.' It is almost inconceivable that a virile race with a great military tradition should sit down peacefully and accept the dismemberment of their beloved fatherland in order to provide an access to the sea for another race which they have always regarded as inferior. And it is equally difficult to believe that a highly cultured race, at last restored to something approaching their former power and prestige, could countenance a proposal to give up newly acquired territory to those partly responsible for plunging them into a long period of national obscurity. Yet a reconciliation of these two opposing forces constitutes the problem that Europe has to face, and I cannot stress too strongly the seriousness of the situation in this part of Eastern Europe, where racial feeling runs high, where nationalism is very strong, and calm contemplation is not regarded as a virtue.

If the difficulty and danger of the Corridor question constituted one self-contained problem the situation would be quite serious enough, but there is another question of the greatest complexity with which it is becoming more and more interrelated, thereby producing a wider grouping of Powers and a considerable extension of the inflammable area. I refer to the frontier settlements in Central Europe, where it must be admitted that grave injustices have been inflicted on certain nations, while the whole Danubian area has been reduced to a deplorable economic state largely owing to numerous tariff barriers in what was previously a self-contained economic unit. When the peacemakers in Paris proceeded to break up the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy they reduced Austria to a pitiful plight by depriving her of her former industrial markets and sources of supply, leaving her as a top-heavy fragment separated from the other essential parts that went to make up the economic whole. The result has been lamentable, and no visitor to Vienna can fail to be deeply moved by the almost desperate condition of this once proud home of the Hapsburgs. In these circumstances of despair it is only natural that the Austrians should look for help in the direction of their kinsmen in Germany. But if Austria is suffering very seriously on the economic side, she has also lost heavily in territory and manpower. The South Tyrol has gone to Italy, with 250,000 Germans, as well as Trieste, Istria, the Cherso Islands, and Zara; Galicia

has been absorbed in the new Poland; Bohemia, Moravia, and a part of Silesia, with 3,100,000 Germans, have been incorporated in Czechoslovakia; Carniola, Dalmatia, and the condominium of Bosnia-Herzegovina now form part of Yugoslavia; and the Bukowina has been given to Roumania. Austria has never clamoured for lost territory, but she has a right to economic conditions in which to live, and this she is being denied. But I think it must be admitted that the heaviest burden has fallen on Hungary, who has been reduced to less than one-third of her former size, with the loss of over 3,000,000 Hungarians. Croatia and a part of the Banat, with 500,000 Hungarians, were ceded to Yugoslavia; the whole of Slovakia and what is now known as Carpathian Ruthenia (all former Hungary north of the Danube), with 750,000 Hungarians, have gone to Czechoslovakia; Transylvania with its neighbouring districts and part of the Banat, with 1,700,000 Hungarians, have been handed over to Roumania; the Burgenland (close to Vienna), with 65,000 Hungarians, is now Austrian; and the port of Fiume has been given to Italy. The effect of these territorial exchanges has been to cause the gravest discontent both within the frontiers of Hungary and among the Hungarian minorities in the succession States, and this is accentuated by resulting economic difficulties in an essentially agricultural country as well as by the hardships due to the actual frontier delimitations.[1] Hence we have in Central Europe one group of States, containing powerful forces in varying degrees of dissatisfaction, but enjoying the full friendship and support of France as champion of the *status quo*, as well as the more indirect support of a progressive Poland supremely interested in the preservation of her newly acquired status; and an opposing group, highly discontented and looking towards Germany for a lead in putting forward claims for treaty revision. I have it on good authority in Budapest that the Hungarians regard the opening of the Corridor question by Germany as the most suitable opportunity for raising these claims, and it is here that the Central European question has a direct relationship to the serious situation arising out of German-Polish relations.

In Central Europe, as in the question of the Polish Corridor, there is a vigorous determination of one side to keep what it has got, and of the other to regain what it has lost, but there is some hope to be derived from the fact that the whole situation is not quite so completely 'frozen up' as it is further north. While the best observers and most competent authorities now frankly admit that there is no solution at present for the Corridor question, this can hardly be said of the question with which we are

[1] Many Hungarian minorities in the succession States are only separated from Hungary by the frontier line.

now dealing. Efforts have been made at the Stresa Conference, and will continue to be made, to improve the economic conditions prevailing in the Danubian area; and there are signs, though not very pronounced, of a guarded willingness on the part of prominent Hungarians and Czechoslovaks to come to some agreement on minor political matters, with which the economic situation is closely related. In a long conversation with President Masaryk, I gained a firm impression that the President had considerable sympathy for the Hungarians and their difficulties, and that certain modifications in the frontier lines were quite possible if the Hungarians were to change their tactics. But while President Masaryk is far too big a man to take the short view on such a question, this does not necessarily imply that his far-sightedness is shared by those who conduct the foreign affairs of his country. Similarly, when I later discussed the matter with Count Karolyi, then Hungarian Foreign Minister, I was impressed with his reasonable attitude towards this question of vital importance to Hungary, and felt that he did not share the view of many Hungarians who say that, although no offer has ever been made, they could not accept the return of the wholly Magyar territories as a final settlement, contending that this can only be achieved by the return of all the territories of the former Hungary. I quote these two instances as showing a certain attitude of conciliation which one would look for in vain in either Germany or Poland. But there is another factor which makes the Central European situation less solidified, and this arises out of the internal condition of Yugoslavia. While considerable and praiseworthy efforts have been made to realise the conception of Yugoslav unity, both past and current events seem to point to uncertainty as to the future of that nation's component parts, and the attitude of the Croats towards the Central Government in Belgrade may possibly lead to some degree of dismemberment, thereby setting an example to minorities, constituent or otherwise, to seek satisfaction on the principle of self-determination. Should the League of Nations receive and recognise a claim from the Croats, such action might in itself considerably relieve the tension in that part of Europe. Yet the prospect of finding an equitable solution of this complex question of frontiers, race distribution, and economic relationships seems just as remote as that of drawing the winning horse in the Irish Sweepstake.

There is, however, one possibility of improving the situation, political as well as economic, on the assumption that prosperity tends to obscure political grievances, and this is to be found in the restoration of the former self-supporting economic unit comprising the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy by means of a customs union, which might well follow a customs agreement

between industrial Austria and agricultural Hungary. A glance at the map shows that geographically and economically all the Danube countries form one entity, which practically coincides with the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; and there is, therefore, good reason to think that a beginning on these lines might have far-reaching consequences of a political as well as of an economic nature. As the late Dr. Schober, Austrian Federal Chancellor, once said to me at the Ballplatz in Vienna, 'the German peoples of Austria, Bohemia and Moravia are like the Siamese twins; they live together, but separated they die.' To a large extent the same may also be said of the other component parts of the Danubian economic unit. Although Dr. Schober fully realised that, as far as the break-up of the monarchy was concerned, what had been done could not be undone, he was strongly of the opinion that much could be done to mend matters on the economic side, while politically he favoured in Central Europe one strong Power incorporating small nations on a federal basis with local autonomy.

It is perhaps appropriate here to mention an important factor to which I have already referred. Hungary is in sympathy and friendship with a progressive and over-populated Italy, whose political orientation is also showing a distinct tendency in the direction of Berlin. It is only by changes in the *status quo* that Italy can hope to expand in Europe, and her line of interest clearly lies to the east of the Adriatic, where changed circumstances might well offer opportunities for the efforts of a most industrious race backed by the powerful influence of Signor Mussolini. This completes the rather painful-looking picture of a *bloc* of States stretching from the Baltic to the Mediterranean in favour of treaty revision, flanked on either side by two parts of another group strongly supporting the *status quo*. It is difficult to visualise a situation more appropriately arranged for a convulsive orgy of bloodshed in the future.

Meanwhile, peace is being maintained by force—in other words, by the defence of the *status quo* by the strong and well-equipped armed forces of France, Poland, and the Little Entente; and Mr. Lloyd George has estimated that France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia alone could produce a combined force of 8,000,000 trained and fully armed men at a week's notice. But, although an enforced peace is most certainly better than war, force must be replaced by justice before any prospect of permanence can be expected. At present Europe has all the makings of another war with the exception of anything approaching equality of armaments, and in this respect the military superiority of the *status quo* Powers is the greatest safeguard of peace in Europe to-day. It is, therefore, essential that, before pressing for the reduction of

French and other armaments towards the level of the restricted Powers, some better safeguard should be found to take their place; for, as things are at present, equality of armaments is all that is needed to set Europe off into a convulsion of hostilities in the near future. The better safeguard to which I refer is only to be found in justice, and wise were the words of Mr. Churchill when he said: 'To bring about anything like equality of armaments, supposing it was within our power to do it, which happily it was not, while the grievances remained unredressed, would be almost to appoint a day for another European war, and to fix it as if it were a prize fight.' While it is to be hoped that the Disarmament Conference will produce satisfactory results in the right direction, there is only one means of approaching a general levelling of armaments without incurring the utmost danger to peace. This consists of reopening such questions as lie at the root of Europe's political disease, with a view to establishing justice as a basis for real security, and making the Continent's component parts capable of co-operating for the general benefit of all and the individual benefit of each. When this has been achieved, and only then, will it be safe to work for equality of armaments as a fundamental step towards general disarmament. The only form of security that can be of any real and lasting value is such as is the natural outcome of a considerable degree of satisfaction and content, which is only attainable in post-war Europe by boldly facing the issue of treaty revision, and making a determined attempt to remove the cancer that is undermining the whole system of political peace and economic prosperity. Neither the League Covenant nor the Kellogg Pact, nor any other piece of paper, can possibly produce a degree of security approaching that resulting from the redress of grievances. It, therefore, cannot be too strongly urged that the principle of reopening the question of the *status quo* should be accepted as that on which disarmament must ultimately depend, and that the necessary machinery for this purpose should be set up at Geneva to replace the use of force as a means of obtaining satisfaction. The alternatives to this course are: (1) to press for disarmament to the level of Germany and the former Central Powers, and literally to ask for war by express delivery, or (2) to let things drift as they are and tempt Germany to rearm. The only difference between these alternatives is that in the second case, the war would be more costly and the bloodshed would be greater. But such a course as I have proposed cannot succeed without a readiness to make sacrifices, which would be repaid many times over in years to come. Even the Americans if they saw Europe following such a course, might feel more inclined to make a contribution towards world recovery.

E. W. Polson Newman.

PERSIA AND THE OIL DISPUTE

On November 30 the world learned with astonishment that the Persian Government had, on November 27, informed the Anglo-Persian Oil Company that its concession, which has still thirty years to run, had been cancelled, ostensibly as a preliminary step towards placing relations between the Government and the company on a basis more satisfactory to the former than that provided by the agreement of 1901. In justification of this decision the Persian Government explained that the concession granted in 1901 by Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah to Mr. W. K. D'Arcy suffered from defects and shortcomings and was not in accord with national interests, and that the Persian Government 'could not legally and logically consider itself bound to the provisions of a concession granted prior to the establishment of a constitutional *régime*, having regard to the manner in which the concession was obtained and granted at that time.' The Note referred to recent discussions with the company, which had caused the Persian Government to lose hope of modifying the agreement by negotiation, and concluded by an expression of willingness 'in principle' to grant a new concession, should the Anglo-Persian Oil Company be willing, 'contrary to the past,' to safeguard Persian interests. The text of the Note was made public in Tehran the same evening; during the following days public rejoicings in the capital were officially ordered and the D'Arcy Concession burned in effigy. A few days later a Bill was passed through all its stages by Parliament, giving legislative force in Persia to the Shah's expressed will.

The company, in its reply, formally denied that the terms of their concession failed to protect Persian interests or that, even were this the case, the Government had the right to cancel a concession accepted by successive Persian Governments before and after the establishment of the Persian constitutional *régime* in 1909. The company claimed that they had always sought to meet the views and needs of the Persian Government, and that failure to reach a friendly agreement was due to no want of effort or good-will on their part.

This letter was followed by a Note, presented by the British

Minister at Tehran to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which the action of the Persian Government in cancelling the concession was described as an inadmissible breach of its terms of which His Majesty's Government took a most serious view. The immediate withdrawal of the notification was demanded, coupled with an intimation that, whilst it was still hoped that the Persian Government would be at pains to reach an amicable settlement, His Majesty's Government would not hesitate, if occasion arose, to take all legitimate measures to protect their just and indisputable interests and would not tolerate any damage to or interference with the company's business activities in Persia.

The Persian Government, in its reply, did not claim that the company had committed any breach of the terms of the concession of 1901 (in which case it could have gone to arbitration in accordance with the stipulations of the concession); it reiterated that the concession was not in accord with Persian interests, and that cancellation was therefore justified. It disclaimed all responsibility for damage consequent on cancellation, and repeated that it was open to the company to negotiate a new concession.

In reply to this Note His Majesty's Government declared themselves unable to admit the validity of a 'unilateral cancellation' of the concession, which they described as 'a confiscatory measure and a clear breach of international law.' It was further stated that, should the notification of cancellation not be withdrawn by December 15, His Majesty's Government would refer the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague as a matter of urgency under the Optional Clause, with a request to that Court to indicate under Article 41 of the statute the provisional measures which ought to be taken to safeguard their rights. The Note concluded with a reiterated warning that the Persian Government would be held fully responsible for any damage to or interference with the company's business, or any failure to afford them adequate protection. Should such damage occur, His Majesty's Government would regard themselves as entitled to take all such steps for the company's protection as the situation might demand.

Thus ended the first round of one of the most remarkable exchanges of diplomatic asperities of recent years. It synchronised, perhaps significantly, with the oral refusal of the Soviet Government to offer the apology demanded by Sir John Simon for the allegation made by the *Izvestia* that the British Foreign Office 'had instructed its agents to furnish documents, real or bogus, establishing the connexion between the Soviet Government and the Communist International.' In the circumstances, it is

not unnatural that the sole message of congratulation on his action that has reached the Shah (fresh from his first inspection on the Persian Gulf of the six armed launches of Italian construction, which constitute the Persian navy) originated in Moscow. Adversity makes strange bedfellows.

The second round in the controversy was opened by the Persian Government, which refused to admit that a dispute between it and a commercial company was justiciable by the Hague Court, refused to admit any contingent liability for damage to the company's interests, and adduced nine reasons in support of its decision to cancel the concession. The Note stated that it could not start negotiations with the company owing to the threatening action of the British Government, which it was bringing to the notice of the Council of the League of Nations.

The refusal of the Persian Government to accept the jurisdiction of the Hague Court might have been, and perhaps was, anticipated, for when Persia in September last ratified the Optional Clause she did so subject to reservations so ample as to exclude practically every possible subject of dispute.[1] The claim, however, that a dispute with a commercial company is not justiciable is, of course, without foundation. Such cases have repeatedly been before the Court. There is, however, much to be said in favour of the machinery of Article 15 of the Covenant, to which the British Government has now had recourse. It will be necessary for the League to appoint a competent neutral commission to investigate the whole question *ex æquo et bono*, and it is unlikely that it will confine itself to the purely juridical aspects, on which alone the Hague Court could have pronounced judgment.

The nine reasons for cancellation given by the Persian Government in their last note were:

(1) The original concession was obtained under pressure.
(2) The amount of royalty paid has been unfairly calculated.

[1] Ratification was subject to 'Reciprocity in any disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or facts relating directly or indirectly to the application of treaties or conventions accepted by Persia and subsequent to the ratification of this declaration, with the exception of:

(a) Disputes relating to the territorial status of Persia, including those concerning the rights of sovereignty of Persia over its islands and ports;
(b) Disputes in regard to which the Parties have agreed or shall agree to have recourse to some other method of peaceful settlement;
(c) Disputes with regard to questions which, by international law, fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of Persia.

The Persian Government further reserves the right to require that proceedings of the Court shall be suspended in respect of any dispute which has been submitted to the Council of the League of Nations.'

(3) Persians not permitted to check the accounts.

(4) Royalty not paid during the war.

(5) The company has refused to pay income tax.

(6) The company has spent money in other parts of the world to the detriment of Persian interests.

(7) The cost of refined products in Persia is excessive.

(8) The company has not developed the Persian oilfield fully, while fields outside Persia have been developed.

(9) The company refused to send a representative to negotiate last summer.

Only the briefest comment can be made here on this presentation of the Persian Government's case.

Item (1), which can scarcely be intended seriously, is dealt with elsewhere in this article.

Items (2), (3), and (4) were fully dealt with in 1920 in a settlement—to which reference is made elsewhere—concluded with the company by the Financial Adviser to the Persian Government, which accepted a round sum of £1,000,000 in respect of certain claims. The manner of calculation of royalty was settled and the accounts are checked by the very eminent British firm of auditors employed by the Persian Government for the purpose.

Item (5) is a question of interpretation of the original concession and a proper subject for arbitration thereunder, or for amicable settlement.

Items (6) and (8) involve large questions of policy which deserve to be fully explored: the oil business is, above all others, international in scope. To secure a market for Persian petroleum products in competition with the great oilfields of the American continent, Russia, the Netherlands, East Indies, and Burmah involves participation and expenditure in many enterprises beyond the borders of Persia. Such matters may properly be discussed with the company, but afford no grounds for cancellation.

Item (7) is a vague complaint which carries no weight in Persian mercantile circles. A great mountain range shuts off Persia from the Persian oilfield and makes it difficult to market the products of Abadan on the plateau in competition with the oil of Baku. Yet since the company started to market oil in North Persia prices have fallen, and there has been no attempt by Russia, as in the famine year of 1924, to create a corner in petrol in emergencies.

Item (9) is fully dealt with in the company's circular to shareholders.

Before attempting to forecast further developments of this extraordinary dispute, we may profitably remind ourselves of some of the salient facts bearing on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's activities, stigmatised by the Persian Government as inconsistent with their legitimate interests.

After a fruitless search in many areas extending over some five years, at a cost of some hundreds of thousands of pounds, the owner of the original concession, Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, who had been joined at a later stage by Lord Strathcona and the Burmah Oil Company, struck oil at Masjid Sulaiman in May 1908.

In 1914, in the words of Mr. Winston Churchill,[2] ' an unbroken series of consequences conducted us to the Anglo-Persian Oil Convention.' The decision, taken in 1912, to rely upon oil as the main source of fuel for the Navy made it necessary on financial as well as strategical grounds to secure a reliable source of supply which was not controlled by foreign interests, in a region which was, strategically, reasonably safe from hostile action. On August 10, 1914, the Royal Assent was given to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Acquisition of Shares) Act, and for an initial investment of £2,000,000 of public money (subsequently increased to £7,500,000) the Government not only secured continuity and security in the supply of naval oil fuel, but acquired a controlling interest in the company.

In the course of the debate on the Bill in the House of Commons Mr. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, had in a prophetic moment declared that the development of this field ' would make the Persian Government strong and the tribesmen tame. How else,' he asked, ' is the country to progress, except by the development of its resources and the gradual civilisation of distant provinces—at any rate, it is a perfectly healthy, legitimate and moral process.' The process had, in fact, already begun, and this corner of south-west Persia was enjoying a peace to which its inhabitants had long been strangers.

During these years, and so long as the Great War cast its shadow over the world, the Government in Tehran remained contentedly aloof from participation in the development of the most distant and inhospitable corner of the Persian Empire. It was, in fact, unable to exercise more than nominal control, nor, indeed, was there any urgent need to do so. The gross revenues received were small, the net revenues larger than at present, for it cost nothing to collect them. The local tribal leaders saw to it that order was maintained, and, except on one occasion, when the Turks crossed the frontier and cut the pipe line, no untoward incident had ever arisen of sufficient gravity to interrupt for a single day the normal activities of the company.

During the war the daily production of Persian oil was quadrupled—partly to meet military and naval needs, partly because in 1914 the company had barely got into its stride. After the war production increased at the same rate from over 1,000,000 tons in 1919 to over 6,000,000 tons in 1931, yet twice this quantity

[2] *The World Crisis*, i., p. 132.

could without difficulty have been produced but for the deliberate decision of the company in the interests of its shareholders and royalty owners, not less than of the world at large, not to be a party to the orgy of over-production that has within a few years reduced the oil industry of the United States from prosperity to something approaching penury. It will be generally realised that development on the scale achieved is not ascribable solely to the wealth of the oilfields. The actual production of oil at the well head is a simple process. To sell this oil profitably in the world's market has demanded technical, financial, and commercial skill in markets in every corner of the world, which have been provided by British energy and, to a great extent, by British finance.

For the first years from 1909 to 1916 no dividends were paid (a fact sometimes forgotten by Persian publicists). The shareholders who had cast their bread upon unknown waters had to wait for long before it returned to them. Then, after providing for the dividends on preference shares, the ordinary shares paid dividends in successive years of 6 per cent., 8 per cent., 10 per cent., 20 per cent., 20 per cent., 20 per cent., 10 per cent., 10 per cent., 12½ per cent., 12½ per cent., 12½ per cent., 7½ per cent., 12½ per cent., 20 per cent., 15 per cent., 10 per cent.

The royalty payments to the Persian Government did not follow quite the same course. For the first seven years, 1913–1919, they amounted to £1,326,000; for the next seven years, £4,476,000, rising from £470,000 in 1920 to over £1,000,000 in 1926; for the last seven years, nearly £5,500,000—or a total of some £11,750,000 sterling. For 1931, however, the royalty payments came only to some £300,000, as compared with an average of over £1,000,000 for the five previous years. The plain fact was that profits had fallen and royalties could only follow the same course. The Persian Government, not having established a Royalty Equalisation Fund, and having moreover established in London a reserve of some £4,000,000 sterling as a preliminary to the establishment of the currency system of the country on the gold standard, felt aggrieved. The budget was, however, unaffected, as royalty payments have been excluded therefrom and kept apart as a currency stabilisation reserve. The blow fell at a very inconvenient moment, for Persia has suffered not less than other countries from the economic maladies that afflict the world. More than half her trade has normally been with her northern neighbour, and Soviet systems of trade are one-sided. Export trade with Europe, never considerable, has tended to decline partly owing to tariffs and exchange restrictions, but mainly owing to the fact that the quality of Persian exports of dried fruit, nuts, etc., has not improved so rapidly as that of other

countries. The carpet industry suffered from a sudden increase of American and other tariffs; even the opium industry, much the largest single source of national wealth, has suffered from disturbances in China, whither (*viâ* Vladivostok) the bulk of the opium crop is destined. The Persian Government was, indeed, forewarned of the impending heavy fall in profits and therefore of royalty payments, but it refused to believe that such forebodings were justified. The Shah allowed his resentment at the vicissitudes of fortune, and his well-known penchant for forceful and dramatic gestures, to get the better of his judgment, with the result we all know.

So much for the facts: in fairness to the parties to the dispute, some further observations are now called for on the allegations made in the published documents. The Persian Government originally claimed the right to cancel the concession on the following grounds:

(1) It was granted prior to the establishment of a constitutional *régime*;

(2) Having regard to the manner in which the concession was obtained and granted at the time (*i.e.*, in 1901),

(3) That neither the terms of the concession, nor the operations thereunder of the company, protect the interests of Persia, but, on the contrary, endanger them; and

(4) That the Persian Government has lost hope of safeguarding its interests by means of negotiation with the company.

As to (1), the concession, which was for sixty years, was granted some eight years before the establishment of parliamentary government, after lengthy negotiations conducted with the existing monarchical Government through the Prime Minister of the day, who countersigned the document, as did the Shah himself and two other Ministers. Not only did the concession arouse no hostile criticism at the time (it was published at once), such as arose in 1872 against the Reuter concession, but it was at no time seriously criticised in the years following the grant of a Constitution and the establishment of Parliament. But for the overt support of Great Britain, the constitutional movement in Persia would have been stifled at birth by Muhammad Ali Shah, and the leading constitutionalists would have met their death at the hands of the public executioner. A curious commentary upon the constitutional aspect of the Persian Government's Note is that one of those leaders was the present Persian Minister of Finance, Saiyid Hasan Takizadeh, of Tabriz, under whose signature the cancellation of the concession was notified to the company. His life was saved by the intervention of the British Legation.[3] He

[3] The facts are set forth in papers presented to Parliament in 1909 (Cd. 4581), from which the following is an extract:

Mr. Marling to Sir E. Grey, July 15, 1908. . . . Towards 9 o'clock Major

has survived to act as Finance Minister to an even more despotic, if more able, monarch. Muhammad Ali Shah bitterly resented this step and protested to King Edward, whose reply merits reproduction here:

> I have received your Majesty's telegram of 26th instant. 'I have no interest nor desire to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of your country, which I hope you will govern as a constitutional Sovereign with justice and humanity. Nobody has been invited to take refuge in my Legation at Tehran, and although certain of your subjects have sought refuge there in fear of their lives, your Majesty is well aware that it is not the custom of your country to refuse asylum to refugees who are not guilty of crime. Those that are already in my Legation will leave on satisfactory guarantees being given.' The statement in your Majesty's telegram that my Chargé d'Affaires has invited mischief-makers to the Legation is the direct contrary of the truth, for he has done everything consistent with the recognized customs of Persia to discourage all persons from taking refuge there. The conduct of your troops in surrounding my Legation and arresting those who came out of it is an indignity which cannot be tolerated and unless steps are immediately taken to put an end to this situation, I and my Government will be reluctantly compelled to take measures to vindicate the honour of my flag.

King Edward's telegram put an end to Muhammad Ali Shah's hopes, and the constitutionalists, strong in the knowledge that they enjoyed British good-will and support, ignored Russian threats and eventually established parliamentary forms of government, which still, in an attenuated and shadowy form, exist under the present monarch.

The claim that a change in the form of government of a country justifies the repudiation of contracts previously concluded in due legal form has become familiar to us of recent years by reason of its adoption by the Bolsheviks. It has never been acted on by Persia, nor by Turkey in similar circumstances, nor was it put forward in China or Japan, nor even in Egypt, where spendthrift Khedives had loaded the country with unremunerative debts. Indeed, outside Russia the only Governments that have successfully made such a claim are certain of the Southern States of the United States of America, which, after the 'War of Libera-

Stokes received a message from Taki Zadé, the famous Tabreez Deputy, whose fearless and, at all events so far as public utterances are concerned, moderate advocacy of the constitutional movement have made him an object of mortal hatred to the Shah, that he and two or three friends desired to take refuge in the Legation, as they were being hunted down by the troops and momentarily expected to be captured, and unless received they would inevitably be put to death. Major Stokes replied in accordance with instructions, and very shortly afterwards Taki Zadé and six others, including the editor of the *Habl-ul-Matin* and the sub-editors of the *Musavat* and the *Sur-i-Israfil*, presented themselves at the main gate of the Legation and were admitted. There is not the smallest question that had they been refused at least three, and very probably more, of the party would have shared the fate of Jehangir Khan and Malek-el-Mutakellimin, who were strangled without trial very early the following morning.'

tion,[3] repudiated certain debts, legally incurred, for the most part in this country. A concession granted under the present *régime* might well, on this reasoning, be repudiated in ten years' time or less, on the ground that at the time it was made the Persian nation was, notoriously, under a despotic *régime* and not free to exercise freedom of choice, whether in Parliament or otherwise.

As to the manner in which the concession was obtained and granted at the time, it is difficult to suggest what may be in the mind of the Persian Government. The prime movers in the matter were not British, but Persian subjects—the Kitabji brothers, who had for several years been seeking to interest European capital in the mineral potentialities of Persia. Their interest was well known; their efforts had met with contumely at home and indifference abroad till they came in contact with Mr. D'Arcy.

Sir Arthur Hardinge has in his published recollections[4] added some picturesque details as to the grant of the concession, but, as I have stated elsewhere,[5] they are not borne out by such documentary evidence as is available, nor are they consistent with statements made by the Kitabji brothers. It is a simple fact, which can easily be verified, that no oil concession granted before 1901 in any part of the world carried so high a royalty as that represented by 16 per cent. of the net profits. It is equally true that few concessions granted in the greal oil-producing States of South America, in the Netherlands, East Indies, in Burmah, Trinidad or in Egypt, carry, in practice, such a considerable royalty, though the method of calculation is different. As to the claim that neither the terms of the concession nor the action thereunder of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company protect the interests of Persia, it is legitimate, without taking sides, to observe that the complaint is worded in terms so vague as to defy analysis. The terms of the concession itself include a provision for arbitration, of which the Persian Government has never availed itself. A very detailed agreement providing for the calculation of net profits was concluded in 1920 by the late Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith, in his capacity as Financial Adviser to the Persian Government. His record as a British civil servant and his Treasury training create a strong presumption that the agreement was in no way unfavourable to the Government. Many British officials have been seconded to serve foreign Governments: whether in Egypt or Siam, Turkey or China, their competence, their devotion to the interests of the country they served, and their probity has never been questioned by the most ardent nationalists in those countries.

[4] *A Diplomatist in the East*, 1930.
[5] *Persia*, 1932, p. 90.

As to the actions and policy of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in Persia, it is other pens than mine to pronounce a final verdic both on the spirit that has animated the company's officials anc as to the result. I am one of the few Englishmen living who was on the spot when oil was first struck in 1908 and have seen the present organisation grow from modest beginnings to maturity. I cannot, therefore, speak with complete detachment. Within few months of the discovery of oil a new spirit was abroad in this long derelict province. Men who had never tended anythin but a date tree, or used any tool but a spade or a sickle, became proficient pump-men or riveters. Shepherds from the high Zagros and from Azarbaijan were erecting drilling rigs and handling heavy machinery over roads the like of which had not been seen since Sasanian days.

A competent and impartial Afghan traveller, Sirdar Iqbal A Shah, whose writings are not tinged with any pro-European o pro-British bias, recorded his impressions on the subject a few years ago in the following terms[6]:

To mould to the exigencies of modern industry such refractory materia as is presented by the gaunt, fierce Bakhtiari tribesmen was the task t which the company set itself from the first. The process was slow, b gained strength from year to year. Gradually a community began t settle on the spot, and problems of health and housing came to the fore Local craftsmen, finding employment regular, began to settle, their son were caught young and were employed at the paternal trade, but wit modern lathes and simple machine tools.

At first, men would come for six months, and then return, the noma to his flocks, the townsman to his city to avoid the sultry summer months From a medical point of view the custom was deplorable, for the townsme were apt to return re-infected with the diseases of which they had bee cured. . . . Men began to settle down and to bring their families. Housin became necessary, and water supply. Free medical treatment was give to all and prejudices overcome in a measure astonishing to those wh like myself, have some knowledge of the ignorance and superstition which the population of many great Indian cities are sunk—cities th have been for a century in touch with higher European practice.

Nor has education been neglected. Persian youths have been provide with scholarships to enable them to pursue specific courses of science Europe.

Primary schools have been opened, in suitable buildings, for boys of th age of eight upwards. The teachers are Persians and the boys learn the mother tongue. It is possible to exaggerate the extent and value of the activities: they are important rather as an indication of the spirit which are being attacked the problems arising from the sudden grow of a community of some twenty thousand wage-earners, in the midst of a agricultural community.

It is an astonishing fact that some eighty thousand souls, or nearly on person in four, in the province of Khuzistan look solely for their dail

[6] *Westward to Mecca*, 1928.

bread to the oil industry, and probably nearly as many more are indirectly dependent thereon, apart from those Persians in Government employ whose salaries, if they knew it, depend on the oil royalties.

Persians are being brought year by year into positions of great responsibility in the industry: motor transport has been made possible, by cheap petrol, from one end of Persia to the other, and the whole fabric of government in Persia has been strengthened by the steady stream of royalty payments totalling in all over £11,000,000 sterling. Remembering that the military budget in Persia is 44 per cent. of the total revenues, it is not too much to say that the Shah, who came into power as a military dictator, owes his position to the prosperity of the oil industry.

A great commercial concern has been built up without detriment to the greater interests of the nation as a whole, without damage to the agricultural and pastoral community, and without danger to the health or *morale* of the labour forces. It is an example paralleled, albeit on a small scale, only by the Iraq Petroleum Company, and on a smaller scale still by the Palestine Potash Corporation, of conscious planning on a great scale of industrial development on lines consistent with the social progress of the national unit of which it is a part.

There remains the question as to whether the company, in the recent negotiations with the Persian Government, disclosed in the circular of December 6 to shareholders, have handled the situation wisely, meeting the Persian Government's desires as far as it was possible to do so. Were they, in particular, justified in countering a request for the presence of their authorised representatives at Tehran by a suggestion that the venue should be in London? On this and cognate aspects of the negotiations some criticism has appeared. The writer can only record his personal view, first, that, on the facts stated, the management of the company did in fact adopt the attitude best calculated to forward the desired negotiations; and, secondly, that the main object of the Persian Government was to avoid a decision on the very complicated royalty agreement drafted by their plenipotentiary in the hope that they might eventually secure a complete and drastic revision on lines previously discussed and more easily comprehended by the Shah, the Cabinet, and Parliament.

It seems, further, very clear that as recently as last November the Persian Cabinet as a whole had not even contemplated cancellation, and that the decision to do so was reached by the Shah, who (notwithstanding 'the constitutional *régime*') is in effect a dictator exercising full control in every department of State. Experience of dictators in action, whether in the Irish Free State or in Afghanistan, in Spain or in South America, does not suggest that they find it easy to withdraw from un-

tenable positions, nor even to accept arbitration under existing statutes.

At the instance of Great Britain, the matter will have been considered by the Council of the League of Nations under the presidency of Mr. de Valera before these lines appear in print, and a commission of experts will doubtless have been appointed to inquire into the question at issue. Much will depend upon the terms of reference, but we may anticipate with complete confidence that during its deliberations the Persian Government will on its part maintain the *status quo* on the oilfields, whence, directly and indirectly, nearly half the inhabitants of a great province (not to mention several thousand British and British Indian subjects) derive their sole livelihood.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company spend over £1,000,000 annually in Persia on wages and local purchases of articles that would not otherwise find an export market, quite apart from royalties, and any serious interference with the company's activities is likely to have a decisive and disastrous effect on the stability of Persia. In this inescapable fact is perhaps the best guarantee of a reasonable settlement on lines indicated by the Council of the League.

Public rejoicings in Tehran, and the publication of the diplomatic Notes exchanged, have made a delicate situation more difficult. In the present temper of the world in general, and of Persia and other somewhat self-conscious States in particular, to refer a dispute of this kind to the League of Nations is no more than the first step towards a solution.

The underlying motives of the Persian Government have yet to be made clear to the world: Persia, on the other hand, has yet to realise that, in the rapidly changing circumstances of the petroleum industry, the products of her oilfields will be less and less easily marketable except within the framework of comprehensive agreements and with the aid of the distributing organisations of the great oil groups.

Failing an eleventh-hour agreement between the parties, which seems in present circumstances unlikely, the best hope for the future in this case appears to lie in an agreement between the parties to invite the Council of the League to decide the case *ex æquo et bono*. By this procedure the scope of the inquiry would indeed be widened, but the moral authority of the verdict would clearly be greatly strengthened, and the friendly and intimate relations that have existed in the past between the company and the Persian Government might soon be restored on an even firmer basis than before.

A. T. WILSON.

THE DEFEAT OF HUGENBERG

General von Schleicher has succeeded Herr von Papen as Chancellor of Germany; his Cabinet consists largely of Papen's colleagues, and cannot certainly command a majority in the Reichstag. The change is therefore likely to be misinterpreted, especially in other countries, as of little importance; a general, it is said, has succeeded a cavalry officer, and the restored Junkerdom remains in command. The more one examines the situation, however, the clearer it becomes that a very real change has occurred, a change which may be described as the defeat of Hugenberg, only six months after he seemed to have witnessed his long-advocated restoration of the pre-war *régime*, and less than a month after his party, the German Nationalists, increased its poll from 5·9 to 8·7 per cent. of the electorate in the General Election of November 6. The defeat of Hugenberg means that somehow trade unionism, at a moment when its economic circumstances are wretched and its political leaders humiliated, has nevertheless defeated its deadliest enemy—the spirit of Big Industry in pre-war Germany.

The wholesale industrialisation of Germany coincided with the early years of the Hohenzollern empire; industrialists had clamoured for German unity, and unity furthered their success. They approved of the military machine, which appeared to enhance Germany's prestige, and therefore her capacity to grasp economic opportunities; they were anxious to rank among the captains of Germany, and the industrial system was in a way linked to the military machine, which was itself in close relation to the system of Prussian land tenure. The principle of the strike seemed to these men as unjustifiable as mutiny, and trade unionism was equivalent to desertion. In 1869 a right of association among town workers had been admitted by the North German Confederation, and therefore inherited by the German Empire in 1871, but Bismarck's anti-Socialist laws nullified its effect until 1890. Eschewing factory legislation, Bismarck constructed his great insurance system, but this again was in the manner of the general's care for his soldiers, of the Junker for his peasants, and wholly antagonistic to the spirit of trade unionism.

Yet, despite the added strength the employers derived from their *Kartell* organisation, the trade union movement grew to extraordinary dimensions, and, at last, in the miners' strike of 1905, was able to make some impression upon its enemies. A perfectly representative confession of faith made two years later by one of the unrepentant industrialists deserves to be quoted. A director of the chief Saxon union of employers at an annual meeting of that body in 1907 said:

> The military state of Germany owes the supremacy of its industry in the world-market to the discipline asserted in its factories. The authority of the employer is a precious possession, to defend which is our most immediate duty. We shall never yield when it is a question of a test of power on the part of the workmen, where the authority of the employer might be menaced. For this authority is not merely the possession of the individual, it is a common good. Modern economic development has brought to the front the estate of the industrialists, who have superseded the old feudal landed proprietors as employers. Upon the efficiency of the industrialists depend the nation's power and progress. It is the duty of the industrialists not merely to provide the increasing millions of the population with a livelihood, but it must primarily wage war against subversive endeavours in every form. Our battle against the trade unions is at the same time a battle against Social Democracy.

It should be remembered that already in 1907 Social Democracy, the political expression of trade unionism, was polling a third of the German electorate, and that it was able to extract a labour code, with some restriction of working hours, etc., from the Reichstag in 1908.

The militaristic attitude of German capitalism was a particularly Prussian thing; in the southern States of Bavaria, Baden, and Würtemburg the relation of capital to labour was something more gentle, in accordance with the more Western structure of South German society. Still in 1908 it was true to say 'that while the fewest strikes [*i.e.*, in proportion to the number of workpeople], and also the smallest strikes, occur in Germany, that country has the largest number of lock-outs, the number of which increased from 28 in 1899 to 51 in 1902, 96 in 1903, 132 in 1904, 263 in 1905 and 305 in 1906.'[1]

When in 1918 defeat abroad brought dethronement at home, the big industrialists suffered a perhaps deeper humiliation than the military and landed aristocracy; the direction of the State was handed over for more than a decade to men chosen by their own factory hands, and kept in power by Catholic connivance. A certain Prussian-Protestant fervour had entered into the bitter warfare waged by the Rhineland employers against their predominantly Catholic employees, whose opposition was

[1] W. H. Dawson, *Evolution of Modern Germany*. The translations of the industrialists' speeches also come from this.

attributed to the subversive influence of the Catholic priesthood, and this made the post-war Socialist-Centre coalition more exasperating for the industrial magnates. To their bitter resentment Hugenberg now gave expression; he succeeded in buying up much of the Press, especially in the provinces, and a large part of the film industry. It is important that English people should realise this military intenseness of the Capital-Labour struggle—in Prussia, at any rate. It cannot, moreover, be described in the too beautifully simple phrases of the Marxians. The German trade union movement was nurtured on Marxian doctrine, but except for the minority movement, which became first Spartacists and then the present Communist Party, it escaped a desire to hit back; it offered, perhaps, too perfect a repudiation of the military point of view. It has sometimes been said that the Social Democrats in the post-war decade were more concerned with giving the working classes a real bourgeois or civic consciousness, in the sense of a love of order rather than a desire for property, within the old social framework than with proletarianising the bourgeois elements in German society. If this was indeed their goal, their co-operation with the Catholic Centre, the 'toleration' for which they have been so much blamed, becomes intelligible. Whatever their professed dogmas, both Social Democrats and Catholics were attempting a liberal policy of conciliation—not individualistic in the Manchester tradition, but about as collectivist as Asquith and his colleagues of the 1908 Cabinet. Yes, they were bad haters, the Social Democrats, yet, in sympathising with them in the evil days the slump has brought particularly to them, it is only just to remember that their benevolence was tinged with too much anxiety—a subservience, pathetic in the rulers of a nation, to the men they had grown up to regard as their social superiors.

The vitality of peaceful Socialism ebbs and flows with prosperity. The Social Democrats had taken over the direction of the State in 1918 because the old Government had collapsed, and they, as its best organised opponents, were compelled to be its heirs. The inflation brought down their voters in the two elections of 1924, and its backwash contributed to the election of Hindenburg as President in 1925, an event now as important as the leniency of the Socialists to the reactionaries and their careless control of the War Office. The boom was already occurring, and the boom election of 1928 brought up the Socialist vote from 26 per cent. of the electorate in December 1924 to 29·8 per cent.—their record figure since the Communist split. But 1924–8 was only a mirage for Germany and German Socialism. The Socialists' success spurred on their enemies, at a time when the imminent slump would, in any case, undermine their defences. The old

ristocracy and its henchmen, the industrialists, have known
low to exploit the clemency of their foes by pouring their pensions
and their profits into the propaganda of Hugenberg and of the
nan he has often treated as a *protégé*, Hitler. The Socialist gains
1928 made it plain to the industrialists that they must definitely
nobilise the *élan* of Hitler's National Socialism on the side of
eaction. Before Hitler, the machinery of propaganda had never
een perfected, but the Nazi leaders were able and willing to
xploit every folly of the Peace Treaties, every evil of the slump,
terms of household prejudices; the most remorseless of them
l is Goebbels, the editor of the *Angriff*. But the peculiarly
rclonic success of Hitlerism, its growth from polling 2·6 per cent.
f the votes cast in 1928 to polling 37·1 per cent. in July 1932, may
e analysed as due primarily to three causes.

First, Hitler has known how to dress up as a political Messiah
rmbolising the Hegelian absolutism of the State, strangely
ttractive to the *frondeur* element in the German, as only an
nrealised aspiration can be. 'The Leader' must, in the last few
ears, have received a numerical record in human homage.
econdly, the inflation followed by the economic rationalisation
the boom period caused the proletarianisation of the major
art of the German middle class. They lost their reserve wealth in
22–4, and usually took refuge as '*Angestellten*' (shop assistants,
erks, etc.) in the host of large-scale distributive concerns which
orang up between 1924 and 1928. In the slump, the helpless-
ess of being economically proletarian has been brought home to
em—always by impoverishment, sometimes by unemployment.
itterly to resent their economic status because they clung to a
ourgeois' outlook was to become the devout adherent of
itler. Thirdly, big landowners, but especially Big Industry,
ve made an important, though not an altogether edifying,
ontribution to the Nazi movement—its money-bags. Now that
ugenberg and Hitler seem to have cut the ground from under
ch other's feet, this fact has a piquant interest. Heavy industry
as been most helpful to Hitler; Krupp's rival, Thyssen, has
en a notorious contributor. Less conspicuous, but perhaps
ore important, has been Kirdorf's behaviour. Emil Kirdorf, the
eat Westphalian industrialist, head of the Coal and Steel Syndi-
ates, is the perfect type of pre-war German industrial magnate.
the Mannheim Conference of the Association for Social Policy
September 1905 Kirdorf was invited to give an employer's reply
an indictment of the syndicates made by Professor Gustav
hmoller. His statement included the following remarks:

It is regrettable that our workpeople are able to change their positions
any time. An undertaking can only prosper if it has a stationary band
workers. I do not ask that legislation should come to our help, but we

must reserve to ourselves the right to take measures to check this frequent change of employment. The proposal has been made that all workpeople should be compelled to join organisations and that employers should be required to negotiate with these organisations. For myself, I would remark that I refuse to negotiate with any organisation whatever. I decline to negotiate either with the Social Democratic organisations or even with the so-called Christian organisations [Catholic], for I regard the Christian trade unions as far more dangerous than the Social Democratic. While the Social Democratic organisations at least say openly at what they are aiming, namely, the subversion of the present social order, the Christian unions fight under a false flag—they fight under the cloak of Christianity. They know well that the subversion desired by the Social Democrats cannot be brought about, so they seek to place capitalism under the domination of the clergy. I regret, too, that the State interferes at all in labour relationships.

In this same year of 1905, the year of the first Russian revolution, occurred the great miners' strike in Westphalia, in which the Kirdorf attitude proved too much for public opinion, and, indeed, for the Government too. The strike, therefore, ended in a virtual Labour success and the establishment of works' committees, and the employers were sufficiently uneasy to start a strike-breaking fund whose administration was put into Kirdorf's hands. In 1918 this man was compelled to become the subject of a Government dominated by the trade unions he so much despised. The immediately post-war period was regarded by many 'die-hards' as an obscene nightmare which would soon pass. Kirdorf, it seems, saved the fund from the inflation, and welcomed Hindenburg's Presidency and the imminent return of the good old days. But the Socialist poll in 1928, when Hermann Müller became Chancellor, shook his iron faith. His colleagues—among them his son-in-law, Hans Krüger, connected with the Gelsenkirchen works—pressed for the mobilisation of the upstart Hitler, who had declared himself the enemy of Marxian Socialism. At first, it is said, Kirdorf could not bring himself—not even in this crisis for capitalism—to patronise a group with the label of an '*Arbeiterpartei*.' Then Hitler was despatched to visit him, and it would be bold to guess whether Hitler's charm or Kirdorf's astuteness settled the matter, but there is reason to suppose that the Ruhr strike-breaking fund was put at the disposal of the National Socialists. It is obviously difficult to substantiate this story completely, but it certainly represents a typical incident. Heavy industry financed Hitler until the spring of 1932; in return Hitler's economist, Feder, condoned the productive capitalism of the iron and steel kings while reserving for the socialistic venom of his followers the financial capitalism which could be decried as Jewish: one is reminded of Bebel's remark that 'Anti-Semitism is the Socialism of the stupid.'

In 1932 the Kirdorfs thought to have their revenge for the reverses of 1905, 1918, and 1928. The Hitler movement, fortified by their contributions and by the distress and insecurity of the slump, grew to such dimensions as to menace the existence of the Republican *régime*. The generals and the big agrarians exploited the situation to seize power for themselves, and Big Industry backed them up with the old pre-war gesture. So on June 1 Franz von Papen was appointed Chancellor, and on July 20 he seized control of the Prussian administration, to the applause as much of the Hugenberg Press as of the monarchist old soldiers' organisation, the Stahlhelm. At once Papen began to denounce the Marxist corruption of the German State into a welfare institution, and claimed to be the herald of a social reorganisation based upon individualism ; to hear him was to be back at Mannheim in 1905. In September came the '*Wirtschaftsprogramm*,' a virtual subsidy to employers coupled with a repudiation of the wage safeguards incorporated in the Weimar Constitution of 1919.

Wrapped in the cloak of '*überparteilichkeit*,' the pre-war industrial magnates seemed to be back in the saddle. They had made skilful use of the Nazi movement ; they tried to buy it off with a few sops, but they excluded it from all real power, and they had no interest to continue to subsidise it. But if Hugenberg could cheat Hitler, Hitler could cheat back ; out of their quarrel arises the best hope for Germany to-day—the hope of reasonable compromise between moderate men. The Nazis were enraged by the littleness of their reward. They were freed now from the fetters of Kirdorf ; they brought out a thoroughly anti-capitalist programme in July, and in September dissociated themselves from the 'feudal' policy of wage reduction. With this elucidation of their tenets it has become accurate to describe about 75 per cent. of the voters of Germany as anti-capitalist—if one considers the July and the November elections. What was even more disastrous from the Hugenberg point of view, the November election gave a potential combination of Nazis and Communists a majority in the Reichstag at a time when Nazi workmen were actually co-operating with those very Communists to destroy whom the industrialists had previously paid Hitler so much. Sporadic but frequent Nazi-Communist strikes prevented the reduction of wages as decreed in the '*Wirtschaftsprogramm*.' The autumn has revealed that it is impossible, even to-day, when unemployment is unprecedented and the working class politically divided against itself, to enforce what Papen himself described in September as the last hope of the individual *entrepreneur*, the last blow that could ever be struck for Kirdorfism.

While Hugenberg's background is industrialist, it would be

absurd to identify him only with the leaders of industry. On the contrary, his attempt to shut his eyes to the passage of time has brought him of late years into closest touch with the big land-owning 'die-hards' of Germany, from among whom men of the Bismarck and Hindenburg type at least derive. These men still have the Kirdorf attitude to their labourers, and were able to shield them from all State aid until the eve of the war, when a Prussian labourer was still almost a serf unable to leave his master's employment. Unfortunately for Hugenberg and the 'die-hard' '*Weltanschauung*,' the Kirdorfs of the land and those of industry have fallen out among themselves. Before Germany had captured the world market for manufactured goods upon a sufficiently large scale, Bismarck could, in the famous tariff of 1879, win the applause of both great interests, for the industrialists were as glad to be protected from the competition of English heavy industry as the landowners from that of Russian and American corn. But after 1890 German industry had good reason to dislike protection which prevented potential buyers from being able to pay Germany in agricultural produce; the slump since 1929 has merely accentuated an inevitable struggle. The Papen Government promised agriculture a quota system to balance its gifts to industry, but was then told the promise would not balance, but nullify, these gifts. The Cabinet seemed hopelessly divided, and incurred ridicule for the difficulty it appeared to find in detecting the right course and following it with promptitude and authority. It is important to note that Schleicher always sided with Warmbold, Krosigk, and Neurath in opposing quotas.

Hugenberg was compelled to identify himself with the quota demand; he has now, therefore, lost the sympathy of all but the most intransigent and short-sighted industrialists, and has to some extent alienated the industrialist Deutsche Volkspartei. So Hugenberg has helped to discredit 'presidial' government, and the Papen plan has turned the Nazis into Socialist agitators and enormously increased the Communist vote. It is probably true to say that at the end of November 1932—when Hitler had again refused office on Hindenburg's terms and the reappointment of Papen seemed probable—Germany was nearer revolution than at any time since the Republic was established. The Ministers feared a general strike, and the practical solidarity of workers of differing political colour, the detestation of blacklegging shown in recent strikes, and the far from unfriendly attitude of the Berliners to their traffic strikers in November—although the official trade unions did not support them—suggested that a general strike was by no means foredoomed to failure. Bracht, Neurath, Popitz, and Krosigk, and at last Papen himself, compelled the President to give way and to appoint some more

conciliatory figure as Chancellor. The appointment of the man who controls, and will continue to control, the army might be misinterpreted as the last word of the 'die-hards,' the acceptance of the trade union challenge. On the contrary, General von Schleicher's first act was to send for the trade union leaders and to appeal for their co-operation.

It seems rash to make assertions about a man who is usually careful to avoid the definition of his views. How far the General regretted the Papen policy from the beginning, how far he has learnt by Papen's mistakes, one may never know. It appears a little as if Papen had shown a regrettable degree of personal initiative, far exceeding the expectation of those, like Schleicher, who were instrumental in his original appointment and at first blamed for his actions. There is no doubt that Schleicher is an opportunist with great personal charm, and with a distaste for pedantic formulations which accentuate differences of opinion. He is an old friend of the Crown Prince, he has hitherto managed to remain on good terms with the Nazis (who have long been raging at Papen); now he seems to have had a successful interview with Leipart, of the trade unions, and even with Otto Braun, the head of the evicted Prussian Ministry. In a faction-ridden country like Germany it is surely desirable that someone should take command who says frankly, 'Let us concentrate upon the thing we are all agreed upon—feeding the hungry—and let us stop quarrelling about everything else.' With this in view, quotas are to be dropped in exchange for a few extra customs duties, and on this condition alone has Papen's Minister of Agriculture, Baron von Braun, been reappointed. In a speech at Munich at the beginning of December, immediately after Schleicher's appointment, the president of the Reichsbank, Dr. Luther, implicitly condemning the policy of Papen, urged that the 700,000,000 marks his Government had intended to advance to employers taking on more hands at reduced wages should be devoted to the direct stimulation of employment by public works. The trade unions have urged the same course, and the creation of a new Minister for '*Arbeitsbeschaffung*' in Dr. Gereke suggests that this policy will indeed be adopted. In this way half the '*Wirtschaftsprogramm*,' whose fulfilment the aged President has for long identified with the authority of his office, will be tacitly withdrawn. The attempt to reduce wages has in any case failed, and it is significant that Papen's Minister of Labour, Dr. Hugo Schäffer, has been replaced by Dr. Syrup. Neither Gereke nor Syrup can be suspected of any leftward inclination: the former is associated with a policy of extending credits to rural district councils; the latter has been since July the commissioner in charge of voluntary labour service, the

method of employing men which Schleicher probably favours. But both are innocent of the association with Krupp which distinguished Schäffer. Thus Kirdorfism is again rebuffed.

It would be a mistake to suggest that Schleicher's appointment, with the less reactionary of Papen's colleagues in his Cabinet, is wholly reassuring to the impartial observer. For one thing, the still numerous Social Democratic Party announces its unwavering hostility in the party organ *Vorwärts*, although its less political colleagues of the trade unions and the Reichsbanner are prepared to meet Schleicher half-way. Secondly, the Communist Party, now greatly stimulated by the unpopularity of Papen, is implacable. Thirdly, a great many Hugenberg Nationalists have in the last six months replaced people of more liberal views in the Civil Service, and are therefore in a position to distort, in its execution, any legislation they dislike; they themselves will for a time be difficult to evict. The Reichstag is still capable—as it showed on December 7, for example—of such puerile rowdyism as to seem to justify dictatorial interference. Nor would the General hesitate on liberal grounds from sudden dissolution or less constitutional actions. Abroad, especially in France, his appointment was regarded with apprehension, which cannot, after his East Prussian outburst in September, be dismissed as wholly unintelligible. But it is really clear that German foreign policy must anyhow remain the same, and many Frenchmen seem to prefer the frank admission of the militarist tendencies of Germany by the identification of Chancellor with *Reichswehrminister* to the vagaries of a Papen. As a matter of fact, almost at the moment of his appointment, Schleicher is reported to have given a pretty example of his suavity in an inspired statement made to a French journalist in the Wilhelmstrasse. 'We mean to borrow your principles,' the Frenchman was told, 'for our policy abroad shall be described as Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—this time between the nations. The third will follow from the other two.'

From the point of view of all those who do not actually wish to precipitate revolution, the appointment of the new Chancellor is probably something to be cautiously welcomed in the interest of the German nation. Whether he was never so 'die-hard' as some of his colleagues in the last Cabinet, or whether he has learnt from the failure of the last six months—probably both are true—his is a good nomination. He typifies a break with Hugenberg and the Stahlhelm. Everywhere, whether caustically or enthusiastically, one hears him spoken of as 'Ein moderner, ein sozialer Mensch,' one who can see things as they are, accept these data and act upon them. Perhaps Kurt von Schleicher is the most representative figure to be found in

Germany in 1932. He is a soldier and his outlook is authoritarian, but the Germans—not only on the Right—applaud the authoritarian conception. He has had, moreover, unlike Papen, a continuous association with the political life of republican Germany. He probably wishes to incorporate the trade unions, like the labour service groups, in the army-like organisation of the State, as he contemplates it. But liberalism has all but vanished in contemporary Germany, and the basic principle of the Schleicher conception is not so different from that of the Marxians, and fundamentally opposed to those who resented any State interference between 'master and men.'

Germany is torn not only by industrial strife, but also by regional, federal, and religious divisions. The General is happily representative of the States of Germany, for his father's family was active in Bavaria in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and later in Hesse, Westphalia, and Brandenburg, where he himself was born ; his mother belonged to a Dantzig family. He has the advantage over Brüning and Papen of not being Catholic, a confession which is very unwelcome to the Protestant majority in Germany. The Germans of the north and east also resent the federalist policy of the Catholics, for Prussians and soldiers do not comprehend the nice adjustments of federal liberties. Schleicher indubitably has the soldier's taste for centralised command, which being single is easily obeyed. Yet the Centre Party is not unfriendly to Schleicher, and *Germania*, its organ, wishes to give him his chance. In return Centralist '*Reichreform*,' by threatening which Papen enraged the south, is to be entirely dropped for the time ; Baron von Gayl, the Minister most associated in the last Cabinet with such projects, has not been reappointed. Schleicher has, of course, become acting Premier of Prussia.

The December sessions of the Reichstag were certainly overshadowed by the danger of dissolution but the indignation of the Nazis at their exclusion from full-blooded authority has made them into the very constitutional opponents of the Government. The feeling as between Government and Reichstag was less bitter than at the time of the ludicrous dissolution of September 12, and the Reichstag adjourned until January in accordance with the known wishes of the Government. Before doing so, it passed an amnesty for political offenders, who have been overcrowding the prisons for the last month or so. It is thought that the Government will co-operate in this matter. Bracht, whose stern administration has incarcerated many of the prisoners now under consideration, remains acting Home Minister for Prussia and becomes Home Minister for the Reich. But the implication emerges that the extremely heavy sentences of the last few

months, especially after the Berlin traffic strike, are unlikely to be repeated. The Reichstag also condemned the second part of the Emergency Decree of September 4 (permitting the repudiation of wage contracts, etc.) by a large majority, only the Deutsche Volkspartei and the Hugenberg Nationalists voting in favour.

The 'die-hard' industrialists withdrew their money from the Nazi movement when they thought last June that they had destroyed their enemies. So Hitler lost all his well-to-do and his fair-weather friends, and now the Nazi boys must rattle money-boxes at all the street corners. But the movement still remains an important symptom of German post-war feeling. Schleicher is in a very much better position to conciliate it although Papen has driven it so far to the left, and his prospects depend in large measure upon whether he can really succeed in doing so. It has been clear for some time that Gregor Strasser, the ablest of the Hitlerites, was prepared to work with Schleicher in constructing a national front with the trade unions. But on December 9 the intransigent Nazis caused Strasser to be sent on three weeks' 'sick leave,' and, at the moment of writing, it is impossible to see how the situation will develop. If Schleicher succeeds in bringing in at least the Strasserites, he may indeed claim to represent the most important aspects of German life, and therefore to justify his appointment. Much depends upon what economic plans his advisers are able to bring forward. But with regard to the political future of Germany it is true to say that the republican form of government is in less danger than it was; just as the Third Republic, founded in defeat, has yet proved stable in France, the post-war republican form seems to divide Germany less than anything else. It is now most seriously threatened from the Left, not the Right, for the Papen *régime* revivified the Communist movement, which seemed to be fading away at the time of the Presidential elections last spring. The fact that 17 per cent. of the Germans have just voted Communist constitutes not the least of Schleicher's problems.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN.

REFLECTIONS ON RUSSIA[1]

Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie.—GOETHE.

IT is unfair to write about Russia at the present time without warning possible readers what they may expect. Too many books about Russia are defaced by blind hostility or fawning adulation. Personally, I strongly dislike many features of the Soviet *régime;* I believe that the assumptions of Marxian dialectic are perverse and for the most part false, and I do not believe that a tolerable society can be built on them; I think that, when every allowance is made for the difficulties faced by the Bolsheviks, many of their policies and acts have been wrong-headed, oppressive and cruel. But I am not conscious of any hostility to Russia; I believe that a prosperous Russia will increase the general well-being of mankind; and I rejoice that, after long centuries, a great nation is at last rousing itself from barbarous slumber, equipping itself with the knowledge and discipline and tools of civilised life, and holding out to future generations the promise of better things than past generations have known. My knowledge of Russia is limited; but it seems to me that to frame even a tentative judgment is in this case more important than to suspend all judgment while seeking complete knowledge. What is written here may only too easily be fragmentary, ill-formed, mistaken and biassed. I claim for it only one merit, that it represents an effort to understand.

The first Russian Five-Year Plan ended last year. The interest which the Plan has awakened is shown by the continuous stream of articles, pamphlets and books on Russia, and still more by the crowds of travellers who have journeyed thither from the most distant lands in order to see for themselves how far the intentions of Bolshevism have been fulfilled. Now that the Plan has drawn to a close, after fifty-two months of life, the outside world is taking stock of its results no less eagerly than the Bolsheviks. Has the

[1] *Soviet Russia and the World*, by Maurice Dobb (Sidgwick and Jackson Ltd.); *Russia*, by Hans von Eckhardt (Cape); *Bolshevism, Theory and Practice*, by Waldemar Gurian (Sheed and Ward); *An Economic History of Soviet Russia* (2 vols.), by Lancelot Lawton (Macmillan and Company); *The Only Way Out*, by Emile Burns (Martin Lawrence); *An Intelligent Man's Guide to World Chaos*, by G. D. H. Cole (Gollancz).

Five-Year Plan succeeded or has it failed? The answer, whatever it may be, is fraught with significance for the hopes and progress of mankind.

While everyone knows that the Five-Year Plan was designed to industrialise Russia, its other purposes are less generally understood. The Plan also aimed at collectivising Russian agriculture, at effecting a cultural revolution, and at making Russia self-sufficient. The collectivisation of agriculture would end the pernicious strip system, make possible the mechanisation of farming, and free the socialised towns from dependence for foodstuffs on the individualistic peasants. Industrialisation and collectivisation, by increasing the volume of manufactured and agricultural products available for immediate consumption, would create the material basis of a cultural revolution, which the new discipline and developed education required by factory production would complete. Self-sufficiency, though not necessary to any other part of the Plan, was regarded as essential to safeguard Socialist Russia from assumed capitalist hostility and possible attack.

On its industrial side the broad outlines of the Plan are simple. The Russians worked by analogy. In the great industrial nations the power, steel, and engineering industries occupy a central place. If Russia was to become industrialised, and if agriculture was to have the machines without which collective farms were impossible, her first task was therefore to create heavy industries capable of supporting the burdens which industrialisation would throw upon them. In the great industrial nations modern methods have reduced many productive processes to operations requiring little knowledge, short training, and slight skill. Russian emigrants to foreign countries were successful machine-minders; Russians at home ought therefore to mind machines no less successfully. When machine-minders had been trained and heavy industries constructed, it would be time enough to set about enlarging consumption goods industries along mass production lines. Russia's resources were too limited to do both jobs at once; so long as the heavy industries were undeveloped, the country depended on machines and supplies from abroad—and these might be stopped at any moment. First things first, therefore; and if in the meantime belts had to be tightened while coal mines were sunk and blast furnaces erected, the reward would be rich in the end. During the first Five-Year Plan Russia would create her heavy industries; foreign countries would supply the requisite technical knowledge and equipment; foreign experts would train Russian successors; and payment would be made by exporting whatever foreigners would buy—in the main, wheat, timber and oil.

This industrial programme has been largely carried out in spite of tremendous obstacles. It is still too early to make a detailed appreciation of the Russian accomplishments, but, even with the limited information now available, there can be no doubt that electrification schemes have been completed, mines mechanised, iron and steel plants built, tractor, motor car and agricultural machinery factories erected. Dnieprostroi, with its dam, its hydro-electric station, its industrial city in the making; the tractor works at Kharkov, Stalingrad and Cheliabinsk; the agricultural machinery factory at Rostov; the re-equipped coal mines of the Donetz Basin; the motor works in Moscow and at Nijni-Novgorod; the great chemical works at Berezniki; the vast metallurgical complex, comprising iron ore and coal mines, blast furnaces and steel-making plant, at Magnetogorsk and Kuznetsk, in Western Siberia,—these and scores of other enterprises have been created during the past four years, often out of nothing: their existence is testified to by numerous foreign eyewitnesses; to some extent they work. It is certain that the Five-Year Plan has disappointed many hopes; but it is equally certain that many of its projects have been translated from paper into concrete and brick and steel.

On the agricultural side the Plan has also succeeded in part. The 'socialisation' of agriculture meant the development of so-called technical crops, the creation of State farms, and the collectivisation of peasant holdings. Technical crops comprise such products as cotton and tea, sugar and *tau-saghi* (a rubber substitute). The area devoted to them has been greatly enlarged: tea and *tau-saghi* are said to have done well; cotton is being grown in sufficient volume to satisfy most of Russia's domestic needs; only sugar has failed. State farms now cover some 30,000,000 acres—roughly, the area of the whole of England, without Wales or Scotland. These vast domains (the largest sprawling over 600,000 acres or more, the size of Dorset or Derbyshire), often carved out of virgin steppe, are worked by thousands of labourers with the aid of agricultural machines of all kinds. The speed of collectivisation has outstripped the expectations of the original Plan. Some 60 per cent. of all peasant holdings have been brought together in 'collectives' of different types, and *kulaks* (the most prosperous peasants) have been extensively 'liquidated.' Both on State farms and on collectives mechanisation has progressed apace, and some 150,000 tractors, together with much other machinery, are said to have been supplied, largely from Russian factories.

The difficulties encountered in the course of this work have been enormous. Transport is the first. Throughout the entire Five-Year Plan the Russians have suffered from inadequate

transport facilities by rail, by road, and by water. Russia has always been under-supplied with railways, whether measured by area, by population, or by the volume of traffic to be handled. After the World War, the civil war, and the revolution the condition of her permanent way and rolling stock was shocking. The permanent way is ballasted with earth or sand instead of with 'metal,' and the rails are light. Much of the rolling stock is old and in bad repair, and many of the locomotives still hauling trains belong to the prehistoric-monstrous age of railway engineering. In recent years a few major extensions have been built, of which *Turk-Sib* is the most important; some lines have been double-tracked, sidings have been enlarged, and a certain number of new locomotives and waggons have been added. Nevertheless, permanent way and rolling stock still remain poor; excessive loads often over-tax the locomotives' hauling power, and train speeds are consequently low. If the railways were carrying only the pre-war volume of traffic, conditions would be bad enough; as traffic has about doubled, the result is indescribably chaotic. The stations are packed with hordes of peasants, who camp there with all their possessions literally for days on end, until, perhaps after seventy-two hours of waiting, they can book tickets and catch their train. Even for privileged persons the purchase of a ticket is a lengthy and time-consuming task. When tickets are bought the traveller's troubles are only half over. Trains are almost always late in starting and are often hours behindhand in arriving. Trains supposed to go to one destination by one route not infrequently arrive at another destination or follow a different route. Some trains simply disappear. Waggons are frequently inadequate for their loads; breakdowns are common; delays in goods transport are universal and play havoc with production schedules; staffs are overworked and harassed. In view of the tremendous demands made upon them, the miracle, in all the circumstances, is, not that the railways work badly, but that they work at all.

Road and river transport do not materially relieve the railways. Russia still has hardly any motor cars, and her roads are few and bad. In the country they are often mere tracks stretching across the steppe from horizon to horizon, dusty and rough in summer, snow-covered in winter, bogs of mud during the spring thaws. Paved roads are rare even in the towns; improved roads are usually surfaced with rough stones; and the mileage of smooth asphalt or macadam roads is negligible. What motor cars, omnibuses, and lorries there are go pounding along, smashing down into potholes and bumping over the knobbly surface; and breakdowns are consequently common, particularly amongst the crudely made Russian vehicles. But to talk of Russia as 'motorised' is absurd. The ordinary means of road transport is

the horse and waggon; with important exceptions in parts of the country noted for their breeds, horses are diminutive beasts, little larger than Shetland ponies, which haul tiny loads at a snail's pace which has not quickened since the Tartar invasion. So far as river transport goes, the great arterial streams which flow through Central Russia carry a considerable volume of timber, oil, and grain; but river shipping is said to have deteriorated seriously since the war, and on the Volga half a dozen or more passenger boats used formerly to ply daily between Nijni-Novgorod and Astrakhan for every one that plies now.

Shortage of skilled labour has created even greater difficulties than bad transport. The Bolsheviks have tried to overcome this lack by utilising foreign specialists to the full and having them train Russian successors; by sending selected Russian workers to study foreign methods; by recruiting returned emigrants to the industries in which they worked while abroad; by enlisting, so far as possible, the aid of such technicians as survived from the old *régime*; and by intensively training able recruits for skilled and managerial posts. These efforts have certainly gone some way to supply the trained staff which modern industry needs. But the shortage of skilled men is still intense; and its consequences are to be seen in every factory as well as in the figures of aggregate output. Russian industry is extremely inefficient; average output is low. Competent foreign visitors say that in many plants three Russians are needed to do as much as one man abroad. Machines are often ill-treated through ignorance, and the life of precision tools is short. Vital details are frequently neglected, with the result, for example, that in splendidly equipped modern works heavy materials will be moved by hand instead of by the cranes which a little forethought would have provided. Work is usually very rough, and rejected parts rise to quite staggering proportions. Disorder and disorganisation are marked. Worked parts clutter the gangways and lie under benches for days on end. Materials, instead of being properly stored, will often be dumped or stacked out of doors, where they frequently rust and become unusable. Meanwhile, delays are common because parts do not arrive, or do not fit when they do arrive, or because tools get broken and 'spares' are not at hand or are out of condition. Troubles such as these can be seen by any traveller reasonably acquainted with the technique of factory operation; and that travellers do not invent them is proved by the bitter complaints about inefficiency which fill the Soviet Press and are repeated by the Soviet leaders. The result, of course, is low output, poor quality, high depreciation, and burdensome costs; and few Bolshevist industries, if any, are free from such difficulties.

Similar troubles have beset Russian agriculture, which, how-

ever, has also suffered from deeper-rooted, less tractable forces. On balance, indeed, bad transport and a lack of thoroughly trained agricultural experts skilled in the problems of large-scale farming have probably played a subordinate though contributory *rôle* to the evil consequences of fundamental mistakes in conception and execution. Thus the State farms—'grain factories,' as the Russians call them—were developed in the belief that land could be most economically worked in vast tracts by the intensive use of machines. But this notion overlooked a number of vital facts. In many parts of Russia wheeled tractors are often ineffective at important seasons owing to mud. Caterpillar tractors get round this difficulty; but most existing tractor plants are designed to produce wheeled tractors. Again, 'combines' (harvesters-*cum*-threshers) can only work efficiently when grain is free from weeds and dry. But Russian fields are filled with weeds at the present time, and rain often falls during the harvest, with the result that combines get choked and work badly. Capital charges are excessive because of natural limits to the possible use of costly machines throughout the year, and because of heavy expenditure on buildings and equipment needed to house thousands of labourers and their families. The problems of organising and transporting labour over such vast areas and ensuring a reasonable degree of efficiency have on the whole proved insuperable. Already many State farms have had to be broken up into far smaller units; and while large-scale farming will continue in Russia and, given reasonable efficiency in labour, equipment and direction, should in the long run produce satisfactory results, the present grandiose experiments cannot survive indefinitely in their existing form.

The tale of collective farms is even more unsatisfactory. Less than four years have seen 70,000,000 peasants uprooted from 14,000,000 holdings and swept into 200,000 collective units. The area affected covers some 150,000,000 acres. The imagination is crushed by the effort to vest such statistics with their human individual meaning. That this unparalleled agricultural revolution was not accomplished merely by gentle means needs no proving. In fact, many of the peasants torn from their own land were practically hunted by Communist officials into the new collectives. For such a transformation to be effected without evil consequences to the area sown or the yield of crops, the new organisation should have been most carefully planned in advance. Actually, the quite unexpected speed with which collectivisation was carried out took the Bolsheviks completely by surprise and seriously embarrassed them. Neither agricultural experts in sufficient numbers, nor tractors nor machinery, were available to cope with the flood. Meanwhile, the peasants, determined that their animals should not be collectivised, killed off their live-stock

by the hundreds of thousands. In some areas half the horses, three-quarters of the cattle and swine, and nine-tenths of the sheep were slaughtered; and, though over Russia as a whole the proportions may not be so high, the destruction of flocks and herds has created a problem insoluble except by time. Soviet officials are fond of boasting that the 'Bolshevist *tempo*' works miracles. But the Bolshevist *tempo* will not help here; and five years will be needed as a minimum before Russia's live-stock are restored to their pre-collectivisation level.

Even graver is the problem of motives. The individualism of the peasants was the rock on which Lenin feared that the Soviet order might founder. Has the mere creation of collective farms swept this individualism away and effected at a stroke the cultural revolution which co-operative enterprise on so vast a scale needs for success? Will the lazy and the energetic, the shiftless and the provident prove good yoke-fellows now that they have been collectivised? Is it a good thing that the *kulaks*, who, at all events since the war, accounted for some of the best biological stock in the Russian countryside, should now have been completely 'liquidated'? Will their qualities of leadership, their energy and their enterprise, be adequately replaced by the so-called 'experts,' many of them only half-trained, who have come from the towns to direct and instruct the *mujik?* How will the unequal rewards to different individuals for which the collective system provides, rewards varying according to the work and energy shown and the land and capital contributed, in fact affect the efficiency of an industry notoriously difficult to supervise? Will the poorest be contented at the slightly less impoverished state of their more favoured fellows? Will the better-to-do be satisfied that energy and industry receive their due reward and sloth and incompetency their due penalty? Time will show. But this year's short harvest, certainly hurt by bad weather, but just as certainly not due to bad weather alone, provides at least some foretaste of the answer.

Russia's agricultural and industrial difficulties are reflected in the current movement of her peoples and the intense shortage of goods—phenomena to which all observant travellers have this year borne witness. Not that the traveller sees nothing but difficulties. The surface of life under the Soviets resembles in many respects the surface of life elsewhere. The streets of Russian cities to-day are filled with people going about their ordinary business. Trams may be crowded and queues common; hours of incredibly patient waiting may be relieved by outbursts of excessively bad temper. But no *régime* can kill the natural human impulses which seek their outlet in gossip or laughter or love-making or play; and so in summer Russians with a day

off and the wherewithal spend their spare time such as other mortals do—in games or swimming or boating, or simply in sheer enjoyment of the sun. Mankind is not divided into two species, Russian and others; and people who go to Moscow to see 'Bolsheviks' all happy or all wretched merely indulge their imagination or their prejudices at the expense of their judgment. In Russia, as elsewhere, discontents and strains lie for the most part not on the surface but below it; and as a rule one must probe to find them.

No probing is needed, however, to discover the movement of people. Stations are crowded, trains packed, boats overflowing. The whole of Russia seems on the move; and vast numbers are in fact shifting from factory to factory, from city to city, from country to town. Why? To better themselves, is the euphemistic Bolshevist answer; to find conditions a little less worse than the last puts the same point more accurately. The Five-Year Plan has created an immense demand for labour. Collectivisation has weakened many ties which formerly bound peasants to the soil. But enterprises, new and old, suffer so severely from disorganisation, inadequate food supplies, and bad housing that after a short time multitudes of workers move off again in the hope that elsewhere rations may be less meagre and dwellings less crowded. The state in which thousands of Russians find themselves may be illustrated by conditions at Magnetogorsk, where it is credibly reported that workers, literally by scores of thousands, have no habitation except holes in the ground; and although, in fairness, reference must also be made to the clean and relatively excellent new flats which are found in Dnieprostroi, Leningrad and elsewhere, the weight of evidence goes to show that extreme overcrowding and all its attendant miseries are far more common, if not perhaps quite universal. In such conditions the migration of multitudes is naturally widespread and unavoidable.

The shortage of foodstuffs and ordinary goods for everyday consumption is intense, though perhaps less immediately obvious than the movement of people. On this subject foreign testimony and Soviet complaints support the observations of the casual traveller. Black bread, and not too much of that, is what most Russians live on; for although the ration cards entitle workers to prescribed amounts of other foodstuffs, in fact these are rarely obtainable. Clothing and boots are also short, and the most common drugs are almost unobtainable. Supplies, however, are not evenly spread, and some parts of Russia frequently fare better than others. Transport is a great hindrance, and owing to its defects there may, for example, be relative abundance of perishable summer crops in some districts hand in hand with extreme dearth elsewhere. On the whole, the shortage of goods for

immediate consumption has markedly increased during the four years of the Plan.

More important, however, than the uneven geographical spread of supplies is their unequal distribution as between groups of people. In their own way, Soviet arrangements for distributing goods constitute a striking achievement in social technique. Stripped of its complications, the system falls into three parts. In the first place, ration cards limit the quantity of goods which any individual is entitled to buy at low fixed prices. Next, no individual may purchase rationed goods at fixed prices anywhere except at an assigned shop or 'co-operative,' which is closed to everyone but its own members. Finally, all other purchases whatever can be made, if at all, only in the free market or at so-called *torgsins*, shops where payment must be made in gold or foreign exchange. In the free market and the *torgsin* shops—which in any case are not overstocked by Western standards—goods may cost five or ten times what they cost in co-operatives; and at such prices the poorly paid multitudes cannot afford to buy much. These arrangements, though obviously complex, have many merits in Bolshevist eyes; for by means of them all the limited supplies of many commodities can be directed to picked co-operatives, or selected areas. Social services, holidays in rest-houses and sanatoria, and similar privileges are allocated by the same discriminating methods. Needless to say, under this system those who are best off—though they cannot be called a 'class,' for 'class' is a word with Marxian overtones, and in Soviet Russia 'classes' have been pretty completely abolished—are the senior officials of the O.G.P.U. (the feared and efficient secret police), the Red Army, and the highest grade of Communist administrators. Other categories of workers fare more or less well according to the favour they enjoy at the hands of the Soviet *régime*; while at the bottom are the masses, whose ration cards may entitle them to goods which their co-operatives simply do not stock, and who must therefore take what they can get and be thankful. The system of communal meals in factory kitchens to some extent alleviates, though it by no means overcomes, the worst consequences of the general shortage.

It is easy for partisans on either side to say that the first Five-Year Plan has 'succeeded' or 'failed,' and, by judiciously selecting facts, to support their assertions up to a point. To make a balanced and critical appraisal is far more difficult. By what standards are the Plan and Bolshevism to be judged? If by the extent to which projects for creating fresh industries and constructing new enterprises have been carried out, then more has been done with the aid of expert foreign direction than might have been expected of a backward people. If by attainment or

non-attainment of the figures laid down in the Plan in its original or revised versions, then success and failure are mixed, for some industries have reached their planned output, other industries have exceeded it, and still others have fallen heavily behind. If operating efficiency and profitability are the tests, then failure is general and largely admitted by the Bolsheviks themselves. More important are other criteria. It is probable that the general condition of the masses of urban workers and peasants is no better to-day under the Bolsheviks than formerly under the Tsars, and may well be worse, since goods and food are shorter. It is certain that conditions are worse in the last year of the Five-Year Plan than during the later years of the New Economic Policy, when a larger proportion of Russia's productive resources were devoted to making articles for immediate consumption. It is equally certain that the average Russian standard of living is much lower in every respect than the average standard of living in any Western, industrial, so-called ' capitalistic ' country. Unless these comparisons are totally inaccurate, it is clear that, judged not as an instrument for building factories but as a means for ensuring material well-being to the people, the Five-Year Plan has not achieved quite the success which its more woolly-minded devotees claim for it.

The future may be brighter if the Bolsheviks can overcome their present difficulties. But this will be no easy task. The ' Dictatorship of the Proletariat,' like all other despotisms, rules by means of force. Force can be effective, however, only so long as its components remain consolidated and their combined strength exceeds the united power of hostile combinations. The O.G.P.U., the Red Army, and the Communist Party form the triune base of the Soviet *régime ;* the countryside and the towns represent the chief conflicting interests which must somehow be reconciled. Hitherto the *régime* has balanced these interests more or less successfully. At the outset Bolshevism brought peace to a war-weary people and satisfied the desire of a discontented peasantry for land. But the dogmas of Marxism imposed on the Soviets the further necessity of organising industrial production, while political requirements have compelled them to win and retain the support of the towns. So long as the peasants had their land, were not taxed beyond endurance, and were able to buy manufactured goods in comparatively reasonable quantities, the danger that small agricultural capitalism might destroy the *régime* by withholding foodstuffs from the town-dwellers was relatively slight, and the urban population could be wooed and won with the exiguous best, which is the maximum the Bolsheviks have ever been able to provide. If the Five-Year Plan had succeeded not merely in socialising the outward forms of

agriculture, but also in maintaining and enlarging agricultural output, the Soviets would have been freed from dependence on the goodwill of the peasants. In fact, the peasants, for years disgruntled by the shortage of manufactured goods and deprived by collectivisation of ownership in the land which they love, have now become seriously dissatisfied; their dissatisfaction is affecting agricultural output and is confronting the towns at last with the full perils of grave food shortage. Hitherto the Soviets have benefited the towns by squeezing the country. Now that it is imperative in the interests of future harvests to leave larger quantities of grain with the peasants and send them ampler supplies of manufactured goods as well, the towns must be squeezed in turn. That this development will create widespread discontent amongst the urban populations which have hitherto been the mainstay of the *régime* is obvious; it is only the outcome which remains obscure.

Profound urban discontent is not the only possibility in the present situation. The more fanatical foreign devotees of Soviet Russia are fond of claiming that Bolshevism has no historical precedents. That no exact parallel exists may be true; history does not repeat itself on a large scale. But to insist that the past contains nothing which is at all analogous to the Russian Revolution is mistaken. The Bolsheviks are not so original, nor are the pages of history so bare. The agrarian revolution which marked the first stages of Bolshevism resembles in many respects the early changes of the French Revolution; while the position of the Soviet *régime* to-day is similar in its fundamentals to the position of the emperors of post-Antonine Rome. In the Roman Empire at that time power depended on the goodwill of the legions, and above all of the prætorian guards. In Russia to-day the legions are the Red Army and the Communist Party, while the *rôle* of the prætorian guards is filled by the O.G.P.U. So long as these three elements favour the *régime* and its policy, the Soviet Government may reasonably regard itself as secure. But if dissatisfaction in the country and discontent in the towns should impregnate the party, the army, and the O.G.P.U.; if these organisations come to feel that their own livelihood, well-being, and safety are endangered by the policy currently pursued; if the disaffection which already exists in parts of the Red Army should become widespread; then the Bolshevik *régime* would face those internal foes before which many past Governments in Russia and elsewhere have perished.

It is so far beyond the power of foreign observers to calculate the probability of such developments that speculation about them is idle. It is clear, however, that the displacement of those now ruling and the abandonment of present policies would be tanta-

mount to a change of *régime*. Whether events like these would be made clear to the outside world, and whether they would connote that Bolshevism had finally failed, no outsider can possibly say at the present time. What alone is clear is that, if Bolshevism is to endure permanently, and if it is to succeed in bringing genuine well-being to Russia's growing millions, many things will have to be done very differently than they are done to-day, and many outstanding problems which will not yield to force will have to be solved.

Planning, though enormously advertised, need not be discussed at length, for it hardly amounts to more than large-scale budgeting which results in paper schemes that bear little or no relation to actual accomplishment. So far as the technique of national planning goes, the Russians still have practically everything to learn and scarcely anything to teach more complex societies. On the material side, however, the Bolsheviks will plainly have to slacken the pace of industrial development. The resources for the grandiose enterprises constructed under the Five-Year Plan have been obtained by depressing the current standard of living—above all, of the peasants, who still form at least three-quarters of the Russian population. Every new factory in Russia to-day has been built on the *mujik's* capacity to endure privation. So long as the proportion of Russia's total resources devoted to industrial development was small, the burden was tolerable. Four factors, however, have combined to swell this proportion. First, disorganisation and lack of skill make most Russian factories run at a real loss, which must somehow be made up. Secondly, because of the same ignorance and inefficiency, machines, tools and equipment depreciate at prodigious rates, and, if Russian factories are not to become mere useless shells, vast sums have to be spent on replacement. Next, the fraction of the country's productive resources devoted to such capital-consuming activities has increased rapidly and largely under the Five-Year Plan, with the result that a heavier burden has to be carried by producers of consumption goods, mainly peasants, whose numbers and proportion, however, have not been correspondingly maintained. Finally, the failure of agricultural output under collectivisation has gravely reduced the total stream of goods from which the resources required for industrial purposes must be taken. For all these reasons, the wherewithal to maintain the previous pace of industrial development is simply wanting, and the *tempo* of future advance will therefore have to be slackened.

This will not be wholly disadvantageous. For years to come Russia's principal industrial task must be the creation of a class of skilled workers, technicians, and administrators. To some

extent education has been speeded up and made more widespread—though at the same time its quality has been worsened. But hitherto the Bolsheviks have largely tried to replace skill by propaganda and enthusiasm. This attempt has naturally failed, as it was bound to fail. Good propaganda, it is true, will strengthen enthusiasm, and enthusiasm will break down many obstacles and carry many enterprises to success. But propaganda itself presents many problems which the Bolsheviks have by no means solved. Popular proverbs, minted by shrewd insight from the tough metal of experience, are true coins which deserve the wide currency they enjoy. The dreary Bolshevist slogans, on the other hand, compounded equally of jargon and journalese, are mere counters which sicken by repetition and in the end are universally disregarded. Probably most Soviet propaganda meets much the same fate. Unless Russians differ radically from other peoples, the Bolsheviks will have in future to revise drastically their methods of reaching and converting the masses if matters even of vital importance are not to be overlooked because of growing cynicism, boredom, and disbelief.

Enthusiasm, an invaluable instrument of social policy when rightly employed, is likewise dangerous when misused or overworked. That many Russians are enthusiastic supporters of the present *régime* cannot be questioned, though it is doubtful whether their numbers are quite so great as impressionable foreign travellers report when they return from a summer jaunt to Moscow and Leningrad. But enthusiasm is of three kinds—that which is based on childish inexperience which has never measured the difficulties of the world and accepts without question promises made from on high; that which is born of advantage, present or desired; and that which is founded on conviction. The fact that the Communist Party numbers fewer than 2,000,000 out of a total population of 165,000,000 suggests that the third kind of enthusiasm is limited. More common is the second kind. In Russia nearly every important career is closed to non-Communists, while to those professing the prevailing orthodoxy all careers—and numerous other advantages—are at present open. Even higher education is largely restricted to those whose belief is beyond doubt. What wonder, then, that enthusiasm—or its outward signs—is widespread amongst the intelligent? Still more common is enthusiasm of the first kind, and keen young Comsomols are undoubtedly numbered by their thousands. But such enthusiasm is a frail foundation for any State to build upon. When impossible material promises are lightly made, disillusionment is bound to follow in time; and if Newton's law of motion holds, if in this field also action and reaction are equal and opposite, then the greater the enthusiasm the more violent and dangerous the

disillusionment. If in the long run they are to succeed, the Bolsheviks must find other forces than enthusiasm to work with and build upon.

Still more fundamental and more important is the problem of motivation, now completely unsolved in Russia. Such a State as Bolshevist propaganda depicts could only exist if the individual motives which are man's heritage from Cain or the jungle can be duly subordinated to social motives. No such conquest of self has been achieved in Soviet Russia. The rare true believers and the childish enthusiasts apart, desire for personal advantage is as strong under Bolshevism as in the world outside, and as all-pervading. The only difference lies in the forms by which individual advantage is sought. Under 'capitalism' these forms are varied, and are largely, though not exclusively, associated with money. In Russia most things are distributed in accordance with status, and the higher grades of status in turn are closely connected with expressed belief. But individual advantage is sought just the same. At the bottom the masses want a bit more food or clothing or house room. At the top the struggle is for power. Most of the high Communist officials encountered by the traveller impress him as being, not *samurai*, but *Schiebers*—hard-faced men who look as though they had done well out of the Revolution.

In the Western world the problem of social motivation, though still deplorably far from being solved, has advanced from its sheerly jungle state by a long and painful process of development. Immensely important in that development has been the growth of a middle class in whom the fierceness of personal ambition has been tempered by social responsibility. In a modern industrial civilisation, where high professional standards, education, and the habit of disciplined, socially considered action are needed to navigate the complex swift-flowing currents of contemporary life, a middle class is indispensable, essential alike to material well-being and to the spiritual health on which material well-being ultimately depends. If Soviet Russia is to become a successful industrial nation, the Bolsheviks will have to create the conditions in which a middle class can develop and allow it to grow. Already, indeed, the inverted snobbism which elevates manual toil above all other social values is giving way before the intricate realities which demand educated intelligence for their solution. Already technicians and administrators are becoming more numerous and more important; and, if production is to be continuous and efficient, they cannot be hounded down in the future as in the past. No man who fears that some night he may be dragged from his bed, secretly tried and summarily shot, can have a stake in the country or feel any enduring sense of responsibility towards

society. But without this sense the problem of social motivation cannot be solved.

Experience teaches that the fundamental conditions of a thriving society are security and freedom based on justice and order. Unless the Bolsheviks can learn this lesson, unless they can curb the egotism, whether wanton or doctrinaire, which has cankered and in the end destroyed all the autocracies and all the dictatorships known to history, the Soviets may indeed maintain their rule for a time, but they will never create a nation secure, civilised, disciplined and free. But more than Bolshevism is at stake in Russia. Elemental forces have been stirred up, until now an entire people is in travail. The Bolsheviks have signally failed, as they were bound to fail, in their efforts to take the kingdom of heaven by storm. But if by rousing Russia as none of her previous rulers have done the Bolsheviks have succeeded in opening their countrymen's eyes to the vision of a better life than Russians have previously known, then the agony, oppression, and terror of the past fifteen years may not have been endured wholly in vain.

JULES MENKEN.

ANGLO-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

THE tension in Anglo-American relations over the war debt question is one of the most unhappy by-products of the present sinister world situation. And this tension need not have developed. The crisis has not resulted from a clash of real interests, but simply from ignorance. In America public opinion has not been educated to face the issue; it has been beguiled and betrayed—first, by the irresponsible popular Press, and secondly, by politicians who have lacked the courage to oppose the sophistries of that Press. And in England public opinion has not been kept aware either of the real American case against cancellation or of the success with which the cheap Press has popularised its quite imaginary case. Out of all this ignorance there has come a situation that threatens to impair Anglo-American friendship.

If democratic control of foreign affairs is to produce anything but bitterness and war, it is clear that the general public must not be allowed to depend for its information upon frightened politicians and the sensational Press. In the case of England and America, where the bases of friendship and understanding are secure, the difficulty could be met by the creation of a bureau for spreading accurate information on questions that affect the relations of the two countries. Such a bureau should be financed half from America and half from England, and the information that it sponsors should be underwritten by a board of English and American publicists. Thus neither public would have an excuse for believing that the facts were being juggled for partisan purposes. Existing organisations, such as the English-Speaking Union, are of limited utility, since they provide chiefly for social intercourse, and for an exchange of compliments between Englishmen and Americans who already have kindly feelings toward one another. What is needed is publicity for the facts, which, if they were known, would remove almost every present source of tension between the two countries.

The problem of the war debts is the most obvious example of the way in which hard feelings could be alleviated by knowledge. The need for debt cancellation (or for an impossibly radical

eduction of the American tariff) has become so clear to people iving on this side of the Atlantic that there is a tendency to nterpret the American attitude as mere avarice or churlishness. No belief could be less just; for the American public, when it is not misinformed, is generous to the point of sentimentality. An Anglo-American information bureau could have been of service to the whole world by carrying on a double publicity campaign: n England a campaign to explain the true basis of the American ıttitude, and in America a campaign to explain the economic realities of the situation, so that action might be taken before ıction was forced by the facts themselves—in other words, before ıction was too late. The American attitude is easy to explain. On the one hand, domestic debtors are already agitating for the cancellation of mortgages and other obligations on a scale that would amount to a capital levy, and the public which is making his demand has never been instructed in the difference between omestic and foreign payments. On the other hand, politicians—partly through ignorance, but chiefly through a life-long habit f telling people what they wish to hear—have convinced the mericans of two things: first, that the present debt settlements how such amazing generosity on the part of the United States hat no one but a professional beggar could hope for anything nore beautiful; and secondly, that the chief debtor nations England and France) could easily pay America if they chose to lo so—and this in spite of the American tariff. The mass of the American public believes these two statements; but there is no eason why it should have been permitted to believe them, since hey are both thumping lies. During the war the astonishingly fficient British propaganda service convinced the Americans of ome of the most bizarre fairy tales that have ever been devised. To this day most of the population has not recovered from the lleged information which it then swallowed whole. If similar nergy and enthusiasm had recently been lavished on spreading he truth, the American populace would now realise, first, that enerosity had nothing to do with the debt settlements, since America simply took the normal business attitude that it was etter to settle for what seemed possible than to spoil the whole ame by holding out for an impractical 100 per cent.; and, econdly, that although it is quite true that France and England ould pay their present war debts, they could only do so in goods, that if America insists on payment she will very nearly have become a free trade nation. All this is understood by educated Americans, whose enthusiastic backing would have been given such a campaign as I have described, if there had existed n organisation with the funds and the personnel to start the ampaign. And, although much harm has already been done,

such an organisation could still be useful in preventing the further evil that may follow.

There is no doubt that the war debts will either be cancelled, or else reduced to an extent that is almost the equivalent of cancellation. The only question is, will they be cancelled by force of circumstances, against the will of a misinformed American public, with increasing rancour and recrimination on both sides, and hence with real danger to Anglo-American relations? Or will they be cancelled (or greatly reduced) as a result of Anglo-American co-operation made possible by an understanding of each other's problems, thus increasing the loyalty and cordiality of Anglo-American feelings? If the matter is left in the hands of politicians, and at the mercy of the great election fear which is the nightmare of modern Governments, the worst will happen. The best never 'happens'; its prerequisite is intelligent effort.

In addition to the thorny war debt problem, there are other, minor, causes of Anglo-American tension, all of which could be removed by an organisation for giving publicity to the facts. The process of naval disarmament is one such cause. At present, England and America both tend to feel that they are being overreached on the question of naval disarmament. In each country there is the fear that the other country, while adhering strictly to legal engagements, has found a way to make its navy the strongest in the world. The explanation for this state of mind is simple. In each country the naval propagandists, wishing to keep their Government up to the limit set by treaty, paint grisly pictures of the decrepitude of their own fleet and the malicious efficiency of the other country's fleet. If these identical laments from the British and American 'large navy' groups were printed in parallel columns, the humour of the situation would appeal to both publics. And if the true facts as to the British and American navies were made as inescapable as are the plaints of the 'patrioteers,' these plaints would lose their power for mischief. For whether the facts show that the two navies are roughly equal, or that one has a marked superiority over the other—in either case there would be a *détente* as soon as the authentic facts were given publicity. There is at present no desire, on the part of the English or the American public, to pay for a paramount navy. If the people of either country find that their navy is actually in this position, they will insist on retrenchments until the balance is adjusted. It is only the present state of ignorance that is dangerous, for it makes possible the suspicion of trickery on both sides, when in fact there is trickery on neither.

The Indian question is another minor source of Anglo-American irritation that could be banished by publishing some of the facts. It is well known that the British Government in India, and the

British Indian policy in general, get a lamentable Press in the United States. This is the result, not of maliciousness on the part of the Americans, but of the fact that over a period of years American correspondents in India have been patronised and antagonised by the English officials, while being cordially received by Mr. Gandhi and his followers. It is not a pleasant experience to be patronised by an English civil servant, who is something of an expert at the job, and newspaper men cannot be expected to respond with gratitude. Mr. Gandhi, on the other hand (although it is a quality unusual in a saint), has a genius for publicity. He is genial and communicative with reporters—provided they have never written anything against him in the past—and he is usually willing to be photographed eating quaint foods and wearing quaint garments. Naturally, he is given most-favoured treatment in American dispatches; and naturally the feeling has grown up in England that this must be a sign of American hostility to the English. It is nothing of the sort. An intelligent treatment of the American reporter in India, and a popularisation (under the auspices of such an Anglo-American bureau as I have suggested) of the facts as to England's problem and policy in India, would quickly clear the air. To be sure, before the English could publish the facts as to their Indian policy they would have to decide what that policy is. But that, in itself, would have utility.

The only serious matter of policy in regard to which England and America are historically opposed is the question of the freedom of the seas. Here the issue appears to be a clear one, and many people are of the opinion that it can only finally be resolved when one country or the other alters its policy. If this were the case, it would not be a problem on which a mere information bureau could be of assistance. Fortunately, however, this is not the case; for the issue of the freedom of the seas is in part an artificial issue. Clarity of definition and a slight knowledge of history remove most of its terrors; therefore, any agency that spreads abroad such clarity, and such knowledge, will lessen the danger of Anglo-American tension the next time the freedom of the seas becomes a disturbing problem. At such a time, if it occurs, the American jingo Press is likely to assert, 'We have fought three wars for this principle, and we will not desert it now.' Such a statement, with its suggestion of an age-long defence of a sacred principle, would have dangerous emotional appeal; and it would be well if the American public knew in advance that the statement is quite untrue. Of the three wars alluded to in this imaginary tirade (the Revolution, the War of 1812, and the World War), the one which would seem most obviously to have been fought for the freedom of the seas is the War of 1812, the alleged cause

of which was the restriction on American commerce imposed by the British Orders in Council. However, it has long been known to historians—though to strangely few members of the general public—that this is not the case. The war was unitedly opposed by the representatives of the commercial section of the country, which only asked that it be allowed to continue its profitable trade on whatever terms it could obtain by negotiation. New England, where American shipping was concentrated, almost seceded from the Union as a result of the declaration of war, her representatives and her Press referring to it disparagingly as 'Mr. Madison's War.' The real causes of the war were that a group of young politicians from the new West were angry at the English for interfering with their fur trade, and, comically enough, that these same westerners were land-hungry and wished to gobble up Canada. With pathetic optimism, in view of the ensuing campaigns, Henry Clay declared in Congress that the militia of Kentucky and Tennessee alone would be strong enough to conquer Canada. The British Orders in Council, impressments of American sailors, etc., were used to distract attention from this ingenious design. No word was said on any of these subjects in the peace that was signed in 1815.

This is but one example of the useful preventive work that could be done to protect both nations against future exploitation of the 'principle' of the freedom of the seas. It is, in fact, no principle at all; at times it has been a red herring, at other times a simple business proposition. And this is just as true from the English side as from the American. The more the Americans talk about the 'principle' involved, the more the English feel that they too, being in opposition, must be defending something sacred and lovely. Actually, of course, British opposition to the American 'principle' has come from the fact that in the past, having a paramount navy, the English have insisted on the convenient privilege of starving their enemies. In the future, when England's navy is no longer paramount and when she is in danger of submarine blockade herself, it is probable that the arguments in favour of the freedom of the seas will become more appealing. In any case, if the facts of history are popularised, and if the fundamental truth is kept in mind that there is no *principle* involved, but mere self-interest, there is little danger that this old dispute will again embitter Anglo-American relations. Two friendly nations can adjust conflicts of self-interest; but a 'principle' suggests a moral conflict, which is not soluble by simple reason.

It is possible that my next suggestion as to a use for an information bureau will sound fantastic; yet I believe it to be the most important point of all. Toward the end of his book on

England's crisis M. Siegfried (who may have had an unconsciously malicious motive) commented vividly on what he regards as the deep contempt of the Englishman for the American—a contempt that finds its most common expression in English sneers at the American language. If this contempt were indeed a fact, there would, of course, be no hope for Anglo-American co-operation. In my opinion, however, the contempt is mere appearance. M. Siegfried chose to take it for fact; but then he was obviously afraid of the immense benefit that England and America would both derive from close friendship. However, though I deny the fact of contempt, there is no question about the reality of the appearance. There are two chief reasons for this appearance. One is the normal, and apparently inevitable, superciliousness of the English; the other is their quite unnecessary, and easily dispelled, attitude of superiority toward the American language. About the Englishman's superciliousness nothing can be done. It has been his handicap, in his dealings with foreign peoples, throughout the centuries. Like certain kinds of birds, the Englishman is born to look supercilious. Fortunately, his charm and his civilised quality are so notable that it is easy to overlook this oddity—provided that one meets the Englishman on terms of equality, and not as a Colonial or a member of a subject race. It was English superciliousness toward Colonial officers during the French and Indian War that prepared the way for the American Revolution; but there is little danger that this trait will further embitter Anglo-American relations. The American, as he gains in self-confidence, is learning to be amused by it, rather than outraged.

The attitude of superiority toward the American language, however, is something that must be combated; and here again a little elementary information is the effective weapon. It is no exaggeration to say that sooner or later the English will have to choose between the friendship of America and whatever pleasure it is (presumably mild) which they gain from treating the American language as an unsuccessful attempt to speak the English of a B.B.C. announcer. If this almost universal English attitude were justified by the facts, it could hardly be eradicated, and the future for Anglo-American friendship would be dark. Since it is based, however, on nothing more formidable than ignorance, and since it is not in my opinion backed by a real hostility, a popularisation of the facts should dispel it. In outline, the facts are as follows: Stuart English was a West Germanic language with a large admixture of Romance words and influence. This language was transplanted to America by the English settlers, and from the seventeenth century to the twentieth this branch of the West Germanic language family has developed inde-

pendently on the two sides of the Atlantic, so that to-day there are considerable differences in vocabulary, grammar, and pronunciation. The differences would have been far greater except that the two languages have been held together by their common literary heritage, by the friendly intercourse which has usually existed between the two nations, by the influence of English-speaking immigrants into America, and by the standardising and stabilising effect of printing and of the ease of modern communication. Without these unifying influences the two languages might have grown so far apart by this time as to make Englishmen and Americans unable to understand one another. (For example, sixth-century Latin developed into the early forms of French, Spanish and Italian in less than three centuries.) The great similarity that still exists between English and American should be, and will in the future prove to be, a blessing. At the moment it is very nearly a curse, for it encourages the English to treat American as a dialect of their own tongue, and therefore to arouse a resentment which stands between the two nations.

A man's language is probably his most intimate possession, since it is the very form of his thoughts, and therefore of his whole conscious, spiritual life. Make fun of his language, and you are belittling him in an unforgivable way. Treat his language as a dialect, and you are patronising him past endurance—for the fundamental distinction between language and dialect is a social or political one; it has no scientific basis. The mere fact that the languages of England and America are called by the same name should not obscure the issue for people of even modest intelligence. The habit of treating them as two closely related languages (between which the problem of better or worse, right or wrong, need not arise) must be cultivated by the English, if they prefer American friendship to a rather tawdry form of self-assertion. And this habit could be inculcated by a little educational publicity, carried on by such a bureau as I have suggested.

At the time of the American Revolution, the loyalists—*i.e.*, the colonists who did not wish to break away from England—were probably a majority. They made up a large part of the educated, influential class; and they opposed secession, not simply out of conservatism, but because they dreamed of a British Empire of paramount strength and prestige, a stabilising influence throughout the world, membership in which would be a privilege and a source of pride. Lecky described the loyalists' dream as follows:

> The maintenance of one free, industrial, and pacific empire, comprising the whole English race, blending all that was most venerable in an ancient civilization with the redundant energies of a youthful society, and destined

in a few generations to outstrip every competitor and acquire an indisputable ascendancy in the globe, may have been a dream, but it was at least a noble one, and there were Americans who were prepared to make any personal sacrifices rather than assist in destroying it.

The dream, however, was destroyed by a series of events that seem more accidental and unnecessary than any other determining events in history. But recently, in a slightly altered form, the dream has returned to stir the minds of men in England and the United States. There is no longer thought of a united empire; that hope was killed forever by the incompetent servants —civil and military—of George III. But many of the benefits of such an empire might still be seized if England and the United States could learn, in the twentieth century, to co-operate cordially and loyally. There is the danger, however, that because such co-operation seems obviously desirable, and because there are so many sentimental reasons favouring it, the whole development may be left to chance. If the feeling grows up that close Anglo-American friendship is predestined, and therefore need not be intelligently forwarded, then from that moment Anglo-American friendship is threatened. For there are many petty forces making against such friendship. If these are understood they can be overcome; but if they are ignored they will triumph. There is sufficient evil in human nature, sufficient natural combativeness and hostility, to interfere with the drift toward friendliness of any two great commercial nations if that drift be permitted to go its own haphazard way. Those of us who actively desire an increasing Anglo-American co-operation must see to it that such original sin is not allowed to work its harm in this case. Ignorance and misunderstanding are natural to man, and can always be counted on to do their mischief sooner or later unless they are forestalled by steady, conscious effort.

HERBERT AGAR.

PROCEDURE IN THE COMMONS

It is now an accepted commonplace that social organisation has lagged far behind the inventive genius of scientists and engineers. The major ills of the day arise out of the growing gap between the achievements of science and the social adjustments they have made necessary. In this race the politicians are half a century behindhand; and thus it is that we are blessed with a knowledge of how to produce enough to provide material comfort for all our population, and cursed with an inability to apply that knowledge. Inevitably, therefore, those who seek progress by constitutional means rather than by revolution desire, as many of them have long desired, to speed up politics. How is this to be done? The very cause of the social and political lag is a matter of dispute. Varied explanations of it are offered. Is it the heavy conservatism of human nature, heavier than ever in these days because a completer system of democracy weights the scales against dynamic men? Is it some inherent vice in the race of politicians, men so often selected for eminence because of abounding capacity for talk rather than action? Or are we to blame the tool with which they have to work—Parliament, and in especial the House of Commons, an old-established mechanism rooted securely in national history and pride, intensely potent to defend its way and traditions against any change that amounts to more than an almost imperceptible growth and adjustment? In recent years all these factors of political life have been subjected to popular criticism—the House of Commons not least. And as we have now before us the Report of the Committee on House of Commons Procedure, consideration of this last factor is opportune.

To appreciate this Report, one must recall its origins, which take us back to the days of the Labour Government. For long the Labour Party had had no illusions about Parliament. They had wanted, however, to give institutions in their existing form every chance of proving adequate to their task, though many of them doubted whether that was possible. During 1929 they may perhaps be justly accused of showing themselves somewhat ineffective masters of the tool placed in their hands. It took them time to cast off long habits of opposition and to acquire the

governmental mind. Nevertheless, the party did its honest best to make the instrument work, and it steadily grew more dissatisfied with the result. In response to this growing discontent, in November 1930 the Government moved for the appointment of a Select Committee whose terms of reference were 'To consider the procedure in this House in regard to the conduct of public business and to suggest any changes that may seem desirable therein.' It was hoped that here at least was a beginning of movement, and a prospect of what was called rationalising the procedure of the House. But a Puckish fate presided over the destinies of the Committee. It met in December and proceeded to elect a chairman. Two candidates, however, were proposed for that office. Six votes were cast for each and the Committee stood adjourned. In February 1931, by a majority of one, the Labour Party nominee was defeated.

The Committee then got to business, and early came to the curious decision that proposals involving constitutional change were beyond its scope, but that it would hear evidence on them. Accordingly it examined witnesses at length during that spring and summer, including all the leading men of the House of Commons—such as Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin, Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, Austen Chamberlain, Herbert Samuel, and the Speaker—and important officials. Then came the cataclysm. Before the Committee was able to frame its Report, Parliament was dissolved. The Committee, however, was reconstituted in the new House, heard a few more witnesses, and has now presented its findings. But in what a different scene! The House in 1932 seems scarcely the same institution as the House in 1930. The parliamentary machine now purrs like a well-groomed Rolls-Royce. The Government gets all the legislation it needs, at whatever speed it chooses to go. Once more the House has proved, what war experience showed so plainly, that in a recognised emergency the Commons are capable of anything a Government may ask of them. The Report, of course, is coloured by this rosy atmosphere. Severely narrowed in its scope, it has no drastic reforms to suggest. Its proposals, indeed, are of little more than domestic concern to the House, and lack the public interest that is to be found in such abundance in the evidence tendered in very different circumstances. So far as it goes, the Report is the sound document one would expect from a chairman so rich in common-sense and political flair as Mr. Ernest Brown, confining himself within imposed limits. A number of technical improvements are suggested, including one to provide the Estimates Committee with an official staff of its own. The practical moral, however, to be drawn from it is that, if any major defects in the House exist, there is not much that can be

remedied merely by tinkering with procedure. The working of the House, the Report points out, depends really upon the wishes of M.P.'s. No conceivable procedure would enable the House to work smoothly if a large proportion of M.P.'s do not want it to. More decisive surgery is needed if major ills are to be cured.

Throughout the evidence it was clear that there was a preliminary question to which there was no agreed answer: What, in fact, is the task of Parliament? Lord Eustace Percy, whose memorandum contained, perhaps, the most solid volume of thought offered to the Committee, defined it roughly as follows:

> To focus public attention upon the important issues of the day, to grant taxation limited to the immediate needs of the Executive, to appropriate the public revenues to particular services, to press the Executive (in return for the taxes granted) for the redress of popular grievances, and to grant the Executive such additional legal powers as may be necessary for the efficient conduct of public administration.

It will be seen from this list that the House of Commons has to perform the functions of a 'general purposes' machine, and it has all the virtues and defects of that type. It resembles a machine required by a small farmer. It has at one time to cut turnips, at another to drag a plough, and at another to take the farmer and his pigs to market. If it does one of these to perfection, it will do the others only indifferently well. In this fact lies the essence of problems concerning the efficiency of the House. Is it possible to improve its efficiency for some purposes without seriously impairing its efficiency for others?

Let us consider a couple of its functions, the first and the last in Lord Eustace's list. To many members the focussing of public attention is its prime duty. 'At present,' says Mr. Winston Churchill, 'the most important thing for the House of Commons is to be the grand forum of debate.' On the floor of the House opinions floating vaguely in the public mind gather together and receive shape. From the clash of the flint and steel of debate the spark of truth may emerge. And since, in a democracy, the public must be informed of the issues, Parliament must provide a certain dramatic interest; otherwise the public will not attend. How is the House fulfilling this side of its work? It is clear from the evidence that there is a substantial body of opinion which holds that the House has not only positively deteriorated, but at the same time lost the public interest it used to command. Sir Austen Chamberlain, speaking with an experience of forty years' membership, says 'parliamentary debates to-day excite much less attention in the country' than in his early days. He suggests a variety of causes. In old days 'We were still largely discussing great political issues of a very broad and simple kind, such as Home Rule.' 'The questions were far less technical and far less com-

plicated than the kind of economic questions which are now occupying a larger and larger share of our attention.' Further, there is not the kind of picturesque clash of personalities which so often gave life to the politics of the past. Mr. Ramsay Muir was as emphatic as might be expected. The object before the Committee, in his view, is, 'To restore the declining efficiency, power, and prestige of Parliament. That this decline has taken place is not a matter of popular prejudice, but of demonstrable fact.' Lord Winterton, a member of twenty-six years' standing, asserts, 'That the House has lost both prestige and efficiency in the last generation is, I fear, the case'; and he offers us what consolation we can derive from his opinion—'there is abundant evidence that belief in the efficacy of democratically elective bodies has been progressively declining in every country.' The father of the House, Mr. Lloyd George, thinks 'There is a very great and growing disappointment with Parliament. . . . There is a growing feeling that Parliament is not coping with its task.' Lord Eustace Percy says, 'Of all its failures, its failure to focus public attention on important issues is the most signal.'

It will be noticed that some of these criticisms relate not only to the publicity function, but also to that of legislation. Here criticism, as was natural, arose from the Labour side. Mr. Tom Kennedy finds the House 'dilatory and ineffective in legislative output.' The I.L.P. witnesses say that its 'unsuitable machinery of procedure renders the activities of Opposition parties and private members largely ineffective except for the purpose of obstruction.' The common people, says Mr. Jowett, 'begin to despair of getting any results from Parliament.'

No one with experience of the House, who has read the evidence before the Committee, can doubt what, on the one hand, is the real cause of so much of this criticism as is justified, and what, on the other, is required to restore public interest in the House. The contrast noted by Sir Austen Chamberlain between the business transacted in the past and the business to be transacted in present times lies at the root of the matter. In the words of Mr. Jowett, its business to-day 'relates to every part of everyday life, and more is expected of Parliament now than fifty years ago.' 'It is now expected to work for a different purpose, and these expectations are being dashed to the ground.' This point is equally clear to competent outside observers not primarily concerned with the conduct of Parliament. The Macmillan Report on Finance and Industry contains these luminous sentences:

The most distinctive indication of the change of outlook of the Government of this country in recent times has been its growing pre-occupation, irrespective of Party, with the management of the life of the people. A

study of the Statute Book will show how profoundly the conception of the functions of Government has altered. Parliament finds itself increasingly engaged in legislation which has for its conscious aim the regulation of the day-to-day affairs of the community.

The accuracy of this statement of fact will not be denied. And it is equally true that there has been no alteration in the parliamentary machine by which it might reasonably be expected to respond to the modern demands made upon it. Both of the functions referred to have suffered. Parliament neither focusses attention, nor grapples with the details it is asked to consider, to the satisfaction of the public.

What is to be done about it? In the solution of this problem the Committee's Report offers no guidance, and the student is left to gather what he may from the evidence itself. Suggestions are not lacking there, and one in especial seems to demand further attention and examination—the Devolution scheme of Mr. Winston Churchill. He speaks with peculiar authority. For not only does he bring to the question a constructive and imaginative outlook all his own, but, also, he speaks with a variety of departmental experience no living statesman can rival. He sees a world of growing complexity in which the material conditions of mankind are dependent upon the proper handling of economic problems. He does not discover in the House of Commons, nor in the processes of democratic election, the assurance of competence or efficiency which should be brought to bear on these problems. In many cases, he finds, 'Parliament as constituted to-day is not in practice the right instrument and does not debate in the right atmosphere or under the right conditions for dispassionate non-party treatment of commercial and industrial questions.' So he seeks to create a body which will hammer out such questions and submit to Parliament an authoritative judgment on them. He suggests an 'economic Sub-Parliament' composed of 120 members; of whom 40 would be M.P.'s, and 80 business men, trade union representatives, or economic authorities (including not less than 20 Peers). 'The whole 120 would be chosen in proportion to the strength of parties in the House of Commons by the leaders of parties, it being the acknowledged duty of such leaders to consider first of all the character and efficiency of the new Assembly.' To this body all Bills dealing with trade and industry would stand referred after their second reading unless specially retained in Parliament. After consideration by the Sub-Parliament, the Bills would return to the House in which they originated, with the criticisms and recommendations of that body. Further, the Sub-Parliament itself might initiate inquiries or discussions upon any economic, commercial or financial question, and might present its report to

both Houses of Parliament. The supremacy of Parliament and the responsibility of the Executive are carefully preserved. In effect, this scheme would normally operate to relieve the House of the committee stage of a large class of Bills and also to make, as its author says, 'better provision for the discharge of the duties by employing more competent persons.'

It is unnecessary here to go into the details of this interesting proposal, which the reader can find elaborated in eleven pages of the evidence. He will probably agree that the scheme survived the examination to which it was then subjected. However that may be, the essential point to recognise is that, whatever the objections to the precise method, there can be no doubt that Mr. Winston Churchill is right in his advocacy of the principle of devolution. In that principle lies the exact remedy for the diagnosed maladies which arise from the fact that the House of Commons has continued year by year to attract to itself the detailed complexities of modern society. It suffers, as has been seen, from a distracting multiplicity of minor matters. If anything is wrong, it is the House that is to blame. Instead of providing a variety of courses down which electricity may run to earth, it has contrived that every storm shall discharge its lightning along a single conductor. This is not only evil in itself, because it has centred on to one body a volume of criticism that continues to grow larger and larger, but it has had the further injurious effect of distracting the House's attention from wider issues and preventing it from concentrating on high policy. Though devolution is the obvious remedy for both diseases, probably nothing short of the Premiership of Mr. Winston Churchill himself would provide the impetus necessary to carry through this particular proposal. It is at once too bold and too conservative—too conservative to be adopted by the kind of future progressive Government that might seek to embark on constitutional reform; too bold for the present generation of M.P.'s who are not themselves experiencing the normal measure of the evils under review. Moreover, devolution is never popular among M.P.'s. They tend to imitate the bad administrator who insists on handling everything himself, rather than allow others to do it better. The average M.P. likes to be able to raise in committee any point that affects his constituents, and he resents the idea of any curtailment of his liberty in that respect.

Yet it would be a mistake for the present Government, with its relative freedom from party pre-occupation, to ignore Mr. Winston Churchill's principle of devolution. The danger of leaving the matter alone is that deterioration of the House of Commons may prove a continuing process, and that remedies now appropriate may prove too late when the patient has been

allowed to get worse. Is there no alternative line of devolution on which progress is both possible and prudent? In answer to this, it is worth considering what remedial steps Parliament has already taken. It has proceeded in two directions. The first has been to clothe Ministers and other authorities with statutory power to expand, to elaborate and even to vary, Acts of Parliament by means of Rules and Orders. It will be remembered that this practice grew up almost unnoticed, and was living a merry life until it received a rude shock at the hands of Lord Hewart. 'The New Despotism' became the subject of examination by a Committee set up by the Lord Chancellor in 1929. Its Report, published this summer, is a masterly balancing of the advantages and disadvantages in this procedure, and its recommendations will doubtless in the main govern the future practice. Broadly, it commends this method of delegation, but subjects it to limitations. The method has come to stay. The need for it may grow. It may be increasingly necessary to pass skeleton Acts empowering departments to clothe them with flesh and blood as part of the duty of administering them. What the Committee demands is that the limits of the law-making power should be defined with precision and clarity in the statute that confers the power. It fetters the liberties of our old friend 'The Henry VIII. Clause,' by which a Minister, for the purpose of removing difficulties, could himself make amendments to an Act; and it condemns that most extreme of provisions which debarred the courts from questioning the legality of an Order. It is properly shocked at the type of clause which states that a Minister's confirmation of an Order 'shall be conclusive evidence . . . that the Order has been duly made and is within the power of this Act.' By way of illustration of possibilities, it recalls a sixteenth-century statute which provided for boiling the Bishop of Rochester's cook to death, and soberly speculates whether the Minister of Agriculture, acting under such a clause, could lawfully confirm an Order for boiling cooks made under the Small Holdings Act, 1908.

It is clear that this method of removing details from Parliament meets a real need, and, if properly controlled, is innocuous. It may well be that we shall develop it in the direction of setting up corporations with specific powers to make Orders in pursuance of their objects. It is, however, a method with limited elasticity, and it can only bring relief to the parliamentary machine within a small area.

A second device with far wider possibilities has been tried in the last dozen years—the method of Ecclesiastical Measures. The experiment is so recent that, though throughout the evidence before the Procedure Committee various witnesses make mention of it, their comments are those of people who had not examined,

and still less experienced, the practical working of the system. The Committee did a service to our knowledge of contemporary institutions by receiving evidence of what exactly the process is. The general effect of the evidence is perhaps most succinctly stated in a paragraph proposed for inclusion in the Committee's Report:

Occasional references were made to the procedure under the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, as providing a precedent for relieving Parliament of detailed consideration of some specialised field of legislation. The evidence received relating to the Ecclesiastical Committee made it clear that under this Act a substantial block of work had been withdrawn from Parliament without loss of ultimate parliamentary control, and had been satisfactorily dealt with in a number of Measures that could not otherwise have been passed into law.[1]

That this system has had an astonishing success in its short life is beyond doubt. It has enabled Church legislation to make an immense advance to meet modern needs. The pivot of the procedure rests in the Ecclesiastical Committee. This is a unique body occupying a position and charged with duties, unlike those of any other existing committee. It consists of 30 members—15 selected from the Lords by the Lord Chancellor and 15 by the Speaker from the Commons. It is appointed for the lifetime of a Parliament and has its own paid legal adviser. In its membership, especially in the case of the Peers, there is considerable continuity from one Parliament to another, so that it tends to acquire a specialist knowledge. Though without power to amend a measure submitted to it, in practice it secures amendment by informing the Legislative Committee of the Assembly that it cannot report favourably on some particular provision. As a body for the critical examination both of the principles and details of a legislative proposal it seems to be more efficient than any committee of the House that I have known. It makes careful reports on every Measure to each House, and on each House is thrown the ultimate responsibility for acceptance or rejection. While the great majority of Measures have in practice been accepted, those dealing with the Prayer Book were rejected after debates that certainly gave a momentary stimulus to the prestige of the Commons.

Now, is this procedure a good precedent for further devolution on analogous lines? That is a question to which no certain answer can be given without careful examination. The point to

[1] This paragraph was excluded from the Report by six votes to one. The refusal of the two Labour members to vote in favour of words, the accuracy of which was not disputed, calling attention to a case of successful devolution is an example of the repugnance often in the past shown by that party to procedure that assists business.

be elucidated is whether there is anything else at all similar to the ecclesiastical matters delegated to the Church Assembly and the Ecclesiastical Committee. Clearly Church affairs occupy a very special position. In the first place, Parliament is conscious of the limitations of its own capacity and authority to deal with them. In the second, no public money is involved. Church legislation deals with Church property, and not with 'moneys provided by Parliament.' Yet the fact that no other subject-matter would be in all respects similar is not a fatal objection to a widening of the experiment. All kinds of other special subjects leap to the mind as candidates for this preferential treatment. Agriculture? How attractive to have a specialist Agricultural Assembly, with due representation of producers and consumers, and an Agricultural Committee to form its link with Parliament! This, however, is probably the worst subject to begin on. On none would the average member be less likely to assent to devolution. Every county member wants an active say in agriculture, and every urban member is interested in the consumption of farm products. No doubt the most suitable subject is to be found in some clearly defined and bounded group of activities, such as Transport, Light, Heat and Power, Social Insurances, or perhaps Housing.

Of all these, probably transport offers the best *primâ facie* case for further experiment. It is highly technical. It needs at this moment far more time and attention than the House of Commons can give it. It excites no strong party animus. It appears, indeed, in every way suited for treatment by a specialist assembly submitting proposals to a Transport Committee of both Houses of Parliament. This is the kind of business that gets so badly behindhand in the House. Just as the Church had to wait fifty years for a Cathedrals Measure because no Government could touch that question so long as it involved all the stages of a parliamentary Bill, so technical subjects in most departments get held up and pigeon-holed almost indefinitely. They are held up, not because they are controversial in a party sense, but because an Opposition can turn their complexities into a glorious opportunity for using up parliamentary time. 'The serious charge,' as Lord Eustace justly observed, 'is that we obstruct non-contentious legislation in order that there may be less time for the passage of contentious legislation.' The result is that Ministers often dare not bring forward Bills their departments know are years overdue.

If the case for the delegation of technical questions is strong, equally so is the case for delegating subjects of exceptional complexity. Many M.P.'s would like to see the problems of social insurances taken from the House and handed to an assembly of persons representing divers points of view, but all possessing a

detailed grasp of the work in hand, such as Parliament cannot pretend to possess. It would be rationed as to expenditure, but given full liberty to offer finished proposals both for the better spending of that money within its field of action and for the general removal of anomalies and grievances. I suggest that the expansion of this method of Church Measures offers the most hopeful line of advance in devolution. Whereas Mr. Winston Churchill's plan sets up something of a general purpose body whose work it is difficult to define clearly in advance, the scheme of specialist assemblies enables us to detach subjects one by one. In our English way we should go cautiously, adapting the machinery with some deliberation to the varying needs of the subjects detached, and learning by experience the measure of delegation and of parliamentary control suited to different types of cases.

It is to be hoped that Mr. Winston Churchill will not allow the question to go to sleep. That in the present unique circumstances the parliamentary machine works so smoothly is the worst possible reason for neglecting the problem. The sleep must come to an end, and we should make ready for the time of waking. Those who are cheerfully confident that democracy is doomed may see without regret a renewal of parliamentary incompetence and a House of Commons falling more and more into disrepute as it becomes less and less equipped to perform its varied tasks. Those, however, who want democracy to have a fair trial will wish Governments to keep its instruments bright, and to adjust its apparatus to the ever-changing needs of the day.

R. D. Denman.

A STAFF FOR THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND

The staff officer plays an important part in the fighting services, but not there alone. Under the same or another name he figures in the large business concern. His duties and opportunities are various; he holds a watching brief for any fresh developments to which the body which he serves should adjust; he translates general principles into their practical detail; he supplies his chiefs with the results of research. The Church of England needs the man, or at least the method; it has neither, except fitfully and most inadequately. It is clear that the Church requires more elasticity in organisation and administration than the army system, for example, allows; but the Church might borrow the idea from the army or some other walk of life and yet not copy it slavishly in detail; the idea may be fashioned to fit the character and the needs of the institution for which it is required.

Perhaps the most vital matter in which the need of a staff method is apparent is the use of man-power amongst the clergy to the best possible advantage. It is well known that there has been a very serious diminution in the number of men who have been ordained during the past twenty years. This decrease intensifies the importance of making the very best use of the man-power which is available. There are, for instance, many specialist posts to be filled; chaplains are required at schools and colleges, for prisons, for hospitals (mental and general), for the three arms of national defence, for an amazing variety of posts abroad; archdeacons and other administrators must be found. But there is room for improvement in the more ordinary use of man-power; certain country districts, no less than some urban areas, demand special qualifications which are not to be found in all men. As things are at present there is no central organisation through which the available men may be used in the best possible way. The diocese is a self-contained unit; its bishop is not expected to offer his clergy for specialised work elsewhere. Indeed, the better a bishop serves his own diocese, the less inclined will he be to advise his clergy to accept work beyond its boundaries. There may be exceptions to this

procedure, but it is a fair statement of the normal custom. The wastage which must result from this lack of inter-diocesan system is very serious. The following instance is typical: The vicar of a large parish writes to ask my help; he describes the difficulties and great opportunities of an institution of some importance which would fall within the pastoral scope of the next senior curate whom he shall appoint. As his diocesan bishop cannot recommend the man with the right qualities and experience, he is writing round to a few friends in the hope of obtaining suggestions. And why so? Because there is no central organisation whatever which, outside that vicar's own diocese, can help him. Somewhere there is the right man longing for just such a post, but neither the vicar knows of his existence, nor any of the friends to whom he writes hopefully.

Such a situation, abundantly common, is as wasteful when viewed from another side. A man comes to me because he knows me personally as one who has written a couple of elementary books about the practical application of psychology to Christianity. He is going to be ordained and has just left Oxford or Cambridge with a first class. He has specialised in the study of psychology, partly because it is what he cares for, partly because he believes that along that line he may make his best contribution to the life and teaching of the Church. Where shall he start? he asks. Where will his special quality of mind and interest be developed and used? What does the Church do with people like himself? The true answer is that the Church does nothing, but I do not dash him by saying so. Because I know something of his subject, I am not completely nonplussed by his questions. I can perhaps find the bishop who will be interested, and get the right start for him. But there should be some first-class central office where such questions may be more competently dealt with. Some of the best men, with great potential contributions to the spread of Christian teaching, turn aside from holy orders because they suspect that they will be unused; even a young man may be humble and yet entertain doubts as to the Church's capacity to make the best of him. It might be urged against much that is said here that there is, after all, the Holy Spirit in the Divine Society; that by His operation many omissions are repaired and much is done which otherwise would seem to require organisation. But God helps those who help themselves; Christians have no business to suppose that the aid of the Holy Spirit could be regarded as an alternative to the use of the intelligence. Indeed, the intelligence should be regarded as one of the main channels through which the Holy Spirit works; otherwise any attempt on the Church's part to organise intelligently becomes an act of faithlessness towards the

Holy Spirit. Amongst such sins would lie the Enabling Act itself, the Central Board of Finance, and much else.

A constructive effort to meet the wastage here outlined should not be difficult. There should be some central Church office where reports on each stage of a clergyman's life would be recorded. The reports need not contain any derogatory statement, but would be positive in character. If the reports contained derogatory matter they would be returned to the senders to be rewritten before being filed. There are, doubtless, in existence other means of recording lapses and failures. The reports would open, if possible, with some brief note on a man's university career; certainly the principal of a man's theological college would make a report, and copies of these, together with anything which the Central Board of Examiners cared to add, would go to the ordinand's diocesan bishop and first vicar. These reports would mention any subject at which he seemed to be or likely to be good and any development which seemed likely to be worth cultivating or watching. On leaving that parish or diocese a report enlarged on the same lines would go to the new incumbent or diocesan, and always at the central headquarters there would be a complete file of these reports together with a subject-index and those other cross-references which a man would soon learn how to compile. Side by side with this he would compile a summary of different types of work; the longer he was at his post the better would he fulfil these duties. Any appointing person or body would be allowed to see relevant extracts from the reports which could be numbered and not named for that purpose. It would be important that, wherever such an office were situated geographically, it should be an adjunct of 'Lambeth' rather than of 'Church House.' The one staff officer who, together with one secretary, could competently manage this piece of work would be attached to the Archbishop of Canterbury rather than to the Church Assembly or any other corporation. Thus the Church would have the confidence which came from the knowledge that the work was under the personal direction of the archbishop, and could never be the victim of a bare majority vote, nor captured by a machine.

In some matters the Church has been forced to employ alternatives to a properly devised staff method. Thus one archbishop (or both) appoints an *ad hoc* committee. These committees are composed inevitably of people who, in most instances, have already enough to do; indeed, the limit has almost been reached for the employment of otherwise very much occupied people on such work. At least it would seem that this method cannot be further developed. These committees have other disadvantages, one being that mostly they are appointed

for some particular purpose, and when that has been served the members disperse in thankfulness. The League of Nations has taught us how tremendously the cause of world peace has benefited from the fact that its office at Geneva never closes down; the League is always in being; its permanent officials are always on the watch. In a few matters we have recognised the importance of this, and have gone much further than work through temporary committees. For instance, in the Central Board of Finance we recognise that this department of the Church's life demands a whole-time supervisor at the centre, and also an organised method of dealing with the dioceses other than by harassing overburdened diocesan bishops. Another method which we employ is the permanent but unofficial society. This usually has liberal episcopal patronage, but not always, one suspects, full episcopal confidence. The society does not really represent the Church, but rather a large group of Church members who wish to work for the particular cause for which the society stands. Thus there is no guarantee that a society will be encouraged or given any status in a diocese where the bishop is himself immersed in other activities or where he is not personally expert in the cause which the society seeks to promote.

In at least one matter we have tentatively gone further. On the subject of sex morality the dioceses have 'rescue and preventive' or 'moral welfare' associations; these are linked by an Archbishops' Board at Lambeth, which has two whole-time secretaries. The sub-committee work of this Board includes a group for publicity, research and propaganda, and this group can draw on a large panel of medical, educational, and other experts who have accepted appointment for that purpose from the Archbishop of Canterbury. The group has direct access to the archbishops. The panel, which includes the names of some distinguished and very busy people, seems better than the ordinary committee; for the members are not meant to be summoned to all meetings, but rather to be called in by the group as their special individual contributions are required. This experiment is an interesting piece of evolution towards a staff method. But side by side with all this is the White Cross League, an incorporated society which stands to promote the same ideals. It is, however, in no sense under archiepiscopal direction, its governing body being appointed by its members. Some of the leading spirits both on this League and on the Archbishops' Board co-operate closely. For some years some of them have been struggling in vain to escape from a system of dual operation which no doubt covers more ground than could be covered by one body alone, but not, in their opinion, enough ground to

justify the wastefulness of personnel and of money involved in the existence of parallel organisations. It should be obvious that the Archbishops cannot be expected to give the time required to the detail of reform in this whole matter. But there is a better alternative to 'muddling along' or even to evolving very slowly and expensively towards a method. This alternative would be to have a Chief of the General Staff, instructed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, to suggest means of reducing the chaos to order.

There is one matter which badly needs the attention of such an officer. Most dioceses, perhaps all, have diocesan missioners. These missioners meet occasionally to discuss their work, but there is no one person responsible for seeing to it that they are forwarding throughout the Church up and down the country any one matter which is at the time of paramount importance. I have been a diocesan missioner in one diocese and now occupy a similar post, for part time, in another diocese; I am not infertile in ideas; and yet I long for someone, competent to do so, to tell me what headquarters have decided to be a good general method of work and what are the particular things which I should be doing. Such direction would not rob me of initiative, nor supplant the desires of my own bishop. But it would help me very much by making me feel that the Christian offensive was being conducted on a considered plan. It is, for example, inconceivable that musketry training and operations in a war should be conducted according to the ideas of the divisional commander or his musketry expert, unless that expert had imbibed a good part of the method decided as best for the army as a whole. A few years ago the Archbishops of Canterbury and York launched an appeal for more and better study; together with this appeal came the issue of ordered schemes of study for the clergy, aiming at and bearing the title of 'The Way of Renewal.' In this instance the staff method was partially employed; there was at Lambeth a priest who worked hard and judiciously on the business side of the scheme. But he had no 'opposite numbers' in the dioceses; there existed no diocesan staff officer with whom he had any right to communicate. Some thought that the diocesan missioner was the right staff officer, existing for just such a purpose as this; but even if they were right in so thinking, there was no one to tell the missioners that this was their business or to organise their efforts towards the common end. More serious criticism could perhaps be made of the method by which the material for study was drafted and the plans of the campaign laid—a group of very busy men meeting now and then; never all present who had been hoped for; and no one in the background of the movement taking unhurried consultation and giving whole-time thought to its educational development. The way of renewal

is not failing for these reasons, but it has proved more difficult to manage and less universal in its influence than it might have been.

A lack of any adequate system may thwart individual ideas, and not only those intended to spread out from the centre. There is in the Church no channel whereby good ideas from amongst the rank and file may reach authoritative consideration and, if of any use, be put at the disposal of the Church as a whole. It is likely that the loss to the Church through the entire absence of any sort of Intelligence Department is enormous. In the defence services and in many business organisations there are some officers who are on the look-out for ideas, and there is a channel for their sympathetic yet expertly critical consideration. In the Church of England there is no definite market for ideas from the rank and file. The truth, of course, is that the average diocesan bishop is far too busy to cope with a stream of what would often prove, no doubt, to be useless ideas. And there is no sort of organised department for sifting the good from the bad and securing episcopal attention to the former. Some ideas do get through a little way, but at a price ; the purveyor may gain his point at the cost of being considered a pushful person. Or, which is worse, he may actually become an unpleasantly pushful person, and in a sense lose his own soul in pushing.

Things are better arranged elsewhere. Here is an example, disguised sufficiently to conceal the identity of the principal performers. During the war a department at the War Office circularised certain commanding officers in England, whom it might concern, about a technical problem to which a solution was required. A particular commanding officer passed the document to his junior sub-lieutenant, who within a very short time produced a correct solution ; this was communicated to the War Office. An immediate inquiry was addressed to the commanding officer for information about the officer who had devised the solution ; the young man was speedily transferred to a post where his special gifts could be employed on behalf of the nation as a whole. This is an instance of good staff work ; there is nothing which in the very least corresponds to it in the Church of England. People with ideas in the Church may, of course, write to the Church Press, or try to persuade a publisher to produce a book. If one of these precarious alternatives is at all successful, it will mean that a certain section of opinion is informed ; no more. For it is unlikely that anyone in authority will read the book, or, if he reads and approves it, will do more than apply it, if time permits, in his own diocese. For bishops and archbishops cannot be expected to wade through the mass of good and bad writing which is issued about Christianity and the Church. The

complaint does not lie against this inability, but against the absence of any arrangement whereby the sifting may be done on the bishops' behalf. If a private individual were to produce a brochure upon a new method of refining oil, there would be some chemist in the big oil company whose natural business it would be to know that that paper had been written, to read it himself, to have its suggestions tested. The absence of any such staff officer would proclaim incompetence. Of such incompetence the Church is guilty. During the war a temporary Chaplain to the Forces burst into print, while the war was yet in progress, about the effect of war service upon the soldier's mind and outlook. In view of its subject this humble publication was read by a member of the Intelligence Department of the army in France; in course of time certain marked paragraphs were copied out and submitted to the Commander-in-Chief himself. The latter incorporated the argument in only slightly different language in a communication which he was preparing upon the moral of his troops. Attention is here drawn, not simply to the humility of Lord Haig in using the opinions of such a junior and non-combatant observer, but rather to the fact that there existed in the army a channel whereby it became possible for a Commander-in-Chief to become aware of the fact that anything of the kind had ever appeared in print at all. In the Church there is no such channel.

The way in which to meet this sort of difficulty would be to have one picked man at the head of, or himself constituting, an Intelligence Department. One of his first duties would be to create a panel of authorities on their different subjects who were known to read largely. They would be asked to hold a watching brief, and to communicate to him anything which ought to be noted. The archbishops would authorise him to approach all the diocesan bishops with the request that a man be appointed in each diocese to act, in addition to his ordinary work, as a clearing-house for ideas; a limited number of these ideas would pass through this diocesan representative to the man at headquarters. Even this would not mean that the idea, having travelled so far, would get any further; it would still have to pass through the close mesh of the staff officer's own criticism, assisted as he would be by a selected panel of carefully picked people or a small permanent committee. Thus, when an idea was finally brought to the notice of the Archbishop of Canterbury he would have full assurance that it was at least worth careful consideration. The submission of an idea to him would not mean usually more than that. The headquarters man (with the same sort of assistance) would note anti-Christian books which should be answered, and he would be responsible for getting such answers

written. At present an alert Christian publisher may approach an individual writer with a proposal for a needed book, but the Church makes no attempt to organise its literary output. The need will readily appear from one illustration. A few years ago a well-known author, with a reputation of extensive range, produced a book attacking in certain particulars the Church's moral code. The book was very widely read and considerably influenced the tone of others which followed from other pens. The Church has appeared to ignore it, with serious results. The other day a clergyman, referring to this book, said to me, 'What can I give my people to counteract the influence of so-and-so?' I made certain recommendations. Then followed the awkward question, 'When is the Church going to answer that book of his?' The answer was, 'Never.' For the Church does not even know officially that the book has been written; it is nobody's business either to answer it or to get an answer written.

There remains briefly to consider the abortive destiny of some episcopal ideas themselves. It is an even gloomier subject. The ten-yearly conference of bishops of the Anglican Communion seems to be in the habit of passing certain resolutions which absolutely require the existence of a staff if they are to be carried into effect. The baffling part of this procedure is that those who pass these important resolutions must know that this is so, far better than the present writer. Many illustrations of the foregoing statement could be given; one must suffice as regards 'Lambeth, 1930.' In resolution 46 'the Conference urges the desirability of organising and participating in efforts of Evangelism in co-operation with Christians of other Communions.' Presumably bishops who helped to forward that particular desire will work for its fulfilment in their own dioceses. But no general movement can be hoped for in the desired direction without a central lead and a central organisation. This duty would naturally fall upon the man who is in any case needed to pull together and lead diocesan missioners. In his absence the resolution in question is likely to be regarded as an expression of pious opinion and no more. Then there are the five magnificent reports presented to the Church in 1918 as an outcome of the National Mission. Archbishop Davidson was careful to say in his foreword to them that they were not official documents, but 'they have the high authority which belongs to the opinions of specially qualified men and women who have devoted long months to their elaboration.' Many of the men so described already belonged to or have since been raised to the episcopate. Though these reports were 'not official,' yet the circumstances of their production entitle us to treat them as at least as important as it is clear that they were regarded by the late Archbishop of Canterbury. Even if generally

approved, much that was recommended was impossible of execution in the absence of machinery for the purpose. It is immensely creditable to the authorities in the interval that any of the recommendations embodied in these reports have been (as only some have been) carried into effect. But there is plenty of evidence that some of the hopes and desires, if not the actual decisions, of the episcopate are habitually frustrated for no other reason than the absence of machinery to render them effective.

To do all that has been here implied in creating a staff for the Church of England would be a big undertaking, for the subjects taken are illustrative rather than exhaustive. A way to set about it would be to select one man for one of the departments mentioned; he should be asked to spare time from the particular quest in order to consult with others and frame proposals for an extension of the staff method and idea. His own work would be of an experimental character, and his purpose would be to discover how best the idea could be worked out in the life of the Church. He would need to be elastic in his adaptation of what he could learn from the business world. It would be of great importance that the experiment should be given a fair chance, and not entrusted to a man as his part-time occupation, when he had time to spare from other work. Many of the questions which arise can only be answered in the process of trying out the experiment. It may be objected that the whole proposal is a reflection upon the ability of our ecclesiastical leaders. But the Life and Liberty movement, which paved the way to the Enabling Act, was never taken to have any critical reference to the then Archbishops of Canterbury and York. The present proposal might commend itself to the present Archbishops. But, even if this were so, they could hardly be expected to go too far in advance of any declared body of Church opinion; of the existence of any strength of opinion on this subject there is no evidence. The Church is complacent as it is, and an outcry would be raised at the expenditure of money required by this scheme and at the withdrawal of good men from other important work, at a time when there is a shortage of both men and money. The outcry would be answered simply enough by pointing out that the purpose of this scheme would be to save wastage both of money and men. The present muddle costs more than its remedy.

Some people have a horror of 'over-centralisation.' Centralisation may destroy initiative; it may standardise and despiritualise. The proposals here advanced have the opposite end in view. And there may be such an evil as 'under-centralisation.' It is the writer's belief that the Church will lose ground with increasing rapidity unless something is done along the lines proposed. The sympathetic reader may be inclined to say,

'Much better leave all these things in the hands of the archbishop; he knows the Church best.' Such a comment would merely indicate how completely the reader had failed to grasp one of the main points of what has been outlined. For in this scheme there is at once work for one man engaged whole-time upon it, and later on for more. Moreover, the plan, if carried out or even started, ought to begin to relieve the Archbishop of Canterbury of the incredible excess of demands made upon a modern archbishop. Our leaders ought to be relieved of much confusing detail in order that they may have more time and energy to give to the larger issues of Church and State with which they alone can deal.

T. W. Pym.

THE SERVICE MIND

CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART, in his article 'The Tale of the Tank,'[1] has remarked that while General Swinton's book, *Eyewitness*, has an assured historical importance, it has a really wider significance. He says it is also 'an indictment of the mentality developed by the military profession,' and that it constitutes 'an urgent argument for an inquiry into the deeper psychological causes of this repeated failure' which the pages of the Official History record. He attributes this defective mentality to various causes, principally the method of promotion, the better prospects which civil life offers to an able man, the absence of stimulatingly interesting work in peace, the unavoidable absence of practice in peace, and to the neglect and misdirection of the study of history.

General Swinton makes somewhat similar strictures. He traces the life of the tank from the time of the conception of the idea until it appeared in the field, and shows the studied opposition which delayed its birth. The way, he tells us, was blocked because men are unable to grasp the implications of a new idea.

> The very nature of the profession of arms, with its long periods of make-believe training based on the experience of a more or less remote past, and unrelieved by the continual application of corrective factors derived from the progress of knowledge, *leads to mental crystallisation and blind adherence to tradition*. There is moreover an inevitable tendency in every profession towards a belief in infallibility of rank or seniority which, again, amounts to reliance on more or less stale experience. One manifestation of this in the Fighting Services is a deeply rooted bias against novel ideas, especially when they emanate from below. To some military minds indeed suggestions from juniors smack of presumption, if not of insubordination.

Whether these criticisms of the fighting service on land are justified or not is a question upon which a sea officer can have no opinion. But are they applicable to the sea service ? Are there in the Navy a 'mental crystallisation and blind adherence to tradition,' a tendency to believe in the infallibility of rank, a bias against novel ideas, particularly when coming from below ? In my experience I have witnessed all these phenomena, with results

[1] The *Nineteenth Century and After*, November 1932.

very injurious to the Navy and the nation. Mental crystallisation is a disease which creeps upon a man without his being aware of it. The patient does not realise that his mind, becoming in the first place torpid from lack of active exercise, eventually becomes rigid. In the performance of the ordinary duties of administration, and routine, which occupy so large a proportion of naval work, there is nothing which drives a man to think of the problems of war; nor, indeed, in many of the principal posts is there time for thinking of other than departmental duties. To men accustomed to routine work and unaccustomed, by the nature of their previous experience, to have their opinions or their commands questioned from below, the innovator who casts doubt upon accepted beliefs and customs, who proposes some new instrument or some new method of using an old one, or the abolition of one long in use, appears as a nuisance. He is a disturber of the peace—the peace of mind. If such disturbances are to be prevented there must be uniformity of outlook, and uniform opinions become as essential a part of an officer's mental output as uniform clothes are of his outer man's. Orthodoxy being thus demanded, all opinions at variance with those generally accepted as authoritative—that is to say, heresies—must be rigorously repressed.

The conditions of peace, the burden of the current details of administrative work, the very natural tendency to deal with things immediate and concrete in preference to those remote and abstract, form a soil peculiarly favourable to the production of the sleeping sickness which General Swinton calls 'mental crystallisation.' Danger from without is far away. No war threatens, no interfering outside body pokes in its nose to inquire whether all is well; and internal dissent is kept in hand by effective deterrents to the exercise of original or critical thought. There is thus no stimulus to activity of mind. The activities of the senses and the bodies in the animal kingdom are maintained by the stimuli of external danger to their existence and their internal needs of food and drink. The administrative animal lacks these spurs. In the normal times of peace there is very little external stimulus to active thought. The prospect of reward—that factor which in ordinary life produces advancement—is absent; for since thinking discovers error, needs for change, alterations of many troublesome kinds, it is discouraged, not encouraged. The alternative stimulus to reward is punishment; but from punishment an administration is almost immune. There is no such barometer as the balance-sheet, which in business indicates whether the machine is functioning efficiently. There may be a general feeling, which may find expression in the Press, as it did in the 'eighties, that all is not well; and this may even get so far as a parliamentary inquiry, as it did when Lord Charles

Beresford accused the Admiralty of unpreparedness for war. But it is obvious that to depend upon an external stimulus is highly undesirable, and, in the ordinary process of administration, unworkable. A parliamentary custodian of the navy custodians of our security there always must be, but it can function only in matters very general, or when crises arise. It is neither the correct nor an adequate safeguard against the mental crystallisation which, according to General Swinton, afflicts a fighting service.

The stimulus to thought must therefore come from within. Hunger for food drives the animal into activity. Hunger for knowledge is what is needed in the administrative kingdom. What has to be guarded against is that form of mental torpidity which makes the patient believe that he is satiated and so transforms him into a Buddha, sitting in bland contemplation of his own perfection. Hunger for knowledge finds its origins, in most men, in a liberal education which produces the desire to learn, to know; which is unsatisfied by mere catalogues of great names or assurances that custom and tradition bear witness to the truth of an idea. It is, however, idle to produce in our youth the spirit of inquiry and the active, questioning, constructive mind, if when the plant that grows from that seed makes its appearance it is deliberately lopped or crushed before it can flower. To produce the desire to know and the habit of seeking knowledge and then to render it impossible to exercise these faculties, is assuredly extremely foolish. Indeed, it is not enough passively to permit the development of ideas; it should also be actively encouraged. The fear of indiscipline resulting from the expression of the views of young and active-minded men is illusory. It is far more to the profit of any community that it should follow Comte and admit that 'a full liberty of exposition and also of discussion is indispensable as a permanent guarantee against degeneration' than to copy the Bolshevist doctrine of Tomsky: 'We permit all political parties, but liberty belongs only to the Communist Party. The place for the others is the prison'—the old rule of the tyrant, whether in the temporal or spiritual world; the rule which has continually kept back the hands of the clock of progress.

Unfortunately, what General Swinton remarks at the end of the sentence quoted shows that Tomsky rather than the philosophers is the accepted guide. 'To some military minds indeed suggestions from juniors smack of presumption, if not of insubordination.' I have recollections of many instances of this doctrine, of which one example may be given. A gunnery officer—this was before the war—advocated the abolition of what appeared to him to be a very artificial test called the gunlayer's

test, and the substitution of a test at longer ranges involving factors likely to arise in battle. When his captain forwarded this to the flag officer in command that officer said that, though he agreed with much that was said, he strongly advised the officer not to send in the paper. Not only did he think it would do the writer no good, but it might do him harm, as he was at that moment nearing the delicate time for promotion. 'It is all very critical; and besides, X. is a very young officer. Why should he write and differ from the views of his superiors?' Needless to say, the officer accepted the advice and destroyed his paper. Subsequent practical experience confirmed the correctness of his criticisms and proposals; but that is by the way. The importance of the episode lies in the fact that to put forward suggestions which had a hint of criticism in them involved the risk of professional ruin.

Then there is what 'Eyewitness' calls the 'blind adherence to tradition.' This is a very old disease. No one with any knowledge of war advocates the throwing over of the great moral traditions attached to a service or a ship, and in which one of the highest notes is that of self-sacrifice—the traditions with which the word 'moral' is associated. These traditions are irreplaceable treasures. But there is a host of supposititious traditions which receive blind homage and obedience. Many of them are the merest legends whose very origins are doubtful, some lost in antiquity, others of more recent growth: bullying and ill-treatment of young officers in gunrooms, for instance, is a thing to which no reference is found in the old memoirs or in the more recent ones of officers who entered the Navy in the 'fifties.

It is curious to observe, on the one hand, this 'blind adherence' to what is traditional, and, on the other, most extraordinary departures from traditions of unquestioned integrity. One example—many could be given—of the grip which what is called tradition has upon the service mind is the tradition of the line of battle. It is an important one, for its influences are far-reaching. They dip deep into the very pockets of the taxpayer, for the tradition plays no small part in determining whether that long-suffering individual shall pay eight millions or a small fraction of that sum for his fighting ships.

To no inconsiderable a proportion of men the 'line of battle' is the only possible formation in which a fleet can win a victory.[1] Because this is so, and because long lines of ships offer targets which cannot be missed by torpedoes, so (so runs the argument) it is indispensable that, as the ships are bound to be hit, they shall be able to stand the explosions of several torpedoes. To take this

[1] I purposely do not say 'fight a battle,' for the object of a battle is victory and it is well to keep one's eye upon the ultimate object.

punishment they must be very large, and hence extremely costly. One may properly ask, when such costly results follow from a certain argument, whether the first premiss, upon which what follows depends, is indisputably correct.

The line of battle is a tradition. For what reason, the active-minded product of a liberal education would ask, did this formation come into existence? Have those battles fought in this formation been victories? Have those fought otherwise been defeats? What, in fact, has experience to tell us which may guide our steps in pursuit of truth? The line of battle was introduced for an object, which was to impose order and maintain cohesion in a fleet in battle. But what, in turn, were objects of order and cohesion? Victory. Victory first, and its consummation later, could not be achieved by great masses fighting like a mob, and in those great masses, with imperfect means of intercommunication, without a high degree of centralisation.

With the passage of time, fleets grew smaller. Sound as the doctrine of the line was in its initial conception, in the circumstances which brought it into being, it was not necessarily the best or the only mode of fighting. Under the soporific influences of peace, the line, from being a means to attain a certain end, became an end in itself—a not uncommon phenomenon. 'The completeness of military achievement [in other words, decisive victory] became in men's minds less of an object than the accurate observance of rules.' So remarked Mahan, and the correctness of that diagnosis stands out in the pages of naval history. Thus an attack upon the rear,[3] which would undoubtedly have paved the way to victory, if indeed it did not actually attain it, was not practicable, according to the evidence of one captain, 'unless the line was broken, which was against rule.' An admiral[4] who attacked without forming line, though his attack had embraced almost a certainty of sweeping success if his officers had supported him, was cashiered. Another[5] with the recollection of this judgment, fearing the same fate, would not venture to do what was obviously needed. He was shot '*pour encourager les autres*,' who may indeed have been thereby encouraged to fight but were definitely discouraged from any tactical enterprise. Clerk of Eldin, the one British writer on tactics of that period (and he a civilian), truly remarked, 'The sentence of court-martial that broke Mr. Mathews ought virtually to be regarded as the source of all the many miscarriages since.' It checked, in Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge's words, the action of individual ability. It needed the immense self-confidence and moral courage of a

[3] At the Battle of Toulon, February 1744.

[4] Thomas Mathews.

[5] John Byng.

Suffren and a Nelson to defy tradition and act in despite of the rules that it brought into being.

But the power of tradition, the power of a phrase, is immense. Though it was not in the line formation that Hawke obtained his sweeping victories off Finisterre and at Quiberon, and Nelson won his great battles of the Nile and Trafalgar, but by tactics directly at variance with the established custom; and though the record of battles fought in the line is one long, practically unbroken story of indecisive results, it retained its pride of place as a tactical formation. Attempts by heretics, followers of that arch-heretic Nelson, to introduce more flexible tactics, decentralisation, delegation of responsibility to subordinates—all the methods by which Nelson wrung victory out of his encounters—broke down before the solid rocks of tradition and torpidity of mind. The power of inertia, of meeting every proposal for something new with masterly inactivity, is as incalculable as it is astonishing. Although, on the one hand, there was this long record of indecisive battles in the rigid, centralised line, and, on the other, a record shorter but startling and glorious of great victories fought otherwise, the doctrine of the line held good. It stood firm against the arguments of some of the ablest of the younger thinkers of the Navy in the seventies of the last century. The tactics of Togo left it unchanged. It was proof against all attempts to investigate more flexible tactics in 1910 and 1911. The war found it as strongly entrenched in the minds of men as it had been in the days of King Charles II. As rigid as ever were restrictions that no one should break the line, that twenty or more great ships must manœuvre in this formation only. What must the shades of Hawke, Suffren, Nelson and de Ruyter have thought when they learned of this in the Elysian fields!

Why was this? The line ministers to two common frailties. It obviates the unpleasant necessity for serious and sustained thinking in advance and for rapid alterations in an emergency; and, by placing no responsibility upon subordinates, prevents giving them an opportunity to make mistakes. I recollect on one occasion asking a flag officer under whom I was serving whether it would not be well to issue open instructions to his squadron commanders, indicating (as Nelson did to Collingwood) what he wanted done and leaving to them entirely the manner of the doing. The clinching argument against confiding such trust in subordinates was contained in the words, 'Why—I don't know *what* they might do.' But (if one had been argumentative) one might have asked, 'How, then, did Nelson and various others manage?'

It is in its departure from the Nelsonic methods that the contrast between observing one sort of tradition and departing entirely from another is most marked. If there is one well-estab-

lished truth it is that the Nelsonic command was characterised by heretical tactical ideas, by putting trust in subordinates, by giving them responsibility, by informing them of all that was in his mind, by inviting discussion, by close study on his own part of the whole range of problems of war and battle, from the height of political influences down to the minor business of how two frigates should tackle two others. But to-day officers must shun heretical views if they value their career; they are not desired, far less encouraged, to formulate ideas. A dislike of the expression of opinions which conflict with those in authority is no new thing in the Navy, but at no previous time has the dislike been more pronounced. In 1849 Admiral Sir Charles Napier's criticisms of the measures of the administration—he then being on half-pay and entirely at liberty to express his views—were disliked, and even officially disapproved of, by the First Lord, Sir Francis Baring; but for all that the fact of his having given expression to them, and in addition having defended his action against the imputation of indiscipline, did not prevent his being subsequently given a command. This would not have been his good fortune to-day, for more autocratic and less liberal views have come into fashion. Fifteen years ago Sir Cyprian Bridge pointed out that when that school of thought which became known as the 'material' school had established firmly the 'dictatorship of the materialate,' it was able to deal with its rivals in drastic fashion:

> It revived the old process of proscription. Any prominent officer who could not be induced to admit that the possession of heavier guns and thicker armour would assuredly make an intending enemy refrain from engaging with you, any officer . . . who might have presumed to express his belief that the potential enemy might also get heavier guns and thicker armour, was promptly included in a proscription list. He was either kept out of all influential positions or banished to the other side of the world.*

This was neither fiction nor exaggeration. The great talents of more than one of our most able naval thinkers of twenty-five years ago were made no use of, their opinions scouted. Nor is there any reason to suppose that a similar proscription would not be applied to one to-day who should follow in the footsteps of those thinkers.

Here, then, is a very remarkable thing. Nelson is held out as the pattern of commanders. His genius, his personality, his mastery of war are the themes of after-dinner speeches. The reasons for his successes can hardly be unknown. But in place of the trust, the encouragement of thought, the very disobedience of which a French writer said, 'Nelson est accusé par tous les marins anglais d'avoir dû toutes les victoires à des actes d'indisci-

* *The Times*, November 25, 1917.

pline'—instead of this we see proscription for heretics, young men discouraged from making suggestions, discussion not encouraged. The principles of the semi-Asiatic Tomsky take the place of those of the great English sailor. The result is that silence for which the Navy is famed as 'the silent service.' Silence is, however, no more a sign of the healthy iving condition of a fighting service than devastation of a country is a sign that peace has been imposed upon it; indeed, it has even been suggested by persons wanting in respect that silence may be the result of having nothing to say. If Moltke was right when he said that the output of literature in a time of peace was the sign of health in an army, silence is less a virtue than an evidence of mental anemia. The German officer's training under Moltke was aimed at producing men who could, and would, think for themselves. Men of that type are not developed by a system which strangles thinking by closing the only channels through which it can breathe and live—writing and discussion. Lord Ullswater recently remarked that it is only by talk and the exchange of arguments that truth can be hammered out of opposing views. An administrative system which uses the hammer to knock on the head those whose views differ from those of the hierarchy, and holds that hammer with unchallengeable power, is unlikely to arrive always at the truth. It needs but little knowledge of events of the last thirty years to see how often infallibility has proved fallible. When decoy ships were first suggested the proposal met with much the same reception as the tank: so with convoy, with the use of destroyers to attack the enemy in battle instead of to defend, with the suggestion that the Fleet's harbours needed defence against submarines.

No sentence runs more readily off the lips at dinners and prize-givings than that Nelson and his captains were a band of brothers. One may ask, What sort of a brotherhood is that in which those of a family who differ from the others are killed? It leaves a united family, undoubtedly, a family without dissensions; but the method of attaining the desired end has a closer resemblance to that of Adam's elder son than to that of Nelson.

If mental crystallisation and a blind adherence to tradition are to be prevented, a strong injection into the body administrative of freedom of thought and discussion is needed. It must be realised that it is they that keep a service alive in peace, that every innovator is an innovator because he has given thought to his subject and nourished it with discussion, and that every great captain in war has owed his success to the fact that he was an innovator to whom tradition was a valuable servant, not a tyrannical master.

H. W. Richmond.

ENGLISH HUMOUR

It is the greatest incongruity of all to be serious about humour.—G. K. CHESTERTON.

PERHAPS not everyone will agree with the definition of humour as a mere sense of incongruity which seems to be latent in Mr. Chesterton's aphorism. But if the reference to incongruity is in fact fundamental I must plead, in defence of this essay, that as I am an Englishman I cannot help being incongruous—English illogicality is a byword—and that as I am incongruous I must be exercising a certain sense of humour in writing so seriously about it. The plea, however, which I should prefer to advance is simply that I am attracted by hints of mystery and beauty wherever I can find them, and that I find English humour to be rich enough in both to make the attraction very difficult to resist.

The typical genius of this country is a strange, haphazard sort of concept. It is not, like the genius of France, an infinite capacity for taking pains; nor, like that of Germany, is it most powerfully operative at the obscurer depths of thought and feeling. Neither is it even, like that of the United States, directed exclusively to material ends. Not Napoleon, not Nietzsche, not Theodore Roosevelt, can be said to have any real analogue in English history since the English cohered and became the nation we know. Whether this peculiar phenomenon, the final nature of the aggregate of souls inhabiting the area of earth between Berwick-on-Tweed and Land's End, is exhaustively descriptible or not, it is certain that in any attempts at such a description the element of humour involved must be given a conspicuous, perhaps the chief, emphasis. For it is quite possible to argue that humour of the specific English brand, an advertisement which we all recognise when we see it, but are seldom inclined to investigate—perhaps because it is so familiar, but perhaps also because we fear the ridicule of such leading humorists as Mr. Chesterton—is the quality in the complex of the genius of England that has, more than any other, made the English great.

Valour and vision, industry and patriotism, we have always shared with other nations. Yet, though Paris, the spiritual heiress of Athens, fails to rival the essential glory of Pericles, London is

more than Augustan Rome. The fact that the Greeks were, on the whole, a higher development of humanity than the Romans does not really affect the point. Athens and Rome were both incontestably great, and London is still the greatest city in the world in so many senses that the greatness calls for some profounder explanation than any which have accounted for the rise of other communities to preponderating influence on the earth. The most usual solution of the problem is to ascribe such eminence to the political and administrative talents of Englishmen. These are of a peculiar kind. For sheer ability in the various spheres of government, for ingenuity of theory and consistency of practice, we are overmatched by a Machiavelli or a Richelieu. The English are not a subtle, scarcely even an intellectual, people in the restricted sense of that abused word. But they have their sense of humour. It is that which enables an English Machiavelli to escape opprobrium and exile, an English Richelieu to rule without oppression. English statesmanship has often been compared with that of republican Rome. The men who made the Roman Empire also worked on the principle *parcere subiectis*, the neglect of which so frequently defeated the ambitions of later architects of dominion. But the Romans were far more conscious of it as a principle than are the English, who act almost automatically in accordance with a psychological disposition very different from theirs. While the policy of Rome was in general sternly and self-righteously just, that of London tends to achieve a humanity which wears quite a casual look—

Like wealthy men who care not how they give.

It is this latter quality, a sort of careless generosity, endlessly exasperating and mysterious to Europeans of the Continent, who never possess it, which I believe to arise largely from typically English humour. It produces in sober and logically minded foreigners first contempt, then amazement, and finally an almost superstitious awe. The spectacle of a whole people 'muddling through' the most formidable obstacles to victory and triumph resembles an unaccountable miracle to brains—all civilised brains except the Anglo-Saxon—which have become too sceptical of human nature ever themselves to act on vague humanitarian impulses in this way.

If I am right in suggesting that humour is at the bottom of such strangely successful conduct, dictated not by intelligence but by a certain ethical sentiment of a unique character, it becomes important to try to discover in what precisely that humour, which can thus move the world more subtly than Archimedes with his lever, may consist. For to the philosopher it has seemed mysterious, to the æsthete or moralist—fundamentally they are

brothers—beautiful, and to the speculative sociologist full of a hope more promising than can be found elsewhere. The modern significance of the word has developed from Shakespeare and Jonson—for whom a humorist was a man with an obsession, such a character as Molière also generally used to build his comedies on—through the notion of eccentricity popular with Congreve, the *Spectator* group, Pope and the satirical novelists of the eighteenth century, to Scott and Lamb, with whom it became fairly explicit in the more complimentary sense we now give it. Its overt existence may therefore be said roughly to begin with the nineteenth century, which was to begin, too, that life of the English as a sturdy, insular people, more cut off from the Continent than they had been since Saxon days. Englishmen were about to become intensely, even narrowly, national and to develop, like all recluses, some queer characteristics. English humour, as we now know it, was to be the chief of them.

The humour of Sir Walter Scott is of course generally that of his native land, dry or whimsical, or both, the humour of a race at once more acute and more tender than the English. But the jovial high spirits which are a capital ingredient in the Anglo-Saxon character were also prominent in the man who could write in 1824, when he was fifty-three, about a pestilent poetaster: 'I had one rogue who came to bully me in my own house, until he had almost made the mist of twenty years, as Ossian says, roll backwards from my spirit, in which case he might have come by an excellent good beating.' This jest, in its suave tolerance, in its playful invocation of what was then an awe-inspiring classic and in its perfectly sterile threat, still further reduced by the 'might,' of physical violence, anticipates very accurately, to my mind, much in the humour we are now accustomed to think of as specifically English. So are the genial ecclesiastics of a later day to unbend—though rarely on paper—to their intimates, and gently bullyrag the less respectable characters and language in the Holy Bible.

As for Lamb, his characteristic charm as a humorist would have been more Scottish than English—resembling somewhat Sir James Barrie's—if he had known how to be really caustic. He had, indeed, a good opportunity, but missed it, in his essay on *Imperfect Sympathies*: 'I have been trying all my life to like Scotchmen and am obliged to desist from the experiment in despair.' It is doubtful whether Lamb ever knew intimately a typical Scot. If he had ever known one at all well, he would have found an *alter ego*. But how much more bitingly would his hypothetical friend have put a similar confession! Lamb's habitual dainty fantasy was in fact very un-English. Yet he set the fashion—for the thing was so new that it became immensely

popular—of English, as distinct from Scottish, whimsy, which still flourishes almost violently in the breast of the average Anglo-Saxon, as the wide circulation of a long series of not always absolutely first-class literary efforts in this direction sufficiently proves. Lamb is the ancestor of an important paper clan that began with Leigh Hunt and shows no sign of ending with Mr. W. H. Davies. There seems no doubt that the Lamb-like element will be permanent in English humour. Elder statesmen, university dons, all sorts of more practical adventurers, and even London business men—after all, Lamb himself was in the East India House—are always likely at any moment to be whimsical and to be generally admired for it. There is something rather odd about this at first sight. Why is Tennyson's great, broad-shouldered, genial Englishman almost invariably ready to be exquisitely wistful and pathetically gay into the bargain? Why does he believe in fairies and fall in love with Shelley's deceiving elves? One must assume that there is a psychological law of compensation at work here. Bull does not want to be so bluff as he is painted, and the wish has fathered a reality. For it is a fact that in poetry of the gossamer variety the English are unrivalled in Europe, if not in the Orient, whence perhaps Lamb of the East India House drew much of his inspiration.

With the marriage of these two contrasted components, the jovial and the ethereal, Jupiter and his consort, who was so frail as to have to be turned into a cloud upon occasion, we may perhaps have got a certain distance with the edifice of English humour. It is true that we seem to have begun at the top. The god must have his cloud to sit on, and that is more of a summit decoration than a fundamental structure. But we are dealing in magic—in a psychological mystery. Dickens will add to this airy palace, besides his resuscitation of eccentricity from the seventeen hundreds, a peculiar sly but quite mild mockery of the bourgeois, founded upon observation that could not well be closer. Most conspicuous in *Pickwick*, it was to be revived, with certain not particularly important differences, at the close of the century, by Mr. H. G. Wells in his lighter sociological moods. Thackeray's acidity plays a lesser part. Peacock's intellectual irony is only a 'super.' The *Ingoldsby Legends*, despite their calculated robustness, are scarcely more. The Reverend Mr. Barham intrudes for a moment a bogey-man ingredient which is quite ephemeral in its effect. The macabre has never been congenial to the risible faculties of the English.

By the 'sixties and 'seventies the pages of *Punch*, particularly the illustrated jokes, are consolidating the new-found English *genre*. Calverley, about this time, is perhaps its most distinguished literary practitioner. He sums up in his smoothly

turned verses not only the wit but also the humour of England at its zenith. Two stanzas from *There Stands a City* must suffice as exhibits :

O among the dancers peerless,
  Fleet of foot and soft of eye,
Need I say to you that cheerless
  Must my days be till I die ?

And the lean and hungry raven
  As he picks my bones will start
To observe 'M.N.' engraven
  Neatly on my blighted heart.

No foreigner could have written anything like this. And of Englishmen, only one who had the root of the mystery of English humour in him and could make it flower until a couple of quatrains take the place of a whole treatise. One can read clearly in such lines the high spirits, the casual irreverence and the equally casual tolerance, the capriciousness, the gentle shoulder-shrugging social satire of the essence of our native humour.

The vogue for absurdity, sheer nonsense in Lear and in parts of Carroll, something more in Gilbert's light operas, introduced a fresh element which, while thoroughly characteristic—in spite of the recent popularity in France of *The Hunting of the Snark*—is perhaps often assigned too much honour. The inconceivable and the unintelligible are not always ludicrous, even from the vantage ground of the perambulator. These things have to be very well done—as the *Snark* is—to come off. People glorify the style because foreigners do not practise it. But it is by no means the only department of English humour that enjoys this distinction. However, this dark and wild kind of burlesque madness has a permanent pedestal in the temple of Anglo-Saxon laughter and acts often as a leaven which enriches a joke until it becomes a dish fit for an epicure :

The Walrus and the Carpenter
  Were walking close at hand ;
They wept like anything to see
  Such quantities of sand :
'If this were only cleared away,'
  They said, 'It WOULD be grand !'

'If seven maids with seven mops
  Swept it for half a year,
Do you suppose,' the Walrus said,
  'That they could get it clear ?'
'I doubt it,' said the Carpenter,
  And shed a bitter tear.

Specifically English humour has not developed to any very noticeable extent since Gilbert. The early Hardy's rural clowns can be related to those of Maupassant or Gogol. Max Beerbohm's

leg-pulling is cosmopolitan in tone. The beginning of the 'nineties, however, ushered in a craze for Cockney humour which was ministered to by the stage and the study for over thirty years—the European War gave it an artificial fillip—and is only now obsolescent with the disappearance from real life of its protagonists. Its urban sharpness, not particularly English, was mellowed, as time went on, from the coster and the horse-omnibus driver through the pseudo-philosophic night-watchmen and sailors of Mr. W. W. Jacobs and the pert private soldiers of Mr. Kipling to the rich solidity of the 1910–1920 navvy, 'Old Bill,' and the other Bairnsfather type, 'Albert,' of the New Army. The war, of course, boosted all things unquestionably English, and among them English humour, which was quite rightly considered inimitable and quite wrongly supposed to be the only humour there was. The casual 'Albert' in trench kit, with his forelock, his ''Arf a Mo, Kaiser!' and his cigarette-collecting ears, was that humour's epitome. He was a jovial satirist of grandeurs and affectations, and the real horror of his situation gave him irresistible pathos. Here one comes suddenly upon a practical illustration of the theory that humour alone has made the English great. Albert, after all, succeeded in the worst of the war jobs. No one else could have done it. One is compelled to find it a pity that he did not have a seat at the Peace Conference, where the English were for once represented by men who were minus English humour.

The politer aspects of my subject were reinforced by such men as Mr. Belloc and Mr. Milne, the successors of Carroll, who imposed a smart finish to the nursery *genre*, while retaining miraculously the *naïveté* of its essence and abiding contribution to the sum of the Saxon style. Mr. A. P. Herbert reaffirmed the cheerful racket which had languished a little in the *Punch* of the 1910–1920 period. Mr. Chesterton closes the latest epoch of evolution with an authentic, if not completely catholic, flourish. His catholicism in the religious sense may perhaps forbid the intrusion of that irreverent independence which cannot be thought of as absent from the true type. But the man who can begin a novel—*The Napoleon of Notting Hill*—with the felicitously impudent sentence 'The human race, to which so many of my readers belong,' is an English humorist of a fine water.

After history, character. It will be instructive, for the purpose of ultimate definition, to quote half a dozen different instances of modern English humour, illustrating its principal parts.

There is the humour jovial:

> There was a pause. The whole strength of the company gazed at me like a family group out of one of Edgar Allan Poe's less cheery yarns and I felt my *joie de vivre* dying at the roots.—P. G. Wodehouse, *Carry on, Jeeves.*

The humour tolerant:

The tumult increased, the invocation of Mrs. Moore continued and people who did not know what the syllables meant repeated them like a charm. They became indianized into Esmiss Esmoor, they were taken up in the street outside.—E. M. FORSTER, *A Passage to India.*

The humour irreverent:

'I'm like Socrates,' he went on, 'I'm divinely appointed to corrupt the youth, the female youth more particularly. I have a mission to educate them in the way they shouldn't go.'—ALDOUS HUXLEY, *Point Counter Point.*

The humour whimsical:

Where his wife had been the moment before was a small fox, of a very bright red. It looked at him very beseechingly, advanced towards him a pace or two, and he saw at once that his wife was looking at him from the animal's eyes.—DAVID GARNETT, *Lady into Fox.*

The humour satirical:

In Froude's case the loss of his faith turned out to be rather like the loss of a heavy portmanteau which one afterwards discovers to have been full of old rags and brickbats. Clough was made so uneasy by the loss of his that he went on looking for it everywhere as long as he lived: but somehow he could never find it.—LYTTON STRACHEY, *Eminent Victorians.*

The humour nonsensical:

On Thursday when it starts to freeze
  And hoar frost twinkles on the trees
How very readily one sees
  That these are those—but whose are these?

A. A. MILNE, *Winnie-the-Pooh.*

In complete typical expression these classifications blend as the lines and colours of an English landscape blend on an English day, moist and misty. The whole is, then, touched with a curious, elusive melancholy, a twilight less poignant than the Celtic, less reflective than the Teutonic, yet somehow profound, and fundamental in the Englishman. It is a touch that gives him, as well as his pre-eminence in the poetic output of the modern world, the famous *sangfroid habituel*—which the schoolboy translated 'his usual bloody cold'—that has presented him with material hegemony also. On this view the definition of English humour would try to depict a mental attitude in which heartiness, tolerance, irreverence, caprice, satire, and the exploitation of practical shrewdness and sheer nonsense are cemented into a solid total by an obscure feeling of resignation to evil which only hovers on the border of consciousness in the mind of the subject. It never becomes explicit, as the kindred sentiment does in many foreign types of humour, making joviality brutal, good nature scepticism,

mockery vulgar, caprice not disinterested, and satire bitter. Such a definition would be, I admit, a very flattering portrait of English humour. No doubt its impure expressions are sorry enough. But I have dealt with it as an abstraction. I have tried to isolate it from what I believe to be its borrowed plumes. Hence its present immaculate aspect, which alone I shall continue, for theoretical purposes, to discuss.

The humorists of the continent of Europe rarely carry their humour into what they most care for and practise, whether that is commerce, politics, administration, art or philosophy. But the Englishman finds his humour much more difficult to dislodge when he loves, or acts according to his love. Conversely, it is the easiest thing in the world for him to laugh at what he loves and to laugh while he loves. It is clear from the position which England occupies in modern civilisation that this peculiar aptitude has been rather an advantage to him than otherwise. It is true that in general intellectual culture he is less conspicuous than the Frenchman or the German. His social life, even, is inferior in many respects to theirs. The old *tabus* are dying harder here, the Anglo-Saxon tyranny—as also in the United States—is more difficult for the intelligent to endure than the Latin or the Teutonic. Moreover, the English masses are stupider and worse educated than those of northern Europe. Yet the average Englishman, with his clumsy manners and his awful accent, is popular and successful on the Continent, both in society and in his business, while the polished and emancipated foreign linguist in England so often fails to make himself at home. This result may be partly due to the delights of European residence as compared with the chilly glooms of English life ; but when we turn to definitely undelightful places, such as the Gold Coast, and find the same situation, we suspect that we have not yet guessed the whole truth.

The fact is that the English brand of humour, when it exists in even a fairly pure form, and is given free rein, is one of the quickest of all roads to a universal adaptability. In arctic solitudes, in tropical jungles, Englishmen have cursed as much or more than representatives of other nations, but they have never forgotten to laugh both at themselves and at their human or non-human enemies. In spite of the reputation of Englishmen for surly conceit—which is a fiction created by their deplorable education—they are the most truly sociable of people, as any foreigner who has ever bothered to investigate has invariably discovered. That celebrated hypocrisy breaks down like a house of cards if the adversary can meet them on their own humorous ground. The trouble is that so few Europeans are constitutionally able to do that, while all Englishmen assume that because of this defi-

ciency every foreigner is inferior to them and should either be ignored or make an easy victim. If Englishmen could be educated to live in accordance with their deepest nature, which is the very humour I have been treating of, there would be fewer international and also probably fewer internal problems to solve. For in England we treat men of different classes and different parts of the country from those we happen to occupy as we treat foreigners, not letting them into a secret which, being English, they actually share already.

For it is a secret, after all. Arising, as I think, from the essentially non-intellectual Anglo-Saxon character, it cannot really be explained in logical terms. English humour remains a mystery, when all is said. And, like all mysteries, it is fascinating; like all fascinating things, it is beautiful. And beauty always carries the seeds of hope. It is the spiritual sun of humanity, of humanity which cannot despair so long as it is able to see, however dimly, that golden light, and feel its eternally restorative warmth. It is necessary, if life is to continue to be worth living, for Englishmen to keep that sun in the heavens while, like Joshua, they finish the battle against the Amorites. Their own enemies are more formidable than his and the days of divinely organised miracles are past. To defeat pride, stupidity, greed and cruelty they have only one weapon, their humour. We have tried everything else. That catholic, and so world-powerful, English humour is the only thing English, contrary to popular belief, that has never yet been conquered, even by death. The last words of Charles II., in other respects a rather Frenchified person, remain to prove that immortality, and hearten us to a very real conflict.

For there are, unfortunately, signs in the sinister course of events since 1920 that Englishmen are in danger of losing their most priceless heritage, so infinitely superior to the illusory freedom which is the boast of our history books. All England's spiritual and material wealth is bound up with it. Anyone who has ever been near disaster in life knows that if he had lost his sense of humour he would have had to lose all he possessed. *Signa canant!*

JAMES CLEUGH.

THE CRISIS IN CRITICISM

A CENSORIOUS but acute writer, whose work was lately discussed in these pages,[1] has pointed out that the republic of letters is drifting into something like civil war. Her argument may be summarised thus: Until the middle of the nineteenth century the only reading public that authors ever thought of regarding was a comparatively small body of people who possessed a certain culture—limited it might be, but real—in virtue of which they could fairly claim to exercise literary judgment. They were not the only people who read, but the other readers were content to accept their opinions and follow their lead. As the nineteenth century advanced, however, literature, like politics, was subjected to increasing pressure from the *plebs*, and as the publishers responded, so the authors had to do likewise. The immediate result was an enormous expansion in the demand for fiction, to which the *plebs* is notoriously partial. This might not have been so bad if the writers of fiction had been left at liberty, as heretofore, to write as seemed good to them, but there was now imposed a stringent condition that nothing might be written that might offend plebeian prejudices. It was an unfortunate situation; for the reading *plebs* consisted of the new industrial middle class who had no tradition of culture and whose many sterling qualities did not include breadth of sympathy. Yet for a long time authors made no difficulty about accepting it, inasmuch as it seemed to represent a *concordat* between Puritanism and art on easy terms—easy because during the greater part of the century authors felt no particular interest in the matters to which the Puritans objected. Scott, Dickens, Thackeray, and Trollope might occasionally grimace at the squeamishness of the reading public, but they never dreamed of making a fuss about it. Neither did their service of God—nor of humanity—require of them that they should give offence to Mammon. The reverse, indeed, was true. For these happy Victorian authors the golden calf wore a benevolent smile and was covered with the cloak of charity. Less

[1] *Fiction and the Reading Public*, by Q. D. Leavis (*vide* the article by Mr. Eric Partridge in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1932).

fortunately placed were such writers as Meredith and Hardy. But by their time circumstances were changing fast.

There was this to be said in favour of the Puritan tradition, that, however deficient in understanding, it always preserved an honest, if distant, respect for literature. But the opening of the twentieth century witnessed the collapse of Puritanism and the emergence of a new reading public—the public discovered, or perhaps invented, but certainly exploited, by the late Lord Northcliffe. This does not deserve the honourable name of *plebs*, being a mere rabble, without knowledge, taste or standards, but cursed with a craving for printed matter of a character suitable to its low and meagre capacities. It has, however, found men and women with ready pens to give it what it wants, and these persons, being well recompensed, have lately become proportionately arrogant. Assuming the mantle of the earlier Victorian writers, they tell their mob and the world that they are the true arbiters of what is good in literature. Nay, they go further. They imply, when they do not announce, that all who observe and appreciate 'values' in literature are either fools or frauds. The term 'highbrow' is employed much as the term 'aristocrat' was during the French Revolution. It is 'off with his brow' instead of 'off with his head.' Sans-culottism has invaded literature. Such, if we understand it correctly, is the gist of Mrs. Leavis's argument. She deals mainly with the literary crisis as revealed in the art of fiction, which is its most striking aspect. It is the purpose of the present paper to consider how the crisis is reflected in the art of criticism.

The regular criticism of new books as a recognised part of the economy of letters began in England with the *Edinburgh Review* and Francis Jeffrey, and for fifty years the *Edinburgh* and its London rival, the *Quarterly*, had the field virtually to themselves. The monthly magazines such as *Blackwood*, which catered for a more popular taste, adopted reviewing as one of their features, but their influence was comparatively small. Down to the middle of the century the only periodical that made any serious attempt to compete in literary judgment with the quarterlies was the *Athenæum*, founded by Silk Buckingham in 1829. The newspaper press was not in the field at all. Its only way of noticing current literature was to lend itself to the publication of 'puffs' of books that stood no chance of being 'reviewed.' It was a vile practice, but as a bookselling proposition it was so successful that the *Edinburgh* was at last moved to Olympian wrath. The mouthpiece was Macaulay, and the occasion was the preposterous popularity of the poetical works of Mr. Robert Montgomery, who, after puffing his *Omnipresence of the Deity* into eleven editions, had already puffed his next work, *Satan*, into two. As a review

Macaulay's article is negligible, but as a statement of the function of reviewing it is a classic. Much of it is as apposite to-day as when it was written a hundred years ago:

At present, however contemptible a poem or novel may be, there is not the least difficulty in procuring favourable notices of it from all sorts of publications, daily, weekly and monthly. In the mean time, little or nothing is said on the other side. The author and publisher are interested in crying up the book. Nobody has any very strong interest in crying it down. Those who are best fitted to guide the public opinion think it beneath them to expose mere nonsense, and comfort themselves by reflecting that such popularity cannot last. This contemptuous levity has been carried too far. It is perfectly true that reputations which have been forced into an unnatural bloom fade almost as soon as they have expanded; nor have we any apprehensions that puffing will ever raise any scribbler to the rank of a classic. It is indeed amusing to turn over some late volumes of periodical works and to see how many immortal productions have within a few months, been gathered to the Poems of Blackmore and the novels of Mrs. Behn; how many 'profound views of human nature,' and exquisite delineations of 'fashionable manners,' and 'vernal, and sunny, and refreshing thoughts.' and 'high imaginings,' and 'young breathings,' and 'embodyings,' and 'pinings,' and 'minglings with the beauty of the universe,' and 'harmonies which dissolve the soul in a passionate sense of loveliness and divinity,' the world has contrived to forget.

From Macaulay's instances the reader will note that more things than a popular blend of whisky were born in 1820 and are still going strong. But of this more presently.

Detestable as the old puffing system was, there were extenuating circumstances. The old reviewers were academic to the point of pedantry in their selection of books for notice, and, taking an Olympian view of time, they were often unconscionably dilatory in pronouncing their judgments. Little attempt was made to adapt reviewing to the rapid expansion of book production. Hence puffing provided the only means by which the new or the average author could make the public aware of his existence. And the 'puff direct' at least was to this extent honest, that it did not, any more than the publisher's 'blurb' of to-day, pretend to be independent criticism. It was as a rule plainly marked 'communicated' or 'advertisement,' and if the public, thus warned, still chose to believe it all, that was their look-out. In the second half of the century the mischief of puffing was effectively countered by the rise of the weekly and monthly reviews—especially the former. The *Athenæum*, the *Spectator*, and the *Saturday Review* did what the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly* had begun by doing, but could now do no longer. They maintained the same high standards, but their outlook was wider and their methods were adapted to the changed conditions. The twenty-five years 1865-1890 may justly be described as the Golden

Age of English reviewing. It was brought to an end by the entry of the newspapers into the field of literary criticism.

At first this new phenomenon was not taken seriously, and even when in the 'nineties—largely owing to the brilliant lead of the *Daily Chronicle*—reviews became an established feature of all the leading London and provincial newspapers, the century closed with the literary weeklies still enjoying the paramount authority. But it was significant that there was no demand for new weekly journals of the *Spectator* and *Saturday* type. Several were started about this time. Most flickered out within a year or two, and even those that managed to survive were never on a sound paying basis. There was no room for them. High-class weekly journalism could not expand because it was now hemmed in by the newspaper press.[1] The next step, naturally, was for the newspaper press to invade the territory of the old-established weeklies. This was done with great boldness at the beginning of 1902, when *The Times* launched its *Literary Supplement*. The first casualty was the *Athenæum*, which obviously could not withstand a rival that, owing to its favourable situation in regard to overhead charges, was able to supply the same wares at a third of the price. A radical change in policy and appearance only made matters worse, and after a long decline it was ultimately merged in the *Nation*. *The Times* was the only daily newspaper to issue a literary supplement, but newspaper reviewing continued to develop. In the first decade of the present century authors and publishers looked more and more to the daily press and less and less to the weeklies for the notices that made the difference between the success and the failure of a book.

The transfer of power—one hesitates to say authority in this connexion—from the weeklies to the dailies was accompanied by another change. The old tradition had been that reviewing must by its nature be anonymous. It was an editorial function, because if a book was worth comment it was a public event and must be treated accordingly. The reviewer must speak, not in his own person, but as the mouthpiece of his journal. It was not permissible for him to use the personal 'I,' but only the editorial 'we.' This was no mere difference of pronouns. It was, in intention at least, an insistence that personal preferences must be subordinated to standards of value. It was a good ruling even if, human nature being what it is, it was not invariably effective. But with the growth of the newspaper spirit in the 'nineties the rule began to be broken. The signed review made its appearance, which

[1] Among the short-lived were the *Pilot* (1900–4) and the *Review of the Week* (1899–1901). More fortunate were the *Outlook* (1898–1928) and the *Speaker* (1890), which in 1907 became the *Nation*. The latter, after absorbing the *Athenæum*, was itself absorbed by its junior rival, the *New Statesman* (1913) in 1931.

implied a different and a lower conception of the function of reviewing. We have the curious paradox that the more attention the newspapers paid to books, the less important did books and judgments of books become. From being 'events' to be discussed books became 'news' to be reported. Hence, on the false analogy of the signed news article by 'our special correspondent,' we came to have the signed review.

The pioneers of this pernicious innovation were—we mention the fact with natural diffidence—two Scottish literary adventurers, Andrew Lang and the Rev. William Robertson Nicoll. Both were exceedingly able, well-meaning and unscrupulous men, especially Nicoll, though Lang had the more entertaining and distinguished mind. Both were ingenious and beyond belief persistent and industrious. Their output of reviews and literary articles was formidable. None before them had seen or seized the commercial profit open to the middleman of literature. But—and the fact is to be underlined—neither of these initiators lived by reviewing alone. They both reviewed because they were both literary advisers to important publishing firms. Lang was with Longmans, Green & Co., and edited, with copious contributions from his own pen, *Longman's Magazine*. He also became literary editor of the *Morning Post*, which 'featured' his name for long reviews, in addition to which he was ever willing to review for all and sundry. Robertson Nicoll was more original. A minister of the old Free Church of Scotland, he gave up a promising pastoral career early in the 'eighties, partly owing to a failure of health, partly because he had made up his mind that journalism was his true *métier*. Entering the employ of Hodder & Stoughton, he presently persuaded them to start the *British Weekly* under his direction, and amazingly clever direction it quickly proved to be. Just as Disraeli had seen that his time required that the Tory Party should be 'educated,' so Nicoll saw that his time required that English Nonconformity should be 'educated'—*i.e.*, in the literary way it should go and the literary thoughts it should think. Along that path lay his own interest, and the *British Weekly* was his instrument. As he had shrewdly suspected, he soon found that there existed a big, solid and suggestible public of excellent people, people with money in the bank, who were thirsting to know something about current literature provided they could be satisfied that it was not in any degree sinful. Nicoll satisfied them, 'so plesaunt was his *in principio*'; for the *British Weekly* always opened proceedings with a sermon by the editor, followed by what he was careful to call a 'prayer,' though it more resembled a collect. There then came political news, very well-informed, of the right Nonconformist Liberal shade; social news about the doings of truly good people only and lashings of chapel news.

Finally there was Nicoll's supreme achievement, the literary section, which was devoured by many who could not bear even to taste any other part of the paper. Nicoll wrote most of it himself, principally over the pseudonym 'Claudius Clear,' but also over his own initials. The signature made no difference. Everybody knew who 'Claudius Clear' was. The success of the *British Weekly* led to the establishment in 1891 of the *Bookman*, under the same capable editorship. The *Bookman* was purely literary: at the same time it was guaranteed blameless; and it was enhanced with pictures. It was, and to this day deservedly remains, successful. In addition to these Nicoll had his finger in other literary pies—some baked by his own firm, some not.

Lang and Nicoll succeeded because of the astute comprehensiveness of their appeal. They could write in a manner that the semi-literate could understand, while enjoying, without resentment, the feeling that they were being instructed. At the same time those who had higher pretensions respected them for being well-read men with well-trained minds and nimble pens. But of course, and most unhappily, it was this very respectability of theirs that made it possible for Lang and Nicoll to begin the debauching of the art of reviewing by shifting the focus of interest from the work criticised to the personality of the critic and the needs of his readers. That was their prime offence, and if they had done nothing more they would have done a sufficiently grave disservice to literature. But they did something more. They introduced 'tied house' reviewing—*i.e.*, they professed to be independent critics when in fact, as we have seen, they were in the pay of particular publishing houses—and in addition 'multiple' reviewing, which magnified the mischief. To these three fruitful abominations Nicoll for his part added a fourth—the deliberate subordination of critical judgment to the prejudices of his readers. He regarded this as not only not shocking, but as positively meritorious, as also did his readers, to whom he had the effrontery to declare that in his humble way he was but following in the godly path of R. H. Hutton! 'Journalists often forget,' he wrote when that great man died, 'that they are writing for a baptized people, but the editors of the *Spectator* did not, and have had their reward.' It is difficult to know which to admire most—the sanctimoniousness or the cynicism of the remark, or the craft with which the two are blended.

No wonder that, mingled with all the admiration, there was an uncomfortable suspicion that Nicoll represented a new and sinister element in literary journalism. Andrew Lang, enjoying in his elvish way the *rôle* of Satan reproving sin, broke into satiric verse about his rival's multiple reviewing, while Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was moved to honest, unamused indignation and protested.

Unluckily, Sir Arthur was not so good a controversialist as a story-teller. Nicoll had little difficulty in turning the laugh against him, and went his wicked way in future unmolested and triumphing. In the years from the beginning of the century to the outbreak of the war newspaper reviewing reached its zenith and signed reviewing became the rule. Even those ancient strongholds of anonymity, the quarterlies, capitulated to the new fashion, though, as their literary articles had long since ceased to be reviews of current literature, this did not perhaps greatly signify. There were exceptions. *The Times Literary Supplement* remained, as it still remains, strictly anonymous, though it occasionally published a signed general article ; and there was not much signed reviewing in the provincial newspapers,[3] for the reason, no doubt, that provincial reviewing is not as a rule the work of professional writers.

Let us now skip twenty years and imagine some literary Rip van Winkle, who (lucky man) has been comparatively asleep since 1913, waking up in the present year of grace and anxious to get some guidance to the labyrinth of modern publishing by reading reviews. He would not fail to note three great changes. Turning first to the ' high-class ' weeklies, he would be grieved to find them diminished in number and influence and living more or less precariously. The journal for most bookish people is *The Times Literary Supplement*, which he is glad to remark has changed little, and observes, with even greater strictness than before, the rule of anonymity. Any satisfaction he may get from this will be, we fear, more than discounted by his dismay at what passes for literary criticism in the daily press. There the book columns are no longer made up of notices by different hands, but of one long, breathless article in which some popular writer—preferably a best-selling novelist—gives his or her necessarily scamped and scanty first impressions of such new books as he or she has been persuaded to look at. Thirdly, our Rip van Winkle will be stunned by the literary development of two of the old Sunday newspapers, which contain column upon column of signed review matter flanked by publishers' advertisements in every kind of blatant ' display ' type. Lastly, if he studies the leading provincial newspapers, he will find that the space allotted to books has been drastically reduced and that the quality of the reviewing has almost equally deteriorated.

Our Rip, of course, knows nothing of the monstrous development of newspaper ' trustification ' that has come about since the war and has affected every department of journalism. But, being naturally intelligent and further assisted by a long oblivion

[3] A curious exception is provided by the *Manchester Guardian*, whose reviews have for many years been initialled, and lately have occasionally been signed.

he can perhaps put two and two together. He can infer, that is to say, that there is some connexion between the shrinkage of provincial reviewing and the formidable expansion of reviewing in London Sunday newspapers from the fact that provincial newspapers do not get nearly as many publishers' advertisements as they used to get, whereas the Sunday papers get a vast amount more—far more, indeed, than any other journals.

From that it is an easy step to discover that, owing to improved methods of distribution, the leading Sunday papers have achieved a national circulation bearing with it metropolitan authority. In so far, therefore, as they claim to be guides to current literature, they have a double edge. They cut out the old literary weeklies and the local dailies. The case of the Scottish reading public is peculiarly interesting. Until 1914 these honest and thoughtful people—lawyers, doctors, ministers of religion, and others of various callings—were well regarded in the publishing world as potential readers. According as they lived in the east or the west, they took their first impressions of new books from the columns of the *Scotsman* or the *Glasgow Herald* and checked them from the judgments of the *Spectator* or the *Athenæum*. The national ethic did not countenance the circulation of Sunday newspapers. But the war changed all that. Newsboys, as a matter of course, stationed themselves at every church door awaiting the 'skailing' of worshippers whose traditions had to yield to the dictates of common, or rather agonised, humanity. '*Facilis descensus Averno.*' The war ended, but Scottish people still take the London Sunday newspapers, if only to be *au courant* with the literary casualties and decorations. The habit has become established, and is even regarded as laudable. For why pay sixpence for the *Spectator* when the *Observer* (which means, after all, the same thing) can give you for twopence even more about letters, art, and music by equally well-known critics, with Mr. Garvin's expansive opinions about the world, a whole lot of news about the world's wife, and Torquemada's crossword thrown into the bargain ?

The metropolitan daily press has also contributed to the decay of provincial reviewing by its increasing competition with local newspapers and the consequent imposition on provincial readers of the desultory opinions of the 'stunt' reviewers. Allusion has already been made to these. They are employed mainly by the London morning newspapers, which now circulate daily through the greater part of Great Britain. London evening papers, in the nature of the case, cannot have such a circulation, but when they employ a 'stunt' reviewer, he, like the bed-bug, 'gets there just the same,' because his pronouncements are 'syndicated' to provincial evening papers at a modest rate that in the aggregate

recoups the original contractors for the handsome fee they have engaged to pay and leaves a margin of profit.

What we have called—using the convenient jargon of the day—the 'stunt' reviewer represents the last degradation of the practice of signed reviewing. He works on the supposed strength of his name; and his own caprices, qualified by a prudent regard for the limitations of his readers and the requirement of his proprietors, are his only standards. His usual title to lay down the law about books is that he has himself written a considerable number of popular books—novels, as a rule—which may, of course, be good, but may equally well be bad, even extremely so. In a casual or modish way his work is bound to be readable, even amusing (though for some readers and in some cases it rapidly tends to become tedious), but it is rare to find in it any backbone. The only 'stunt' reviewer who was able to present a backbone over a prolonged period was the late Arnold Bennett. But Bennett, for various reasons of character and achievement, was in a class by himself. Even so he was neither invariably nor lastingly happy in it. It is no great secret that towards the end of his *Evening Standard* career he also declined as a seller of the books he recommended.

Let us turn from the 'stunt' reviewer—who, after all, is the least important, as he is the most truly to be pitied, of his tribe, inasmuch as his function is to write for people who do not know what criticism is and about books which cannot wholly be either within his choice or his capacity—and consider the main body of reviewing that claims to be serious, *i.e.*, the reviewing that is done for the Sunday newspapers and the weeklies. The first thing about it that emerges is that most of it is in the hands of a comparatively small body of men and women, and the second is that these same hands write books as well as reviews. An ethical question at once arises. A. has B.'s new book for review. He thinks it bad; but how can he say what he thinks when he has a book of his own coming out next month, which will in all likelihood be reviewed by B.? He is probably further embarrassed by the fact that he and B. are personally acquainted, or at least have many acquaintances in common. Accordingly he praises and is praised in return. If A. and B. could write anonymously they could afford to be honest men. But they like to see their names in print. It is good publicity, and publicity is bread and butter to all of us who are in the writing line. We may hate the system, but there is no getting away from it. Nor does the scandal end here. Many professional reviewers not only write books, but are employed as publishers' readers; and there is reason to believe that they do not always refuse to review books that have been published on their advice. Logically speaking,

why should they? It is merely on the grounds of literature that the practice is indefensible. The connexion between reviewing and 'reading' was shamelessly avowed not long ago, when an enterprising publisher, advertising a new book, quoted the favourable opinion of a well-known critic, but omitted to state that the opinion was not given in the capacity of reviewer, but in the capacity of reader to the firm!

It may be claimed for signed reviewing that it affords some protection against personal malice or jealousy being passed off under the guise of criticism. The answer is that it does not. Although literary London forms a kind of society, it is not homogeneous. There are various gangs, and, like the gangs of Chicago and the racecourses, they have their rivalries and feuds. On the whole, it is true, they keep the peace fairly well, for 'corbies dinna pike out corbies' een.' Their weapons are usually kept for those who do not or will not belong to one gang or another. The late D. H. Lawrence is an admirable case in point. He ignored the gangsters when he did not carelessly reprobate them, and was never forgiven.

We have already suggested that signed reviewing, by its implied stress on the critic's personality, militates against the preservation of standards of value. Even when he strives to be perfectly honest he is constantly tempted to sacrifice truth to cleverness and to think of a book as an opportunity primarily for the display of his own brightness or profundity. When we add to this the duty of log-rolling and the necessity for dealing with a huge number of books in a very short time, it is no wonder that most contemporary reviewing is not distinguishable in quality from the 'puffing' of Macaulay's day. If proof be needed, it is supplied by the publishers' advertisements, many of which are mere lists of epithets culled from reviews. Here is a recent example. Three books are being advertised with the aid of press opinions. Book A is 'fascinating,' 'indispensable,' 'clever,' 'perfect,' 'delectable,' 'charming,' 'helpful.' Book B is 'striking,' 'sane,' 'acute,' 'critical and incisive,' 'cleverly written and exhaustive,' 'vitally interesting,' 'careful, sane, complete.' Book C—a work of fiction, as may be inferred—is 'amazing,' 'thrilling,' 'wonderful,' 'astonishing,' 'miraculous,' 'dramatic,' 'superb,' 'exciting,' 'unbelievable.' If it be urged that adjectives out of their context can always be made to look ridiculous, what can be said of the following? They are all from utterances of persons who are presumably sane:

What a glowing sunlit gift for our dull day this is! The luscious Italian scene glows in all its colours.

As nearly perfect as anything human has any right to be.

She has given us something so individual, so fresh, so interesting that

the novel-reader who does not fly to it will be unworthy of the proud name of novel-reader.

One of the freshest and most delicate books that have appeared in years.

Everything that Mr. —— writes bears the stamp of a distinguished mind.

The list could be made funnier if time were taken to search the files for the snows of yester month, and it could be prolonged indefinitely. We do not question that the works to which these moving tributes have been paid have some merit. What we do question is if one of them will be heard of three months hence. They will have been swept away by the new horde of masterpieces while slowly, and it may be heart-breakingly, the few books that are destined to a longer survival are being discovered by readers here and there.

Dishonesty, whether from choice or necessity, is not the only crime of contemporary reviewing. One is constantly being offended, even in the work of the pretentious critics, by *gaffes* that make one wonder if education is regarded as a value at all. In times past there has been a recognised *corpus* of learning that was assumed to be common to the critic and his readers. Now we seem to be approaching a stage when one is tempted to believe that few critics ever read, or ever have read, anything apart from their commercial dollop. Regarding this, our paper can close with a story that is only too true to be good. Some months ago a well-known bookseller heard the bell of his shop door clang, and came out of his office hoping, in these hard times, to find a customer. He found, however, what he took to be a sixth-form schoolboy. This young gentleman greeted him blandly and asked if he had on his shelves a bibliography of a difficult and much-discussed writer, recently deceased. The man of books produced the volume. The visitor was too profuse in his thanks. He was no buyer. 'So awfully good of you!' he said. 'I only want to have a look at it. You see, the ——' (naming a well-known literary journal) 'has sent me this chap's posthumous book for review, and never having read any of his other things, I wanted to see what he had written!'

Donald and Catherine Carswell.

JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN THE RADICAL[1]

THE *Life* of Joseph Chamberlain has been awaited with impatience and deferred hope by all his friends, and meanwhile two questions have been uppermost in their anxious minds. The first is answered conclusively for all by the opening volume which has now appeared, covering the years from his birth to the fall of the Gladstone Government in June 1885; but the second is not answered, for those who were not his friends and some others, by this disclosure of the scale on which the work has been planned.

The first question arose from doubts as to whether Mr. J. L. Garvin was the right man to have been entrusted with the biography. This volume more than allays any such misgivings. Let me express these doubts and their dispersal in terms of the most English of sports. Many of us have often watched at the wickets some mighty hitter whom we favoured and, while cheering his sixes, have known that he was capable of the really great innings that he did not give us. Then at last he does it, exercising just that restraint we have always wished for, and our hearts are all the warmer towards him because we feel that he has justified our belief in him and that we ourselves have in some way shared in his success. A few bad strokes, being human, of course he makes, and our hearts jump into our mouths (if he had popped up the words 'decade' and 'half-decade' one single time more I am sure he would have been caught in the slips!); but, looking through the notes of interrogation I have pencilled in the margin of my copy of this book, I cannot find one that I can mark down as a real 'chance.' It is a great innings, and, to change the metaphor, I am not sure that he is not the first of my contemporaries, who have charmed us by their writings in different ephemeral branches of literature—who, we knew, had it in them to do great things—the first of them who has set himself to write a classic and has succeeded.[2] The qualities which have impressed

[1] *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain*, by J. L. Garvin (vol. i., 1836–1885): Macmillan & Co.

[2] The publishers' apology for the lack of an index to this volume I cannot accept. To a reviewer the omission is frankly unpardonable: after the trouble it has caused me, and the evasions by means of generalisations it has forced on me, I am inclined to regard it as a discourtesy.

themselves most on my mind are his modesty of approach to his subject in all its aspects, the youthful freshness with which he revels in the colour and atmosphere of past times, and the restraint and generous impartiality (this alone betrays that he is as old as the rest of us) of his judgments on persons and policies.

The second question is not so easily or so briefly answered. Is the life of Chamberlain really worth such stupendous exercisings of the pen? *Punch* has calculated that 'The *Life* of Joseph Chamberlain will consist of six volumes, about three thousand six hundred pages and more than a million words,' and adds the comment, 'we doubt whether any other writer could have made it longer.' One might, of course, at once give the answer that any life written as Mr. Garvin writes this, with, among his other qualities, that rare one of the true story-teller, holds the reader's interest so long as events, dramatic in their sequence and their trend, furnish the material. And of political drama this volume is full, fuller even than some of the biographies of great statesmen which have recently appeared, and, like this, are invaluable records of the history which some of us older people saw partially in the making.

But, if he can maintain throughout the same high standard of workmanship, these volumes will have an appeal carrying them far beyond those circles, diminishing, alas! daily, for whom 'politics' have a fascination; for he gives to it a quality which stamps the highest class of fiction—that which is popularly described as character-study. Let me hasten to add that he has not given us history in the form created by Dr. Emil Ludwig, as it was whispered he might. That form, which has had many English imitators, has imposed on millions of people of many tongues; a best-seller might certainly have been written by applying to Chamberlain the treatment which these masses of the public accepted as adequate for Christ and Napoleon. No, this history is good solid stuff; there is evidence of untiring research, of the sifting of innumerable documents and the weighing by ripe judgment of claim and counter-claim to responsibility and to credit. At the same time it is the story of a man in action, alive, moving, growing and expanding, his impulses flinging him at moments aside from the path to his ordained goal, but his motive remaining constant; and we close this volume our minds gripped by the personality which events have hammered into shape fit for further ventures. Even those of us who thought they knew all about him lay down the book with the expectancy which only a good book brings, asking ourselves what the sequel will unfold. We still like stories of this kind to be long.

One more word about Mr. Garvin's literary craftsmanship. In the first seventy pages he gives us, admirably and with much

new material, the story of young Chamberlain, his breeding, education, and domestic life, his career in business, his happinesses and sorrows in his home, sorrows beyond the ordinary lot of man, and his expansion into public life. We start then, on the part which he played in his country's history, with that personal background vivid and fixed in our mind's eye. But from then onwards he is swept into public affairs, beyond the author's control, and in the consequent telling of national history the personal background becomes dim. It is still, however, the background, and we must be reminded of it, if we are to keep our sense of proportion. So Mr. Garvin raises a curtain at the back of the stage, and gives us something as deeply moving as anything in the book. It is best told simply, to speak for itself. In 1882 Frederick Cavendish, a near connexion of Mr. Gladstone, had been appointed Chief Secretary for Ireland, a post which Chamberlain had expected to hold; a few days after his appointment he was stabbed to death in Phœnix Park, refusing, as we now know, passively to see his companion done to death before his eyes. Chamberlain was ready to replace him, and his brother Arthur writes:

> Dear Joe,—I cannot believe that W. E. G. would be so mean as to ask you to take *now* the appointment that he did not offer when it seemed your due.
>
> But if you go over there it is impossible that we should let you go alone. I hope and believe that there will be no danger for the new Secretary, but there must be a terrible strain, and if you think it your duty to accept the post, you must allow one of us to be with you—not to get in your way and follow you about, but to be handy when you have time to talk, so that you should have one of your own family to talk with.
>
> I am waiting now to see Dick and Herbert and Walter, to settle who should go with you. I think I ought to be allowed to go and have agreed with Louey [his wife] so—but must consult with the others to obtain their agreement.
>
> In any event one of us will come by first train to-morrow. . . .

What a background—as fortifying as Mother Earth was to Antæus!

But to go back to our second question. The final answer is to be found in the subject of the biography. There are some of us who think that Chamberlain will, in English memories, fill a legendary niche in politics akin to that which has been assigned to Dickens in fiction. In the period dealt with by this volume (and, I am prepared at the proper time to maintain, throughout his career) Chamberlain appealed directly *to* the same class of Englishmen as Dickens and *for* the same classes. (How he extended that appeal we shall see later.) Dickens pleaded with the middle class for the lower classes, speaking to them in their

own language, and from their own outlook; his great contemporary Thackeray did not know that language, and that outlook was closed to him. Chamberlain used the same language and stood, by training and breeding, at much the same viewpoint; the Whigs, who controlled the political party with which he had to work, understood neither. Dickens aroused the consciences of middle-class Englishmen; Chamberlain gave them by converting theory into practice large satisfaction. Indeed, it would be interesting to tabulate the abuses which Dickens exposed and see for the removal of how many of them Chamberlain was directly or indirectly responsible. To anyone who wishes to follow up this affinity, based upon a common, merely English, ancestry, it is interesting to read some of Chamberlain's appeals, which in thought and style are very Dickens. Take one only, which Mr. Garvin says 'left its mark upon the memory of Birmingham':

> We bring up a population in the dank, dreary, filthy courts and alleys . . . we surround them with noxious influences of every kind, and place them under conditions in which the observance of even ordinary decency is impossible; and what is the result? . . . Their fault! Yes, it is legally their fault, and when they steal we send them to gaol and when they commit murder we hang them. . . . It is no more the fault of these people that they are vicious and intemperate than it is their fault that they are stunted, deformed, debilitated and diseased.

Both were what Mr. Garvin calls, choosing a conventional label, Radicals, though many now would agree with Hartington when he told the Queen, in 1885, that Chamberlain's ideas 'almost amounted to Socialism,' using the term loosely as Whigs used it then and many others use it to-day. But Chamberlain's added claim to legendary fame is that, as the man of action, he took a more practical means of saving the lower classes than mere appeals to the middle class; he placed them in a position to save themselves by an extension of the franchise. When in 1884, largely owing to Chamberlain's *intransigeance* within the Liberal Party, the electorate had been increased from 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 voters, he writes: 'A revolution more important and more far-reaching than any previously accomplished in English history has been peacefully effected.'

The peaceful accomplishment of revolution, by constitutional means, was Chamberlain's aim and, in astonishing measure, his achievement. Whether he considered the parliamentary system as ideally the best—and there is every evidence that he regarded it as a natural outcome of the English genius, and therefore sacred to his patriotic soul—he recognised it and used it as the only existing means of giving effect to the will of the people. How he forced vitality into that system and worked it to his ends should certainly be told as fully as possible, all the more fully as

he, more than any man before him, made it produce practical results. But in so using it he overstrained it, and exposed its shortcomings, and is in that respect responsible, more than any statesman of his time, for the decline of public confidence in its efficacy. Above all did he, for good or ill, shatter faith in the two-party system, a characteristic English adjunct to the parliamentary institution, allowing for the swing of the political pendulum and ensuring the retention of the English collective mind within that half-way house, dear to its instinct, and exonerating it from the fate of pressing on to a logical conclusion. All this makes of his life a political history of the times.

Fully, too, should be told his efforts that failed, owing to this system in which he worked, to carry in time the policies and measures which the moment required to prevent the growth of greater evils, whether in the sphere of social or foreign affairs. So far from unduly swelling the narration of such failures Mr. Garvin has at times presumed a little too much on the knowledge of his younger readers, on whose hearts are not graven, as on ours, such events as the death of Gordon and Majuba. But, on the whole, he has shown a mastery of the art of lucid concentration. The nine pages, for instance, given to Chamberlain's attack on the 'Coffin Ships,' and his personal defeat over his 'Merchant Shipping Bill,' could hardly be shortened by a word, or greatly improved by extension.

I have chosen this example from several because it is the first severe check of its kind which Chamberlain experienced. Here, as on other occasions, he had, with foresight and a unique mastery of the details of the problem, planned and submitted for parliamentary sanction a reform which the nation demanded; in spite of splendid courage and generalship, he had to retreat before opposition within his own nominal party. (How right he was is proved by the later piecemeal adoption of his proposals.) This confirmed him in his view that, if he was to get things *done*, he must bring the will of the people to exercise pressure from outside on Parliament itself as well as on the party. Both were to him but instruments for the attainment of his object, neither were for him the ark of the covenant as others then esteemed them. And this it was that not only exposed him to the calumny, waves and sweeping torrents of calumny, from more orthodox political minds in his own time who regarded him as a demagogue; but as is evident from some of the reviews of this book which have already appeared, it is still the gravamen of the charge brought against him by party politicians.

In the notes I have made, to replace in some measure the truant index, I find no less than fourteen referring to Chamberlain's own words emphasising his fundamental principles

and deliberate intention in this connexion. Of those I can retrace there is his reply to Harcourt in 1880, 'Give us a policy we like, and you may be certain of our assistance in or out of the Government'; or again, as to office, 'I will take it, if it comes my way in a form in which it presents the opportunity of doing something considerable for my opinions.' For, I repeat, he wanted to get things *done*. Froude, who 'detested Radicalism in general but desired efficient government,' writes to him in 1883: 'You seem to me to be the one member of the Cabinet who looks beyond the division list of this or the next session, who knows what he wants to do, and means if he can to do it.' To Morley, Chamberlain writes the same year: 'Unless I can secure for the nation results similar to those which have followed the adoption of my policy in Birmingham, it will have been a sorry exchange to give up the Town Council for the Cabinet.'

How was he to give effect to these principles? It was in those wonderful two and a half years of his Birmingham mayoralty that he learnt how to make representative institutions a means of getting things *done*. The story of how he carried out his boast, 'In twelve months by God's help the town shall not know itself,' how in 1876 he was able to write to Jesse Collings: 'I think I have now almost completed my municipal programme. . . . The Town will be parked, paved, assized, marketed, Gas-and-Watered and improved—all as the result of three years' active work'—this story is related by Mr. Garvin with the right impressiveness to mark it as the source and origin of his purpose and his methods in a wider sphere.

His genius for organisation very nearly enabled him to make of Parliament as effective a machine for the production of practical results as he had made of the local authority. The creation of the Caucus, on which Mr. Garvin throws some new light, and which he discusses with impartiality, gave him so complete an offensive armament and stronghold of defence, that his power alarmed his enemies. He himself summed up the merits which made this organisation feared when, writing to Morley in 1878, he said: 'The Caucus is force, enthusiasm, zeal, activity, movement, popular will and the rule of the majority—the Seven Deadly Sins in fact.' But he never obtained in national affairs the supreme control which he exercised in his own city. By the irony of fate this intensely practical statesman, English in every fibre of his being, had in the periods of his greatest power to serve under Scottish masters, Gladstone and Balfour, whose caution and subtlety irritated him and neutralised his 'sagacious audacity.' It was they who blocked the way to his advancement to the Premiership. But to understand why, in actual accomplishment, he fell short of the object he set out to attain, why in other and

even weightier instances than the Merchant Shipping Bill he was compelled to leave it to successors to justify his foresight by adopting his measures, why his efforts to find, in time, a practical solution of the Irish Home Rule tangle (and, may it be said here, of the problem of Imperial economic union ?) were frustrated, leaving us in these times to deal with the fulfilments of his Cassandra prophecies—to find the answer to these questions it is essential to grasp what Chamberlain's political objects fundamentally implied.

That is to be learnt from this volume as it never would have been learnt from any less consecutive history of his development—the history of the rise of this great mind to maturity. What strikes one most in this development is its consistency, a consistency which resulted not only from a crude strength of soul, common to all those with generations of nonconformist blood in their veins, who believe that their individual spiritual destiny—that obsession of some forms of Protestant egoism—hangs on strictest adherence to every negation in the creed of their forefathers. It was a consistency laid like a solid foundation, layer on layer, compact of the experience of life, narrowing as purpose concentrates and grows more definite, but the only foothold if one would stand and not fall—and the great are those who stand. In this sense Chamberlain was great beyond dispute. The enunciation of his policy (the same in essence which he had always pursued, but tempered, tried, and refined to the perfect instrument) in his ' unauthorised ' Radical Programme of 1886 is based on the three F's of his earlier days—Free Land, Free Schools, Free Church. The enemy of liberty for him was and remained unearned privilege.

It is here necessary to digress, for we observe him in this volume often compelled to suspend his struggle for social liberty while he endeavours to clear away obstructions in his path—foreign crises, Irish difficulties, and all the other ills which a nation among nations is heir to. On these occasions the practical mind is seen at work, and he shows a rare understanding of the real issues underlying the popular and prejudiced presentation of a problem. But they can be for him but side-issues, enlarging his outlook if you will, but they are not the main work. Those who suspect these excursions of occupying his whole-time thought know little of official life and its exacting claims on the physical and mental powers of a Minister, for whom the clock ticks out the inexorable minutes on a twenty-four hour dial. And there never was a better Ministerial head of a department—ask any old civil servant who served under him—than Chamberlain. It was from his own department that his own measures of reform emanated, and, when in the Cabinet, he had to devote all his best

energies and thought to these. It is important that this simple sum in physical energy and in hours and minutes should not, as many simple things, be ignored in judging a man's deeds and motives. Above all, do not let us underrate its bearings on the question of Chamberlain's personal responsibility for decisions of the Gladstone Cabinet on matters—vital to the interest of the nation—for which other Ministers with other departments were responsible.

This is not the place to elaborate the theory of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, but I have touched on the point as I think Mr. Garvin shows a slight tendency to exaggerate the influence of these, in a sense, extraneous questions on Chamberlain's political development, as if through them he had grown out of a narrower conception of national liberty. I am probably quite unnecessarily anxious, as to the succeeding volumes, in suspecting a slightly apologetic treatment in this volume of some of Chamberlain's radical views at the time I am referring to—for example, as regards his theory of 'Ransom'; sensing, quite wrongly I hope, a tendency to lead up to a later explanation of the inconsistency with which Chamberlain's detractors charge him. For I find for instance his theory of Ransom—wanting perhaps in the scientific economic precision which attempts to explain, to our further confusion, our present difficulties—I find that both in inspiration and in content this theory is a logical outcome of the fundamental principles of freedom (the three F's) which were his very life-blood. This is from the speech of June 5, 1885:

> If you will go back to the early history of our social system you will find that . . . every man was born into the world with national rights, with a right to share in the great inheritance of the community, with a right to a part of the land of his birth. Private ownership has taken the place of these communal rights, and this system has become so interwoven with our habits and usages, it has been so sanctioned by law and protected by custom, that it might be very difficult and perhaps impossible to reverse it. But then I ask what ransom will property pay for the security which it enjoys? . . .

The underlying creed of which such views and theories were the outcrop is held, rightly I think, by many who followed him, to have been his to the end. It is certainly what gave him clean and immediate contact with Colonial thought when he entered upon his great Imperial phase. Merriman, coming from South Africa to England in 1885, gave it the first recorded response, he said:

> In the Colonies we have everything you are trying to get, and more besides. We have realised the Radical ideal, and there is not a man even among the most conservative of us who does not hold opinions compared with which those of your extreme Left are quite moderate.

Briefly Chamberlain, as his enemies perceived, was out to fight and abolish unearned privilege, wherever he found it, and privilege, attacked, defended itself implacably. Here I think is the cause of his failure ever to achieve supreme political power.

First, he had to overcome privilege to win entry into the narrow circle of 'governing classes,' who for centuries had kept political power within a strict preserve. It is difficult for anyone born in the twentieth century to grasp the full meaning of his words, when at last he had been admitted to the Cabinet. Writing to Dr. Dale, of Birmingham, he says: 'There is no reason now why in the future men without connection or rank may not run on even terms with the "governing" families. It is a hard pill for the Whigs.' This entrenchment won, he pushed on. His great strength was that he never suffered from what, in these days of over self-analysis, is called 'an inferiority complex,' in face of the silent ostracism which these governing classes imposed on those of different birth, education, and religion from their own. He believed staunchly that what he stood for in these respects made as good a man as any other; he met frigid opposition with a dignity as tranquil as its own and without aggressiveness, but hot contempt he could and did overwhelm with blistering counter.

It is difficult, in the ampler social conditions of to-day, to realise with what hope and zeal privilege charged its opponents with uncouthness and a lack of superficial culture. So successful were Chamberlain's enemies in establishing such a reputation for him that to meet him in person for the first time was a shock and revelation to many. In the 'seventies 'Leslie Stephen . . . thought him "a very pleasant intelligent person" in spite of his repute as a Republican bugbear.' A writer to an American newspaper who had seen him in Parliament in 1876 says: 'He is the very opposite in appearance and manner of the professional demagogue. . . . Mr. Chamberlain is terse, polished and brilliant. . . .' Here and there throughout the book are many instances of the same pleasant disillusionment, but once more the index fails me, and I am driven back on to one of my own greatest younger recollections, my first meeting with him, after which I remarked with naïve astonishment to my companion: 'Why, the man's a gentleman!'

Whether this weapon was a fair one or not for his enemies to use, it recoiled on their own heads. But good cause they had to hate him. In attacking privilege itself he was all aggression, going on from audacity to audacity, 'sagacious audacity' which made it the more formidable. His whole soul and being were devoted to sweeping it away, wherever it stood between him and

his main objective—'How to promote the greater happiness of the masses of the people, how to increase their enjoyment of life.' Others had outdone him before, on the same ground, in vehemence but not in strength; for he led the first organised attack, his supporters well in hand, seeking revolution by peaceful means. *Laisser faire*, leaving in possession, was a doctrine foreign to his nature, now and throughout his political career. At the moment when, all his plans developed, his main attack is launched Mr. Garvin sees him,

'The bugbear of the possessing classes whether Conservative or Whig, and the chief object of their anathemas, he draws upon himself the displeasure of the Crown. Breaking through the former bounds of Victorian statesmanship and leadership he rouses a spirit of change deeper, more far reaching than that of 1832 or 1868. The consequences are felt to this day.'

Could he have won, could he have accomplished by peaceful revolution the removal of the abuses against which Communism and revolts of violence are raising angry storms to-day; could he have organised the nation and the Empire socially and economically and set their feet on the path of human happiness to which he had guided his fellow-citizens? Throughout the period covered by this volume the gods seemed to smile on him. They raised up Dilke. So invincible seemed the alliance of these two great men that all was possible. With Dilke on his right hand, Dilke marked by every qualification which the governing classes demanded of an equal, Chamberlain's vulnerable flank was covered in the advance to political dominance, with every hope of attaining to it in time—before, like Disraeli, he should find that sufferance was accorded by privilege only to impotence.

Mr. Garvin closes vol. i. with the fall of Gladstone's Government in 1885. 'It was,' he says, 'the end, after somewhat more than fifty years, of the epoch of politics opened in 1832.' He has come to the conclusion that it also marks a definite stage in Chamberlain's career—'There let us leave him at the height of his political dreams and at the top of his own confidence. . . . Still well under fifty, and looking and feeling no more than thirty.' I have before me as I write an engraved portrait of Chamberlain painted at this time. It was presented by him to Dilke, on whose death it was given to me by Miss Gertrude Tuckwell.

'The things that changed all in Chamberlain's career were to begin in a few weeks,' and last among these things, shadows thrown forward from his next volume, Mr. Garvin mentions the eclipse of Dilke as a Cabinet Minister, one of these elements which 'make in real life and politics a melodrama too complex in improbabilities for any stage.' I think he is right. Melodrama from the

Olympian point of view, but tragedy for those human puppets with whom the gods played. Tragedy which still wrings the hearts of those of us who, as younger men, knew and loved the Dilke of later years. Tragedy in which the plottings of politics had a share ; of these Dilke was a victim, to what extent we shall never know until the time when are brought to light ' the hidden things of darkness—and then shall every man have praise of God.'

Mr. Garvin says much of the alliance and friendship of these two great men, but he says nothing to which those who cherish a sense of loyalty to both of them can take exception ; most of what he says commands their gratitude. His short sketch of Dilke in chap. xv. is adequate and enlightening, and it is here that he voices his own consciousness of tragedy when, referring to the partnership founded and cemented between them, he says :

> it endured for five years with increasing effect as the strongest collaborative of its kind known in modern politics. Had fate allowed it to endure for twenty or thirty years, as these two hoped, there is little conceivable that it might not have achieved for the reorganisation of Britain and the Empire.

The human quality which they possessed most markedly in common was indomitable courage ; and I should like in closing to record one of my personal debts to both of them, believing that, in so doing, I may hand on the message they would most wish to give to those who are living in times fraught with the dangers and difficulties which they foresaw. Dilke in his later years would never speak of his own 'martyrdom,' as lesser men could not have refrained from doing ; as to all that concerned that period of suffering he wore a mask on his face and let down a shutter on his soul which none could pierce or raise. But once, I remember, on a summer evening at Dockett Eddy, the twilight falling on the Thames, his head lifted and his eyes brightened when somebody discussing John Gabriel Borkman, then playing in London, quoted the lines—' Oh, we are all of us run over, sometime or other in life. The thing is to jump up again, and let no one see you are hurt.'

The setting of my other reminiscence is very different : the luncheon table at Princes Gardens, Chamberlain crippled and imprisoned by the cruellest of the fates which he had dreaded. His spirit was as bright as ever, but the flesh had failed him. I had come to consult him as to a line of policy which I was, too obstinately as I thought, pursuing in journalism. Having listened patiently to my misgivings, he replied, forcing the words painfully into resonant speech : ' I have never seen the good of giving in ; if you don't give in, something always happens.'

FABIAN WARE.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER



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THE THIRD ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

Some of the Indian delegates will probably return to England this spring to attend the Joint Select Committee, but the process of Constitution-making by the conference method virtually ended at Christmas. The new Government of India Bill may or may not be already in draft, but with the publication of the promised White Paper, probably this month, the framework of the measure will be completed, and it is now possible to judge the effects of an experiment which has lasted for some two and a half years. The conference method had its genesis in the effective boycott of the Simon Commission, and in the general realisation that Constitution-making was a waste of time without some measure of Indian support. For the calling of the Round Table Conference due credit must be given to Lord Irwin, Mr. Wedgwood Benn, and Sir John Simon. It was a valiant attempt to jolt Indian politics out of the rut into which they had fallen since the war, the vicious circle of suppression and non-co-operation which prevented any hopes of advance. Probably few Englishmen appreciate the

effect in India made by the proposal for a conference on equal terms. Nearly all educated and many uneducated Indians suffer from the feeling that their status as human beings is degraded by the British connexion. The idea is constantly in the mind of almost every Indian who travels abroad, and for over half a century it has been drilled into all Indians who read newspapers, and the far larger number who hear them read. A striking example of this connexion between nationalism and status occurred during the negotiations between Lord Irwin and Mr. Gandhi in the spring of 1931. The Viceroy asked for some definition of the phrase '*purna swaraj*,' which was described as the aim of the Congress Party, and is usually translated 'complete independence.' Mr. Gandhi replied that it meant Indians and English meeting as equals to hammer out a Constitution for India. This may have been only one of those paradoxes in which the Mahatma delights, but it illustrates the importance placed on the conference method. Nearly all nationalist criticism of the Round Table Conference has aimed at proving that it was not a conference on equal terms, or that the delegates were not representative. In spite of this the theoretical equality will win support for the new Constitution which would never have been given for a measure 'dictated from Whitehall.'

The first session of the Conference opened with a notable achievement. The Princes' acceptance of early Federation gave India a definite object for which to work, and brought responsible Indian government into the field of practical politics. The essential weakness of the Simon Report had been that it made any change in India's status dependent upon two factors which were outside the control or influence of British India politicians. The first was the willingness of the Princes to join a Federation, and the second was the development of a national army. The politician had no method of bringing pressure upon the Princes except by agitation amongst the States' subjects, and this was prevented not only by the Princes but by the Government of India. He also had no voice in the organisation of the army. The Simon Report left those who disliked its provisions no alternative but to continue sniping at the Government. The conference method succeeded at once in making everyone do some rapid thinking. The officials had to alter all their plans and the British India politician his ideas. For some time Indian India led the way. The effectiveness of the States' delegation was partly due to getting their blow in first, but it was soon apparent that they could produce a number of men with long administrative experience, while British India, apart from its officials, has singularly few men of any standing who have held Government office. The first years of dyarchy were marked by

rapid changes and frequent resignations. Few reputations have been made amongst the provincial Ministers. Almost the only men known outside a small circle had spent their lives in perpetual and hopeless opposition. Most of them aimed at the gradual attrition of British rule by the methods of guerilla warfare, and were so confident that it would be a long process that they had troubled little about constructive thinking. The Congress Party has never seriously considered the implications of a responsible unitary Government for India. Only a few men, like Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Mr. Jayakar, and some of the Moslems, were sufficiently aloof from nationalist activities to appreciate the importance of the Federal scheme. They could see, what is obvious from a glance at the map, that British India could never function as an independent unit divorced from the States, and were sufficiently realist to know that only chaos could follow from the ordinary Congress idea of capturing the Government of India through the British India Legislatures, and then claiming to exercise the Viceroy's authority over the States.

India has undoubtedly gained by the turn of events which caused the States' delegation to play such a leading part. Having launched their scheme, the States could not adopt their usual neutral attitude, the *tertius gaudens* watching the long nagging quarrel between British official and Indian politician. The handful of States' Ministers became increasingly important throughout the Conference. Most of them hailed originally from British India, and are keen nationalists at heart, but they are men of assured position who have spent many years in posts requiring patience, discretion, and common sense. They had no ' constituencies ' in India to send them unwanted advice. They had no political past and no political commitments. It is chiefly owing to them that the Conference followed a logical course. Instead of wasting time on vague political arguments, the delegates examined the various difficulties inherent in Federation, and in reorganising British India on a democratic basis. The conference method forced them to consider the differences which exist between groups of Indians, before coming to the more familiar issues between the British Government and the future Federation, which by that time had begun to take definite shape. This may explain Mr. Gandhi's ineffectiveness at the second session, because he was still thinking along the old controversial lines, and could not attune himself to the more practical tone introduced by the States' Ministers and the Indian Liberals. The former were able to insist upon very favourable terms for Indian India in the new Federation, but, taking a long view, even this is probably an advantage. When the British occupied India they spread up the more fertile and settled valleys, leaving the States much of the

hilly backbone, and also an undue proportion of the more pugnacious inhabitants. There may be times when the Federal Government will have to restrain some of its constituents, who may hanker for a separate independence, or some Prince, who may have ambitions. At such a moment it will be best if the poorer but virile and less democratic elements do not feel that they have economic grievances against the Federation.

The points at issue between Indians can be divided into two groups. The first includes those problems which arise from uniting British India with the States. They cover the terms of Federation, financial as well as political, the nature and authority of the central Legislatures, and the extent to which the States will have to abdicate their sovereign or semi-sovereign powers. The other group of problems chiefly affects British India. Most of them arise from the existence of minorities, religious or racial. They include the apportionment of seats in provincial and central Legislatures, alterations of the franchise, the formation of new provinces and changes in the frontiers, all of which were closely linked with communal questions. In all these matters the British Government had little direct interest, except for the fact that their nationals and the mixed race of Anglo-Indians form two of the minorities, and for their desire not to leave India a *damnosa hereditas* in the form of an unworkable Constitution. The triumph of the conference method was that after two years some general measure of agreement has been reached on all these points. Complete agreement was impossible, for some of these problems have been the subject of long controversies, and many of the delegates were pledged to views which were not compatible, and in these cases the Government has acted the part of the 'honest broker.' What is most surprising to those who know anything of Indian history is the speed with which many subjects have been cleared up. This is chiefly due to taking the work entirely out of the hands of the Government of India and leaving it to people, Indian and English, who have no vested interest in procrastination, and who were not hampered by that system of report-writing which Lord Curzon once described 'as the most perfect and the most pernicious in the world,' but which he did not succeed in destroying.

Perhaps the best example of this cutting of Gordian knots is the simplification of the relations between the States and the new Federal Government. The grant of adoption *sanads* after the Mutiny only settled one question, and for the last seventy years innumerable others have been left unsolved. Occasionally a Viceroy would attempt to introduce some order into the mass of antiquated treaties, and of complicated financial and military obligations, or into that ever-growing body of custom and

precedent which is known as 'political law.' Nothing effective was accomplished, and the position remained as confused as ever until after the war. The appointment of the Butler Commission was a belated effort to rectify this failure, but it was too official in outlook and too engrossed in the past to accomplish much. The Conference forced both the Government and the Princes to concentrate on the future. With the help of two Commissions, both of which were political rather than official, a workable scheme for Federation has been evolved. In this process a vast number of anomalies and anachronisms have already disappeared, and none of the points still undecided are sufficiently important to prevent the States joining the Federation, though some may defer doing so until their particular question is settled.

The new Federation will be unique in the number and variety of its constituent members, and this alone would justify the rather loose form of federation suggested and the limited powers and activities of the central Legislatures, in which representatives of the States and of the Provinces will sit together. Federal finance has proved a great stumbling-block, as it is complicated by the troubles through which the world is passing. The ordinary social services will remain provincial responsibilities, and this means that the chief central liabilities are the two unpopular items of defence and the interest on debts. At present the former amount—about £41,000,000—is about balanced by the import duties. This system has the advantage that it throws the cost of defence upon the whole of India, but it is not otherwise satisfactory. India is fiscally autonomous, and has long given up the idea of import duties for revenue only. Receipts from customs may be rapidly diminished, either by lowering tariffs as the result of an agrarian movement, or by raising them until they become prohibitive. The second process has already begun. Efforts to provide the new Federal Government with some more direct source of income have brought to light that old weakness of the Indian Government, the limited sources of its revenue. Land revenue cannot be increased and is already the mainstay of provincial finance. The salt tax and opium revenue are unpopular, and the latter is rapidly disappearing. Excise is also closely connected with local political movements. Little is left except the income tax, corporation tax, and stamp duties. The Indian family system makes death duties impossible. The Federal Government will have to be given a share of the two direct taxes, but both will raise awkward questions, especially with regard to the States, unless some considerable measure of economy is possible in military expenditure.

The difficulties between groups of Indians in British India

attracted more attention. They are of a nature common in other parts of the world, which has heard enough of racial and religious minorities since the war. In India the segregation of the different religions, castes, and races is unusually complete. There is no intermarriage and very little social intercourse between any of the following groups: high-caste Hindus, low-caste Hindus, outcaste Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians and Europeans. Since the first introduction of democratic institutions into India all these groups have tended to form what are virtually defence associations, and when a Conference was summoned it was necessary to include representatives of these bodies, whose main public activities had been as protagonists for some communal or sectarian interest. Most of them were keen nationalists and anxious enough for a settlement, but they could not put their signatures to an agreement which would mean giving way on certain points about which they had already pledged themselves. In this matter the British Government were somewhat disingenuous, for everyone interested in Indian politics knew that negotiations on communal questions had been proceeding for many years, but owing to their intense complication, due to the large number of groups, it was never possible to get complete agreement. One section, like the Sikhs, could upset the whole arrangement by standing out for one or two more seats in a provincial Legislature. At the end of the first session it was clear that some award would have to be made, and equally clear that everyone would be secretly relieved even if duty demanded a protest. This is what has happened since the communal award. Certain groups have grumbled, and will go on grumbling until the award is actually incorporated into the new Constitution; but it is notable that the chief protests have come from the Sikhs, the depressed classes, and the Bengal Hindus. The Sikhs have already been granted representation on historical grounds far greater than their numbers justify. By supporting these further demands the Hindus are weakening their case elsewhere, for if ancient supremacy gives a claim to greater 'weightage' in the Legislatures it is difficult to oppose the Moslem and European demands. The Poona agreement about the depressed classes has been accepted by the Government. The Untouchables now get electoral colleges instead of separate constituencies, a distinction without much difference, and the only result of Mr. Gandhi's fast has been to increase the number of seats reserved for them, an extra quota which would certainly not have been refused if Dr. Ambedkar and Mr. Gandhi had combined to ask for them at the second session of the Conference. The Bengal Hindus, who seem to suffer from every complex known to Dr. Freud, are very unhappy because they are in a

permanent minority. Time has its revenges. The Calcutta Hindus who struggled successfully against the partition of Bengal, because it would endanger their supremacy in the east of the province, now find themselves betrayed by the census. Bengal is likely to remain a Moslem province, for the Mohammedan is usually a poor man and a peasant, and his proportion of the population is rising steadily.

By holding up the communal award until after the second session the Government left a large number of subsidiary questions unsettled. Until they knew what terms they would receive, neither Hindu nor Moslem cared to give a definite verdict on such questions as the size of the Legislatures, the possibility of developing a cabinet system in the provinces, the transfer of 'law and order,' the division of powers between centre and provinces, or the division of central Legislature seats between British India and the States, for the latter are preponderantly Hindu. Even such proposals as the separation of Sind and the status of the North-West Frontier Province were affected by the communal issue, and this tended to bring an air of unreality into the second session of the Conference, which was increased by the holding of a general election, and by the secretive and guarded attitude of the Congress representative.

The general acceptance of the communal award and of the sensible report on the franchise which was produced by the Lothian Committee have combined to prove that the communal difficulty was not an insuperable bar to a Federal Government. Those who stressed this difficulty and also exaggerated the unwillingness of the States to enter a Federation are really opposed to the whole scheme. The rigid division of India's population into castes and religious groups will adversely affect her future, but this is equally true whatever form of government is adopted. The unfortunate effect of laying such stress on the communal question and of hesitating so long in issuing the communal award has been to leave too much to be settled by the final session. Its work has been consequently too hurried, and in some matters too timorous. Greater efforts should have been made to attain more homogeneity amongst the federating elements. Certain constitutional changes in the States might have been insisted upon before entry was permitted. It was a State Minister, Sir Mirza Ismail, who suggested adopting the formula of the Indian States Committee, 'a fixed privy purse, security of tenure in the public service and an independent judiciary,' and he would have added 'the existence of a consultative body with the function of advising the Ruler.' The larger States would not have objected to a condition which only affects the more backward. On the British Indian side all the provinces will have much

the same Constitution, but they vary too much in size, and in two cases—Bengal and the Punjab—the Moslem and Hindu communities are so nearly equal in number that it will make any development of the cabinet system of government extremely difficult. The provinces are merely satrapies, carved out by the British with little regard to racial or linguistic considerations, and certain rearrangements would have been better carried out before Federation. Sind and Orissa are to become separate provinces, and Berar's future is uncertain; but proposals for dividing Madras and reapportioning the Punjab and the United Provinces were considered merely for their communal effect, and not on their suitability for easing future difficulties of the Federation. Finally, there is the tragedy of Burma's vote for inclusion, which would mean adding another language, another religion, and another frontier problem to a Federation which has a superfluity of all three. It is clear that the vote was almost entirely due to the local Government's open support of the other side, and that within a short period the Federal Government will be faced with a strong separationist movement at a time when it is quite possible that similar movements will be starting in the peninsula itself. There is already a 'Bengal for the Bengalis' agitation, and much talk of an independent Moslem zone in the north. Perhaps it is not too late to avoid the mistake of including Burma, and it is to be hoped that officials will have learnt that for many years to come the mere suspicion of British interference will be as certain to lose votes in India as it is in Ireland.

The real difficulties and dangers of Constitution-making lie in this racial antagonism between Indians and English. Disputes and jealousies between groups of Indians are inevitable when attempting to unite a population over three times that of the United States, but the Conference has shown that it is undoubtedly possible to form an Indian Federation, and the procedure would be comparatively simple if it was only a matter of 'handing over' in a friendly atmosphere. A few 'safeguards' during the transitional period would be of little importance, but, unfortunately, the basic fact about Indian politics is that they mean little to any educated Indian except the turning out of the present Government, and that an atmosphere of the deepest suspicion surrounds every action of the British. About 20,000 Indians are in prison for political offences, and, owing to economic and agrarian troubles, the feeling of distrust has spread into the villages, and amongst social classes which a generation ago cared little for such matters. All those factors, which in a democratic country cause the political swing of the pendulum, have been operating for many years in India, and the most moderate-minded Indian, including

some who are opposed to any change, would probably hold that the British are only making the present concessions under compulsion, and that they have in the past used their control of the army for their own Imperial purposes, and their fiscal and financial supremacy for the benefit of England. There is enough truth in these accusations to make them effective in forming Indian public opinion. The British in all their political concessions have been obsessed by the 'leading-rein' theory—the idea that, however much play is allowed, one end of the rein must be in European hands. The Indian Army has been used all over the world, and sometimes, as in Abyssinia, at India's expense. Then there is the long history of the cotton excise, which it may be possible to defend, but about which Indian opinion is united, and more recently the 'rupee ratio' controversy, when England was widely accused of managing Indian currency in her own interest.

The three most important safeguards, upon which the British Government has insisted, are calculated to arouse suspicion on these very points. The emergency powers of the Viceroy and provincial Governors immediately suggest the retention of the 'leading-rein.' The treatment of defence as a 'reserved subject' threatens to postpone indefinitely the formation of a purely national army. The restrictions on financial autonomy arouse the deepest suspicion, because the East has had much unhappy experience of the control exercised by European Powers acting as 'mortgagees in possession' for their nationals in Egypt, Turkey, and elsewhere. It was therefore inevitable that while British politicians concentrated their attention upon producing a workable Constitution, and tended to emphasise the difficulties due to communal troubles, the Indian delegation should have been mainly concerned about the safeguards. Few can doubt that the chief danger to the Federal Government will be that politicians will spend their time agitating about constitutional issues between their country and England instead of carrying on the government.

The Conference did not succeed in allaying the suspicions even of the Indian Liberals, but it did prevent a number of mistakes and exaggerations on both sides. The instinct of the official, whether in the India Office or the Government of India, was to insert every conceivable form of proviso into the draft Constitution and include a mass of paper safeguards, practicable and impracticable. The Conference eliminated a number of these. Some, designed to protect the foreign business community, were not held to be necessary by the European representatives. Others had only to be discussed by practical politicians to be discarded as useless. The Conference clarified and defined, and in the

process the safeguards were reduced to certain essentials. In the end there remained a considerable divergence of opinion about these essentials, and the British Government is insisting upon the acceptance of its own views, but the discussion has prevented a host of misunderstandings and causes of further racial disputes. The special powers of the Viceroy will cover a large but a limited field. Apart from the reserved subjects of defence and foreign affairs, he will be responsible for the prevention of any grave menace to the peace of India; for the protection of minorities; for the preservation of the rights of the public services; for the protection of the rights of the States; and for the prevention of commercial discrimination. He will also have certain financial powers, the exact form of which is still uncertain, but which will enable him to ensure a sufficiency of money to meet the cost of the army and of the debt services. It is a list formidable enough to explain why the Indian is afraid lest he is getting only the shadow of self-government; but on closer examination the really crucial points are comparatively few in number. Several of these powers are for emergencies, and are only likely to be used during the transitional period when the Federal Government is being established. Subsequently no Viceroy will be able to carry on an alternative government, and the powers mean little more than the right to force a dissolution, and to delay some measure of which he does not approve.

The army and finance form the subject of the two most controversial safeguards, and of these the former is probably the most important. The present Indian Army is a British product. No Indian has had the least responsibility for its organisation and strength, its cost and composition. It is only of very recent years that Indians have even been consulted on these questions, or that the idea of building up a national army has been seriously considered, and it is most unfortunate that in certain circles the argument has been brought forward that the lack of a national army is due to some failing in the Indian character. For many years after the Mutiny the British policy was aimed at preventing the formation of a national army. The Company's army had been drawn from many parts of India; it had no trans-frontier element except the British troops, and these formed little more than a sixth of the total strength. Indians were trained in all branches of the service, and in still earlier days were allowed to have independent command of irregular units. After the Mutiny the army was gradually converted into a branch of the Imperial forces. The British element was increased to two-sevenths, and later a considerable force of Gurkhas was introduced from over the border under terms which prevent their being incorporated into a national army. Indians were excluded from the artillery

and certain key services. Subsequently, as the fear of another Mutiny grew less, army policy was prescribed by the troubles on the North-West Frontier and the fear of a Russian invasion. Troops were concentrated in the north of the peninsula and the small number of Indians required recruited more and more from the Punjab and from certain classes. The southern and also the lower caste regiments were disbanded. This system was justified by the 'martial race' theory, which has little historical justification, and little practical significance since the development of modern arms. The war showed one disadvantage of confining all recruiting to a narrow field. The prospect of an autonomous India suggests other dangers from an army recruited on such a limited basis. They are already apparent in the special 'weightage' granted to Sikhs in the Punjab Legislature, and in their demands for further privileges which their numbers cannot justify.

The provision of a cadre of Indian officers is equally essential for a national army; and here again one must look back upon a long history of hopes deferred. It is perhaps unfair to blame the successive Commanders-in-Chief who have failed to take any effective action in this matter. The initiation of policy lies with the Viceroy, though the Commander-in-Chief, especially since the Kitchener–Curzon controversy, enjoys a kind of *imperium in imperio*, and Lord Roberts, during his term of office, threw his great influence against the idea of treating any Indians as the equals of British officers. His views were very definite:

> However well educated and clever a native may be, and however brave he may have proved himself, I believe that no rank that we could bestow upon him would cause him to be considered as an equal by the British officer, or looked up to by the British soldier in the same way as he looks up to the last-joined subaltern. . . . Thus for the present at any rate, the grant of such commissions to Indian gentlemen as would place them on the same footing as British officers is in my opinion to be deprecated.

Lord Roberts also argued that highly trained commanders might, in another Mutiny, use their knowledge against ourselves. His successors took no further action in the matter until Lord Minto reopened the subject and Lord Kitchener suggested the foundation of a military college to train Indian cadets, but the idea was postponed for financial reasons. Since the war a beginning has been made in training Indians to replace British officers, but the same half-heartedness and tendency to procrastinate have been painfully apparent, and at the present rate it will be many years before a cadre of Indian officers and an Indian General Staff will be available.

In view of this past history it is inevitable that Indians should

feel suspicious about British sincerity in the matter of raising a national army. Indian politicians are prepared to hand over defence to the Viceroy as a reserved subject so long as there are British troops in the country and British officers in the Indian Army; but they demand a policy which will steadily replace the non-Indian troops, British and Nepalese, will broaden the basis of recruitment, both as regards locality, race, and caste, and finally will hasten on the work of training Indians as officers in the Indian Army. Indians also demand some voice in deciding the total military expenditure. It is natural that, knowing little about how the money is spent, they should cavil at the amount. Unfortunately, on these points Sir Samuel Hoare would concede no more than a vague promise about consultations between Ministers in charge of the reserved departments and those other Ministers who will be responsible to the Legislatures.

The military safeguards, however open to criticism, can clearly be brought within Mr. Gandhi's formula, which demanded that all safeguards must be for the benefit of India, for very few Indians accept the Mahatma's view that an army is an unnecessary luxury. The financial safeguards raise more directly certain questions as between Indian and English interests. The Viceroy, according to a form of words accepted by the Conference, is to have 'a special responsibility for safeguarding the financial stability and credit of the Federation.' Three main points arise: First, he must see that the charges in respect of the reserved departments are met: about this there was little disagreement, and the Conference has decided that these shall be non-votable. Secondly, the Viceroy is to prevent actions by the Ministry which will damage India's financial credit abroad. It is here that a conflict of interests is bound to take place, for this suggests an unlimited field in which interference will be possible, and certainly includes currency questions, the raising of future loans, and the budget. The setting up of a Reserve Bank with non-political directors may settle the first point, but as regards the other two the Viceroy is to have a financial adviser, whose services will also be available for the Ministry. It is a compromise which has not worked well in other countries, and suggests endless friction in India. Thirdly, the Viceroy can insist upon the payment of interest charges on the Indian debt. On the English side it can be claimed that, owing to our financial backing, India has raised the money necessary for development purposes at very low rates of interest. This is true, but few Indians will care to accept the burden of pre-Federation debt without any possibility of its future reconsideration. There are two lines of attack. The first is the Congress view that India has frequently been charged unfairly

with the costs of wars from which she did not benefit, and of transactions from which England has profited. Although few of these charges are included in the debt, most of them having been paid from current expenditure, there is quite a strong Indian case, which has been spoilt by the absurdly exaggerated statement put forward by the Congress Party. It is difficult to see why India should have contributed anything to wars in Africa and Persia, or, if Burma is separated, why she should pay for its conquest. The other point is that, since the war, nearly every country, including England, is claiming the right to modify or suspend her debt payments because of difficulties about transferring money, or because of the weight of taxation on her subjects. Probably none of the British delegates at the Round Table Conference saw an amusing note which passed amongst the Indian delegates when the Secretary of State made a rather sententious statement about the American debt question. Every argument that he used to prove the need for debt revision could have been applied with even greater force to India.

Finally, there is one safeguard which can hardly, by any stretch of imagination, be made to appear as a benefit to India. The Viceroy has special powers to prevent commercial discrimination against non-Indians. After long and very technical discussions, which had been carried on unofficially for the last two years, the Conference finally returned to a vague general formula for preventing administrative and legislative discrimination. The idea of a special commercial treaty has been abandoned. With good-will on both sides, and no desire on the part of future Indian statesmen to undertake any drastic social or economic reconstruction, the proposals should work well enough. Otherwise, it seems probable that they will form a convenient method of attacking the Viceroy on constitutional grounds.

The Conference ended in a cheerful mood. The English Press responded nobly to the note of optimism in the speeches of the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State, but there is not very much ground for such premature jubilation. The Conference has certainly achieved more than was expected when it began its work. There is little doubt that the Federal Government will come into being, and that a sufficient proportion of the States will join. Sir Samuel Hoare stipulated for not less than half the States and half the total population of Indian India. He should get these, in spite of the passive opposition of the political department. The new Government will also have a fair amount of support in British India. Many nationalists—and this term must be taken to include almost every educated Indian—are ready to support a settled Government so long as it possesses a fair degree of independence and is on some kind of democratic basis. They

have grown very tired of Congress methods and Congress pretensions. On the other hand, the temptation to adopt a wrecking policy will be very great. India's problems are economic, and a long period of opposition does not make politicians too careful about their promises. The safeguards will offer an obvious target when the first attempts at economic reforms meet with failure or only partial success. It will be possible to say, as Mr. Gandhi has already said, that '80 per cent. of India's resources are mortgaged irretrievably,' this being the share of the army, the debt payments, and other non-votable items. Affairs in Ireland are a very unsafe guide as to what is likely to happen in India, but they do suggest what is likely to be the behaviour of politicians when asked to redeem their promises. The weakness of the Conference's final decisions, a weakness for which the Indian delegates are hardly to blame, is that they leave the Viceroy as a kind of universal whipping-boy.

It is possible that the British delegates, especially since the formation of the National Government, have been obsessed by the idea that there is a great body of inarticulate but 'loyal' peasantry in favour of the British connexion. This is the only other point on which the Irish parallel might suggest a useful warning, for peasantry have something in common throughout the world. In pre-war days it was often said that the Irish Home Rule movement was confined to the educated and middle classes, but to-day it is the peasantry who are supporting Mr. de Valera and the middle classes who are demanding a moderate policy and more friendly relations with England. There is much to make the Indian *ryot* into an extremist. Pressure on the land is growing steadily worse, and large areas are suffering from an extremely bad system of landlordism. In every province the moneylender is still very powerful. After the vocal but essentially cautious Indian middle classes have had their innings, the Indian peasant, with little to lose and a cynical contempt for urban politicians, is quite likely to put his faith in some idealist of extreme views who may have formed an opposition party. This will put a great strain on the new Constitution and place the Viceroy in an anomalous position. There is no reason why the British should be expected to defend the Indian capitalist, or the Indian landlord, or the Indian moneylender, through the special powers of the Viceroy, who is dependent ultimately on the presence of some 60,000 British troops. It would be better if the new Federal Government were given greater constituent powers and if the safeguards were of a definitely transitional nature. India will continue to develop unevenly. The industrial centres and the newly irrigated districts may soon be centuries in advance of the more 'jungly' areas. A more elastic Constitution than seems

likely to be produced at present would prevent the need of futur[e] interference, which will become increasingly difficult after [the] Federal Government has once begun to function, and which wil[l] usually mean our taking sides in some purely Indian dispute.

G. T. GARRATT.

SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR SCOTLAND

THE Treaty of Union between Scotland and England was passed by the Parliament of Scotland on October 16, 1706, and ratified on January 16, 1707, the voting being 110 for and 69 against. Her Majesty Queen Anne's Commissioner (in the manner which had been in practice from the accession of James I., when the sovereign had ceased to reside in Scotland) touched the Treaty with the sceptre, as the symbol of giving the Royal Assent, and the Treaty became an Act of the Scottish Parliament. This Act of the Scottish Parliament was then taken to Westminster, and the Queen in person proceeded from the Palace of St. James's to the Houses of Parliament on January 28, and there, in addressing her faithful Lords and Commons assembled together, she said to them that 'she deemed the passing of this Act of Union by the Scots Parliament as the happiest circumstance of her reign, and it would do away with the schemes of the enemies of Britain to disturb the peace and happiness of her Dominion, and extinguish all jealousies, regarding either civil or religious rights, in the United Kingdom . . . and they had now the opportunity of putting the last hand to an Union that she hoped would add to the wealth and power of the whole island and to the security of the Protestant religion.'

The English Bill, framed on the same lines as the Act of the Scottish Parliament, then went before a Committee of the whole House of Commons. It was read a first time on January 31, 1707, and a second time on February 3. After a few short debates it was read a third time on February 8, and was then sent to the Lords. On February 15 the Lords referred the Bill to a Committee of their House, and during the course of the debates several points were warmly argued. The Earl of Nottingham brought up the objection 'that assuming the name of Great Britain was an innovation on the monarchy of England and subversive of the laws.' He was adequately answered, however, by the judges. Lord Haversham proposed a federal union instead of an incorporating union—the latter, he said, being against the English Constitution—but he was overruled. Lords North and Grey thought Scotland had 'too well of a bargain,'

especially in regard to the small portion of the land tax to be paid by the Scots. But Lord Halifax observed 'that if in some instances the Scots had the advantage in the Treaty, more important advantages in strength and security would be gained by England,' and his views prevailed. Finally, the Bill was read a first time on March 1, a second time on March 3, and a third time on March 4, receiving Her Majesty's Royal Assent on March 6, upon which occasion she again visited Parliament in person and expressed 'her greatest satisfaction at the passing of a Bill for uniting England and Scotland; a measure which she doubted not would be spoken of hereafter, to the honour of those who had brought it to a happy conclusion.' The union of the two countries was arranged to take effect as from May 1, 1707.

In this way, then, were the wars terminated which had wracked England and Scotland for centuries in the past. There could be no alternative to this union but civil war, for history shows that the same sovereign from the accession of James I. (except during an interregnum of twelve years) had governed the two kingdoms, each possessing a distinct Legislature and a distinct Privy Council, and each country had distinct foreign relations with independent overseas trade. During the same period the Scots had been gradually working themselves into part of the English foreign trade, and under the usurpation of Cromwell they had been allowed to direct their industry and navigation to the English plantations (colonies), and, indeed, to many foreign countries as well. At the Restoration the English Parliament passed its celebrated Act of Navigation. It struck at once at all the permissions to trade overseas which the Scots had enjoyed. The animosities between the two countries were therefore again stirred up, for the interests of one part of the King's subjects were directly opposed to those of the other. A continuance of this state of things without trouble was obviously impossible, and as the eyes of Scotland were turning once more to the 'Auld Alliance' with France, Lord Halifax was not far wrong in thinking that, though the Scots might obtain some advantage in points of the Treaty, England would most assuredly gain strength, security and peace by the union.

From this brief survey of one of the most momentous epochs in British history it becomes evident that the Union was not a tyrannical piece of oppression forced without rhyme or reason by England upon Scotland, but was in reality a culminating incident in 400 years of effort to bring together the thrones and interests of the two countries; and that it represented the free expression of the will of the law-makers of both Scotland and England. The Union of 1707 has been an undoubted blessing to both countries, and no sensible person could wish to go back

upon that Union to-day. Peace between the two countries established the conditions suitable to fertilise prosperity, and, as the seed was sown at the dawn of the industrial and manufacturing era, it flourished amazingly, and the crop has been manifold. But, it has been wisely said, 'there is no ideal unchanging policy for any country at all stages of its economic development'; so while we insist that the Union shall be maintained inviolable in spirit, it does not follow that no modification can be allowed in clause or letter to meet changing circumstances or changing times.

When the Union was made, Parliament had little to do beyond providing for the sovereign's requirements and meeting the exigencies of war. There was no Empire to deal with. There was no local government and no social welfare legislation of any kind. Foreign policy was settled by ships of the line, or by cannonade and musket. Government of the people was simple, stern and quick. To-day, how different it all is: nothing can be done without much talking; legislation takes months and months. A vast Empire exists with sister nations of co-equal independence and status. Many Crown Colonies are dotted over the world, all requiring careful consideration in Imperial work. Our foreign policy, with the complications of disarmament and war reparations, is difficult and pressing. Our trade and economic conditions generally are vastly complex, and call for immediate development and expansion. In 1705 the revenues of England were £5,700,000, and were appropriated in various ways for 'Her Majesty's household, and the honour and dignity of the Crown.' The English national debt was £15,500,000. The Scottish revenue was £160,000, but there was no national debt beyond an obligation to redeem the capital stock of the 'Scotch Company trading to Africa and the Indies.' To-day the estimated revenue necessary for our joint national requirements totals the amazing sum of £793,942,000, and we have a national debt of £7,433,000,000. It is quite obvious that the legislative machinery that would work 200 years ago cannot and will not function properly to-day; and yet we are trying to employ it on the same old lines. Is it surprising that there is congestion of business? Is it a wonder that it took nine years to get the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act passed and six years to get a Scottish Education Act passed? Is it to be marvelled at that it is taking more than three years to get agricultural credit facilities (which were allowed to England) extended to Scotland? Congestion of legislation at Westminster is fearful and unmanageable. There is only one way to remedy matters, and that is to delegate business to local legislatures, leaving matters affecting the United Kingdom and Imperial and foreign policy to be dealt with by a joint Parliament at Westminster.

The aim of all reasonable men who favour self-government for Scotland is, as the late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain so well described it, '. . . to get rid of everything in the Parliament at Westminster which is not absolutely essential to the security and integrity of the Empire. It is only in this way that we can relieve our overburdened Parliament of work which prevents it from giving due attention to Imperial affairs.' There have been eighteen committees appointed by Parliament since Queen Victoria came to the throne, with precisely the same reference—namely, 'To consider what changes in procedure might be adopted with the view of expediting the transaction of public business'; and the result of their labours has always been the same—nothing achieved beyond the curtailment of debate by such methods as 'applying the closure' and 'the kangaroo,' which things are the very negation of government by Parliament. Although practically every Prime Minister since the days of Gladstone has spoken in favour of some form of devolution, how is it that nothing has been done? The answer is that, since the Irish question of Home Rule became a bone of contention between the Radicals and Conservatives of the United Kingdom, it has been impossible to consider in any way devolution in favour of Scotland. But now the whole position has been altered, for we have given Home Rule to Ireland in two Parliaments, and there is no reason any longer why self-government should not be given to Scotland. In fact, there are to-day within the British Isles no less than five independent legislative assemblies: two in Ireland, one in the Isle of Man, one in the Channel Islands, and virtually one in London for England. It does not, therefore, appear consistent that Scotland should remain any longer the only country in the British Isles whose affairs are managed outside her own border.

On the termination of the war a 'boom' of nationalism swept over Europe, and it could hardly be expected that the Scottish spirit would not be stirred. So it happened that about four years ago a small body of enthusiasts decided to form a new party—or rather, an amalgamation of small existing groups—into the Scottish Nationalist Party. In their early days the Nationalists were largely swayed by idealism. Novelists, essayists and poets, rather than business men, were found in their ranks. Hence the insistence on such terms as 'sovereign power' and 'independence,' without much consideration as to what these ideals meant or how they were to be attained. Other extravagances, such as 'separation from England,' 'kilted sailors in Scottish ships,' and 'Gaelic-speaking ambassadors,' got mixed up with their Utopian ideals, and certainly put off much support which the party's energy and enterprise would otherwise

have obtained. To-day the national spirit is sponsored by another 'Scottish Party' based on principles moderate, reasonable, and free from all 'hatred of England.' There is no suggestion in the policy of this party of 'separation,' or of the erection of tariff barriers at Carlisle. The platform upon which this 'Scottish Party' bases its claims for self-government has been succinctly stated in a memorandum which was circulated at a largely attended and influential Conference in Glasgow last September:

I. The Committee recommend that the Government be asked to introduce and pass, within the lifetime of the present Parliament, a Self-Government Bill for Scotland which shall be based on the following principles:—

(1) That a Parliament shall be set up in Scotland which shall be the final legislative authority on Scottish affairs.

(2) That the powers of the Scottish Parliament shall apply to all matters not expressly reserved to the present Parliament or to any future body which may be established for dealing with some or all of the reserved matters.

(3) That the Executive Power of Scotland shall remain vested in His Majesty the King.

(4) That the powers of the Scottish Parliament shall include the control of Finance and Taxation subject to (*a*) what may hereafter be decided with regard to Customs and Excise, (*b*) a contribution by Scotland for her proportion of Imperial Expenditure.

(5) That the said Bill shall contain provisions regulating the mode of election to the first Scottish Parliament and fixing the number and size of constituencies for that purpose.

(6) That the representation of Peers of Scotland in the House of Lords shall remain as at present until that Chamber shall be reformed.

(7) That the present representation of Scotland in the House of Commons shall continue for Imperial affairs until such time as a Council of the United Kingdom or a Council of the Empire shall be established.

(8) That the matters to be reserved to the present Parliament or any future body in place thereof shall be as follows:—

(*a*) Crown—Succession to the Crown.

(*b*) Peace and War.

(*c*) Defence Forces.

(*d*) Foreign Affairs.

(*e*) Dominion, Colonial and Oversea Affairs, excepting questions relating to (*a*) Immigration into or Deportation from Scotland, (*b*) Reciprocal rights and obligations of Scottish nationals and the people of the Dominions and Colonies, and (*c*) Questions of domicile.

(*f*) Such other matters as shall be reserved by joint arrangement between the two Parliaments.

(9) Finality of the Supreme Courts of Scotland.

(10) Any constitutional questions which may arise shall be determined by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

(21) That a Statutory Commission on which Scotland shall have a representation of not less than one half shall be set up to determine
(a) How Customs and Excise can best be dealt with having regard to Scottish interests and without involving a Customs Barrier between Scotland, England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, with power to the Commission to set up a Customs Union.
(b) The method of Scottish contributions to the Imperial Expenditure, with power to the Commission to set up a joint Treasury Committee.

From this it will be seen that, while the Scottish people seek the right to manage what are purely their own domestic affairs with final powers, there is no intention whatever to interfere with present arrangements at Westminster as regards Imperial and foreign policy. At first sight some people might feel inclined to question the Scottish representatives remaining at Westminster, but on mature reflection it will be observed that this is in keeping with the policy followed by Northern Ireland (Ulster), under which thirteen of their members sit at Westminster. Furthermore, Scotland contributes about £25,000,000 towards Imperial services (excluding Scottish services), and it seems only right she should possess some representation at the seat of expenditure. If the result of granting self-government to Scotland should be that a similar privilege be granted to Wales, and that a federal system embracing all the States of the United Kingdom should follow, an opportunity would then arise to consider a readjustment of local representation in the central body.

It has been sometimes suggested that control of Scottish legislation could be obtained without the elaboration of a complete parliamentary system, but the only definite alternatives so far put forward are two: (a) An extension of the powers of the present Private Bill Procedure Act, or the powers of the existing Scottish Parliamentary Grand Committee, so that Scottish Bills could be examined and agreed upon in Scotland. But it has never been stated whether final powers in favour of these bodies for passing such approved legislation into law are intended. On the contrary, it has been hinted that the approved measures would be taken down to the House of Commons for third reading and for sending up to the Lords. This would never do. It would mean that Scottish opinion duly arrived at in Scotland would have to be submitted for the approval of English and Welsh members of Parliament, who would not have heard the preliminary debates on a Bill, and few of whom would be conversant with the details or circumstances of the measure. It would place both the Scottish and English representatives in a most improper and undignified position. Furthermore, supposing a difference of opinion arose, and that the English members disapproved of the Scottish proposals,

what then? Would the Scottish opinion, duly arrived at in the north after mature consideration, be set aside? If so, this would certainly make for trouble. The 'Scottish Party' declare, as a basic principle of their policy, that, whatever legislative procedure be adopted, it shall provide final powers for determining Scottish domestic legislation, in Scotland, by Scottish authority.

As regards the other alternative, (*b*). It has been proposed to increase the Scottish Office staff in Edinburgh either by appointing an additional Under-Secretary of State, or by appointing more officials, or even by moving north the whole of the Scottish Office, now quartered at Dover House, in London. The objection to this idea is that it would not give the Scottish people one word more say in the administration of their affairs. It would really mean more 'bureaucracy,' and increasing 'bureaucracy' is the curse of the present-day system of government. The Scottish people are great believers in democratic rule; that is, they hold fast to the principle that after free debate the will of the majority shall prevail, and therefore they want 'a floor' over which they can debate their legislative proposals; and they also desire their administrators to be directly responsible to the representatives of Scottish electors, in the same way that in Ulster, the Free State, the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and in England the administrators are responsible to the representatives of their nationals. At present the Secretary of State for Scotland is in charge of some eighteen departments, and he answers in the House of Commons to the 531 English, Welsh, and Ulster members rather than to the seventy-four Scottish members. Therefore the 'Scottish Party' declare a second basic principle, which is to the effect that no change will be satisfactory which does not guarantee to Scottish people the full right to govern themselves with an administration directly responsible to the representatives of Scottish electors.

The third basic principle for self-government laid down by the 'Scottish Party' is that there shall be a Scottish Treasury in control of Scottish taxation and finance. There can be no government without this. While many financial schemes have been put forward, the prevailing suggestion is that of a trial budget on the lines of the recommendation of the Chalmers Committee of Mr. Speaker Lowther's Conference on Devolution, 1920. Here it was suggested that the tax revenue from excise duties and certain other sources arising within the national territory should be collected and retained by a Scottish Treasury. These special revenues were to be divided under seven heads:

1. Liquor Licences.
2. Establishment Licences (including such things as carriages, motors, guns, game, dog, servants' licences).

3. Traders' Licences (auctioneers, hawkers, pawnbrokers, etc.).
4. Entertainments Duty.
5. Inhabited House Duty.
6. Land Values Duty.
7. Death Duties.

And there might be added other new duties imposed since 192 In so far as these total revenues fall short of Scottish expenditur the deficiency could be made good by an equivalent grant-in-a from the Joint Treasury Board of so many pence in the poun derived from the income tax, surtax, and customs duties held . them, to which Scottish taxpayers have contributed. The Cor mittee then suggested that this scheme might be tried for period of five years, and then reviewed according to the light experience. It would be understood, of course, that all prese block grants and doles would cease. The free balance of t Scottish-contributed income tax, surtax, and customs dut would continue to be held by the Joint Treasury Board ar would represent the Scottish contribution to Imperial expenditur It is quite possible some amendment or adjustment might desirable by reason of the changes that have taken place sin 1920, but until this scheme has been shown incapable of adju ment or wholly impracticable the 'Scottish Party' do not fe called upon to produce an alternative.

A good deal of argument has been put forward to show that Scotland depended upon her own finances she would be a hea loser, for Sir Robert Horne and others have declared that in t matter of education and road grants, Scotland receives a high rate than England, and more than her fair share. Quite apa from the question whether it is dignified or fitting for Scotla to play the part of a mendicant people, these statements of gai and losses are not convincing. It is a well-known axiom th the mere statement of a level rate of tax, or a level rate of gran is no criterion of equality of burden. What has to be ascertaine of course, is the relative taxable capacity of the peoples, and wh ratio the impositions bear to their relative taxable capacitie Without this information the mere quotation of a level rate taxation is valueless. Again, it is misleading to pick out one two particular headings and show advantages gained under then What about other headings? If we allow that Scotland has a advantage under education and roads, we can say, on the oth hand, she certainly suffers loss under sugar-beet. In the Unite Kingdom last year we were taxed close on £6,000,000 for suga beet subsidies. Had Scotland received back the usual Gosche formula of eleven-eightieths there would have been expended i Scotland about £800,000, but instead of that only £5000 w received. Again, we were taxed in the United Kingdo

£110,000,000 for the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Assuming one-third of this was expended overseas, then there should have been spent in Scotland from the remainder, on the eleven-eightieths basis, nearly £10,000,000, but nothing like this amount of money came back north of the Border. So also in the wheat quota; England received payments greatly in excess of anything received by Scotland. It may therefore well be that what seems an 'advantage' under education and roads is really nothing more than equity and justice in respect of losses sustained under other headings. The fact is that no comparative figures can be worth anything at all unless they show the taxation raised under different headings of national service and the proportion that is returned and spent in the respective countries. The prevalent feeling is that, with the drift of industry to the south, the English taxable capacity has been growing, while the Scottish taxable capacity has been dwindling, and that consequently the financial burden is pressing more heavily in the north than in the south.

One of the main points advocated in favour of self-government is that it will enable a local Parliament to give much more close attention to industrial and agricultural development than at present. The Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, said very truly in the debate on the Address: 'If you are genuinely interested in the unemployed, you have to face the question of how to produce legislation and create conditions which will solve their problem.' It is not so much what is done in the House of Commons that disturbs us as what is left undone. We have an urgent necessity for intensive industrial development. More might be done by the Government to promote the economic treatment of Scottish coal. Something more might be done to eliminate wasteful competition between the railways in Scotland. Transport facilities among the islands and in the Highlands might be greatly improved. The fishing industry might be better protected from foreign trawling. More people could be provided for on the land. All trouble about deer damage might be settled. Agricultural credit could be arranged. Housing could be improved and encouraged; afforestation greatly developed; marketing and grading of produce could be pushed on with much more vigour, and general research for new industries initiated. We require a Scottish policy, but we will never get this until we are able to attract the best brains and the most efficient men to give their services to the country. As things are now, Parliament requires about nine months' residence in London, and there are very few men in active public life or business in Scotland who can afford to leave their homes and enterprises and dwell in the south for such a long period. The sessions of a Scottish Parliament would be short, because business would be

taken every day consecutively, and probably for most of the day. In the Irish Free State, Parliament sat last year for only fifty-nine days and dealt fully with fifty-four Bills, enacting thirty-five of them. There would be little likelihood of a Scottish Parliament sitting much longer, or for more than three months at the most in a session.

The late Lord Bryce put the case well when he wrote of America: 'That a country where each local body in its own local area looks after the objects of common concern, raising and administering such funds as are needed, and is interfered with as little as possible by any external power, comes nearest to the ideal of a truly free people.' One objection frequently urged against a Scottish Parliament is that, since the major voting power is in Glasgow and Lanarkshire, it would place the House under the heel of Irish and 'Bolshevist' domination, for it is said that Irish and Clydeside firebrands are strongly represented in this area. Allowing for some exaggeration, it is not likely that the Irish element represents more than about 10 per cent. of the electorate, and it is difficult to imagine how 'the tail could wag the dog.' In any case, if a Scottish Parliament be established, there would have to be some increase of members, and some redistribution of seats. It is likely that a better balance in the electorate would be established between town and country, and that some consideration would be given to geographical area as well as to numbers. One thing is plain—that if there be any danger from the Irish element, it has grown up under the existing system, and it cannot well be altered. For purposes of immigration the United Kingdom is treated as one area, and no distinction can be drawn between one part of the country and another. But let self-government be granted to Scotland, and she at once automatically obtains the power of a State to control both immigration and emigration in the interest of her nationals. It would certainly be advisable that in the qualifications for franchise, poor law, and unemployment relief, the treatment of non-nationals should be based on a strictly reciprocal basis with that accorded to Scotsmen in neighbouring States.

It is frequently urged that if Scotland obtains self-government she will sacrifice her position in the Empire, and that it would be a retrograde step in her history. This is a shallow argument, and misinterprets the fact that Scotland as a nation has never figured in Imperial history since the Union of 1707. Scotsmen as individuals have performed wonders the whole world over. As individuals they have been prime ministers, ambassadors, commanders-in-chief, pioneers and merchant princes, but as a nation Scotland has never yet figured for the simple reason that she has never possessed a parliamentary Constitution. If Scotland

obtains self-government, and has 'the three estates of the realm' set up once again within her borders, then for the first time in modern history she will be able to play her part with pride as an Empire-builder enveloped in the robe of nationality. The step will not be retrogade; it will be an advance. As self-government would apply purely to domestic affairs, it would not weaken the United Kingdom. It would strengthen it. Out of plurality will come a unity greater than ever before, and the freedom given for self-expression will be in keeping with the spirit which has proved so successful and binding throughout the whole British Empire.

MONTROSE.

THE CRISIS IN SOUTH AFRICA

SOUTH AFRICA writes its history in crises. Its political life is a long wrangle broken by occasional explosions. In a country with two white races, two official languages, two capitals, and two flags, there are always powerful influences against any innovation, and when a change does come it is apt to be in the nature of an explosion. Roy Campbell, one of its few poets, wrote of South Africa as

> Renowned, both far and wide,
> For politics and little else beside,

which, if it does not do the country justice, at least emphasises the persistence of its party struggle.

Still one more crisis is disturbing the Union. In the space of a few days a Cabinet which vowed it would never leave the gold standard has abandoned it. The kaleidoscope of parties is assuming new shapes. A Government which has been firmly entrenched for eight years stands in danger of early defeat. The economic basis of the Union has been altered; and the mining industry, which has given the world over £1,200,000,000 of gold, and still produces it at the rate of £50,000,000 a year, has attained a position more in keeping with its value to the country. What is more important, the upheaval weakens the exclusive and isolated Afrikanderism which General Hertzog has fostered for two decades, and encourages a better national spirit and a sounder appreciation of the value of closer association with the British Commonwealth.

On the surface it was a curious one-man crisis. Mr. Justice Tielman Roos suddenly descended from the Appeal Court bench and announced his intention of re-entering the political sphere, and in the twinkling of an eye the whole situation was changed. But though Mr. Roos fired the mine, it was only because the conditions had gradually become conducive to an explosion. To explain the political significance of the upheaval, and also the personal element which adds to its piquancy, one must take a bird's-eye view of South African history in the twentieth century. In those distant days before the Boer War, there practised law in

the Pretoria of Paul Kruger's time, two young barristers belonging to Dutch families in the Cape. Jan Christiaan Smuts had completed his studies at Cambridge, while James Barry Munnik Hertzog, who was four years his senior, had intentionally avoided England and taken his legal degree at Amsterdam. Both their careers were cut short by the Boer War, from which they emerged as generals with a reputation as guerilla leaders. Both turned to the political organisation of their people in readiness for the granting of responsible government, and they were both in the Colonial Ministries that preceded the formation of the Union. But even then their paths were beginning to diverge. In the Transvaal, Smuts was the chief colleague of the conciliatory Louis Botha; while Hertzog pursued a more racial and anti-British course in the Orange Free State.

In 1910 it fell to Botha's lot to form the first Cabinet of a united South Africa. It was with reluctance that he took into it the now rather notorious Hertzog, whose reputation as a racial firebrand was an obstacle to the co-operation of British and Dutch, which was the basis of the Botha-Smuts policy. His hesitation was justified by events. Hertzog soon began to preach a gospel of aggressive Afrikanderism which split the Government, and in December 1912, when Hertzog refused to resign, Botha resigned instead for the express purpose of getting rid of him. A section of the Dutch in Pretoria held a meeting to protest against the ejection of Hertzog from the Ministry, and there presided over it the third figure in the drama of twenty years later, one Tielman Johannes de Villiers Roos, another of the young Cape Afrikanders who were seeking their fortune in the golden North. A man of thirty-three, who had already won some reputation as an advocate, Roos seen revealed himself as a vigorous and astute politician. Hertzog, despite his activity, was a student and a dreamer rather than a politician, and he owed much to the efforts of Roos. A National Party was launched in opposition to the South African Party led by Botha and Smuts. Roos was the leader of the Transvaal section of it. Year in and year out he stumped the dorps and the farms preaching the new faith of Hertzogism with a fervency that made many converts. In due season he was called the Lion of the North and 'the father of the Independence movement.'

For twelve years the Hertzogites wandered in the wilderness of political opposition. Their leader preached an extreme Afrikanderism, and Roos always tried to go one better than his chief. Through the dust of industrial strife, and the black years of the Great War and the Rebellion, the new faith of Hertzogism made converts among the Dutch. Roos 'gingered up' the faction with outbursts of republicanism and secessionism and a wonderful

assortment of anti-British attacks. He seemed always to be, as Melbourne said of Lord John Russell, 'teeming with some damned imprudence or other.'

The bitter years when son turned against father, and brother was estranged from brother, drove Botha to an early grave, and Smuts, who had been the chief force behind him, became Prime Minister and the head of the South African Party; and the long wrangle of South African politics went on in the same old way. The astute Roos at last engineered a pact with the Labour Party, and finally in 1924 Hertzog stepped back into the Council Chamber at Union Buildings from which he had been ejected twelve years before. He was now Prime Minister, and his right-hand man was Tielman Roos. But as Hertzog's party enjoyed the promised land of office, the team spirit which had carried them to victory began to fade. Roos developed a Chamberlain-like love of 'unauthorised programmes.' The intrigues of rivals anxious to play the part of Elisha to Hertzog's Elijah created dissensions behind the scenes. After the 1929 General Election, which gave Hertzog a second term of office, Roos, whose health had become indifferent, withdrew from the political sphere and sought the honourable seclusion of the Appeal Court bench. Without him, Hertzog and his followers marched on into the gathering gloom of world depression. Havenga, the Surplus King of the first lustrum of the Nationalist-Labour *régime*, drifted into budget deficits and unpopular measures of retrenchment and new taxation. And then as an antidote to growing discontent Hertzog and his followers magnified the racial issue. South Africa is not, and never has been, British in the sense in which the term is applied to Australasia and Canada. The Dutch have always formed the majority of the population, and if all the Dutch can be driven into one party kraal they can elect the Government. The Hertzogites strove to make the racial issue overshadow the economic. They insisted that Afrikanderdom was in danger. Imperialists and jingoes were said to be lurking in the background of Smuts and the South African Party, awaiting an opportunity of destroying Afrikander culture and language. White South Africa was discovered to be in peril. Its independence was to be wrested from it. Stories were told to the backveld Dutch that were enough, in Canning's words, 'to make your blood curdle, your hair stand on end, and your silver turn black in your pocket.' Racial feeling ran higher than it had done for years.

Such was the situation in September 1931 when Great Britain went off the gold standard, and incidentally introduced a new factor into South African politics. With the Hertzogites it is generally enough for England to do something to persuade them

to do exactly the opposite. Where the English are concerned it can, as a rule, be said of the Nationalists that

> So much they scorn the crowd, that if the throng
> By chance go right, they purposely go wrong.

So when Britain went off gold the Hertzog Government resolved to remain on it, even though the economic heavens fell. Ministers swore again and again that never, never would they desert the gold standard. But a great many people in South Africa were convinced that the Union could not long remain on the gold standard after its best customer had gone off it. When, therefore, there was a fall in sterling, they transferred money to London to await the day when the Union would go off gold and they would be able to get it back again with a handsome profit. It is estimated that, despite the restrictions imposed by the banks, at least £18,000,000 left the country. Smuts had from the first pronounced in favour of linking up with sterling, but Hertzog sneered at his advice. Talking much of 'economic independence,' and threatening a new South African coinage, he made desperate efforts to adjust the Union's financial arrangements to a pound standing 30 per cent. higher than the British pound. His Government spent many millions on an elaborate system of subsidies for agricultural exports, and also levied special duties on imports to balance the high rates of exchange. The strict discipline of the Nationalists maintained a small majority in Parliament, but there was evidence that the popularity of the Government was waning, and even in the Dutch backveld there were murmurings that the farmers were being ruined. The voices of the controversialists rose ever higher, but a position of stalemate was reached. It seemed that the repeated assurances of the Government that the Union could, and would, remain on the gold standard indefinitely would be fulfilled.

Then out of the blue came the one-time Lion of the North. Just before Christmas Tielman Roos resigned from the bench and announced his intention of re-entering politics. It was a curious and dramatic 'come back.' Roos still insisted that he was a Nationalist; but he was plainly in the mood in which John Bright wrote in his diary: 'I cannot and will not be in Parliament a mere joint of a Whig tail.' Moreover, his manifesto declaring that a coalition Government was necessary, and that the Union currency ought to be devalued, was diametrically opposed to the policy of his nominal party leaders. In his speeches he insisted that he must be the head of a coalition Ministry. As he had not consulted the Smuts party, and did not seem to have more than two or three parliamentary supporters among the Nationalists, this was rather comic opera politics for a solitary individual. But

the effect of his reappearance was remarkable. The public jumped to the conclusion either that the Government would resign, or that Roos's influence would bring about its defeat when Parliament met, and that therefore South Africa must very soon go off the gold standard. In a day or two another £3,000,000 of South African money was sent oversea, and people who could not buy exchange began to demand gold for their Reserve Bank notes with the intention of hoarding it until it appreciated in value. In the face of this movement the Government suddenly threw in its hand. It abandoned the gold standard and left the South African pound to find its own level. It might have been said of Hertzog's gold policy, as it was of Gladstone's 1860 Budget, that it collapsed 'more suddenly and completely than anything since Jonah's gourd.' The Government simply left the Union's pound in the air. Fortunately, the commercial banks, with the co-operation of the very efficiently managed and level-headed gold-mining industry, made adequate exchange arrangements on a basis that placed the South African pound only slightly above sterling.

The gold standard has gone in South Africa ; but the political crisis remains. The former idol of aggressive Afrikanderism has condemned the latter-day development of its policy. He denounces racialism, and practically repudiates the gospel recently preached by Hertzog. With such a lead from one of the former high priests of the faith there are signs of a widespread reaction against the National Party. Roos entered a Cave of Adullam, 'and everyone that was discontented gathered themselves unto him, and he became a captain over them.' Labour men without a shepherd, and Nationalists disgruntled because there were not enough 'jobs for pals' to go round, reveal a disposition to seek the new retreat. The Government has been badly shaken, and beyond 'smelling out' potential traitors it does not seem to know quite what to do. But the Nationalists believe they can still command a small majority in Parliament, and one may say of them, as Disraeli wrote of the Whigs in 1841, 'their feebleness is of so vigorous a character that I doubt not they will still totter on.' But the confusion into which the Nationalist ranks have been thrown will probably be only momentary. General Hertzog is not the man to go down without fighting. Already he has denounced the crisis as being due to treason.

> The enemies of our country and our people are for the moment triumphant [he declares]. Organised finance, supported by Afrikander treason, has forced South Africa off the gold standard. The deep wound of national humiliation, of national dishonour and material ruin, which has thus been caused to our country and people by malicious conspiracy and treason, will create in more than one of us a feeling of doubt, if not of

despair, in the future of our people. Such doubt, which is the result only of a temporary frame of mind caused by grave disappointment, however, is devoid of all grounds for justification ; and notwithstanding the setback which so maliciously has been given to Afrikanderdom, our people will, true to itself and its part, triumphantly gain its object and fulfil its high calling.

In this mood he will meet Parliament. Whether he can be defeated there depends upon the number of Nationalist members who are prepared to vote against him, or to abstain from voting in a critical division. The Nationalist leaders will bring immense pressure to bear upon their men to keep them loyal. It is not unlikely that they will be able to do so. The present Parliament will expire by the efflux of time about the middle of 1934. Although Hertzog has allowed to be done what he vowed again and again he would never do, he has no intention of going off the office standard. He will cling to power in the hope that time will show that going off gold is not as advantageous a measure as it has been represented to be, and also in the expectation that an improvement in world economic conditions will begin before he has to go to the country. At the same time a desperate effort will be made to persuade Afrikanders, whether of Dutch or British descent, that their independence and their well-being have been undermined by capitalists and jingoes. A somewhat narrow nationalism is inherent in most South Africans. Two centuries ago it made the early Dutch farmers hostile to their Dutch governors at Capetown, and in more recent times it has stirred up British South Africans in Natal and Rhodesia against decisions arrived at in London. No one can play more skilfully upon this sentiment than Hertzog. For years it was his chief political stock-in-trade. That the crisis was really brought about by oversea financiers will be his cry in the bitter controversy that lies ahead. Yet even here Roos's protest against racialism may have some effect. It has been welcomed by a great many people in South Africa in a manner which even the most fiery partisans can hardly ignore. The Hertzogites will continue to preach Afrikanderism, but it is not unlikely that they will broaden the basis of their appeal, if only in the hope of securing some support from English-speaking people who favoured the gold standard. Less may be heard in future of Our People.

Still the position of the Nationalist Government is very insecure. It is admitted in the Union official Year Book that at the last General Election there were 156,398 votes recorded for the South African Party candidates, against 144,907 cast for the National Party candidates. In South Africa, as in Canada and Australia, the composition of the elected chamber is not always an accurate reflection of the polling-booths. The Smuts party is

stronger than it has been for a good many years. In the ordinary course the swing of the pendulum would favour it at the next election, without what is likely to be the deciding factor of the economic position. Few Governments survive bad times. South Africa, hard hit by retrenchment, low prices, and restricted trade, is in the mood to listen to the old cry which somebody said was the only one needed at an election : ' That damned Government ! ' Thus the new crisis may ultimately bring about the defeat of the narrow and isolationist Afrikanderism, with its hankering for republicanism and secession, and take South Africa back to a policy of more sympathetic co-operation with the British Commonwealth of Nations. If that is the sequel, then Tielman Roos's historic sortie from the Appellate Court will not have been made in vain, quite apart from its effect upon the currency policy of the country.

L. E. NEAME.

REFLECTIONS ON FRANCE

A MILD note of optimism is being sounded at the present moment in many countries. The year 1933, so it is asserted, will bring the world in general, and each country in particular, a cure for at least some of its evils. Even Germany, since the formation of the Schleicher Government, appears to feel slightly less depressed than she has been of late, although the situation there still remains serious. It is not altogether surprising that this revival of optimism in other countries—and only time can show how far it is justified—is conspicuous by its absence in France. The French certainly have every reason to consider the outlook for 1933 a gloomy one. First of all there is the unbalanced budget, with a deficit of some ten milliard francs (over £80,000,000 at par) and the urgent necessity for providing the empty Treasury with funds. Then there is the War Debts deadlock, to which must be added the increasing fear of Germany, now free of her reparation payments, where reaction and militarism have triumphed over an impotent and inefficient democracy. A number of vital issues both in foreign and domestic politics demands a speedy solution. Yet the political imbroglio is such that the chances of a strong and stable Government appear somewhat remote. And last but not least there is the world crisis, of which France is only now beginning to feel the full severity—very much later than most other countries, and at a moment when some of them perhaps have actually seen the worst.

The budgetary situation is due partly to world conditions, which have brought about an enormous shrinkage in tax receipts in every country, and partly to the financial profligacy of the State, which has proved unwilling or unable to cut down expenditure. Now, it is a truism almost worthy of the proverbial Monsieur de la Palisse that, apart from bankruptcy, only three courses are open to a country with an unbalanced budget and with a deficit of such dimensions. The first is a drastic cutting down of expenditure and the imposition of new taxes; the second is borrowing; and the third is inflation. Although the first of these alternatives would appear to be the normal one, it is most unpopular. Nobody is willing to agree to a reduction of

expenditure, and certainly nobody wishes to add to the already extremely heavy burden of taxation. The dangers of the present huge deficit, it is argued, are exaggerated, and the country can afford to wait till there is a general revival in world economic conditions, when this matter will adjust itself. But in that case the State would have to resort to the second alternative—namely, to borrowing the funds that will keep it going until the expected improvement takes place. The protagonists of that solution—a lottery loan, incidentally, is one of its many varieties—fail, however, to show how the money is to be raised. Capitalists—big or small, French or foreign—do not appear inclined to lend their money to the State at the present moment, and in this connexion it should be remembered that two big colonial loans have recently failed. Neither the Algerian nor the Moroccan loan could be placed in France despite the over-abundance of cheap and liquid money in that country. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the present Chamber of Deputies is a chamber of the Left, and that the Left has always been opposed to borrowing as a means of balancing the budget. It is hardly conceivable that deputies of this Left would now adopt a method they so bitterly fought when it was used by the reactionary '*Bloc* National' or by Monsieur Tardieu.

The remaining alternative is inflation. That, of course, removes the need of an appeal to the public in any shape or form and for a short period provides the illusion of a successful remedy. But all countries that have been through the havoc of inflation within a bare decade since the present crisis are afraid of the very word. It has become a bogey, and the suggestion that moderate inflation could be used to a good purpose, that it could be kept under control and be stopped at a given moment, fails to convince. The danger is that, once it is started, it is bound to get out of hand; it is bound to slip away and to bring about ultimately the complete devalorisation of the country's currency, and finally bankruptcy. If Germany or France were to inflate to-day there would immediately result an unprecedented panic; those who remember the loss of their fortunes under the previous experiment would hasten to avoid its repetition, and there would be a panic flight from the currency. No political party is blind enough not to realise that. Consequently it may be assumed that no French Government will deliberately use inflation as a means of providing what can only be a temporary solution of its financial problem. In this connexion it should be mentioned that the gold reserves of the Banque de France, which had already grown by fourteen and a half milliard francs in 1931, increased practically as much again in 1932, having passed from 68,863 million francs in December 1931 to the huge figure of 83,269

millions in December 1932. But whereas in 1931 the increase in the bank's gold reserve was mainly due to the repatriation of French funds from abroad and the influx of foreign deposits, in 1932 it was the result of the gradual transformation by the Banque de France of its own foreign currency holdings into francs. As a result of all this absorption of gold the cover of the note issue has actually reached the hitherto unprecedented figure of more than 100 per cent. It will be seen from this that inflation could only be brought about as the result of completely abnormal political circumstances, and by purely artificial means—an event which appears as yet unlikely.

But if all three solutions are rejected, if it is to be neither the reduction of expenditure and the introduction of new taxes, nor borrowing, nor inflation, there remains only the fourth possibility, which is bankruptcy, politely called repudiation. It is the duty of the Government—of any Government, in fact—to make that quite clear to the people; to make them realise how grave the situation really is. And in commenting on the formation of the Paul-Boncour Government a leading French financial paper quite rightly suggested that the new Cabinet should be one of 'public confession' and that Monsieur Chéron, the Finance Minister, should be in charge of this painful process. The appointment of this particular politician to the Ministry of Finance was in many ways symbolic, for he had held the same office on a previous occasion when the Treasury was filled to overflowing as a result of Monsieur Poincaré's great work of reconstruction. Monsieur Chéron, a cautious and shrewd man from the north, staunchly defended the funds of the Treasury against all encroachments of the less thrifty parliamentarians, whose delusions about prosperity he did not share, and he was overthrown in 1930. His various successors soon allowed the huge reserves of the State to vanish, and pursued a half-hearted policy that was doomed to failure. In the words of the same French paper, 'such was often the fate of French politics during the last few years. Either things were done too late; or else they were left only half-finished.'

The recent return of Monsieur Chéron to the Ministry of Finance was therefore interpreted as a first step towards the resumption of a practical and constructive administration of the nation's financial affairs. And indeed the new Minister lost no time. Appointed barely a few days before Christmas, he immediately invited the country's greatest—and incidentally also most orthodox—economic experts to advise him on the best means of solving the main problem, of balancing the budget. Complete secrecy surrounded these experts' deliberations. Finally a plan, recommending a more than drastic reduction of expenditure and heavy fresh taxes, was submitted by them to the Minister, and

he in turn put it before the Cabinet. He identified himself entirely with the plan of his experts, and took up an uncompromising attitude. Not without difficulty, he obtained the unanimous support of the other Ministers, and his Finance Bill at the time of writing had already reached the Finance Committees of the Senate and the Chamber. This Bill, which meets a deficit of ten milliard francs half by fresh taxation and half by economies, raises a far greater issue than that of the budget only. The whole of France's credit is concerned, perhaps even her present political structure. Financial reconstruction is, after all, fairly simple from a purely technical point of view. But the political difficulties that stand in the way of its successful realisation are complex and innumerable. A heated debate is bound to take place in the Chamber, and in all probability the Government will have been defeated by the time this article appears in print.

All prognostications on what will follow the defeat of Monsieur Paul-Boncour's much harassed Government are naturally to a great extent pure guess-work. The situation is so complicated that nothing appears impossible. Yet the reader will perhaps remember that in an article on 'France after the Elections,' which appeared in the June 1932 issue of this Review, I ventured to emphasise a certain evolutionary process that has followed almost every one of the sixteen elections held since the Third Republic was established. As I then pointed out, the

> Continuous re-grouping within the Chamber has usually brought about the result that a Left majority is rapidly transformed into a Centre coalition with leanings towards the Left, then into a purely Centre Government, and finally into coalition of the Centre with the Right, with the former Left majority split up and in opposition. And at the following election the pendulum once again swings to the Left.

In the light of this tendency there would be nothing new or unusual in the fall of Monsieur Herriot's Government in mid-December 1932, or in the almost unavoidable defeat of his successor, Monsieur Paul-Boncour. The really significant thing is not so much the actual fact of the Chamber of Deputies voting against the Government as the reasons for its behaving as it did. And here it is necessary to leave the budgetary crisis and to turn to the vexed problem of War Debts and Reparations.

The very emphatic refusal of the Chamber to pay the War Debt instalment due to the United States on December 15, and the resignation of Monsieur Herriot's Government that came as a result of it, deserve careful study. It is important to remember that, in spite of the bitter attacks of the Right, with which M. Herriot's Government had had to deal since its formation in the summer of 1932, his Administration could still rely on a fairly

long lease of life. It was threatened neither in its domestic nor in its foreign policies with any immediate dangers. In fact, like most other Governments at the present day, it could have gone on 'muddling through' for quite a while. The present problems and difficulties were there, of course, but somehow their solution did not seem so terribly pressing, and after Lausanne it actually seemed as if at least a part of them would solve themselves. There can be no doubt that Monsieur Herriot's part at the Lausanne Conference which ended Reparations won him great popularity among the overwhelming majority of his more level-headed countrymen. The Right, of course, accused him of every possible crime—almost of high treason, in fact—but the man in the street felt with appreciation that a great international problem had been solved, and that a huge obstacle blocking the way to recovery had definitely been removed. Indeed, Monsieur Herriot's authority and popularity among the masses was comparable to that of Poincaré or Briand in their most glorious moments. But there was an absolutely firm conviction that the end of Reparations also meant the end of War Debts. There was not a single man in France who did not draw the inference that the abandonment by France of her claims on Germany at the same time released her from her obligations to America. No Frenchman would or could have admitted the principle of formal and legal differentiation between Reparations and War Debt payments, or the cancellation of one without the corresponding liquidation of the other. Even if Washington or Berlin always had emphasised the existence of this difference, French opinion was invariably inclined to dismiss this purely formalistic approach to the problem in favour of its own realistic view. To the French the issue was always fairly simple: for a long time America's fantastic prosperity, they felt, had enabled that country to carry through a great and constructive plan of international debt adjustment; but America had done nothing of the kind, and had invariably intervened in Europe's difficulties only when these seemed to threaten American interests. Thus the Dawes and the Young Plans, the Hoover moratorium, and various other international measures, to which France had only reluctantly submitted, were to the French nothing more than purely egoistic manœuvres on America's part. And perhaps the words quoted earlier in this article should be applied to these experiments—'most of the things were done too late or left only half-finished.'

Be this as it may, France never saw the beneficial effects which had always been held out to her as an inducement to surrender some of her claims. And she never saw the United States surrender any of their claims, but merely got a lot of free advice or moral indignation hurled at her in a very irritating manner.

'What,' the French said; 'you preach Disarmament and the cancellation of Reparations to us—you, who will not in any way commit yourselves to ensure our security and who will not cancel our debt to you? Why, you are driving us to act as we do. We do not want to be invaded again, and we do not want to be the only people to pay for a war we are supposed to have won!' This may possibly be a somewhat primitive expression of the French standpoint, but it is none the less a true interpretation of France's feelings. That France was not the only country to interpret the Lausanne Agreement as a suspension of War Debts as well as of Reparations need hardly be emphasised here. The correspondence between Great Britain and the United States on this subject is still sufficiently vivid in everybody's memory. And the demand to pay up on December 15 came as a surprise. France's reaction to America's demand was not devoid of a certain primitive logic, and it was forceful if not altogether diplomatic. But the nation was very nearly united in telling the Americans what it really thought of them. Under American pressure the French had agreed to forego the large sums which they were legally entitled to receive from Germany. Moreover, by proclaiming his famous moratorium President Hoover had definitely established a link between Reparations and War Debts, and he had introduced the international debt holiday in order to save America's post-war investments in Germany. Why should France be penalised in this way and be left to hold the baby? She was prepared to negotiate a final adjustment of the balance of her debt to the United States after the cancellation of Reparations, but she certainly was not going to pay a cent until an agreement with regard to such a final settlement was reached. On that the French attitude was quite uncompromising.

There was thus a national outburst of violent feeling of outraged justice. Perhaps it was not very wise, but it was instinctive, spontaneous, and passionate. To this elemental force Monsieur Herriot tried to oppose logic, cool reasoning, and the wisdom of real statesmanship. For him the situation was particularly tragic, because in the past he had voted against the so-called Mellon-Bérenger agreement and also against the Hoover moratorium. In other words, he had helped to create that opposition to payment which now broke out with such violence. But the position had changed, and he could not take the responsibility of repudiating France's signature. Had he not tried to bring about a gradual solution? Had he not done his utmost in Lausanne to find a compromise? Had he not gone out of his way to maintain the re-established solidarity with Great Britain? And now he was called upon to smash all that, to break the sanctity of contract and to antagonise America. He, who had always been opposed

to War Debt payments, found it both unworthy and unwise to default on a signature; he found that the moment when a debtor is called upon to pay up is not an appropriate one for starting a discussion about the debt. And he implored the Chamber to take a long view, to forget their outraged feelings (which he shared), and to analyse dispassionately what the decision to repudiate would really mean. The speech which Monsieur Herriot made on that occasion is certainly the greatest he has ever made. The tragedy of his political career is that he always has to pay for the policy of his predecessors, and that he is compelled to deal with situations that have been forced on him against his better judgment and against his convictions. In his attitude over the Debts question he showed not only vision, but character and courage. He resigned and has refused to participate in any Government until the Chamber's decision is revised. But his personal reputation and his moral authority are greater than ever.

The Cabinet that followed him is composed almost entirely of his former Ministers. It is to all intents and purposes a Herriot Government without Herriot. The inclusion of Monsieur Chéron as Finance Minister is the only striking novelty. But the Chamber that defeated Monsieur Herriot because it felt outraged about paying the United States—or rather, because it was afraid that the electorate's feeling would be outraged by payment—is also too frightened of the electors to adopt any satisfactory solution of the budgetary problem. That is why a fresh Cabinet crisis in France is inevitable, and not merely one crisis, but probably a whole succession. Whatever the outcome, the problems to be faced will still remain, only to reach an ever more acute stage as time goes on. And no competent or responsible man will accept the formidable task of putting France's finances in order until he is either assured of the necessary parliamentary support or given a free hand. If, therefore, the Chamber remains purely negative, if it persists in an attitude analogous to that of the Bolsheviks in Russia fifteen years ago, when they would not make peace and yet would not carry on the war, then the fate of Parliament in France will be very much the same as that of the German Reichstag: suspension, adjournment, even dissolution, or perhaps some other means as yet untried under the Third Republic will be found of doing away with it until it can safely be allowed to return. It is unthinkable that France should allow herself to be driven to bankruptcy merely because her deputies, both of the Left and of the Right, are afraid of their electors and are pursuing a personal or a party policy instead of facing realities. So much, then, for the problems of balancing the budget and settling the War Debts deadlock. Neither of them can long remain in the present state of suspense, and no amount of emotionalism or

passive resistance can bring about a satisfactory solution. Sooner or later these questions will have to be approached in a practical way, and the longer the nation waits the more it is bound to lose.

Meanwhile the question arises who is likely to follow Monsieur Paul-Boncour, either now, or, if by a miracle he survives the discussion of his Finance Minister's scheme, in the obviously not too distant future. The candidature of Monsieur Chéron himself is frequently mentioned. In the event of his Bill being defeated in the Chamber and of the Government resigning, he is credited with the ambition of taking the Premiership into his own hands. He would certainly meet with strong opposition from the Socialists and also from the civil servants, who are opposed to his intended wage cuts. Another candidate seems to be Monsieur Daladier, a prominent Radical, who is supposed to enjoy the confidence of military circles. The return of Monsieur Herriot is being foreshadowed, but his hour has not yet come, nor that of Monsieur Caillaux. The former would not accept office unless the Chamber revoked its vote on the War Debts, and the latter would certainly demand an absolutely free hand, which he could not get. Perhaps one day, when a National Government is formed under Monsieur Gaston Doumergue, the popular ex-President of the Republic, both Monsieur Herriot and Monsieur Caillaux will find seats in it. But a great deal more has to happen before that kind of coalition is possible. In certain quarters even the advent of the Socialists to power for a short time is considered as an unavoidable prelude to the formation of a stable and strong Government of 'National Union.' To me such a development appears unlikely. But the present deadlock is fraught with so many surprises that all prophecies are futile and even the most unusual things might happen. France wants a leader, but so does practically every other country. The great question is, where is he? A position like that held by Mussolini in Italy or Stalin in Soviet Russia is achieved, not by talk, but by action.

The mention of these two dictators is a reminder of the fact that France's policy towards both of them has recently undergone a considerable change. An agreement was reached some weeks ago between the liberal and democratic Government of Monsieur Herriot on the one hand and the reactionary dictatorial system represented by Stalin on the other. It would be foolish to imagine that this sudden *rapprochement* was dictated by any feelings of mutual goodwill, or that Stalin and Herriot suddenly discovered a hitherto unsuspected love for each other. That the Governments of France and Soviet Russia still hated, distrusted, and feared each other when signing their treaty of non-aggression goes without saying. And each signed it with an ulterior motive: the Soviet Government because they could represent it in their

Press and to their people as the capitulation of France, and also because their domestic difficulties dictate the conclusion of as many pacts of non-aggression as possible; France, not because she suddenly became convinced that the Bolsheviks would now stop their insidious propaganda, but because she is aware of her increasing isolation both in Europe and elsewhere, so that Russia (even Bolshevist Russia) has once again become an important trump card to be held in reserve for France's intricate and vital diplomatic game. In this connexion it should be pointed out that Monsieur Herriot's liberal Cabinet merely completed a manœuvre that was initiated by its conservative predecessors under Monsieur Tardieu. And the key to this otherwise incomprehensible move on France's part is the change that has taken place in her relations with Germany. During the Briand–Stresemann era of Franco-German *rapprochement* France observed a non-committal attitude towards both the Soviets and Italy, but since the collapse of liberalism in Germany and the impossibility of cultivating the spirit of friendliness fostered with such difficulty by the two dead statesmen, she has had to look round and adjust her diplomatic relations to the existing situation. In the light of these facts the new policy of France towards Stalin and Mussolini assumes the greatest international significance. So far as Stalin is concerned, no great results may be expected. The French know full well the present situation of the U.S.S.R., and they also know the Bolshevist methods. Here the new orientation is therefore rather more of a moral than of a practical character.

With Italy, however, the position is very different. The appointment of Senator Henri de Jouvenel as French Ambassador to Rome is more than a mere gesture. If anybody can reconcile the French outlook on life with that of the Duce, this picturesque French aristocrat can. He is in every way as different from Mussolini as can be. Curiously enough, both have been hard-working professional journalists. If they can agree on nothing else, they will at least not be able to contradict each other upon the truth of the saying '*Le journalisme conduit à tout à la condition d'en sortir.*' The plebeian, and once revolutionary, Italian journalist is now supreme ruler of a great country and a true aristocrat of the spirit. The refined French aristocrat, once upon a time the brilliant news editor of a popular daily ('One does not *read* a paper, one looks at it,' he used to say in those days), a Left-wing democrat by choice and a pacificist by persuasion, and a legislator in his own great country, is now its ambassador in the other. The old phrase '*Les extrêmes se touchent*' seems to justify the expectation that somehow these two men will understand each other and bring about a better understanding between their

respective countries. France and Italy can certainly look to these two men to repair all the unnecessary damage that the last decade or so has caused in their relations, and to bring about a genuine co-operation which would benefit both countries.

But these things take time, and France is still deeply suspicious of Italy; and not only of Italy, but of every other country under the sun. Some Frenchmen realise this; and quite recently, in a brilliant article, Paul Morand—diplomat, globe-trotter, and novelist—was admonishing his compatriots to mend their ways in this respect. They not only suspect every other country of the most sinister intentions: it is characteristic, for instance, that the disaster which befel the liner *L'Atlantique* and other boats before was attributed to the Germans or the Italians or to the Bolsheviks. And while the responsible Minister invoked fatality in a way reminiscent of *La Belle Hélène*, opposition papers accused foreign countries of nothing less than incendiarism. The French are also profoundly suspicious of each other, except, of course, when they are being duped by dishonest financiers and their like.

This extraordinary suspicion of everybody and everything is rather apt to be misunderstood and misinterpreted. It is certainly an important factor both in the domestic and the foreign policy of France. Yet it is far more a matter of national temperament than the result of cool deliberation, and therefore its importance should not be exaggerated. It makes things even harder than they need be for the French themselves. No wonder that they are looking at the year 1933 with gloom and apprehension.

GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK.

THE BETRAYAL OF MONTENEGRO

It is now nearly twenty years since I began to take an active part in the military and political life of my nation, Montenegro. Many are the bitter days which I have had to endure during that period, innumerable the trying experiences and profound lessons. Of all the more important events which have taken place during that time in my country I have kept a faithful record, and registered in it brief characteristics of all the more significant personages with whom I have come into contact or had dealings and transactions. At the present moment, while there is a lively discussion going on with regard to the various nations and the parts they played in the World War, most contemporary historians and critics, purposely or otherwise, are passing with shut eyes over little Montenegro and the heroic *rôle* which she played in the common struggle, while some of them, shamelessly and cynically, wish to consider her dead. It is my duty, therefore, as a Montenegrin, to say and prove the following things:

After having made a careful study of the text of the ultimatum which the Imperial Austrian Government had sent to Serbia, from which it was quite obvious that war was imminent, the Royal Montenegrin Government, by a Note dated July 11, 1914, informed Belgrade that Montenegro was ready to help Serbia. Nicholas Pashitch, the late Serbian Prime Minister, assured the Government of Montenegro that Serbia, in return, was ready to divide fraternally with Montenegro everything which Serbia possessed. However, his friendship for Montenegro lasted exactly seven days! As soon as Great Britain declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary, Nicholas Pashitch, feeling more confident that the victory would be on our side, began openly to show signs to Montenegro that he no longer wanted her help and her company, for he would not care to share with her the Yugoslav territories within the frontiers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was from that very hour that he started concocting his plan for the annihilation of Montenegro—the land which was the first to run to Serbia's aid in her hour of peril.

It was on behalf and in the name of both States, Serbia and Montenegro, that Nicholas Pashitch appealed to the great Allies

for war material and for money. And he was regularly obtaining both, together with the authorisation to divide that assistance between Serbia and Montenegro into two proportionate parts. Pashitch apportioned the Allied subsidy thus: every Montenegrin fighter was to receive for his food, clothing and footwear 1½ dinars (about 1*s*. 3*d*.) per day, while every Serbian soldier was to have 7 dinars (about 5*s*. 10*d*.) a day for the same needs, although the cost of living in both countries was the same. Contrary to Pashitch's expectation, the Montenegrins did not grumble, although, with their practically empty haversacks, they had to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Serbian soldiers, whose haversacks were always full. The total number of Montenegrin combatants and those mobilised for military service did not exceed 53,000. But this included all the able-bodied male population between the ages of seventeen and sixty-two. By September 1914 the entire Montenegrin army was stationed on the enemy's territories, and remained there until the end of 1915. In Bosnia some of the Montenegrin battalions had fought their way as far as the gates of Sarajevo, but the Montenegrin Government was forbidden to give any reports to the Press, and so no one who was not actually within this theatre of war knew anything about the successes which the Montenegrin army had gained in its struggle against the common enemy. The Serbian high command contended that such information would help the enemy, who should not know about the movements of the Montenegrin forces; just as though the enemy did not know of Montenegrin achievements! However, abundant news was constantly disseminated throughout Europe from Nish, in Serbia, claiming that Serbian troops were fighting at Sokolatz, in the forest of Romania, and at other points in Bosnia, in spite of the fact that not a single unit of Serbian forces had ever been anywhere near those positions.

At the beginning of October 1914 the Montenegrin battalions were forced to retreat from Sarajevo as far as the right bank of the River Drina. They did so under most difficult conditions, because the Uzhitchka Division (Serbian) had clandestinely deserted the Montenegrin right wing. Encouraged by this betrayal on the part of the Serbian command, the Austrian General Pochiorek attacked the Serbians and the Montenegrins on the entire line from the junction of the Drina with the Save to Fotcha, in Herzegovina, with a force of 130,000 men and 400 guns. At the same time he sent another army of 105,000 men to attack the Serbians on the line Biyaljine–Vishegrad. These he estimated to be some 160,000 strong. He also despatched two full divisions (the 18th and the 50th), which, according to the Viennese War Archives, must have numbered about 25,000 men, against the Sandjak line

(from Vishegrad to Fotcha), which consisted, as he thought, of only 10,000 men. In reality there were about 25,000. Facing the Serbian armies the enemy crossed the Drina and advanced towards the heart of Serbia, so that on November 8, 1914, he wired to Vienna that success was certain. But soon after he was defeated and his forces ejected from Serbia. The Drina line was defended by Montenegrins, whose numbers were equal to those of the enemy; but General Pochiorek's forces failed in several attempts to cross the river, despite the fact that he had plenty of guns, and the Montenegrins no artillery at all! Now, if he had defeated the Montenegrins decisively on the Drina and penetrated into the Sandjak, it is highly probable that, so far as both Montenegro and Serbia were concerned, the war would have come to an end, as it did a year later, in the winter of 1915. However, this success was exploited exclusively for the benefit of Serbia; there was not one good word uttered for Montenegro and her army, although it was in reality the Montenegrins who had saved the critical situation and had gained the victory. During the whole war the Montenegrin armament was in every respect inadequate. Nicholas Pashitch failed to fulfil his promise to assist Montenegro with food, clothing, and arms. On the contrary, even the small quantities of arms which Russia was from time to time sending to be divided between Serbia and Montenegro were retained almost entirely by the Serbians in Serbia. Pashitch had probably reasoned that, as the Montenegrins had fought the forces of Islam with almost bare arms for five centuries in defence of their independence and national honour, they could surely meet the highly-trained and well-equipped Austrian forces in almost a like manner!

After the rout of General Pochiorek it was thought in Serbia that there was no further danger threatening her from the enemy. Political action was begun for a sort of unification. To obtain this, it was considered necessary that Montenegro's independence should disappear. And so a number of Serbian agents were sent from Nish to the Sandjak, where two-thirds of the Montenegrin armies were stationed, to suborn and persuade the Montenegrins to proclaim, within the hearing of the vanquished enemy, Montenegro's absorption by Serbia. The Chief of the General Staff of the Montenegrin headquarters was at that time the Serbian General Bozha Yankovitch. He was, however, replaced on June 21, 1915, by Colonel (now General) Petar Peshitch, also a Serbian. These are only some of the instances showing the official Serbian attitude towards us who were her first allies. As upright mountaineers, we Montenegrins considered it unthinkable that our allies could be capable of propagating a treacherous campaign against Montenegro, her Government and her army, in

supreme command of which there were Serbian officers. We therefore received all such information with reserve, realising that we were, after all, still in the middle of the war.

But now let me make a cursory review of the principal events which followed. On September 24, 1915, General von Mackensen attacked Serbia on the front extending from the junction of the Drina and the Save, along the Save and the Danube as far as Orsova. The Prussian general's forces numbered in all 200,000 bayonets and 800 guns, one-third of which were of large calibre. He was facing the major part of the Serbian army, while the lesser part was drawn up against Bulgaria with its main body stationed at Pirot under General Stepanovitch; and forty battalions of Macedonian troops, under General Damyan Popovitch, were stationed along the Bulgarian frontier. According to the Viennese War Archives, the Serbians had 1000 guns. Two days later, September 26, 1915, the entire Serbian army along the Danube was in retreat. The Serbian Government and the general headquarters of the Serbian army decided to withdraw alongside the Rivers Morava and Vardar to Salonika, in the hope of placing themselves under the protection of the great Allies. But had anybody thought then of Montenegro?

On October 1, 1915, General Boyadgieff, with 60,000 Bulgarians and 250 guns, attacked General Stepanovitch on the line Negotin–Pirot, and General Todoroff, with 30,000 Bulgarians and 150 guns, attacked the forty Macedonian battalions under the Serbian General Damyan Popovitch from Zayetchar to Pirot. The Serbians retreated before the Bulgarians and their way to Salonika was barred, while another attempt to break a way through Katchanik also failed. 'The Serbian army is rapidly melting away,' admitted General Stepanovitch in his message to Colonel Peshitch. 'Our armies are reduced to less than one-fourth of their original strength,' said Voyvoda Putnik again to Colonel Peshitch, the Chief of the General Staff of the Montenegrin headquarters. 'We must retreat through Montenegro,' said, at last, Nicholas Pashitch. The trial was a superhuman one. Voyvoda Putnik, the elderly, noble and virtuous head of the Serbian army, through Colonel Peshitch, appealed to King Nicholas of Montenegro 'for brotherly help in need.' It was King Nicholas' opportunity to abandon the Serbs to their doom, and thus to rid himself of his rival; but he was incapable of doing such a thing. On the contrary, he said to Colonel Peshitch, 'The army is mine, the command is yours!' And then the mountaineer King added, 'Use my army as you yourself may think best for the Allies' common cause.' Peshitch, thus authorised by King Nicholas, forthwith withdrew all the Montenegrin forces from Herzegovina, Drina and Albania, and sent them with all speed to Serbia 'to

save what could still be saved.' The Montenegrins did succeed in performing their difficult task: they covered and rendered possible the Serbian retreat, and thus prevented the dispersion of the last remaining quarter of the Serbian army. All this took place in the course of the last two weeks of October.

About a fortnight later, in the middle of November 1915, the Serbian Government arrived at Scutari, which was held by the Montenegrins; and at the end of the month the remnants of the armies of General Mishitch and General Stepanovitch, with that which had defended Belgrade, arrived at Podgoritza. The total number of these broken forces was exactly 63,000 men, but they no longer had the appearance of an army. The majority of the officers looked little better than the men, and those who did were mainly non-combatants. During the whole time which the Serbians employed in effecting their retreat, both through the old Serbia and Montenegro, the Montenegrin army was fighting bravely in Serbia and in the Sandjak, and actually checking the advance of 60,000 Austro-Magyars under the command of General von Kevesh!

On November 17, 1915, Alexander Kara-Georgevitch, the Regent of Serbia (now King of Yugoslavia), went to Cetinjé to thank King Nicholas. On December 9 Nicholas Pashitch arrived at Cetinjé to present his compliments to King Nicholas, and also to thank him for the great services which his armies had rendered to Serbia during her catastrophe. The Serbian Premier remained in Cetinjé until December 11, and King Nicholas gave a dinner in his honour. One of the diplomats—the French Minister at Cetinjé—had communicated towards the end of November 1915 the following words to his Government: 'The Serbians have evacuated their country under the cover of the Montenegrins. . . . The much depreciated Montenegrins have shown themselves to be worthy descendants of their glorious ancestors.'

As soon as Nicholas Pashitch heard of this, forgetting entirely that it was the Montenegrin army that had saved him and the Serbian army, he devoted all his attention to one idea, which degenerated into a vile passion. Knowing as he did that some 50,000 Serbs and as many Montenegrins could not decide the issue of the World War—whether the Entente Allies used them or not—and confident that the destiny of Serbia lay entirely in the hands of her great Allies, his sole political preoccupation was reduced to the annihilation of Montenegro's sovereignty and the subjugation of her territory and population under the sway of Serbia. The Montenegrin army was at that moment in the hands of the Serbian commanding officer, Colonel Peshitch. On Decem-

ber 10, while he was still in Cetinjé, the Serbian Prime Minister, just before or immediately after the dinner which King Nicholas had given in his honour, issued a secret order to Colonel Peshitch to betray the Montenegrin army and King Nicholas. Colonel Peshitch received the order and promised to carry it into effect; and so he did.

On December 25, 1915, the enemy had some 60,000 men facing the Montenegrin army in the Sandjak, and about 30,000 on the Moykovatz front, which extended from the River Tara to Rozhay. After two days' sanguinary fighting, the Austro-Hungarian troops began to retreat during the evening of December 27. The previous day, at 6 a.m., the enemy, some 46,000 strong, attacked Lovchen, held by 7000 Montenegrins, who were also responsible for the defence of the regions extending from the Adriatic Sea to Grahovo. The enemy brought the entire ordnance of the forts at Cattaro, and the naval guns from the Bocche di Cattaro, to augment his land artillery, consisting of two large 16-inch guns, three 13-inch guns, thirteen heavy batteries, and twenty batteries of quick-firing mountain artillery, according to data taken from the Viennese War Archives. Against the Lovchen sector, Solar-Mirac–Krstac, which was the easiest place to break through the Montenegrin lines, the enemy had some 25,000 rifles under Generals Weber, Strait, and Sorsich. This sector, six and half miles as the crow flies, was defended by only 700 Montenegrins. The natural configuration of its ground was exposed to the effect of the attacking artillery, and the Austro-Hungarian infantry could under its protection move comfortably without the least danger as far as the mountain's very edges. According to all appearances, Colonel Peshitch's idea was quite different. He considered that even an incomplete battalion was sufficient to defend Lovchen; that is why he had sent three-fifths of the Montenegrin army to Serbia and the Sandjak. Of artillery there was on Lovchen only one quick-firing battery; all the rest were mere scrap-iron. Kuk—the key to all the positions on Lovchen—fell to the Austro-Hungarian forces on December 28 at 6 p.m. It had resisted for just three days and two nights. According to statements in the Viennese War Archives, the enemy admitted that the Montenegrins defended Lovchen very bravely, and that the Austro-Hungarian troops had had to face fierce resistance even at places in which a mouse could not have found safe protection!

On December 26 and 27 Montenegro was attacked all along the Austrian frontier by the Austrian Generals Kevesh and Sarkotich, the former with 60,000 men in the Sandjak, and the latter with 76,000 fighters against Lovchen and the Herzegovina. The Montenegrins fought bravely on all their fronts, as the enemy

invariably acknowledged. In the Sandjak, although there were two Austro-Hungarians to every Montenegrin, the mountaineers defeated the invaders. At Grahovo, where the odds against the Montenegrins were four to one, the enemy's progress was checked. On Lovchen (Kuk-Krstac) the Montenegrin position was much more difficult—namely, to every Montenegrin there were twelve Austro-Hungarians; in fact, 700 Montenegrins against 25,000 Austro-Hungarians. As I have said, our army defended it for three days and two nights. The defence is strongly reminiscent of the Spartans at Thermopylæ. The Montenegrins only left when there was no room on Lovchen even for the devil!

In the entire World War there was no instance of similar disproportions of forces as between any two enemies. In a letter [No. 0–8274] dated December 27, 1915, Colonel Peshitch informed the late King Nicholas that 'the enemy is progressing; that he is not farther away from Cetinjé than three hours' march, and that he [Peshitch] *politely* [*sic*] recommends the immediate evacuation of Cetinjé for the sake of peace and tranquillity [*sic*] . . .' However, even at the moment when this message reached the hands of King Nicholas, Kuk had not fallen, nor was the enemy within three hours' march of Cetinjé. It is true that the enemy was about three and a half hours' march from Cetinjé, because that is the distance from the Montenegrin capital to the Austro-Hungarian frontier. The enemy had been there for 200 years! Nor did the enemy progress so rapidly. It took him exactly five days and four nights to cover that distance of 'three hours' marching,' for it was only on January 1, 1916, that he occupied Cetinjé. The enemy would not have been able to occupy Cetinjé even on February 1 had a Montenegrin officer been at the head of the General Staff of the general headquarters. In that case the enemy in all probability would have been even driven from the Montenegrin frontier, because on December 27 the Austro-Hungarian army in the Sandjak had been defeated and was in disorderly retreat, while at Grahovo the progress of the Austrians had been completely arrested.

On that same evening (December 27) Colonel Peshitch had informed the commanding officers of the Sandjak and Herzegovinian armies of the fall of Kuk. But Kuk did not fall until 6 p.m. on the following day, according to the Viennese War Archives. The false statement produced a disastrous impression upon the Montenegrin soldier. No sooner did Colonel Peshitch arrive at Podgoritza than he began preparations for the decisive battle impending on the position Carev-Laz. For this 'decisive battle' Peshitch had only some 4000 half-starved Montenegrins. Nevertheless, this 'ingenious' Serbian strategist wished to show

the world what he could do with 4000 Montenegrins, who had not one gun and only a very insufficient supply of rifles and munitions, against 46,000 soldiers armed to the teeth under the Austrian General Trolman!

This same Colonel Peshitch, writing in the Serbian military review *Ratnik*, explains this 'strategy' of his by saying that it became imperative that the Montenegrins should detain the Austro-Hungarians within Montenegro for as long a time as possible, otherwise the enemy would have captured some 80,000 of the Serbian troops which were retreating through Albania. So the Chief of the General Staff of the Montenegrin general headquarters wished to sacrifice 4000 Montenegrin lives to save from captivity 80,000 soldiers of a then 'Allied,' yet altogether foreign, State. What Colonel Peshitch wished to achieve he achieved thoroughly. On January 4, 1916, at 3 a.m., Peshitch fled as fast as he could into Albania. He saw Nicholas Pashitch *en route*, and no doubt explained how he had fully succeeded in delivering the Montenegrins into foreign bondage! However, the Montenegrins were still to fight sanguinary battles at Grahovo, Kosmach, Troglav, Kalinovik, Drin, Glazinatz, Vishegrad, Moykovatz and other points, and the enemy was still to chase the Serbians along the Adriatic shore, and even as far as Vallona, Rome, Paris and London, where their leaders and other deserving Serbs were receiving medals from the great Allies in recognition of their supposed bravery.

As soon as the Austro-Hungarian troops began the evacuation of the territories of Serbia and Montenegro in November 1918, the French and Serbian troops forthwith raided the territory of the kingdom of Montenegro. The Montenegrins regarded the French and Serbian troops as their own allies, and all those Montenegrin warriors who found themselves within the borders of their country placed themselves at once at the disposal of the commanders of their allies. But no command was given to any of them, and no members of the legitimate Montenegrin Government (most of whom were in exile in France) were entrusted with any function of the provisional Administration. This was the first sign—though as yet unsuspected—of the revolting truth that no liberation but a reoccupation had been carried out. By the terms of the mandate issued by the Allied Powers these Franco-Serbian troops were to enter Montenegro for the purpose of maintaining peace and order, pending the return of King Nicholas, together with his Government and Parliament. Instead of discharging these duties in the name of King Nicholas, these troops obeyed the orders of the Serbian imperialists, and the French troops went so far as to aid the Serbian troops in fighting battles against the

unarmed Montenegrins. On November 26, 1918, we Montenegrins were further astonished. The Serbian authorities collected an assembly of some 200 men, some of them old Montenegrins who had not been at the front, but most of them Serbians. They met at Podgoritza under the 'protection' of Serbian bayonets, and were informed that they were to constitute the national parliament of our free constitutional Montenegro! Our real Parliament and Government were waiting impatiently to be allowed to come back, while France was detaining our rightful Ministers by all sorts of excuses; and the greater part of our soldiers were not home yet. This body of persons actually dared to 'vote' on the question of the independence of Montenegro! Montenegro, free for 500 years, was to have her liberty surrendered by a couple of hundred men intimidated by Serbian bayonets during the absence of their King, their Government, and a large part of the country's male population!

Montenegro was filled with Serbians. It was for them that we entered the war. We had protected their retreat in 1915 at our own expense. We had received them into our land as allies. They were well armed and held all supplies. They took all the help sent by the Red Cross from other countries. Our own women and children were starving, and nobody could obtain food or medical supplies without acknowledging Serbia. What could we do? Appeal to nations for justice? The nations were tired of war. Besides, they were preoccupied with celebrating the success of the principles of democracy and the rights of small nations. There was only one course open to us. We would fight for liberty. A few of us gathered together and drew up a plan of action. The Serbs were everywhere, suspicious of every move, and it was with difficulty that we secretly arranged conferences of our leaders at various remote points. But we were determined not to submit without striking a blow for our liberty. On Christmas Eve, 1918, our 3000 warriors, armed only with rifles, descended from their hillside hiding-places and attacked the well-armed Serbian force of 50,000 around Cetinjé. For three weeks the fighting continued, and then our losses made us realise that our cause was hopeless. The French general invited us to lay down our arms and submit to the Serbians. But we preferred to retreat, fighting as we went. The Serbians were determined not to let us retire, and we had several narrow escapes. One night a number of us were completely surrounded by a superior force. They thought they had trapped us, but we waited till dawn, and when they were settled down for breakfast we broke through. By the time they had recovered from their surprise and were able to fire at us we were well away, and thus we were able to escape descending from Lovchen to the sea, where we found a number of

Italian warships waiting to bear us to safety. Guerilla warfare continued intermittently in Montenegro, but the civilian population was completely crushed.

Torture, hunger, rapine, pillage, murder, and cruelties impossible to mention, have reduced the Montenegrin population to unwilling servitude, and their feeble complaints are never allowed by Serbian censors to reach the outside world. Once in a while some Serbian diplomat announces that Montenegro is happy and contented; occasionally some Montenegrin is intimidated or cajoled by Serbia into saying the same thing. It is in vain that investigators from other countries try to discover the truth about Montenegro. Their voices are silenced before their reports are heard. And so the world remains in ignorance of the great injustice that has been done. The tyrant is still in power. As regards the financial aspect of the question, it has been said by interested persons that Montenegro could not exist without the support of some other State. But the truth is that Montenegro, enslaved as she is, pays to-day by way of taxes some 300,000,000 dinars (about £1,400,000) per annum. The total expenditure for Montenegro does not exceed 100,000,000 dinars, while two-thirds of the taxes are misused by the occupation authorities, who have built, and are still building, palaces for themselves in Belgrade and other cities in Serbia. And yet the Belgrade Press incessantly clamours about the 'assistance to the financially incapable Montenegro.'

If Montenegro had been restored to its pre-war independence by her great Allies—in the way they restored Serbia and Belgium—my country would have received, by way of reparations, some 723,000,000 German gold marks, which indemnity had been allotted to her by international decisions. Her territory would have been greatly enlarged,[1] and she would also have every year the 200,000,000 dinars of which she is now plundered by Belgrade.

[1] *Cf.* the text of the Agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, signed at London on April 26, 1915, on the eve of the entrance of Italy into the war:

Article 5.—'The following Adriatic territory shall be assigned by the four Allied Powers to Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro:—In the Upper Adriatic, the whole coast from the bay of Volosca on the borders of Istria as far as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the coast which is at present Hungarian and all the coast of Croatia with the port of Fiume and the small ports of Novi and Carlopago, as well as the islands of Veglia, Pervichio, Gregorio, Goli, and Arbe. And, in the Lower Adriatic (in the region interesting Serbia and Montenegro), the whole coast from Cape Planka as far as the River Drin, with the important harbours of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and St. Jean de Medua and the islands of Greater and Lesser Zirona, Bua, Solta Brazza Saclian and Calamotta. The port of Durazzo to be assigned to the independent Moslem State of Albania.'

Article 7.—'Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits specified in Article 5, and the Bay of Valona (Article 6), and if the

With that money Montenegro could convert the marshy lands of the Lake of Scutari into a vast arable field of some 30,000 hectares. In the valley of Metohia, if ploughed and cultivated by means of the power that the Rivers Tara and Moratcha could supply, Montenegro could produce food not only sufficient for her home consumption but also for exportation to countries abroad. Apart from this, the electrical power of the Tara and Moratcha—some 90,000 horse-power—would be sufficient to supply most of Montenegro's national railways and all the factories for the treatment of her timber, wools, skins, iron, aluminium, silver and



antimony; and the Montenegrin workmen would find work in plenty at home, instead of rotting, as they do, in foreign parts, and that at a time when their own country needs them so badly. Before the war Montenegro was exporting in considerable quantities some of her domestic raw materials, such as cattle, sheep, wool, skins, dried fish, *buharitsa* (*i.e.*, a flower for the production of a powerful insecticide powder), timber, ore, etc.

With regard to the future of Montenegro as an independent kingdom within its post-war frontiers, I can safely say that, thanks to her national wealth and her intact natural resources,

central portion of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised state, Italy shall not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece, should France, Great Britain and Russia so desire. The coast from the southern boundary of the Italian territory of Valona up to Cape Stylos shall be neutralised.'

together with her seaports, my country could, in a comparatively brief space of time, become as happy, as progressive, and as exemplary a State as Switzerland, with the additional advantages which a coast-line offers. Our provinces have not only as beautiful and as romantic mountains as those in Switzerland, but also a littoral the beauties of which have been the subject-matter of the world's greatest artists, who have described them as among the finest and most picturesque on this planet of ours.

MILO OF MONTENEGRO.

OIL FROM COAL

The great growth in our consumption of petroleum and allied products and the extent of our dependence on foreign sources for our supply are shown by the following figures of imports of these commodities into the United Kingdom, less re-exports, for the years 1913 and 1931 :

	1913. Gallons.	1931. Gallons.	1931. £ value.
Crude petroleum .	1,108,900	344,369,573	2,974,342
Motor spirit . .	100,858,017	877,884,102	12,982,335
Other spirit . .	—	—	185,799
Kerosene . .	157,141,241	256,221,930	3,299,144
Fuel oil and gas oil.	161,011,864	562,804,851	11,952,625
Lubricating oil .	67,962,493	95,103,251	3,800,761
Other petroleum oils . . .	—	193,223	17,457

The 1931 figures are practically the measure of our current consumption of oil and motor spirit, for that provided within our borders by the distillation of coal and oil shale is at present a negligible quantity. As the production of petroleum in the British Empire amounts to only about 2 per cent. of the world output, the United Kingdom is chiefly dependent on foreign sources for its supply—*e.g.*, the United States of America, Venezuela, Russia, Roumania, and Persia.

The value of the imported petroleum products specified above, amounting to £35,212,443 for 1931, is an important item in our adverse trade balance ; and the gravity of our dependence on foreign countries for our supply during times of war, if wars continue, has only to be stated to be realised. That the possibility, therefore, of developing a home source of supply should have periodically occupied the earnest attention of experts and others is not surprising, and scheme after scheme with this object in view has appeared before the public, with the result, generally speaking, that more pounds sterling have been extracted from

pockets than tons of oil from coal! Of late the increasing encroachment of oil on the domain of coal, the great depression in the coal-mining industry, the heavy taxation of imported petrol and petrol made from imported petroleum, together with improvements in the low-temperature carbonisation of coal and the development of the hydrogenation process, have again turned public attention in the direction of a possible home source of supply.

In the consideration of this subject two questions present themselves, on the nature of the answers to which the solution of the problem would appear to depend, namely:

(1) Is the recovery of oil from the coal of the United Kingdom practicable as a commercial proposition?

(2) Is it in the national interest that the Government of this country should foster the development of an oil from home sources industry?

After a long experience in the investigation of many of the processes which have been devised for the extraction of oil from coal, and mature reflection on the subject, I have come to the conclusion that, with certain reservations, the answer to both questions is in the affirmative.

The question of the extraction of oil from coal is one of long standing, the possibility having first been conceived by the ingenious Lord Dundonald towards the close of the eighteenth century,[1] since when there have been many other efforts directed towards obtaining oil from coal, all, with one notable exception, being along the lines of the distillation of the raw product. The exception is the hydrogenation process. Judging from the views which one frequently hears or sees expressed in the Press and in Parliament, it would appear that there exists much confusion and doubt in the mind of the public regarding the nature and comparative merits of the high-temperature and the low-temperature distillation—or, as it is more commonly termed, the carbonisation—of coal, and the liquefaction of coal by the hydrogenation process. Although without resorting to a somewhat detailed technological exposition it is difficult to explain the operation of the several processes, the following brief description may perhaps serve to show in what respects they differ from each other and to indicate their relative merits and potentialities.

[1] William Bray (writing in 1818), in his edition of *Evelyn's Diary*, appends the following note to Evelyn's description of John Winter's 'new project of charring sea-coale': 'Some years ago Lord Dundonald revived the project, but with the projected improvement of extracting and saving the tar. Unfortunately his Lordship did not profit by it. The Gas Light Company sell the coal thus charred by the name of *Coke* for fuel for many purposes.' The patent 'for extracting pitch, tar, essential oils, mineral acids, volatile alkalies and cinders from pit coal' was taken out by Lord Dundonald in 1781.

The process which is employed for the production of the hard metallurgical coke of commerce and the softer coke of the gas-works is known as the high-temperature carbonisation of coal and is carried out in ovens and retorts, at temperatures ranging from 1800° to 2500° F. When the coking is completed, all the volatile hydrocarbon content of the coal has been extracted. Until about fifty years ago the manufacture of metallurgical coke was so carried out that all the by-products were lost; now, however, these, consisting of tar, gas, ammoniacal liquor, and, if the gas is 'stripped,' of benzol, are recovered. I am old enough to remember the scepticism with which the advent of the regenerative by-product recovery coke oven was greeted in this country, with the result that, just as with the aniline dye process, also discovered in Great Britain, it was left to foreign experts to develop these processes and to reintroduce them into Great Britain in an improved form. In order to produce coke, only that class of bituminous coal which possesses a caking or agglomerating property can be used, and such coal is characterised by a high volatile hydrocarbon content. There are coals which, though rich in volatile matter, are totally devoid of the caking characteristic, such, for instance, as cannel coal and lignite. Such coals cannot be coked though they can be carbonised.

The amount of coke produced in the United Kingdom during the year 1931 was as follows:

At gasworks . .	12,107,372 tons.
At coke ovens . .	9,020,961 "

Of the by-products recovered in the conversion of the coal into coke the ammoniacal liquor is converted into sulphate of ammonia and sold as such; the tar, though containing only a small quantity of paraffin, is rich in naphthalene and anthracene, but holds less benzine, toluene, and carbonic acid than many gas tars. The tar products are yielded up by the fractional distillation of the tar, the residue being pitch. The benzol occurs in the gas and in the 'light oil' of the tar. From the gas it is recovered by 'stripping' it—that is, by 'scrubbing' the gas with oil.

The amount of by-products recovered at the coke ovens and gasworks of the United Kingdom during the year 1931 was as follows:

Tar	1,640,709 tons.
Pitch	341,370 "
Ammonium salts expressed as sulphate 25 per cent. NH_3	646,629 "
Refined benzol.	28,000,000 gallons.

The tar, which contains several valuable products as well as those already named, is usually sold to tar distillers, who extract the various substances. One of these is creosote, which can be used as a fuel for engines. As, however, coals vary so much in composition in different parts of the country and the creosote is derived by different methods of distillation, it is impossible to distribute it, even were there enough of it, on a large scale for use in motor vehicles or stationary Diesel engines. But in each district a tar distillery could get rid of its products locally: for instance, the Belfast Corporation supply a mixture of creosote and naphtha at 4*d*. a gallon to the Belfast Omnibus Company. Presumably the arrangements of that company are such that their vehicles can fill up at a central depôt, so rendering unnecessary the elaborate scheme of fuel distribution which would be required were the attempt made to supply tar oils to the public generally. The benzol which is recovered from the gas when refined is used for automobiles, and realises in the London area, at the present time, 1*s*. 6½*d*. per gallon. Were all the high-temperature coke produced in this country made in by-product recovery ovens, it has been estimated that there would be available annually 93,750,000 gallons of motor benzol, or about 11·5 per cent. of our requirements.

Under a system of low-temperature carbonisation—that is, with temperatures ranging from about 750° F. to 1350° F.—a semi-coke is yielded which differs from metallurgical coke in that there is retained in it a certain amount of volatile matter (from 6 to 14 per cent.), and it is more vesicular and softer even than gas coke. Although in most cases utterly unsuited to metallurgical purposes, it constitutes an admirable domestic fuel, better even than the coal from which it is manufactured, making when burned a bright-red smokeless fire. The by-products, as in the case of high-temperature distillation, are gas, ammoniacal liquor and tar, and if the gas is 'stripped' light spirit or petrol is recovered. The gas, though less in volume, is richer than that produced under high-temperature conditions, the ammoniacal liquor is weaker, and the recovery of the ammonia in the form of sulphate is unprofitable, whilst the tar is of much greater quantity and quite different in character from high-temperature tar, being rich in paraffins but containing little benzine and toluene—the former so valuable for the manufacture of dyes and the latter for high explosives. High-temperature tars are known as benzenoid tars; those of the low-temperature type are termed paraffinoid. It will be seen, therefore, from the above very elementary description that of the two systems of carbonisation it is to the low-temperature process that we must chiefly look for a supply of oil and of petrol from the distillation of coal.

To show what may be accomplished by low-temperature carbonisation of coal, the case may be taken of a process which has been at work for some years in the North of England using a distilling medium consisting of inert gas and superheated steam at a temperature of about 1000° F. and treating washed Northumberland small coal costing 15*s.* per ton when delivered at works in London. There has been obtained per ton of coal treated:

75 per cent. of semi-coke.
14·55 gallons of dry tar.
28,000 cubic feet of gas equal to 28 therms—*i.e.*, 100 British thermal units per cubic foot.

The gas, being all consumed in the working of the process, is not available for revenue. Of the 15 cwt. of semi-coke, 11½ cwt. (large) is priced at 29*s.* per ton at works, and 3½ cwt. (smaller coke, termed breeze) at 14*s.*, and the crude tar at 2*d.* per gallon (it has been sold as high as 3*d.*). On such a return, and on the basis of the treatment of 300 tons of coal a day and a 90 per cent. load factor (*i.e.*, treating 98,500 tons per annum), there is producible a gross profit of £21,854. Allowing 12½ per cent. for depreciation and capital charges there would, on the capital required (amounting to about £100,000), be available by way of dividend a sum equal to a return of 9 per cent. By washing the gas about two gallons of light spirit or petrol would also be obtained,[a] and if the crude tar is subjected to refining by fractional distillation a specific range of valuable products are recovered—namely, a small quantity of motor spirit possessing good anti-knock characteristics, white spirit (which is used in automobiles or as a solvent), light and heavy creosotes (which are required in the chemical industry and for wood preservatives, and which, mixed with naphtha, can be used in motor transport as at Belfast), low-boiling tar acids, and pitch.

If transport by the Diesel engine develops, as seems likely, oil will largely supplant petrol. Mr. Howell Davies, of the Imperial Motor Company, recently fitted one of his omnibuses running between Cardiff and Swansea with a Diesel engine that could use coal oil, with the result that it was found to be cheaper and superior to petrol. And the Tramways Committee of the Cardiff City Council have undertaken experiments with the creosote derived from coal tar with the object of ascertaining the suitability of that fuel for a like purpose. The Diesel engine, which works by compression ignition, will run satisfactorily on a very wide range of heavy distillates and has a thermal efficiency of 35 per

[a] As a testimony to the excellence of the quality of low-temperature petrol it may be mentioned that the petrol distilled from British coal in Italy was used by the car which won the 1000-mile race in the latter country last year.

cent., whereas the petrol engine, which is worked by spark ignition, will only run on light distillate and has a thermal efficiency of 22 per cent.

Under the influence of pressure 'cracking,' as it is technically termed, of the tar takes place, the vaporised tar being converted into petrol to the extent of from 20 to 25 per cent. of the tar, free from tar acids and bases. Within the last fourteen years cracking has become one of the most important processes of the petroleum industry, for it must be borne in mind that the crude petroleum raised from oil wells has to be subjected to refining as well as the crude tar from the coal if the various oils and spirits are to be obtained. As Dr. Dunstan and Mr. Pithkethly have stated [3]:

> Without doubt the greatest advance that has been made within the petroleum industry during recent years is the development of the modern cracking plant. This development has been made almost entirely in the United States of America, notwithstanding the fact that inventors in most European countries as well as in America have filed innumerable patents for the production of motor spirit from heavy or less valuable oils.

If the tar were subjected to hydrogenation 80 per cent. and upwards of it could be converted into petrol, the extent of the conversion being dependent largely on the quality of the tar.

The low-temperature distillation of brown coal has been carried on extensively in Germany for about eighty years, and recently the conversion of the resultant tar oil into motor spirit by hydrogenation was inaugurated in that country. It has been stated that fully 100,000 tons of tar oil have so far been converted into spirit. In regard, however, to the success which has attended the distillation of brown coal in Germany, two facts have to be taken into consideration: the one is the very low cost at which the coal can be produced—namely, about 3s. per ton into works; the other, the high tariff by which the distillates are protected. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that German brown coal contains from 40 to 60 per cent. moisture, rendering it ton for ton inferior to true bituminous coal.

The process of converting the greater part of the coal substance into liquid hydrocarbons by hydrogenation has been evolved from the initial experimentation of Marcelin Berthelot in 1868, chiefly by Bergius. The laboratory work of Bergius culminated in 1924 in the invention of a continuous plant for the conversion of coal into oil. Briefly, the process consists in bringing about under the influence of great pressure and comparatively moderate temperature the chemical combination of hydrogen, not only with the 'unsaturated' hydrocarbons, but even, in part, with the fixed carbon itself of the coal substance,[4] to such an extent that over

[3] *Recent Advances in 'Cracking,'* by Dr. A. E. Dunstan and R. Pithkethly (World Power Conference, 1928).

[4] The expression 'coal substance' is used to denote the carbonaceous matter

60 per cent. of the coal treated is converted into oil or, if the process is continued far enough, into petrol of the highest quality. To achieve this the coal acted upon has first to be ground fine, mixed with oil, and a catalyst added. The pasty mass is then placed in steel vessels and in an atmosphere of hydrogen, and at a temperature of about 800° F. subjected to a pressure of about 200 atmospheres (3000 lb. per square inch). This process (which is at work at Leuna and at Ludwigshafen in Germany on the hydrogenation of tar oils distilled from brown coal, the direct hydrogenation of the coal having been discontinued) has been tried out at Billingham, near Middlesbrough, in Yorkshire, with a pioneer plant treating 10 tons of coal a day. It has resulted in valuable data being obtained as to the return of oil, probable cost of working, and the capitalisation necessary to ensure results on a larger scale.

The capital cost, it has been estimated, of a plant to treat 1000 tons of coal a day, giving an annual output of 219,000 tons of petrol, would be of the order of £7,000,000, and the cost of production would be *7d.* per gallon. But it seems doubtful whether the latter figure is not too low; if interest at, say, the rate of 5 per cent. on borrowed capital is taken into account, an increase of 1¾*d.* would have to be added to the cost. It is conceivable, too, that the allowance for depreciation of plant—which will naturally be very heavy in a process of this sort—would be greater than has been contemplated. The probability is that the cost of *9d.* per gallon, as recently surmised by Dr. Tizard in his valuable contribution to *The Times* of December 10, 1932, is nearer the mark than *7d.*

The hydrogenation process has this advantage over all those based on the carbonisation of coal in that its application is not restricted to coals of high volatile content, for all classes of coal, short of anthracite, can by it be converted, more or less, into oil. But £7,000,000 sterling, if expended on low-temperature carbonisation plants, would give much more spectacular results than if devoted to the hydrogenation of coal, for instead of treating only 360,000 tons of coal per annum 6,895,000 tons would undergo carbonisation, and instead of 219,000 tons of petrol per annum there would be yielded 447,867 tons of crude tar oil for refinement and conversion into petrol, and, in addition thereto, some 6562 tons of petrol recovered direct from the gas. There would also be available in fuel about 5,000,000 tons of semi-coke, which could be used as a smokeless substitute for raw coal, whereas the residue from hydrogenation is only suitable for burning under boilers on the spot. This, financially,

of the coal, for coal comprises ash, sulphur and other impurities, as well as carbon and carbon compounds.

would therefore appear to be a better proposition than the direct hydrogenation of coal. The hydrogenation of tar oils is a much more practicable proposition than the hydrogenation of coal. The world interests in the hydrogenation process are controlled by the International Hydrogenation Engineering Company in the Hague, in which, amongst others, it is understood, the Shell Company, the Standard Oil Company, and the Imperial Chemical Industries are participants.

We have now to consider whether oil or petrol from coal, obtained either by carbonisation or by hydrogenation, can be produced at such a cost as to permit of its competing successfully with imported oil or petrol. The lowest price at which imported petrol has been delivered in the Thames during recent times is about 2½*d.* per gallon, though the present price is considerably in advance of that figure. The excise duty on imported petrol or on petrol made from imported petroleum is 8*d.* per gallon, which would bring the price up to 10*d.* per gallon. Apart from the protective tariff, the lowest figure—and an uneconomic one for the oil companies—with which the home-made petrol might have to compete is, as I have stated, 2½*d.*; though the present figure is nearly twice that. If we take the price (ex-works) of petrol made by the hydrogenation process at 9*d.* per gallon, the cost would probably be 4*d.* above the imported untaxed commodity. The irresistible conclusion is, therefore, that

(*a*) Under a system of direct hydrogenation of coal the petrol could not be produced in competition with the imported commodity unless subsidised by a protective tariff;

(*b*) That with the existing protective tariff it could be produced in competition with the imported commodity, though the margin of profit would not be great.

The price at which petrol of premier quality is being sold at stations in England at the present time is 1*s.* 7½*d.*[5] per gallon, which would seem to point to the cost of distribution (inclusive of profit) being about 6½*d.* per gallon.

When we come to consider the position in respect of crude petroleum (of which about 30 per cent. is subjected to distillation for petrol and other products), this may be considered as comparable with the tar oil obtained from coal. The price of the imported fuel oil is from 42*s.* 6*d.* to 50*s.* per ton, say from 2¼*d.* to *d.* per gallon, and the imported commodity has a calorific value of about 19,000 British thermal units, as against 17,750 B.T.U. of the crude tar oil resulting from the distillation of coal, which has proved under test to be a perfectly satisfactory fuel oil and should easily realise the figure of 2*d.* per gallon in competition

[5] This is for No. 1 grade. The wholesale price is, of course, a lower figure.

with the imported crude petroleum. The petrol obtained by stripping the low-temperature carbonisation gas has been sold ex-works at a wholesale price of 1s. per gallon. The solution of the problem relative to the low-temperature carbonisation of coal depends not now so much on points of engineering technique (it has passed beyond that stage, and, technically speaking, there are several highly satisfactory processes in being), but on an outlet being found for the semi-coke. The London price of good domestic coal varies from 45s. to 50s. per ton; the smokeless semi-coke, which has attained the status of a standard fuel in the London market, is being sold at from 53s. to 55s. per ton.[6] The price of 29s. which I have taken in my statement of revenue available under low-temperature carbonisation allows, therefore, an ample margin for distribution costs.

If conducted on a large scale the cost of production would be materially reduced, and it would be possible to sell profitably the semi-coke at prices certainly not higher than those of domestic coal, and probably below them. No reason exists, therefore, why in our large cities we should not follow the example of America and prohibit the use therein of bituminous coal, so securing that most desirable result, the abolition of the smoke nuisance, by which the health of the populace would be enhanced and the output of coal increased. There would be an intensified home demand for steel in the construction of retorts, our adverse trade balance would be materially reduced—for in 1931 the value of imported petrol alone amounted to £12,982,335—and our dependence on foreign sources for our supply of liquid fuel, both in times of peace and war, would be ended.

It has been estimated that there are annually consumed in Great Britain as domestic fuel from 35,000,000 to 40,000,000 tons of coal. If this demand were met by semi-coke instead of by raw coal, taking the lower figure, the result would be:

(1) An augmentation in the output of coal amounting to 12,000,000 tons per annum.
(2) The production annually of 2,000,000 tons of fuel oil.
(3) The production annually of 100,000,000 gallons of petrol.
(4) An increase in the employment of miners of 35,000 to 40,000 men—apart from the increase due to employment at the steelworks and carbonising works—with an annual saving in unemployment benefit of about £3,000,000 per annum.

The capital cost of such a scheme would not fall far short of £40,000,000 sterling.

If the 2,000,000 tons of oil (sufficient to meet the peace requirements of our Navy) were subjected to the process known

[6] Winter price, 56s. to 58s. per ton.

as 'cracking,' this, together with the petrol recovered from the gas, would provide about one-tenth of our requirements of petrol, but if subjected to hydrogenation, with the petrol recovered from the gas, about three-quarters of our requirements would be met from home sources.[7] This would seem to point to the desirability of the establishment of a hydrogenation plant to treat tar oils only, as is done at Leuna and Ludwigshafen—the two big factories of the German Dye Trust. True, the cost to the works of a ton of tar oil would be more than double that of a ton of coal; but not only would there be a return in petrol of from 80 per cent. upwards, depending on the quality of the tar, instead of about 10 per cent., but the cost of treatment of the tar oil would be considerably less than that of the coal.

The consummation of this most desirable project would take some time to realise, but a great impetus towards its attainment would be given by an announcement from the Government that they purposed:

(*a*) To pass a Bill through Parliament prohibiting, within a period of, say, five years from the date of the Bill, the use of bituminous coal in all towns of the United Kingdom with a population of 300,000 inhabitants and upwards. The alternatives to coal would then be semi-coke, anthracite, or gas, and of these semi-coke would be the most satisfactory.

(*b*) To maintain in existence for a stated period of years the present excise duty on all imported petrol and on petrol made from imported petroleum.

This is the utmost measure of support which should be forthcoming from the Government, for the financial participation by the Government in industrial enterprise is to be deprecated, as it inevitably leads to confusion and log-rolling.

Before the Government could be induced to take the action advocated above, presumably they would require to be satisfied that the production on a very large scale of semi-coke, oil, and petrol from home sources would be available within a reasonable time. It should not be difficult to meet such a very proper condition. A combination of the interests concerned in the most efficient of the low-temperature carbonisation processes with those connected with the hydrogenation process and the establishment of a conjoint company or companies to work the processes on a

[7] If, instead of coal, semi-coke were burned at our electric power stations for raising steam these figures would be increased by fully 25 per cent., as the coal consumption at these stations at present is about 9,000,000 tons of coal annually. The low-temperature carbonisation works could be attached to the power stations and a lower class of coal be used than would be necessary for the production of domestic fuel.

large scale would seem to meet the case. It would be a fine achievement on the part of Imperial Chemical Industries, Limited, if they brought about such a combination.

Epitomising the position, the following would appear to be the deductions which can properly be made from the facts set forth in this article:

1. That certain products, the result of the high-temperature carbonisation of coal, can be and are being used for motor transport, but that their production cannot be augmented short of an increased demand for metallurgical and gas coke, which demand is dependent on an improvement in the metallurgical industries.

2. That the low-temperature carbonisation of coal worked conjointly with the hydrogenation process presents the greatest possibilities in the way of meeting from a home source in great part, if not entirely, the fuel oil, Diesel oil, and petrol requirements of the United Kingdom.

3. That to accomplish this, financial assistance from the Government is neither necessary nor desirable. Government support should be limited to the maintenance of the present duty on petrol and to the enforcement of the use of smokeless fuel in our large cities.

RICHARD REDMAYNE.

GRIDS FOR WATER AND GAS?

THE years since the war have seen a general acceptance of the principle that many individual units of production or supply working separately cannot exist effectively under the changed conditions of to-day; they must adopt some form of co-ordinated working, preferably under a single control, in which the variety of the products they manufacture are allocated so that each factory makes but a single article, or is limited to a small range of similar articles. As output and efficiency rise because of the concentration of the products, each in separate factories, together with the speeding-up that naturally follows, the older and more poorly equipped factories are gradually shut down, and through the concentrated management of specialists in each section with common buying, etc., in the end the total costs of production for the group are greatly reduced as compared with those of the original individual works and the inefficient redundancy is removed. This development in industry, usually called rationalisation, has not received quite the degree of acceptance in the field of public utilities which supply the common needs of the people which might have been expected, with the notable exception of electricity. This single case has outstripped any parallel example in industry, for we have in the electricity grid a nation-wide supply under the control of one central authority. This very remarkable achievement, well known as it is, has led to few if any proposals to extend the principle to other common supplies, such as water and gas.

Abroad, electricity grids also exist, notably in Germany, but not over the complete area of the country; they are either State undertakings, as in Bavaria, or regional concerns, like those in the Ruhr or the Berlin district. On the other hand, gas, which was operated in this country as a public utility before it was in Germany, provides a notable example of the grid system in that country in the Rhineland and Westphalia, and a trunk main system has been planned for the whole country. There can be little doubt that as time goes on modern conditions of living and the movement of population into the country will compel the extension of the work done for electricity to similar schemes for

other public utilities, such as gas and water, and perhaps land drainage and reclamation, as well as other common needs. The relative smallness of this country and the density of its population render it peculiarly suitable for such schemes of common working—more so, in fact, than most other countries. Developments of this nature may be carried out piece-meal, or they may be part of a programme of national planning, in which the whole subject is properly surveyed, with due recognition of the relations of one public utility to another, for in this manner alone the most efficient plan as a whole can be properly arrived at.

A common water supply is the oldest public utility there is, for it was recognised in very early times that pure water was the basis for the good health of the community. Even before the historic work of the Romans, the remains of many of whose famous aqueducts still exist, public water supplies have been traced in Assyria and Egypt in the East, and in the Aztec and Inca empires in the West. The Romans carried their demands for water to such an extent that it was said that 100,000,000 gallons were delivered to Rome daily by their aqueducts, an almost unbelievable quantity for those days. In the centuries that followed the fall of the Roman Empire water supply as a public utility almost disappeared, and it was not until quite modern times that a real revival took place.

Conditions in London were exceptional, inasmuch as a relatively large population existed so long ago that public supply by company had to be undertaken comparatively early, as in the case of the Myddleton and the New River Companies. No doubt in the North and the Midlands the industrial expansion was the main reason that forced the development of public supply, the rapidly growing population of many industrial towns and the insanitary conditions that followed eventually compelling the authorities concerned to take action. If we had continued in the haphazard way that had been customary until the beginning of the nineteenth century, appalling epidemics might have followed. One calls to mind the terrible epidemics of the Middle Ages, which were due to the insanitary conditions prevailing and to the meagre and poisoned water supplies available. Any considerable resettlement of the countryside by migration from the towns will call for vastly increased water supplies and drainage, if we are to avoid such a state of affairs as has lately occurred in the North.

The industrial towns in the North each developed as an individual unit with its own public utilities; it was, of course, recognised that each town must have a water supply, but it must be its very own. Nothing is more remarkable than this expansion

of modern industrial England in distinct units, and, in spite of the fact that this must have been recognised in most cases as not being the most economical method, the feeling for individual action and the opposition to joint working under a common control for public undertakings were, and are to-day, still extraordinarily strong. To this rule municipalities are no exception. The use of water for so many purposes in industry and in the home has increased so rapidly, and is still increasing, that thoughtful people begin to recognise that some concerted action must be taken to divide out our supplies in a more rational and efficient manner.

The other day the chairman of the Metropolitan Water Board observed: 'Unless regional control and pooling of supplies are established, there is going to be a great shortage of water in some of the large populous areas.' This expression of opinion from the head of the most outstanding example of a unified water supply undertaking for a great area which was formed by the combination of a number of smaller units is surely very significant. It does not seem unreasonable to maintain that the extension of this principle—namely, the unified control and joint working of water supplies for much larger areas, if not for the whole country, somewhat on the lines of the electricity grid—would be enormously advantageous. This might at first take the form of group working over selected areas with regional control; and common action, at any rate for more limited areas, seems already to be considerably overdue. The metropolitan undertaking is the best example we have of a water grid under unified control as the result of the co-ordinated working of many undertakings previously running as separate concerns. The original concerns amalgamated by the Board were the following:

The New River Company . .	founded in	1609
The Chelsea Company	„	1723
The Lambeth Company . . .	„	1785
The Grand Junction Company .	„	1798
The West Middlesex Company .	„	1806
The East London Company . .	„	1807
The Kent Company	„	1809
The Southwark and Vauxhall Company	„	1845

The success of the Metropolitan Water Board shows that there can be little doubt that the area now covered could be increased with advantage.

In the northern industrial districts of Lancashire and Yorkshire, where the various towns, if left to rely on their individual initiative, would compete one with another for their water supply from the Pennines, a particularly good case can be made out for

joint working by pooling the supplies through the linking-up of the existing undertakings. The principle of joint working has at last been accepted, at least in theory, and some progress has been made by a regional board for the West Riding, which is now considering some form of interconnexion between its more ample supply and the drier area of the East Riding. Further south we have a definite joint scheme, that of the Derwent Valley Water Board. This authority supplies water to Leicester, Sheffield, Derby, and Nottingham in the proportions of 35·72 per cent., 25 per cent., 25 per cent., and 14·28 per cent. respectively. On the Lancashire side of the Pennine hills Liverpool and Manchester are the chief distributing authorities for their own and some neighbouring areas, drawing their respective supplies from Lake Vrynwy, in Wales, and from Thirlmere, in the Lake District. There are also, of course, many other relatively large towns with their own water undertakings, such as Bolton, Bury, Oldham, etc. There is, however, no joint working, and if, for instance, Liverpool required more water, then the Haweswater scheme, started by Manchester but not proceeded with, could not supply it, even though it has been found redundant to Manchester's needs. Nor is there any co-ordination or linking up with the West Riding.

As a country we have an ample rainfall, and the resultant sources of supply are good, though limited to certain areas. The rainfall varies from 40 inches per year in the west to one-half of that quantity on the east coast, with over 100 inches in the Lake District. If we cross from the west to the east side of the country we pass into a relatively dry area, disagreeably noticeable in some parts of Lincolnshire. The country is generally flat with no hills to attract rain ; supply is often very limited, and taken mainly from surface wells liable to fall in output and subject to the risk of contamination. The area of limited supply continues through the Fens and Cambridgeshire to the south. At the present time there is the city of Hull about to apply for powers to carry out a scheme for 1,500,000 gallons per day to be brought from the hills in the north of Yorkshire. The aqueduct would pass by Malton, where trouble (epidemic) has lately been experienced. In north Lincolnshire two districts have prepared separate schemes, and these are mainly dry areas. There is still a supply of water available from the Pennines, and it is reported at the present time that Bradford has 10,000,000 gallons to spare.

This has led to the suggestion of a balancing trunk main from the hilly district to Hull, connecting *en passant* with all the various water undertakings of Bradford, Leeds, Harrogate, York, etc., which would appear to meet the demands of Hull

without the new work proposed. On the other side of the Pennines Manchester has stopped the Haweswater scheme, as an immediate increase in supply is not now found to be necessary. The creation of a West and East Riding regional control on the Yorkshire side and of another regional control on the Lancashire side would seem to be a logical development. It would be desirable as a means for extra supply in emergency, or even for a regular supply in certain cases, to connect up the two systems by a special main passing the difficult hilly district. No doubt some special technique would have to be developed for this main—either a section with a high rate of flow in special pipes laid through or adjacent to a railway tunnel and using 'booster' pumps, or a novel syphon may have to be devised depending on the locality selected. A connexion between the valleys of the Ribble and the Aire seems possible without a tunnel. One must not forget that in this dense industrial part of Lancashire and Yorkshire a vast amount of water is required for the trades carried on there, apart from the domestic needs of the population, and not infrequently this fact has proved an actual limitation to the expansion of industries. On the other hand, if any new works like the Hull scheme are sanctioned, then it should only be on the explicit condition that they form part of a general scheme for co-ordinated working. A trunk main might, for instance, in this case be arranged to pass through Yorkshire and connect with the cross coast-to-coast main just mentioned. It would then continue on into Lincolnshire, supplying the districts now contemplating schemes of their own, traversing that county on its way further south. The need of modern industry for ample water supplies is, *inter alia*, indicated by the new iron and steel works to be erected at Corby, Northamptonshire, which for lack of any trunk main near by must undertake a special work of their own.

Whilst the gathering ground in the hills forms the supply for the North, wide areas in the Midlands depend largely on wells bored down to the lower strata, as in Nottinghamshire, for instance. To the west we have the very considerable undertaking of the South Staffordshire Water Company, covering an area from Derby to Birmingham, touching Stafford, Burton, and Wolverhampton. The supply is largely obtained by pumping, some stations being as far north as half-way between Stafford and Crewe.

If now we consider in more detail some progressive plan that might be followed leading up to a national water grid, the first step seems to be to set up regional boards for selected areas, the ultimate object, of course, being their interconnexion to form a complete grid. It might be found that the beginning would best

be made in the south-east, for instance, using the Metropolitan Board as the authority, but extending the area to one of, say, approximately a 50-mile radius. A regional board could then be created for South Lancashire, and one for the West and East Ridings of Yorkshire, the connexion between the two counties being by the trunk main previously mentioned. A trunk main passing through the dry areas of the east coast, the Yorkshire plain, Lincolnshire, the Fens, Cambridgeshire, etc., would continue on until it connected with the Metropolitan region. A western trunk main would link this up with the Midland region and have suitable interconnexion by link mains to the Leicester and Nottingham districts. The country lying south and west could later be provided for by trunk mains in a similar way, though this area is an extended one and the hill supply—Dartmoor and Exmoor, etc.—somewhat limited. A trunk main from the south-west could then interconnect this system with the Midlands.

No doubt many difficulties will arise when a great project like this comes to be considered by those concerned. Some of these perhaps will be magnified by the conventional outlook that has grown up round the English system of water supply as a result of the almost invariable consideration of any problem from the narrow standpoint of the individual unit. This water-tight habit of mind presents a real difficulty when any great scheme of co-ordination comes to be considered. A village or small town, for instance, may obtain a limited supply from local wells with only a small charge on the rates, whilst a soft mountain water for some large town brought from afar if tapped from the aqueduct passing near by might mean an extra shilling. A rather crude comparison of costs of this kind has a very material effect on the prospects of any widespread scheme in a county like Lincolnshire, for example, which might, if the wider view had been taken, have already had a county supply, but still has, in consequence of this narrow outlook, only a number of separate undertakings—some good, some indifferent, and some liable to drought and pollution, etc. These difficulties cannot be overlooked, and much educational work is called for to clear the ground. Legal difficulties, too, will be met with, as they have been in other schemes. There are also technical difficulties, such as differences in pressure supply, class of water, etc., but nothing to compare in all these with those overcome in the electricity scheme.

On the constructional side it is instructive to look abroad to what has been done in other countries, and the following brief particulars of some American water supply undertakings in which long-distance supply is also used make an interesting comparison with some of our own. Los Angeles, for instance, takes 280,000,000

allons per day (the same total as the Metropolitan Water Board) om a distance of 223 miles, whilst Glasgow in Loch Katrine has supply of 75,000,000 gallons, but only from a distance of 23½ miles; Birmingham takes a similar quantity from a source 73 miles distant in the centre of Wales. San Francisco, with the Hetch Hetchy aqueduct from catchment areas near the Yosemite National Park, 156 miles away, takes 400,000,000 gallons per day, whilst Manchester draws only 50,000,000 gallons from Thirlmere, 96 miles away, and Liverpool 40,000,000 from Vyrnwy, 58 miles away. The latest New York aqueduct is capable of delivering 500,000,000 gallons from the Catskill Mountains, 120 miles away. These figures illustrate the distance, traversed often over mountain districts, and the heavy engineering work entailed, but any problems arising out of a grid system in this country would be much smaller than those that have been successfully solved abroad.

There is another water supply scheme so magnificent in conception that some mention must be made of it, if only to show to those concerned here how far people are prepared to go abroad. This great work is the Apulian aqueduct in Italy, conveying water from the gathering ground on the western slopes of the Apennines behind Naples down to the dry districts in the heel of Italy (Foggia, Bari, Lecci, etc.), 8000 square miles in extent. This extraordinary piece of work involves several long tunnels, one of which is 10 miles long, and in many places arched bridges are used to cross valleys. The water capacity is 5 cubic metres per second, delivered to a population of 3,000,000 in 266 connexions by a system of 841 kilometres of main and trunk pipe and 550 miles of distribution pipe. One can form a better idea of the nature of this undertaking when one knows the difficult territory traversed; in addition, it must be remembered that it was carried out in Italy under more difficult conditions than any obtaining in this country, and took many years to construct.

An examination of maps in England with the various towns and water supplies indicated thereon, with contour levels, etc., will confirm the easier nature of our problems; but it also brings one very quickly to the real surprise—namely, that such a scheme as I have roughly sketched out has not been put into practice long ago, at any rate in some special regions. Finance, after all is said and done, may be the major reason, particularly in country areas, but the successful carrying through of the great electricity scheme, which covered the whole country and had to meet and adjust a much greater number of diverse and separate units, should give confidence to the opinion that a water grid for England can also be successfully carried through. What is needed at once is that a survey of the potential supplies of the country be undertaken.

The Ministry of Health, which is thoroughly alive to the importance of this matter, may have much of the information already, but hardly perhaps in the form in which it could be used in formulating a co-ordinated scheme for the country. The present demands for water can then be totalled up and an estimate be made for the future, in which account must be taken of a considerable expansion of the population ; a balanced table of supply and demand can then be worked out. The increased allowance for the country districts is made because in any agricultural development which may well come, as agriculture offers the most promising outlook for employment, a considerable proportion of the population of the towns would move out and reside in the country and less water would be required in the former, and a considerably increased supply, hardly at present existing, in the latter.

It has been suggested that a similar scheme might with advantage be applied also to our gas supply. A gas grid bears a family resemblance to its water relative in that it implies one correlated working of existing producing plants by means of connecting trunk mains, so making possible the capillary supply over an extended area in the countryside. But the likeness to electricity is perhaps more marked, and it is more practical to consider it in relation to the electricity grid than to the water supply I have just outlined. Nevertheless, where at all possible, the interrelation and co-ordinate working of all three systems—gas, water, and electricity—must be attempted : *e.g.*, water pumping must be done by electricity when the price per unit is nominal—that is, at times of least load. Gas-driven power stations for electricity could be arranged to meet peak loads, as they entail so little, when stopped, by way of stand-by costs. Both gas and water are suitable mediums for storage—to be released later when the extreme demand arises in the particular supply required.

The relative values of gas and electricity have, of course, an important bearing on this question of co-ordination, but for our purposes it may be taken for granted that gas is the cheapest medium for transmitting heat. Though the idea of a grid method of supply is relatively modern, the proposal to generate gas at the pithead and to transmit it under pressure by pipes relatively long distances to the areas of large consumption is an old one. It must have been brought forward in the very early days of the industry—no doubt on the ground that it was better to generate gas at the pit than in the town, and more economical to transmit gas than to transport coal. Though the gas industry began in this country and spread from it to others, British practice

has lagged behind them in later developments in both long-distance and grid supply, so that in considering this question to-day we have to go abroad for most of our examples. There are doubtless very good reasons which explain this course of events. In the earlier days installations were of a more primitive character and relatively isolated, coal was cheap to transport, and as time went on legal restrictions grew up which prevented the interrelation of gas supply with other industrial processes. All available talent was consequently concentrated on the plant itself. This did indeed result in this country taking the lead over other countries in the design and construction of the special plant required for supplying towns with gas. To what extent the gas industry has been handicapped by legislation in this country as compared with electricity it is difficult to determine adequately, but there can be no doubt that legal restrictions have been a very real limitation. This limitation has been imposed not only by the restrictions placed by Parliament on the distribution of profits, with its obvious effects, but it has also determined the areas of distribution and supply. No gas concern, for example, could conclude an agreement with neighbouring undertakings to extend its area except by special Act of Parliament.

To-day the whole economic comparison of the transmission of energy by coal, gas, and electricity has been investigated in careful detail, and the parallel between two of them—namely, electricity and gas—is a close one. An important condition, however, in which the gas grid differs from the electric is that while special new super-power stations have been erected for the electric scheme to yield the additional power required, the extra supply of gas would come from the coke oven installations already existing or in course of erection at the pitheads of various mining companies in south Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, etc., from which even at the present day gas is blowing to waste. The general development in the equipment of coal-mining plants, particularly in certain areas, points clearly to a considerable increase in the number of these installations and therefore in the volume of gas available. This large amount of gas gives the grid system a considerable advantage over the electric from an economic point of view, as it will not require such a large amount of fresh capital and will ultimately make its construction inevitable. Had the coke oven installation advanced at a more rapid rate in this country the question of a widespread gas supply would have been forced to the front before this—in fact, before the electrical grid was mooted. The method of procedure would be to connect up existing efficient gas stations in different towns by link mains, thus allowing common working of all areas. The efficient stations would in this way be made more efficient and

the others would be gradually shut down. Thus there is an important difference between the two grid schemes—the gas grid has, or will have, a large excess supply to draw from, whilst the electrical one had to create a large part of its supply by heavy capital expenditure on new stations. When we come to the more detailed consideration of the gas scheme we find, of course, many differences in the supply of different towns and in the thermal value of the gas, which varies up and down the country, but none of these differences are greater than those which existed in the supply of electricity; they are probably less, and present no fundamental difficulties that cannot be overcome by patience and experience.

The subject of extended gas supply was partially investigated and certain recommendations were made in the Report of the Departmental Committee on Area Gas Supply, published in 1930. The Committee's analysis of certain areas, stretching from Lancashire and Yorkshire down into the Midlands, is complete, and forms a very useful basis for the consideration of the wider aspects of the subject. These aspects were, it is true, considered by the Committee to a limited extent, but they were treated rather as being outside the immediate terms of reference. Though, as has been indicated, the interconnexion of units into a system of long-distance supply in the gas industry has been much hindered by legal restrictions, it is not contended that in the past the policy of building gas plants as separate units in the large towns of the country was wrong. Times have changed, however, and it may now be necessary to make a change over to the grid system, because the increased capacity of coke oven plants has made available such large quantities of gas, and also because of the extended demand that will arise over the countryside. The Area Committee's inquiry was exceedingly carefully undertaken, and the recommendation which it made for a gas grid, though covering a smaller area than had previously been suggested by the coke oven owners, does help in considering the larger problem. The scheme proposed to collect gas from nineteen coke oven plants to a maximum volume of 80,000,000 cubic feet of gas per day, the flow of gas to be uniform throughout the twenty-four hours of the day, the gas being purified at the coke ovens before being delivered into the network. Compressor plants were to be installed at the coke ovens, and their cost and the cost of operation would therefore have to be met by the coke oven owners, but these costs would be recovered by them in the price of the gas sold. The cost of the compressor plants was estimated at £63,400. The pressures to be used were to vary from 9·7 lb. to 8·2 lb. per square inch when the mains were carrying up to 40,000,000 cubic feet per day and

rom 4·9 lb. to 22 lb. when they were carrying up to 80,000,000 cubic feet per day. The length of the mains was to be nearly 3½ miles. The cost of distribution (excluding compression) would have varied from 1·33*d.* per 1000 cubic feet (0·25*d.* per therm) with a volume of 40,000,000 cubic feet per day to 0·66*d.* per 1000 cubic feet (0·13*d.* per therm) with a volume of 80,000,000 cubic feet per day. The scheme is now under construction by the Sheffield Gas Company.

When the wider national aspects of gas supply are taken into account, not only are the economical factors modified, but other questions also arise, such as the use of longer trunk mains, higher pressures, storage by various methods, etc. Hence it is necessary to examine the experiments of other countries where long-distance supplies have been installed and are at work. The first example which naturally suggests itself is that in the Ruhr district in Germany. Here a grid (Rohrnetz) supply has been in use for some years, and has during that period been rapidly extended. Though the Ruhr Gas Company was not restricted by legal conditions, its extension was held up by the opposition of existing gas interests, and the German railway company (Reichsbahn) regarded the long-distance transmission as antagonistic to its coal traffic. Under the present policy it is not proposed to interfere with existing gasworks which are producing economically, and certain districts are left to separate companies and authorities. The Ruhr Gas Company took over the existing supplies gradually, so that at the end of 1929 its mains totalled 286 miles. No less than 208 miles were then under construction, and it was estimated that an additional 125 miles would be required for the supply of Hesse. The use of coke oven gas for the supply of towns has been practised for some years. It is freely used in Lower Silesia, as well as in the Ruhr district. In the general conception of widespread gas supply in Germany the ultimate object has been the connexion of the coalfields in the Ruhr district with those in Silesia, and the supply of all the intermediate towns between either directly or by spur mains. The trunk mains pass from the Ruhr through Hanover and then on to Berlin, whilst the more southerly line goes through Kassel, Leipzig, and Dresden to the Silesian coal district. Hanover at the present time is the limit in use on the one side and Hesse in the south. Further developments have been affected by the present economic conditions. There is also a main under the Rhine to Cologne and places further west.

Though in the Area Committee's Report it is stated that conditions in England are not the same as those in Germany, and therefore that the success of the Ruhr Gas Company should not be taken as any guarantee that a grid would be successful in this

country, it may equally well be contended that actually conditions here may even be better, owing to the more concentrated population, seeing that there is no such big open agricultural district in England as lies between the Ruhr and Silesia. Nor have we any really long distances to deal with. In connexion with this point some account should be given of long-distance supply in the United States. More often the American mains convey natural gas and not manufactured gas; they run, however, over distances much longer than any we have to meet in this country. For example, one notable main from Texas to Chicago has just been completed. This trunk main is 24 inches in diameter and nearly 1000 miles long; an outstanding feature is that it has fifty-seven units in ten pumping stations to speed the gas on its 1000-mile journey; there are also many river crossings, that over the Missouri being 6000 feet long.

In the gas grid the main trunk lines would have to be provided, as in the electricity scheme, and this would hold true for water also. In initiating, controlling, and administering the new grids, a public undertaking based on the lines of the Port of London Authority, and free from any disturbing political influence, seems to be indicated.

In carrying out these projects, both of which should bring a return on the capital expended, much employment would be provided for many trades. The electricity grid will cost £34,000,000. It is difficult to give a correct estimate for the other two without further inquiry, but it would, in any case, certainly be less.

ALAN CHORLTON.

THE POOR MAN'S COURT OF JUSTICE

The centenary of Bentham's death is a year in which to encourage attempts to reform. It is to be hoped that outspoken criticisms will continue, for there are some of us to whom they are really helpful.—The LORD CHANCELLOR at the Mansion House, July 15, 1932.

FOR several years complaints have been made against the excessive cost and delay in obtaining justice in our civil courts of law. These complaints have related mainly to the High Court of Justice; as a result, several valuable reforms have been made, and in May last a 'New Procedure' was introduced, by which, at the option of the parties in certain classes of cases in the King's Bench Division of that Court, many of the defects complained of can be avoided. These reforms and this experiment are being watched with great interest, and it is almost certain that they will lead in due course to bigger changes in the procedure governing all classes of civil cases in the High Court. But it is not only in the High Court that complaints against unnecessary cost and delay are justified. One of the many legal reforms which Jeremy Bentham inspired was the creation of a system of local courts where civil disputes concerning comparatively small amounts could be cheaply and promptly settled. Describing the system for deciding such cases in Bentham's day, Sir Thomas Snagge wrote as follows:

> For small suitors there was almost a denial of justice. Of an average of some 90,000 causes entered annually in the superior courts of Westminster during the five years ending 1827, no less than 30,000 were for amounts not exceeding £20. To try these cases out would require an expenditure of at least four times the aggregate amount in dispute. The estimated cost of trying some 60,000 entered for the recovery of sums not exceeding £50 was more than double the amount of the claims.

From 1820 onwards Lord Brougham struggled to carry out Bentham's ideal of cheap and quick local courts, but only in 1846 (fourteen years after Bentham's death) was passed the first Act to establish our modern system of county courts. Since then there have been many other Acts of Parliament, and county courts are now held regularly in all parts of the country. But

Bentham's ideal has never been realised, for the criticism expressed by Sir Thomas Snagge about the pre-county court era would not be much of an exaggeration if applied to our county courts of to-day.

When I was writing my book *In Quest of Justice* I asked a registrar of one of the London county courts to give me some examples of what ordinary litigation costs in his court. The result is a table printed in my book. It is too long to reproduce here, but a few items may be quoted: (1) A man owed £100 which he had borrowed some time before. As he could not pay he was sued in the county court, and then he let matters slide. He did not appear at the trial and accordingly judgment was given against him for the £100. But later at a ceremony known to lawyers as 'taxation' the court allowed the sum of £55 11*s*. 6*d*. to this man's successful creditor; in other words, a county court action which in the end was not contested cost £55 11*s*. 6*d*. for one side only. (2) A claim for £16 19*s*. 4*d*. for negligence was upheld by the court to the amount of £12 8*s*. 4*d*., but the defendant was officially ordered to pay also £13 14*s*. 2*d*. for the plaintiff's legal costs, as well as his own lawyer's bill. (3) A schoolmaster claimed nine guineas from a parent in respect of fees. He won his case, and the parent had to pay in addition £4 2*s*. 6*d*. to the schoolmaster's lawyers, and probably at least three guineas to his own lawyers as well. These are just ordinary actions, the type of action that is daily being decided by the county courts. When judgments are taken to the higher courts on appeal, the figures as to costs become astronomical. My book quotes instances where £200 or more have been spent in legal costs (and officially approved in 'taxation') on issues involving a few pounds. But let us dismiss all abnormal instances and concentrate upon the ordinary litigation in county courts, of which the three examples given above are typical. The table printed in my book has come as a shock to many, just because it gives a picture of everyday happenings in the 'poor man's court.' But none of the proposals for legal reform yet put forward to the authorities will effect any change here.

Why is the expense of proceedings in county courts so high, so out of proportion to the issues at stake? This is a social problem of real gravity, for humble people have nowadays to resort to the county courts on matters that are really vital in their lives. Anyone who spends a day in a busy county court will soon realise how false is the widespread idea that litigation is something derogatory, some luxury which only foolish or rich people undertake. A resort to the county court is an everyday necessity, and if justice there is unduly expensive, very real hardships are inflicted. In order to find the explanation of present

conditions it will help us to draw a comparison between the methods in the county court and those in our other courts which deal with poor men's problems—the police courts. In many branches of law police courts (their name is misleading, as they have an extensive civil as well as criminal jurisdiction) deal with the same matters as come before our civil courts. They have to decide, for instance, all the essential issues that come before the Divorce Division of the High Court, and in some other matters it is merely the choice of the litigant whether to sue in the county court or to apply for a summons in the police court. It is worth while to compare the different methods of dealing with facts and circumstances which can be brought before the different courts, and I cannot resist the thought that this comparison may be of assistance in the investigation of ways and means for cheapening and speeding-up the procedure in all our civil courts.

The most obvious illustrations are legal proceedings following a motor accident. Police courts, county courts, and the High Court are occupied daily with such cases. A motor lorry injures a pedestrian in the street and some witnesses are convinced that the lorry driver is to blame. In the High Court the injured pedestrian can claim unlimited damages against the driver, or more usually against his employers and indirectly their insurance company. In the county court damages can similarly be claimed up to £100. In the police court a summons for, say, careless driving against the driver may result in a personal fine up to £20 for a first offence, or to £50 for a second offence, or to imprisonment up to three months; the police court may endorse his licence, and thus in these days jeopardise his prospects of obtaining further employment as a driver. If the driver chooses, as he usually does, to be dealt with in the police court for the more serious offences, far heavier fines may be imposed and his licence may be suspended. Comparisons being odious, I will content myself with saying that the proceedings before the police court are at least as important to the parties concerned as those in the other courts. It will, therefore, be instructive to compare the different procedures. The police court proceedings begin with a summons which costs 2*s*. If this should be taken out by the injured man, it would ordinarily be drafted by an assistant clerk at the police court. If, as is more usual, the police prosecute, the summons is likewise prepared by an assistant clerk. In either case a printed form is used, and it merely informs the defendant that you on the 31st July, 1932, on a road called Blank Street did unlawfully drive a motor vehicle without due care and attention, contrary to s. 12 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. You are therefore hereby summoned to appear before the Court of Summary Jurisdiction, sitting at the North London Police Court, on

—— at the hour of 2 o'clock in the afternoon.' That is all. No legal expenses are incurred beyond the two-shilling stamp and no further details are given; the driver is presumed to know the further details of what is alleged against him.

In the county court the injured man has first to 'enter a plaint,' and at this first step the State, not the lawyers, charges him a sum that varies, according to the amount claimed, from 1*s.* to 50*s.* Thus in an action for £5 the fee is 9*s.*, for £30 it is 34*s.*, for £50 it is 42*s.*, and so on. If more than 40*s.* is being claimed, the injured man, in order to obtain his 'plaint,' has to file with the court 'a *præcipe* for that purpose.' It is significant that this word *præcipe*, which must be meaningless to those concerned, is still used; it comes down to us from centuries before English lawyers were forced against their will to conduct legal proceedings in English. On this *præcipe* is set out the names, addresses and descriptions of the parties to the action and the amount claimed. In addition two copies 'of the plaintiff's . . . particulars of claim are required.' The framing of this latter document has to be done with great care, and legal assistance is ordinarily necessary for it; very often both solicitor and counsel are employed to draft it, the cost then being about £5. This document has to set out in full the details of the negligence alleged, of the injuries, and of the damage done. The following is an extract from the precedent given in Judge McCleary's book as to the details of negligence; the whole precedent occupies nearly a full page of print in his book:

The Defendant (*a*) drove the said motor car at an excessive speed
(*b*) drove the said motor car on the wrong side of the road
(*c*) failed to give any or any proper warning of his approach
(*d*) failed to keep a proper look-out
(*e*) failed to apply or properly apply his brakes
(*f*) failed to stop so as to avoid striking the plaintiff
(*g*) failed to so manage the said motor car as to avoid striking the plaintiff
(*h*) failed to keep the said motor car under proper control.

Upon receipt of this portentous document the defendant's lawyers usually set about the task of preparing (at a similar expense) a 'defence' denying in full detail each of these allegations, and, if the defendant wishes to maintain that the injured man was himself to blame, wholly or in part, the plaintiff's alleged negligence has to be set out in similar detail. In the county court the omission of any of these allegations will invite adverse comment and may have awkward results. As to the

High Court, all that it is necessary to say here is that the ordinary procedure is similar to that of the county court, only still more involved and expensive. Even the simplified 'new procedure' insists on the preparation of these elaborate documents in all cases. In the police court the defendant has nothing more to do on receipt of his summons than to appear in court. But in the county court it is usual for the 'pleadings' (*i.e.*, the particulars given by both sides) to be laid before counsel, together with the proofs of all the witnesses, for his 'advice on evidence'; each side incurs an expense of about £4 in taking this step.

So already before the case is opened we see a remarkable difference between police court and county court, the former providing a cheap and simple procedure, the latter a slightly modified edition of the clumsy and verbose methods of our ancient Common Law procedure. As a barrister I have drafted these documents in this class of case on many occasions, but never with any feeling of satisfaction, and as counsel in court I have never used them, save to make some bad point in the hope that it may impress an old-fashioned judge or a somewhat unintelligent jury. When trying such cases as deputy county court judge I have never paid any serious attention to them or to points raised about them. They do not materially assist either the parties or the judge to arrive at the true interpretation of the facts. Now, as a police court magistrate, I know that it is possible to do without them entirely.

In the county court the injured man ordinarily instructs a surveyor to prepare a plan of the scene of the accident. Quite often both sides do this—at about £3 a side. In the police court a policeman prepares the plan and receives 10s. 6*d*. for doing so. In the police court proceedings the date of hearing and the approximate time of hearing are given on the original summons. In the county court the actual date of hearing is usually fixed at a later stage. In the police court the case is almost sure to be heard within an hour or two of the time fixed, whereas in the county court the parties are fortunate if their case is heard any time on the day fixed; they will ordinarily be summoned to attend at 10 o'clock in the morning, although usually the judge does not arrive in court till 10.30 or later. The county court list of cases will probably be a long one, and the parties may well have to be 'adjourned for want of time' to another day, especially in London. The last time I appeared in a county court as a barrister there was one such case that had been so adjourned four times, which meant that parties, witnesses, and lawyers had attended the court on four days without being heard. After that no true justice is possible, however right the decision may be, for, needless to say, these adjournments add greatly to the cost of the action.

The question needs investigating why county courts, which can nearly always plan their day's work weeks ahead, so often have to adjourn cases unheard, whereas police courts, which never know from day to day what fresh crimes they will have to deal with, so rarely find it necessary to adjourn unheard any of their civil cases.

Now let us see what happens when the case begins. In the police court, unless the case be of unusual gravity, nobody but a police officer and the witnesses is present for the prosecution. Not long ago magistrates in London were officially requested, in the interests of national economy, to be content with the absence of lawyers for the prosecution. Of course this makes the conduct of the case more difficult for the magistrate, but I have never been conscious of any serious drawback. The witnesses for the prosecution go into the box and tell their tale, the police officer asking them questions on any points that they may have omitted. In respect of each witness the magistrate or the clerk of the court asks the driver if he wants to put any questions. Nobody expects a full cross-examination or draws any adverse inference from its absence. Usually the driver contents himself with his opportunity to tell his own story when his turn comes. In most cases the driver has no legal assistance and needs none, the magistrate seeing that he has every opportunity of explaining his defence. If he employs a solicitor, an ordinary fee would be two guineas. When all the witnesses for the prosecution have been heard, the driver usually goes into the witness-box and gives his account of the accident. Then he calls any witnesses that he desires to be heard. He or his witnesses usually raise some fresh point which, had the defence been conducted by a lawyer, would have been put in cross-examination, and then the magistrate intervenes to put these new points to those witnesses for the prosecution who can say anything about them. The police officer in charge of the case has an opportunity of cross-examining the driver and his witnesses, but usually the magistrate or the clerk has already done what is necessary. Then the magistrate decides the case, as a rule without any set speeches. Could any procedure be more simple, cheap, quick or effective? Yet, let us not forget, the driver has all the time been in danger of a heavy fine or imprisonment; far more than mere money damages has been at stake.

In the county court it is unusual for the parties in such cases to appear without lawyers, especially if any serious amount is in issue. Very often both solicitors and barristers are instructed on both sides, and the cost of employing them is in practice always approved if the damages claimed are over £10. The State demands a substantial 'hearing fee,' the amount of which is usually the

ame as the plaintiff has paid on entering his plaint. The full igour of High Court procedure is enforced. There is 'examina-ion-in-chief,' cross-examination, and 're-examination' of every witness, followed by formal speeches by the lawyers. If a jury ıas been requested (though why a man who claims a small sum n the county court should have a right to a jury, when no man :an have one in a police court, has long been a mystery to me), he proceedings may last at least half a day, whereas in the olice court it is unusual for more than an hour to be taken up y any case of this sort. At the end of the case in the police ourt, if the magistrate convicts the defendant, he inquires what osts have been incurred. He is told, say, £1 10s. for witnesses' xpenses and 10s. 6d. for the plan. So the magistrate orders the ıriver, in addition to his penalty, to pay two guineas costs. esides this the driver may have to pay small sums to the wit-ıesses he has brought in his defence and the guinea or two to his olicitor, if he has employed one. Any expense, apart from the ine, of over £10 inclusive in a police court case of this kind would e very unusual; the ordinary cost is considerably below this.

The legal bill which the loser in the county court will have to ay may well amount to double the damages at stake, and the mount of the costs will not be fixed till some time after the trial, resh costs having often to be incurred to settle them. In the able printed in my book there is quoted another actual case here a man was sued for £30 damages arising out of a motor ccident; at the trial the judge decided that the defendant was ıot to blame, but that attempt to get £30 ended in an official rder from the court for £30 7s. 4d., the legal costs of the defen-lant, which the unsuccessful plaintiff had to pay in addition to iis own lawyers' bill. The total bill for costs could not have been ess than £50. In another case in the table a judgment for £22 esulted in an official order for £47 10s. 5d. costs, and in addition here were the defendant's legal expenses, which must have mounted to £30 (£77 costs to recover £22 !). All these cases were, s I have said, just ordinary actions without appeals, selected at andom by the registrar of a London county court.

But motoring cases are but one example of cheap and quick ustice in the police court. The same contrast arises in other ields where police courts and the civil courts have concurrent urisdiction. Under an Act of Parliament of 1838 the landlord f a dwelling let at a rent of 7s. 6d. a week or less may apply to a olice court for an order to eject his tenant. Above that figure ases of this sort—and they are very numerous—have to be aken to the civil courts, but in both courts the law is the same. n the police court landlord and tenant both appear by them-elves. The magistrate provides the law and has in these cases

no power to award any costs at all. He does all he can to avoid the interminable subtleties in which the Rent Restrictions Acts have become involved as the result of appeals from county court decisions, appeals which so encourage the employment of lawyers in apparently simple cases and the taking of ultra-technical points. It is significant that practically all of these appeals are from county courts, not from police courts. A case is cited in my book—and a pathetic human document it is—where the rent of the house was £3 12s. a month and the unfortunate lady tenant was ordered to pay a legal bill of over £200, the final result being to confirm the decision which I gave when trying the case as deputy county court judge.

In the police court such cases begin by the clerk asking the tenant, 'Have you had your notice to quit?' This is technically irregular, as it is theoretically for the plaintiff landlord to prove his case before the defendant tenant is called on to say anything. When a friend of mine was appointed a county court judge he was shocked, as he told me soon afterwards, at finding this method in force in his court, and he at once ordered that the strict technicalities should be observed. So every landlord had in future to go to the expense of calling as a witness either the man who served the notice or the man who sent it off by post. These expenses are, of course, added to the bill to be paid by the tenant if the landlord wins his case. In practice it is very rare for the service of these notices to be disputed by the tenant. This is typical of the contrast between the atmospheres in the two courts. Our law books on Landlord and Tenant have all many pages devoted to the technicalities of notices to quit, and one legally important problem in connexion with them still remains to be solved by the High Court at a cost of about £200 to some unfortunate county court litigant. But in the police court we hear little of such technicalities, and usually find a way round them if they are raised. Not long ago I tried an assault case in which a landlady summoned her tenant. There had been trouble for months between them, and the landlady had sued in the county court for possession of the tenant's rooms on the ground that the tenant was a 'nuisance.' I came to the conclusion, as had the county court judge, that there were bad faults on both sides. So the landlady lost both her county court case and her police court case. But the former cost her, she told me, £14, and I knew that the police court case cost her 2s.

Similarly with the recovery of wages by workmen. Under an Act of 1875 police courts have power to decide disputes up to £10, and here also magistrates have allowed no legal rigmaroles to encumber the dispensing of justice.[1] Similarly, again, with

[1] Unfortunately the High Court has repeatedly limited the scope of this

matrimonial and bastardy cases; here only police courts and the High Court have jurisdiction. The High Court insists on elaborate 'particulars' of all allegations of cruelty, adultery, paternity, etc. All these issues come before us daily in the police court, and we decide them on methods akin to those just described, and usually without legal assistance or legal subtleties. Is anyone in these democratic days prepared to assert that the matrimonial affairs of wage-earners are less important to them, or to the community, than those of the people who are better off? Despite the criticisms of 'Solicitor' in *English Justice* (criticisms which mostly refer to the failings of individuals, not of the system), it cannot be seriously said that in general the justice administered in the police court is inferior to that of other courts, with all their expensive legal documents and advocacy and often with their jury, ever prone to give sentimental and mistakenly gallant verdicts. That police court justice satisfies the public is shown by the fact that defendants nearly always elect to be dealt with by magistrates when they have an alternative right to go before a judge and jury. Justice is cheap in the police court because we are free from the hampering traditions of our legal history, and justice could be cheap, though never as cheap, elsewhere if drastic breaches could be made with many traditional ideas.

It follows from what has been written that one important matter for the early consideration of all those who believe that the obtaining of cheap justice is an urgent public need is whether the present low limits set to the jurisdiction of police courts in the civil side of their work should not now be raised. They were fixed, as I have shown, in 1838, 1875, and so on, and the value of money has greatly fallen since then. The greatest boon that could be granted to the small litigant would be to transfer him as far as possible from county court to police court. Better still would it be to simplify proceedings in the county court, so that there should be an end to the present unfortunate contrast between the two courts. I can see no reason why, for instance, the ceremony of 'taxation' should not be entirely abolished in county courts for all proceedings under £50. Why should not the judge, like the magistrate, inquire into and fix the legal costs immediately after he has decided a case? I have sat some sixty times as deputy county court judge, but I never got free from the

useful Act. Thus, such wage-earners as domestic or 'menial' servants, grocers assistants, potmen, telegraph clerks, and hair-cutters, etc., have all been excluded; also an omnibus conductor, though a motor-omnibus driver has been held to be within the Act. Those wage-earners excluded from the Act have to seek their remedies in the more expensive county courts. These distinctions seem arbitrary, and might well be revised by the Legislature, so that all wage-earners shall have access to the police courts in such matters.

depressing thought that after my decision would come this 'taxation,' which would result in a heavy bill being presented to the loser, thus often converting justice into injustice. Nothing pleases me more in my work as magistrate than the knowledge that before parties leave my court they know, and I know, the full amount of what they have to pay. If the judge did his own taxation and followed a stringent policy, as magistrates do, it would quickly become known in the legal world that litigation, even where legal assistance is employed, must be economical. An end would speedily be put to all unnecessary writing of letters, duplicating copies of correspondence, and to all the other devices by which at present legal costs are inflated. Nobody wants lawyers to be underpaid, but everyone, lawyers included, should want to be paid only for work that is really necessary. I have long held the view, even when I was at the Bar, that reforms such as I am suggesting would be to the advantage of lawyers, and I believe that many lawyers agree with me. As to this proposal to abolish separate 'taxation' in small cases, I recently talked it over with a county court judge. He then talked it over with one of the registrars on his circuit, and he afterwards wrote to me that both he and the registrar agreed that the idea is practical.

To many lawyers it will seem a new, perhaps an absurd, idea that the methods of police courts may contain lessons for our civil courts. In the legal world the idea has long been abroad that police courts are only places 'where small motoring offences and such things are dealt with,' and that 'the whole atmosphere at petty sessions (police courts) is trivial.' I intentionally refrain from giving the source of these statements. In fact there are no courts where the importance of the issues to those concerned is greater. From the purely legal point of view I freely admit that the task of the magistrate is easier than that of the judge, for nearly all the law which the magistrate administers is in statute form, and we are less tormented by the 'lawless science of our law, that codeless myriad of precedent, that wilderness of single instances.'[2] But in the process of ascertaining the truth from conflicting evidence, not only have we no advantage, but we often have a far more difficult task than the judge, for, unfortunately, so many parties and witnesses in a police court have no sense of truth. In most civil, as well as in all criminal, cases the ascertaining of facts must be a predominant task, and it is here that a study of police court methods would help in the search for cheaper and quicker justice. It will doubtless shock the orthodox legal mind to suggest that in many classes of cases elaborate written 'pleadings' are not necessary. But it is stimulating to realise that when a man is tried for murder the indictment merely states:

[2] Tennyson, *Aylmer's Field*.

A. B. on the —— day of —— in the County of —— murdered C. D.' The indictment does not give elaborate particulars as to the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed. And if this comparison is vitiated by the fact that the accused hears all the evidence given against him in the preliminary police court proceedings, the fact remains that for all the lesser crimes which are finally disposed of in the police court (which may result in a sentence of twelve months' imprisonment with hard labour) the only information given to the accused before the hearing is a bald statement of the date of the alleged offence and the nature of the charge against him. In all criminal proceedings the prosecution has to face the trial without any knowledge as to what the defence will be. These facts show that it is possible for justice to be done without having the cases for the opposing sides fully set out on paper before the hearing, and surely this must apply to many classes of civil actions. The universality and the strictness of the rules of pleading are a great cause of expense in civil litigation.

To make these comparisons is not to suggest that the High Court, or even the county court in all cases, could do its work with the same simplicity as the police court. Especially in complicated cases preliminary formalities and documents, by limiting the scope of the dispute, often save time and in the end money. But none the less the whole of the rules of procedure in the civil courts, and especially in the county court, might well be overhauled in order to ascertain where and to what extent greater simplicity, and therefore cheaper and quicker justice, is possible. I believe it would be found that in many classes of cases something akin to the simplicity of police court proceedings would be found possible. At present many of the steps taken, and much of the expense incurred in civil actions, are taken and incurred solely because the rules of court allow them.

Again, it will shock the orthodox legal mind that a court can do justice in plenty of kinds of cases without the formal cross-examination of the parties or of their witnesses. Yet, as I have shown, formal cross-examination by lawyers is rare in police courts. Its absence casts a greater burden on the magistrate, but justice is not impaired. In difficult cases cross-examination is often a vital necessity, but the majority of cases, both civil and criminal, are not difficult, and often full cross-examination is a waste of time.

Cheaper and quicker justice will never be obtained unless for comparatively simple cases our civil courts are prepared to accept standards which from the point of view of legal science must be regarded as lower than those now prevailing. So long as county court procedure is but an abbreviation of High Court procedure,

and so long as traditional methods are there observed, no big reduction can be hoped for in the cost of county court proceedings. Even a reduction of the State's tolls in the county court (and, unlike Bentham, I have never seen injustice in compelling civil litigants to pay for the expenses of the courts) would not solve the problem.

Despite the many attempts at the reform of legal procedure that have recently been made—all due to the inspiration and energy of Lord Sankey—to-day, so far as the public has been informed, no investigation is being made into the cost of proceedings in the county courts, and nobody is proclaiming the troubles of the county court litigant. The matter scarcely comes within the province of the London Chamber of Commerce (at present the pioneer of law reform), and suitors after justice in county courts are usually too humble to be heard of in the public Press. But their difficulties are considerable and need ventilating. Recently one county court judge has made several protests against the cost of county court proceedings. 'With regard to the police court,' he said, 'that is a poor man's court, but the county court has lost that character. . . . It cannot be deemed the poor man's court to-day.'[3] Another county court judge has written that certain classes of appeals from county courts 'are a disgrace to our legal system.'[4] Here is an important social problem that needs to be investigated. The justice dispensed by our courts must be tested, not only by the correctness of the final decision, but by the final cost to the parties and by the time taken as well. At present only our police courts can pass this full test.

Magistrates begin their day by allowing anybody in trouble to come and ask their advice, often on matters far removed from their jurisdiction. Frequently the troubles relate to matters that would have to be dealt with in the county courts, and it is always with real reluctance that I, for one, have to advise these humble people to go to the local county court, for I know the expense to which they will be put. When I say to them 'You must sue in the county court,' I often feel that I might as well tell them that they have no redress, and often they seem to have a similar feeling; their longing to have their troubles settled in the police court is pathetic. This state of affairs should not and need not be. County courts could be far less expensive and far less terrifying than they are, though they cannot be quite as simple and accessible as police courts, because the laws they have to administer are at present more intricate. All the same, great improvements in our county courts would follow a serious study of police court methods. It might, as I have said, even be found

[3] *The Times*, April 14 and 25, 1932.
[4] *Law Journal*, February 20, 1932.

that police court methods have something that would be of value when more drastic changes of High Court procedure come to be considered.

In a non-technical journal I obviously cannot enter into the details of the reforms that could be introduced to cheapen procedure in our civil courts, but the comparison given above between police courts and county courts will indicate the general nature of what could be done. The first essential is to realise that at present justice is far more expensive and complicated than it need be. If the would-be reformers within the law could be encouraged, if such bodies as local chambers of commerce would take up the question, if social workers would realise what a big social problem cheaper justice is, and if, finally, the legal profession would appreciate that small profits on many cases are better than large profits on a few, then big changes would quickly come and cheap justice would become a reality.

CLAUD MULLINS.

THE TRAGEDY OF CLAUDE DEBUSSY

It seems hard to believe that Debussy might still be with us—a man of seventy, Richard Strauss's senior by two years only, Schönberg's by twelve, Ravel's by thirteen. His music, it is true, is as fresh as ever, and still a live influence although not an obvious one. But all that he stood for, and the very days when each work of his, as soon as it appeared, was a bone of contention for music-lovers and critics, have receded far back. Alone among the prominent composers of his time, he belongs to the past as definitely as Wagner, Brahms, or even Berlioz. And this has not occurred for the mere reason that things have been moving fast, ideals have changed, and present-day tendencies are the very reverse of what they were a quarter of a century ago: he seemed far away even during his lifetime—an enigmatic, retiring, saturnine man, bewildered by his surroundings, and loathing the limelight and the atmosphere of intrigue and strife into which he was drawn as soon as he began to grow famous.

Yet, far back as it all seems, one wondered whether the moment had come when it would be possible to write a true account of him and his background. In theory, it is still too early to see this vast subject whole. Old prejudices and habits of thought are not yet quite extinct, maybe. But, in practice, one thing is certain: nobody who has not lived in the Paris of the 'nineties and after, and watched the circles in which Debussy moved (or, rather, those which moved around him), will be able to do it. From afar—whether in space or in time—the perspective may be truer, but many a detail will pass unnoticed which sheds light on otherwise unaccountable points. And very fortunately, a shrewd, independent, and outspoken witness has turned up in the person of M. Léon Vallas, one of the few French critics who in Debussy's days had maintained a dispassionate (although by no means an indifferent) attitude. His book *Debussy et son temps*[1] gives a most faithful and thorough survey of its subject.

Paris in the 'nineties and after was a wonderfully active and stimulating musical centre, and also a very strange one. France—as everybody knows now, but hardly anybody outside the

[1] Paris (Alcan).

country realised at the time—was in the throes of a musical renaissance following upon a long period of stagnation. This was marked not only by new ideas and aspirations, keen interest in the wealth of fine music turned out by French composers, in long neglected or underrated masterpieces of the past and in contemporary developments abroad, but by many currents and cross-currents, and a spirit of violent partisanship and combativeness. The fight around Wagner's music (whose influence was one of the main factors of the renaissance) was at its height, official musical circles and the majority of the Press representing the opposition; and it was only one campaign among many. All this was attended by a good deal of fuss and flurry. One inclines to smile when one reads of the pitched battles and guerilla warfare which to-day seem so many storms in a teacup, and to wonder whether it was really needful and could have done any good.

Again, it is not possible to judge fairly unless all the circumstances of the case are taken into account. In England, too, a musical renaissance was then in progress. It began and continued quietly and decorously. From the days of Parry, Stanford, and Mackenzie in his youth to those of Bax, Bliss, and Walton it went on steadily, marked by no upheaval or violent reaction; enthusiasm and apathy, approval and disapproval, co-existed without perceptible friction. Opponents would now and then break a lance or two, but showed no desire whatever to draw blood. If in France things were different, it is not Gallic excitability alone that should be held responsible. An almost omnipotent musical officialdom, the Académie des Beaux-Arts and the Conservatoire (a State institution enjoying a practical monopoly of tuition and leadership), stood arrayed against all composers, French or foreign, who wrote anything but operas or light music in the accepted style. A saying of Ambroise Thomas (the director of the Paris Conservatoire from 1871 to 1896), to the effect that 'no composer of distinction would ever stoop to teach symphony,' became, in its time, a byword. So that pioneers and partisans rightly felt that they had not only much to fight for, but good reasons to fight lustily. If in the circumstances a few of them gradually developed a taste for warfare for its own sake, it may be deplorable and ridiculous, but it is only human after all.

It was in the midst of this turmoil that Debussy reached his artistic maturity. Like Berlioz—another brand of discord, but one who loved a fray above all things—he had embarked upon his career with the full endorsement of the powers that were, winning the Prix de Rome for composition in 1884, at the early age of twenty-two. In proportion as he matured, he evolved a musical style very much his own and surprisingly different from any

style then current, and also an ever-increasing belief in simplicity. 'Music,' he used to say, 'expresses the motion of the waters, the play of curves described by changing breezes. . . . Musicians listen only to music written by expert hands, never to that which is written in nature. . . . Music should humbly seek to please. Extreme complication is antagonistic to art; beauty must provide us with immediate enjoyment.' And so, he was fated to displease both the official conservatism and most of the progressives: the former were unable to conceive that his daring innovations could ever give pleasure, and the latter were intent on more ambitious ideals. They realised that French music had sunk to a shockingly low level through 'merely seeking to please,' and at the time happened to be concentrating mainly on Wagner, Beethoven and César Franck, whom they loved not only for the sheer beauty of their music, but for its intellectual appeal, its complexity and profundity. The moment was still far distant when he was to be extolled for having led French music back to simplicity. And yet there was no dearth of music-lovers keen and alert enough to realise the rare quality of his musical imagination. Even some of his teachers at the Conservatoire had felt it, although they were scandalised by the unconventional character of his tasks and examination papers (some of which, preserved in the official files, actually show 'consecutive fifths,' then a bugbear to all pundits). At an early date he found in his friend Georges Hartmann a publisher ready to encourage and back him. His works were performed almost as soon as written; and, in short, he was given, from the very outset, quite a fair chance. But his music, while steadily winning new admirers, was violently attacked, described as shallow, deliberately paradoxical and painfully cacophonic, decadent, and morbid.

The first stage of the actual campaign for and against him extended from 1893, when his string quartet was first performed (and does it not seem incredible nowadays that this delightful, utterly straightforward music should ever have been thought involved and ugly?) to the battle around his lovely *Pelléas and Mélisande* in 1902, when disgraceful demonstrations took place in the auditorium of the Paris Opéra-Comique. By that time his admirers were numerous, strong and resolute, and *Pelléas* soon overcame opposition.

At the age of forty Debussy stood recognised at last as one of the greatest live forces in French music. It seemed that all he had to do was to enjoy the fruits of victory and carry on his work under favourable conditions. But, on the contrary, the moment was to mark for him the beginning of a period of uncertainty and dissatisfaction. He soon discovered that his partisans could be more obnoxious and dangerous than his bitterest foes. He who

asked for nothing but to be allowed to proceed in tranquillity along his own path and at his own pace found himself surrounded by people who clamorously appropriated him, quarrelled over him, and presumed to dictate to him. What seemed to matter to these self-appointed champions and judges was no longer Debussy, but 'le Debussysme.' Whenever a new work from his pen appeared, somebody or other was sure to start complaining that it was too different from what he had done before, and not at all the kind of thing which he ought to have attempted; and somebody else that it was not different enough, and that he ought not to rest content with repeating the same tricks over and over again.

However indifferent to, and indeed contemptuous of, adverse criticism he may have been, this kind of thing was bound to flick him on the raw. No one better than he realised that after *Pelléas* and the instrumental works of his 'impressionist' period a thorough renovation was imperative for more reasons than one. He stood satisfied with his exploration of certain regions and wished to explore fresh ones. He saw his music imitated, not in the main—for his fluid, intuitive methods of construction and working out were inimitable, and copyists turned out mere patchwork instead of live tissue—but in all its details of melodic patterns, harmonies and colours, which are as easy to imitate, singly or severally, as, say, Strauss's remorseless acrobatics or Schönberg's stark discords. It was pointed out that 'Debussy's apes did that kind of thing far better than he himself'; and he was urged to gird his loins and resume leadership—which was the last thing in the world he would have dreamt of doing. 'The artist,' he said to a reporter who interviewed him on this subject, 'must devote his time to his own work, renewing himself so far as possible. He has no leisure to devote to forming disciples, nor to elaborating codes of rules for their guidance.'

And at the very time when he was so eager to create works of his own and renew himself, he was feeling that he had come to a standstill. In the summer of 1902 he wrote to his friend André Messager: 'I am like a sucked orange. To start on a new work is to me like taking a perilous leap with the risk of breaking my back.' And in 1903: 'Music is the most shameless of wantons. I hate those persons who sit on your lap for five minutes and then rush away God knows where.' With pathetic eagerness, he kept casting about for suitable subjects for new operas. His first plan after *Pelléas* was to set to music a French adaptation of Shakespeare's *As You Like It*. This was to be 'in a lyrical, cheerful vein throughout, with many songs and choruses'—a sharp contrast to *Pelléas*. Soon he gave up the idea, and turned to Poe's *Devil in the Belfry* and *The Fall of the House of Usher*, out of

which he began to draw libretti himself. He started work on the former during the summer of 1902. He wrote to Messager:

> This is going to be a felicitous admixture of reality and fancy. I know exactly the kind of music I wish to write. It is still out of reach, but I am full of hope. Those kind friends of mine who fondly believe that I shall never be able to escape from *Pelléas and Mélisande* are deluding themselves. They are unaware that if this was to happen, I would give up music and start growing pineapples at home: for I consider that nothing could be worse than to repeat myself. But then, of course, they will blame me for having deserted the ghost of Mélisande in favour of the devil's sarcastic pirouettes, and again accuse me of eccentricity.

In 1906 he wrote to his publisher that 'he had found a fairly new way of writing for the human voice—an altogether simple one'; but five years later he was still dissatisfied with his progress. In the meantime, he had started (in 1908) on *The Fall of the House of Usher*, which he conceived as 'a symphony of dire forebodings and anguish, leading up to a climax which brings appeasement in desolation . . . if I carry it out successfully, I shall have rendered yeoman's service to music.'

Two other plans of his are noteworthy for a special reason: one is that of an *Orphée Roi* which was to be 'an anti-Gluck demonstration' (he disliked Gluck's music as much as he loved Rameau's), and the other a *Histoire de Tristan*, modelled upon Bédier's adaptation of the old French romance, and 'epic, descriptive, anecdotic, tragic and comic in turns' (he had begun by loving Wagner's *Tristan*, and he ended by being a fierce anti-Wagnerite). But none of these schemes, nor others, more vague, for renewing the old opera-ballet, ever matured. And not even rough drafts or sketches of these various attempts are available to show how far he was actually on the way of 'escaping from *Pelléas*.'

It was not a dramatic work, but an instrumental one, *La Mer*, which gave the Paris public the next opportunity to demonstrate for and against him. The behaviour of part of the audience at the second performance, in 1908, was scandalous enough almost to recall the early days of *Pelléas*.

In 1910 he started on a dramatic score which he was compelled to carry to completion within a short time, having accepted from the Russian dancer and actress Ida Rubinstein a commission to write the music for d'Annunzio's *Le Martyre de Saint-Sébastien*. When this was produced there could be no doubt that he had struck an entirely new vein. But whereas many of the best critics praised the broader style and the more serene, more powerful eloquence of the work (one or two of them did not hesitate to describe it as 'Debussy's *Parsifal*'), others—those who had been repeating for years that he was no longer the

man who had written *Pelléas*—complained that it was artificial, deliberate, 'rather a parenthesis than a natural stage in the course of his evolution.' He himself, although satisfied that he had succeeded in doing what he had set out to do, felt that not only *Saint-Sébastien* had been written too hurriedly, but the very form in which it was cast—preludes, incidental music, and separate vocal numbers—was not the best possible. In 1914, in agreement with d'Annunzio, he decided to turn it into an opera; but he soon gave up the notion.

In 1912 a commission from Diaghilef led to his composing the ballet *Jeux*, a delightfully original little score around which the same old controversies again arose. After that the only work for the stage which he carried to completion (except for part of the orchestration, which, after his death, was finished by another composer) was the miniature ballet *La Boîte à Joujoux*. In 1917 he reverted to *As You Like It*. But he was already very ill, and could not proceed with it. Nor was he able to tackle a Hindu lyric drama which d'Annunzio had planned for him.

During all those years his activities in other directions had not been very great. A few instrumental works—including the lovely *Images* for orchestra and the twenty-four piano preludes—and a small number of songs are all that he composed between 1904 and 1914. Later he went back to chamber-music for the first time since 1893, planning a set of six sonatas. He managed to write three, which contain fine things but do not reach a very high level. The third (for 'cello and piano) shows clear signs of exhaustion.

If after reaching the age of forty he produced so little, and never succeeded in taking the big step forward of which he dreamt, it was mainly due, no doubt, to his own nature. It is impossible to tell whether he had a really clear vision of the new goal, or only vague yearnings. He had successfully explored certain regions of music, inspired chiefly by his love of natural scenery and poetic suggestion; but pure, abstract music had but little attraction for him, and thus one path—the main path, maybe—towards self-renewal remained closed to him. And he never found another subject for a lyric drama which fired his imagination and roused him to sustained effort as *Pelléas* had done. Maybe he carried self-criticism to excess, and was too preoccupied with points of detail. He was also, as he himself acknowledged, very lazy, easily discouraged. And certainly the continuous wrangling to which every move of his gave rise contributed to his depression. He was ill-equipped for weathering storms of this kind—which, let it be repeated, were in those days all in the day's work for French composers. Vincent d'Indy and Ravel, too, had to undergo ruthless, and often unfair, onslaughts. But

this never perturbed them in the least. D'Indy remained aloof and invariably indifferent; Ravel aloof, contemptuous, and a times amused. Neither of them, it is true, had to suffer from hi professed admirers as well as from his foes—from what one the belligerents around Debussy aptly described as 'malevolen admiration.' I well remember a long talk I had with him, towards the end of 1913, on recent developments in music. He declare that, wishing to concentrate upon his own work, he had made i a rule to hear as little music as possible. He spoke feelingl of the evils of premature discussion of young composers. ' consider it almost a crime,' he told me. 'The former policy o allowing artists to mature in peace was far sounder. It is wickec to unsettle them by making them the subjects of debates that are generally, as shallow as they are prejudiced. Hardly does composer appear than people start devoting essays to him, anc weighing his music down with ambitious definitions. They dc far greater harm than even the fiercest detractors could do. And there was in his voice a wistfulness which made it clear that he was thinking of himself as much as of any of the young composers to whom he was alluding. To his friend René Peter h said, one day, 'Les Debussystes me tuent.'

Would things have gone otherwise had he been allowed the peace of mind for which he longed? Or had his creative imagination already run its full course, irritating comments whose memory preyed upon him, only increasing his consciousness of a feeling of impotence which would have developed in any circumstances? It is hard to tell how great a part 'Debussyites' anc 'anti-Debussyites' played in the tragedy of his later years; but even if he was destined by his very nature as an artist never tc go further than *Pelléas* and the later works which he completed, it is clear that, unfortunately, they played no small one.

M. D. CALVOCORESSI.

A NATIONAL THEATRE?

A NEWSPAPER reporter from another world, commissioned by his editor to survey the present state of art and letters in these islands, would be faced by a problem which, unversed in the social history of our race, he might well find hard to unravel. If the early days of his sojourn with us were spent (as presumably they would be spent) in London, and if he put up (as he very well might) at the Savoy Hotel, his first impression would be that, whatever the vogue of the other arts, the theatre, at any rate, was well beloved and well provided for. The doors of a luxurious playhouse would invite him whenever he stepped out of the entrance of his hotel; half a dozen others would obtrude themselves upon his notice almost within a stone's throw; and cinemas galore.

Soon, however, our fabulous reporter might begin to feel that his first opinion required some modification. Walking westwards he would be confronted by a building more grandiose than any he had seen, and posed more spectacularly in what must surely be the central square of London. He would be told that this was, in fact, no theatre, but the National Picture Gallery; and then, turning his steps to the north, he would pass, it is true, theatre after theatre, but none of particular magnificance; and the first considerable edifice to strike his imagination would be a building in Bloomsbury, and that, he would find, was dedicated to none of the living arts of mankind, but to the dead glories of vanished ages as displayed in plastic arts and literature. Architecture, too, he would find exemplified in many a 'museum piece' like Westminster Abbey or St. Paul's. Even music he might consider to be adequately glorified by the Albert Hall. But for a public symbol of Britain's appreciation of the art of the stage he would look in vain. Still, thinking the matter over, he might find confirmation of his first belief in our love for the drama in the fact that, whereas it appeared that the public could not be induced to patronise the other arts unless provided gratis, large sums of money were charged and willingly paid by the public for entry into the theatres. The natural inference might be that whereas what people wanted most they paid for, what they wanted little

or not at all had to be thrust upon them. Against this, however, further experience of our ways and habits would induce the conviction that it must be painting, sculpture, literature, which were after all, the really valued arts, since these alone the State thought it worth while to cherish ; the art of the stage being totally ignored and relegated to the rank of a commodity of commerce, severely left to work out its own salvation, and even taxed, like petrol or tobacco, as a rich source of national revenue. If some such conclusion was thrust upon our friend by his visit to the capital, a tour of the provinces would only serve to enforce it. In some of the larger cities in Great Britain he would find the professional theatre non-existent, though these same cities would flout their pride in possession of civic picture galleries, municipal art schools, libraries, colleges of music. By this time our inter-planetary visitor might well be doubtful whether we were a theatre-loving people at all, and might even coquette with the theory that the so numerous and so crowded playhouses of the metropolis were nothing else than the outcome of a cynical exploitation of the entertainment value of the drama, rather than any evidence of that genuine solicitude for its artistic welfare which in Mars or Venus is universally regarded as the drama's due.

Some such realisation of the pitiful truth has been at the back of the various efforts made from time to time to establish in this country at least one playhouse which might clinch once and for all the drama's claim to rank as a fine art, and thus qualify for proper treatment at the hands of the community as a whole. Arguments adduced on behalf of a National Theatre have been both theoretical and practical, and while few people are found at this time of day to dispute the former, the latter are still in many minds *sub judice.* The critics of a National Theatre, while admitting the sentimental case for it, are fearful lest a theatre endowed by the State, or even privately, might in the long run prove a positive handicap to progress in the theatre. They raise an academic bogey which is enough to frighten anyone who holds that freedom in art is a necessary condition of progress. But prophecies as to the evil effects of an endowed theatre cannot be proved before the event. Better, surely, to consider the experience of other countries where the thing has been tried, and to remember that the idea is no crankish notion of a few eccentrics or place-hunters, but that it has been held by almost every outstanding actor or theatre manager from Garrick downwards.

The growth of the National Theatre idea on the continent of Europe is a chapter of stage history that still needs to be written. But we know that throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France, Germany, and Russia the development of the drama is inextricably woven with the rise of theatrical

companies established by the reigning monarchs or petty princes who thus became the virtual founders of National Theatres in their respective territories. In Paris, from the illustrious company of Monsieur de Molière was destined to evolve the pattern of all National Theatres—the Comédie Française. In Germany, rather later, but well by the time of Goethe, ducal courts were everywhere following suit in the foundation of subsidised theatres and companies, whether professional or amateur. In Russia, Catherine the Great established on the French model her theatres for drama and for opera, the influence of which has outlived the Revolution, and persisted to this day as almost the only fount of culture in a land given over to the struggle for efficiency on the material plane.

With so many precedents and examples, why, it may be asked, has England failed so utterly to rise to the occasion, and this despite the fact that our dramatic genius is admittedly second to none? The answer must be sought not so much in the annals of the stage itself as in those of the political and social life of the seventeenth century. The Elizabethan age left behind it a tradition of courtly patronage of the stage that might easily have come to fruition as it did in other countries. But that was not to be. The peculiar influences of our Puritan movement worked in a quite contrary direction. The claims of the stage to respectability had at the best of times been slender. The Roundheads would have none of them. The result was that the centre of gravity in the realm of culture was shifted away from the theatre to the more innocent arts of poetry and music; and when, with the restoration of the Stuarts, the theatres opened their doors again, moral idealism was the last thing which was either asked for or expected of the art of the stage. Gone were the high emotions, the spiritual fervours of the Elizabethan drama, and while abroad the art of the stage was coming into its own as the very symbol of national spirit, an instrument tuned to the whole gamut of human experience, here in England it was more and more narrowly constricted to a monotonous note of sexual satire. Charles II.'s theatre was far more licentious than Louis XIV.'s, and when licence failed there was little to take its place. So for many a year, and even in spite of Dryden, it was hard for the solid Englishman to regard the theatre as of wholesome significance, still less of social value. As time went on, however—behind the scenes, as it were, but with ever-increasing ardour—a change in feeling came about. Garrick brought back idealism to the theatre. Gradually the pendulum began to swing, and the stage to recover something, if not all, of the prestige that it had lost. Since the beginning of the present century the pace of rehabilitation has been fast and furious. But it is no piece of

fanciful theorising to assert that its real beginning dates from the knighting of Henry Irving by Queen Victoria in 1895. Sir Henry Irving, as a matter of fact, was in sympathetic touch with the pioneers of the contemporary movement to found a National Theatre. Matthew Arnold from his high seat in the clouds had pronounced in its favour some years before. But for practical purposes we may more fitly start with Irving. For his approval was momentous. He was a man of the theatre *par excellence*, and he spoke not only as an artist but as an economist when, towards the end of his life, in reply to someone who had asked what he thought of the project which was then starting, he exclaimed, 'Splendid! Splendid! But don't touch it, my boy, without you see your way clear to a million pounds sterling!' That figure indicates both the nature of the task and the difficulties of its accomplishment. It also sets a standard of which, in these days of second best, it is well to be reminded.

What, then, do we envisage as the scope and purpose of a National Theatre when we speak in terms of a million pounds, more or less, as its price? And in making such an estimate, what exactly was it that Irving had in mind? Substantially, no doubt, what was in the minds of the promoters of the scheme when they issued the statement of 'objects' which formed the basis of the appeal made at the inaugural meeting of the Shakespeare Memorial National Theatre Committee held at the Mansion House on March 28, 1909. That appeal proved abortive. Four years after the initiation of the plan, and in spite of Sir Carl Meyer's encouraging gift of £70,000, only £22,000 had been added to the fund, and this had been achieved only by an expenditure of an almost equal amount. In the spring of 1913, however, the committee gathered itself together for a vigorous attack. On Shakespeare's birthday in that year they took their case to the very citadel of public opinion, the House of Commons. There they pleaded for a Government subsidy which would pledge annual support for the enterprise, and which, in their own words, they felt would call forth 'a magnificent generosity from private donors.' Their hope, they stated, was to have the theatre ready for the tercentenary of Shakespeare's death in 1916, and they suggested, with unconscious irony, that the fruition of their labours would be 'utilised for the purpose of peace in the world.' The Government, however, in responding to the proposal, felt that the time for 'crowning private enterprise' had not yet arrived, and would not arrive until the theatre had been built and at least partially endowed. This view-point, adopted somewhat arbitrarily in 1913, would be to-day, no doubt, inevitable; though it is rumoured that personal sympathy with the National Theatre idea has been admitted by more than one British Prime Minister

since the close of the war. At any rate, discouraged as they have been at every overt approach to the Government, the stalwarts of the movement seem never to have abandoned faith in its ultimate triumph. Throughout the war period, and subsequently, the National Theatre Committee has kept in being. At one time a site was purchased in Bloomsbury, then sold again at a moderate profit. Schemes innumerable have been considered, one of them ending in a legal argument which led to the capital of the trust being placed under the administrative care of the Charity Commissioners. The committee has also been encouraged in its hopes by spontaneous action from outside. In 1923 the British Drama League organised a competition for designs for a National Theatre, and the winning plans, the work of a Canadian architect, when shown at the British Empire Exhibition, attracted a good deal of attention. In 1929 the same league collected and published over 100 eminent names in support of the scheme, among them that of Mr. Baldwin.

Even in darker days such efforts were continued. In 1930 Mr. Granville-Barker published his important survey of the practical problems involved in the organisation and running of the theatre, and concurrently the Shakespeare Memorial National Theatre Committee was making plans for a new approach to the Government. On the basis of Mr. Granville-Barker's book a revised 'scheme' was drawn up by a special drafting committee under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton. This scheme was in harmony with that which had been enunciated at the original Mansion House meeting in 1911, but it was both more elaborate and more precise in its indications and expressed the considered agreement of some of the most technically experienced minds at work on the contemporary stage. Since this document offers the nearest approach that has so far been made to a charter for the National Theatre, it may be useful to reproduce it here:

The Committee appointed the Earl of Lytton as Chairman, and Sir Israel Gollancz as Honorary Secretary.

The Committee have held ten meetings (in addition to meetings of the sub-committees), and have considered the scheme of the Shakespeare Memorial National Theatre adopted in 1909 and also a scheme recently prepared by the British Drama League.

They beg leave to report as follows:—

1. The Committee are of opinion that the proposal to establish a National Theatre in London to be regarded as a Shakespeare Memorial is practicable, and that every effort should be made to carry it into effect.

2. The objects of the National Theatre should be:—

(i.) To provide in the Capital of the Empire a theatre where the people may have continual opportunities of seeing the best plays of all ages worthily presented on the stage;

(ii.) to keep the plays of Shakespeare in its repertory;

(iii.) to revive whatever is vital in British Drama;
(iv.) to prevent recent plays of merit from falling into oblivion;
(v.) to produce new plays and to further the development of the modern drama;
(vi.) to produce translations of representative works of foreign drama, ancient and modern;
(vii.) to stimulate the art of the theatre through the varied opportunities which it will afford.

3. To accomplish the aforestated purposes the Theatre should be organised on a repertory system.

4. The controlling authority of the Theatre should be a Board of Governors, not exceeding fifteen, appointed by the Prime Minister (vacancies to be filled by him), which shall meet at least four times a year, and shall appoint the Managing Staff of the Theatre, consisting of (i.) the Director, (ii.) the Assistant Director, and (iii.) the Treasurer and Business Manager.

5. As the Officers of the Theatre would require the assistance of the Governors in the discharge of their responsibilities to an extent which could not be conveniently provided by the whole Board, the Governors should appoint an advisory Council, consisting of three of their number, and not more than three persons of experience from outside (who should receive a fee for attendance). The Advisory Council should meet regularly and discuss with the Director, the Assistant Director, and the Treasurer and Business Manager, the general policy of the Theatre.

6. The Treasurer in consultation with the Director should prepare and submit for the approval of the Governors, at such intervals as they may require, the estimates of expenditure.

7. Within the limits of the approved estimates the Director should select, engage, and dismiss all artists and other employees, except the Assistant Director, and the Treasurer and Business Manager, and be empowered, after consultation with the Treasurer and Business Manager, to make contracts on behalf of the Theatre.

8. The Director, after consultation with the Assistant Director, should be responsible for the programme, which should be submitted to the Advisory Council.

9. The Director, if an actor, should not practice his art during his term of office.

10. The National Theatre Company should, with the approval of the Governors, give performances in other towns of Great Britain and the Empire.

11. There should be a Pension Fund, under conditions to be defined, for the benefit of the regular members of the Company and Staff.

12. To establish a National Theatre on an adequate scale provision must be made for the following requirements:—

(i.) Site;
(ii.) Building;
(iii.) Equipment and initial expenditure.

13. The site should be in some central position, large enough to allow of a building with an auditorium to seat about 1800, with space for an additional smaller auditorium. In designing the Theatre the possibility of providing a platform stage for the performance of 16th century drama or translations from the Greek drama should be kept in view.

14. The Committee have examined the estimates prepared in the past of the probable cost of such a theatre as is contemplated, and they have revised these in the light of present-day prices. It is impossible to assign exact figures to the different items of capital cost without knowing (1) the site on which the building will be placed, (2) the cost of the land and the work, if any, which would be required on the foundations, (3) the design of the building and the space that would be available for storage of scenery, properties, etc.

15. Towards the amount required the Shakespeare Memorial National Theatre Committee could contribute about £100,000.

It will be noticed that the committee who framed this report were careful not to commit themselves to any exact estimate of the cost. Perhaps they did not wish to alarm those whose assistance they were anxious to invoke. But the scheme as defined in the report is manifestly an ideal scheme, and in at least one particular—the double auditorium—it is even more ambitious than that proposed at the Mansion House meeting. Failing the gift of a site by the Government or other interested party, and including provision for an adequate endowment fund, the capital involved could not fall far short of Sir Henry Irving's estimate of £1,000,000. In these days of all but bankruptcy a very good case will have to be made out before expenditure on such a scale can be justified; and this certainly can best be done, not by stressing the possible glories of a National Theatre, but rather by expounding its necessity in the light of the actual conditions under which the work of the theatre in this country is being carried on. For these conditions are such as to make the practical need for an endowed theatre far more urgent than at the time when the Shakespeare Memorial Committee first issued its appeal. The economic position of the theatre has never been more precarious than it is to-day, and although the common saying that the stage is moribund is a fallacy, we must recognise that the constant iteration of the fallacy is not simply the idle catchword which it appears, but that it is significant of a widespread sense of something lacking in the polity of our stage, and of the fact that private enterprise is itself incapable of fulfilling the artistic possibilities of the drama.

As an industry of public entertainment, the theatre still holds hopes of financial reward like any other speculative enterprise; as an industry of art, the balance is always weighted on the debit side, if only because the material involved in the business is too evanescent and impermanent to offer a satisfactory basis for economic security. A race-horse that loses one race may win the next. But success for a play that has once failed is rare indeed, and the ownership of an expensive copyright may become valueless in a single night. Thus the theatrical speculator has no

backing for his investment but his own perspicacity, and in this he is at a disadvantage compared with speculators in other arts like painting, or even literature. In approving the work of any individual artist and in acquiring canvases by him the art dealer is acquiring goods whose value, if at first negligible, may grow and grow with the years. Thus the buying and selling of pictures is a form of gambling which is well worth the attention of the connoisseur, a fact which suggests the somewhat cynical comment that social or even civic patronage for art is only exercised in virtue of the fact that pictures possess intrinsic value like any other form of 'real property.' Patronage of the theatre, however, implies a measure of pure philanthropy, and the connoisseur of plays had better give up all idea of putting his talent to the service of his pocket unless he is prepared to regard every new stage venture in much the same way as he would view the throw of a dice from a dice-box.

This is not to imply that in the ordinary way of business the commercial manager does not frequently achieve work of a high artistic value. Neither would it be for a moment desirable, even from the artistic point of view, that the theatre as a whole should be endowed and thereby released from the invigorating tests of profit and loss. Nevertheless, the fact stares one in the face that, as a result of present financial conditions, there is an immense and necessary wastage in good dramatic material which is either never performed at all, or else by methods which can only be described as 'hole and corner.' And when we come to Shakespeare the case is proved almost without argument. The experience of the last ten years has shown that the commercial production of Shakespeare's plays in England is well-nigh impossible. One of the most advertised and popular of recent London productions of Shakespeare was a financial failure, and the only organisations for the regular performance of his plays are endowed theatres like the Old Vic and the Stratford Memorial. Without attempting to underline the obvious moral, it is at least significant that the one country in Europe where the number of Shakespearean productions is at all commensurate with Shakespeare's fame is Germany, the country which above all others is riddled with national or municipally-endowed theatres. But Shakespeare and the classics are not the only forms of drama which are inadequately represented on the modern English stage. The long-run system in vogue in London has many advantages. It secures more careful casting and production for new plays than is possible under any other system. But the absence of any repertory theatre conducted on a serious scale means that few successful plays, when once their first run is ended, are ever revived, while new plays of an unusual or experimental type, if

produced at all, are produced in circumstances which make it unlikely that they will achieve more than a single performance. The work of the Sunday Producing Societies, of the Arts Theatre Club, of some of the small outlying theatres like the Everyman or the Ambassadors, is and has been of the utmost value. Without them three-quarters of the most interesting modern work in the theatre, both native and foreign, would never have seen the light. At the same time, many excellent plays produced in this way are doomed to still-birth—plays which under repertory conditions might be revived from time to time, and might even be nursed into continuous popularity. Rare instances where plays produced on a Sunday night find their way into the commercial theatre do not suffice to satisfy the need which exists for an endowed theatre that should itself experiment from time to time and should be ready to take advantage of the experiments made by other organisations whenever a play worthy of the national repertoire is discovered.

For it cannot be too often insisted that an essential characteristic of a National Theatre is that it is a repertory theatre—a theatre, in other words, that gives a constant change of programme and where a long run is never permitted. Mr. Granville-Barker envisages as many as twenty productions in the year, and in every week the presentation of as many as four or five different plays. The more popular productions would be repeated at frequent intervals during the year. Those which appealed less to the public might evaporate from the repertory after three or four performances. In this way the laws of supply and demand would be effectual, but there need be no case in which a play with a potential public appeal would be withdrawn without a fair chance of being nursed into success. The proportion of modern to ancient drama performed in the theatre would be a matter for the direction. To begin with, it might seem expedient to offer a programme composed of, say, 75 per cent. modern plays (including new and original work and translations) and 25 per cent. Shakespeare and the classics. In the course of time this might be modified in the light of experience of popular need and response. For the National Theatre, while inflexible in its artistic standards, must be alive in every age and sensitive to the varying forms and pressures of the time.

The position of the National Theatre as the central home of repertory would also have an important bearing on the art of acting and on the status of the actor. Players of the old school are often heard to bewail the restlessness of the younger generation. In spite of the long-run system, and in spite of the practice of casting to type which is the result of that system, the life of the modern actor is nearer the life of a vagabond than ever it was.

In the old days the general lines of the adventure were pegged out to the limit of monotony. And that very monotony provided a background of routine which is, perhaps, the best sort of background for creative work. But to-day the successful actor's life shows nothing but foreground. The field of employment is so wide that he never knows where he will be playing in a few months' time, whether in London or New York, or in the Antipodes. And then there are the attractive offers which point away from the stage to the fun fairs of Hollywood or Elstree, or to the æthereal word factories of the B.B.C. Is the poor, distracted player ever moved to consider the strain to which his artistic integrity is subjected by these vagaries? Does the actor turned talkie-star ever pause to regret the perennial fount of inspiration that lies so mysteriously in the electric field between the human actor and his human audience—an inspiration whose place can never be taken by all the amplifiers in the world? Alas! he cannot afford to consider these things, even if he would like to do so. The forces of economics are too strong. Only here and there a logical Frenchman like M. Sacha Guitry is found to reason the thing out and to make a stand.[1]

In its own sphere a National Theatre would change all this, for it would provide permanent and exclusive employment for fifty or sixty actors and actresses with perhaps a secondary company of half as many again. A limit might be put on the period of engagement, but, in any case, variety of experience would be assured by the constant change of parts to which every member of the company would be subjected. It is a nice point whether perfection in the art of acting is more likely to be attained by the individual player who sustains a large number of different *rôles* under a single management or by one who is continually changing from one management to another but always appearing in the same part. In London to-day the latter practice is in vogue, with consequences that are apparent. But in several provincial theatres the former system holds the field, and it is significant that it is from these provincial repertory companies that are recruited many of the most promising young actors on the London stage. A Repertory Theatre for the Empire is what in fact the National Theatre would set out to be, with all the advantages which would accrue to a picked body of actors and actresses playing together for a settled management, and under a consistent routine of artistic control. Further, all that has been suggested in regard to the merits of the National Theatre from the standpoint of the players would apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other artists of the

[1] The sense of uneasy compromise to which stage players acting for the screen are subjected is well expressed in an article by Mr. Stanley Lupino published in the issue of *Drama* dated January 1933.

stage, to the scene designers, the musicians, the craftsmen of various kinds, who would be attracted permanently to the theatre, and would find in it a centre of inspiration from which they would win ability and courage to consummate their art.

The report of the Lytton Committee adumbrates a skeleton organisation for the running of a theatre planned on this grand and exemplary scale. The scheme has been criticised as extravagant, particularly in respect of the double stage and auditorium which figures in the specification. But what seems like an extravagance is really an economy in all but the initial cost. For with one stage and a company large enough for the casting of alternative performances of Shakespeare and of modern comedy, many of the players would often be standing idle; while on the production side a fraction only of the considerable stock of scenery and properties could be in revenue-yielding use. The idea of two theatres in one is thus put forward primarily with a view to making the utmost economic use of the human and material stock at the director's disposal. The larger auditorium would seat 1800 people, the smaller 800 to 1000. The larger stage would naturally be appropriate to Shakespearean or spectacular plays, the smaller to modern comedy or to work of a frankly experimental nature. The whole concern would be run and controlled by a central staff, with joint restaurant, box office, etc., and thus again the interests of day-to-day economy would be served.

Now, in spite of these cogent reasons for upholding the scheme in its pristine integrity, it may be admitted that the provision of the capital outlay involved would be, in present circumstances, a tough task. Hence, perhaps, its fascination for those who, like myself, regard the ideal aspect of the National Theatre as its most important aspect, the seed, as it were, without which the resulting flower would either not exist or belong to a different species altogether. Nevertheless, there comes a point when loyalty to an ideal may amount to obstinacy, and, seeing that the financial state of the world is changed beyond belief since the date of the Lytton report, it may be permissible to consider what modifications, if any, could be made in the plan so as to render possible the establishment of a National Theatre in our time, but without destroying those essential attributes lacking which the theatre, whatever it were called, would cease in fact to be 'national.'

In the first place, no compromise should be made that would render ridiculous the offer of the theatre as a gift to the State. Better to have no National Theatre at all than to launch a meagre experiment that would make us the laughing stock of those more fortunate countries who know what a National Theatre is and stands for. Our National Theatre must be a theatre which

the King himself would be proud to own. For, although it would be foolish to ask His Majesty's Government under present conditions to assume responsibility for the cost of the theatre's establishment, a moral responsibility for its direction would certainly be expected of them. The governing body of the theatre would stand, in fact, in much the same relation to the State as does the governing board of the B.B.C. And this demands as its corollary that the theatre shall be managed on the grand scale and be situated in a position worthy of a national monument. From the standpoint of mere business a central site for the theatre is no less obligatory. It is true that there are instances of outlying theatres like the Lyric, Hammersmith, which for certain periods have contrived to attract large audiences. But this has been for some specialised form of entertainment, and the productions at a National Theatre must be various and catholic, with no hint of coterie or clique appeal. In order that the man in the street may learn to value his own National Theatre, its door must stand open wide in the very market-places where men most meet and congregate.

If parsimony, then, in respect of the site is dangerous, it remains to discover if some saving on the theatre itself may not offer a more fruitful line of approach. It seems, indeed, that in certain circumstances the provision of a second stage might be postponed, its place being taken by an arrangement which would also involve a great economy in respect of production and running costs. I have elsewhere made the suggestion that the Stratford-on-Avon Memorial Theatre might be brought into partnership with the National Theatre in London on the basis of undertaking the Shakespearean side of the National Theatre's work. Such participation would necessarily be limited to fixed periods in the year, but besides reducing the production costs of the London company by at least one-third, the opportunity would be given for the London company to tour the provinces for such time as the Stratford company was 'in residence.' This would offer an easy solution to a problem which would otherwise prove difficult on technical grounds, while a yet further advantage would accrue in that for the larger part of the year competition between the National Theatre and the Shakespeare productions at the Old Vic and at Sadler's Wells would be eliminated.

This is not the place to analyse in detail the varied recommendations made in the report in regard to the management of the theatre. Here, again, some saving might be effected, always with the proviso that nothing should be done to limit the range of the theatre's scope, or, by conforming its character to that of an ordinary playhouse, to validate the objection that the National Theatre would compete unfairly with existing theatrical enter-

prise. It cannot be denied that this objection is sometimes made, but with scarce an exception it comes, not from those theatre managers who deal in plays of a National Theatre standard, but, if at all, from the more commercial managements with whose work the National Theatre could have little relation. Such managers forget, it seems, what a magnificent advertisement for their business a National Theatre would provide—an advertisement which, in view of the tightening stranglehold of the cinema, the theatre sorely needs. As regards the general reaction in theatrical circles to the scheme, a certain cynicism is not uncommon, born of the repeated failures which the movement has encountered during the past thirty years. But in principle the profession is almost uniformly favourable, and would surely grow enthusiastic when once the idea took shape.

The fresh impulse which will found the National Theatre must come, however, from outside. Not that a widespread public appeal would be likely at the moment to meet with any wide response in terms of cash. This is a case for minority action. But on the day when a few determined English people believe that a National Theatre is a necessity, ways and means will be forthcoming to bring it into existence. During the past ten years, and in spite of all our financial difficulties, there has been no failure to raise funds for altruistic purposes where the public conscience has endorsed such appeals. Hundreds of thousands of pounds have been voted for educational institutions in the North of England. Hospitals have not suffered over much from the prevalent dearth. Almost as much money as would have founded the National Theatre has been rightly contributed to save an open space in central London for the benefit of some hundreds of poor children dwelling in the immediate vicinity. But the appeal of a National Theatre would be world-wide; while as an instrument of national education it would be inferior in value to no other enterprise which can be conceived in the same sphere. It may be that it is on this educational plea that public opinion will be best aroused, and that on that ground alone the Government will one day find ample justification for granting at least a site for the theatre. One or two admirable sites exist, and such a gift would not actually entail any expenditure of taxpayers' money. The existing fund at the disposal of the National Committee, coupled with a further sum to be raised by public subscription or private munificence, would do the rest.

In the meantime, there is much to be said for the Fabian policy hitherto adopted by the Shakespeare Memorial National Theatre Committee, and for the conservation of the present fund as a nucleus for further effort when the time is ripe. Many suggestions have been made for the use of the money on enter-

prises cognate to the National Theatre. Several of these schemes are in themselves richly deserving of help, besides providing a positive form of service for the considerable capital sum that now lies fallow. Here is an obvious temptation. But it must be remembered that on the day when the present fund is dissipated the National Theatre, for our generation, will be dead. For where the corpse is, there the ravens are gathered together.

GEOFFREY WHITWORTH.

THOUGHTS ON THE BRITISH NEWSPAPER: 1622—1932

After Caxton had set up his printing-press in the Abbey almonry at Westminster, London, he thought of a public sign with which to typify and make known his new handicraft, and his final choice was a Red Pole. Why? What varieties of symbolism did he discover in the colour red applied to an upright pole? I think he would discuss this important matter with his encourager, the learned Thomas Miling, Abbot of Westminster, and together they would note why red could be employed as a multiple symbol denoting the contests between good and evil, and also how, by uniting this multiple to an upright pole, they could give an aspiring quality—an ascension as in Gothic architecture—to the troubled significance that their chosen colour suggested to their thoughts, as when the timid pale rose of health in a baby's cheeks was compared with the violence of red in flames leaping from a house on fire. Red is a symbol of light when the sun rises and a herald of night when the sun sets. The presence of red in the life-blood of animate creatures gained a new and a sacred meaning when it flowed into Christianity from the Crown of Thorns and the spear-thrust, and became the emblem of an endurance forever active among self-sacrifices and sufferings and hopes renewed. To those good men at Westminster, Thomas Miling and William Caxton, the sign of the red pole may well have presaged that the art of printing would become the art of all humanity, since it could always keep in circulation a conflict between good and evil and make itself in every land subject to the same social laws as could be applied there to women and men alike. The red pole, then, would remain for Britain an epitome symbol of all that she would achieve with her printing-presses.

One of the meanings that red suggests, danger, can be chosen for Milton's magnificent plea *For the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing*, that defended the people against a provocation that rejected public virtue as a wayfarer and treated it as an invalid. No such danger as that was active when Caxton died in 1492, leaving his art so far in advance of the people's ordinary needs that it would remain for a long time little more than a young friend to scholars

and authors and the well-to-do. The street-by-street value of printing did not appear in London as a herald of newspapers till a century and thirty years had gone by; and even then it failed to come entirely from English minds. It came once as an emigrant from Holland speaking Low Dutch. But it was welcomed by a couple of astute Londoners, Nicholas Bourne and Thomas Archer, honest fellows, not pirates, for they acknowledged that their little publication was translated from the Low Dutch copy. Though little in size, their forerunner of journalism was a gadabout in its title:

WEEKELY
NEWES FROM ITALY,
GERMANIE, HUNGARIA,
BOHEMIA, THE PALATINATE,
FRANCE, AND THE LOW COUNTRIES.

This offering of foreign news to Londoners has remained notable, as a very diligent curiosity about foreign countries has been a traveller through British journalism from May 23, 1622, when Bourne and Archer bought out their venture, on and on into our own daily and weekly Press, that delivers its brawling judgments unashamed on too many things from everywhere and all day long.

Caxton complained that his art of printing had many foes at the outset, and few friends; but self-pity has never been a prudent guide. What if Caxton in twenty years had seen his art developed into a menacing commonplace, as we have seen the discovery of aeroplanes? He would have read then in print a multitude of offensive popular news, as perhaps much feared by his gentle mind as bombing aeroplanes are by ourselves. Sometimes I say to myself: 'If Caxton in spirit has ever in recent days revisited London, what has he said on his return to the other world when talking to Spenser and Shakespeare, Ben Jonson and Milton? How has he described the impetuous inundation of printed news, flooding at full spate through perhaps sixteen of the twenty-four hours, that readers may know, almost minute by minute, what a rivalry in competition has chosen from the world's fears and crimes, disasters, scandals, accidents, sports, games, adventures in finance, and political troubles, national and international? What did Shakespeare say when he learned that three of London's newspapers were printed, night after night, in more than 1,500,000 copies apiece, every copy with as many words in it as he put into four or five of his plays? Did he say of this achievement that it was like an evil genius of confusion with power enough daily to deface from the memories of readers the jumbled impressions left by yesterday's news, just as every powerful tide clears from a seashore the patterning left there by an earlier tide, and forms for a brief time a pattern of its own?'

These are the first matters that I offer for debate. The people are so perplexed and so agitated by a noisy superabundance of ever-changing news, boomed all day long by rival papers without any respect for relative importance, that they find it impossible to do at the right time and in the right way anything that invites prompt action. To statesmen, also, prompt action has become a big adventure for dilly-dally; that is why it has so many tedious deputies—called committees and conferences and Royal Commissions. For instance, though any newspaper is allowed to offer tempting racing tips to its readers, the Government feared to aid our hospitals by approving controlled sweepstakes, and tried to conceal the fear by appointing a Commission. Shall we ever have a Royal Commission on the best tonics for dilly-dally? Consider, too, another fact. The nation that has been least able to bear financial crises during the past five years is the United States, the very nation that brought into vogue the most florid types of story-shrieking journalism.

Since 1920 London's most popular papers have copied more and more from the American methods, as though every increase in the total number of electors ought to be welcomed by a greater increase of journalistic Niagaraism. As a contrast, turn to London's newspapers of 1805 and 1815, and then compare their quiet display of news about Trafalgar and Waterloo with the hubbub that is made now over a Barney case, a Davidson case, a championship prize fight at the Albert Hall, or a cricket match between an Australian team and the M.C.C. This winter, when Bradman began the season with some poor scores in minor matches, the evening papers screamed joyously from their placards and headlines and reporting. Since Bradman was not invulnerable, the M.C.C. could enter their first Test battle in pretty good spirits, aided by India. It is also worth while to think of the frenzy with which journalism approves the mania that makes and breaks records in speed tests, as though coquetting with suicide were a new sort of chivalry in which both sexes should score points off each other's predatory speed vanities. Would even journalists like to aid a girl athlete to challenge male rivals by running in a zigzag among the moving traffic from Golders Green to the Mansion House, London? Probably not. That brave folly would be a nuisance along a public highway, and its coquetting with suicide could be watched all the way by news reporters; but as a folly it would be very much milder for a girl than a speed-breaking flight from England to the Cape, for chauffeurs and omnibus-drivers would do all that they could to aid the girl zigging past and around the moving wheels; whereas an airwoman is dependent on the waywardness of a machine, and she cannot foretell how her terrific experience, almost without

sleep, and challenging death hour after hour, will be influenced by storms and fogs. It is a gamble with suicide—just to break a record by a few futile hours; yet newspapers applaud hysterically.

Still, as action and reaction really are equal and opposite, the news Press from day to day invites an equally powerful counter-attack from the British people, favourable to a reasonable display of all news, and also to real nationalism in quiet politics.

Let me sketch three big subjects more:

(1) The aggregate bulk of printed matter which has been handed down to our own time from the evolution of British newspapers through 310 years—preserved mainly by national libraries.

(2) The relations of newspapers, past and present, with advertisers and with the State.

(3) Would it be wise to reimpose on journalistic adventure a portion of the old taxation?

First, then, how should we view the aggregate of news that the British Press has accumulated, from its creeping development in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on and on to yesterday's papers? Not in London only, of course, but, from a variety of dates, in English counties, and in Wales and Scotland. The historical material collected from three centuries has become so enormous that I am dizzied and scared when I try to think of its magnitude. Who can weigh and measure its value to students of history, whether lay or professional? A portion here and there has been indexed from year to year, as in the case of *The Times* newspaper; but the indexing is sketchy, and of little more value to students than finger-posts would be if they were set up here and there at random in an immense virgin forest. If, for example, you attempted to learn from the yearly indexing all that *The Times* has said in its history about the decoration of ships, you would soon feel as irritated as Emerson's little son felt after watching the antics of a circus clown: 'I want to go home pretty sharp.' One lifetime would not enable any man to discover what has been said by British newspapers about any important general subject that has been developed through the three centuries. He would need a lifetime as long as Joseph Addison's antediluvian couple, Hilpa and Shalum, who could enjoy a picnic lasting half a century and do justice to a bickering courtship in ten score years.

I have done a good deal of artistic research among old newspapers, period after period, and it has been like trying to empty a well by sipping from it now and then. When I did find some bits of biography that appeared to be genuine finds, my joy was short-lived, because the scraps of evidence could not be verified, and

they may have been refuted by other newspapers in London or somewhere in the provinces. This research invites a professional worker to sleuth his way into bankruptcy. For this reason a day-dream has taken control of my mind, and it has done many sorts of necessary things within the Crystal Palace—and outside the palace also. It has formed there a National Institute for the Selection of Research Materials from the History of London Newspapers, to be published in chronological sets of volumes under such general titles as these: *Art, Artists, and their Exhibitions; Music, Musicians, and their Concerts, Plays and Operas; Playwrights, Players, Dramatic Critics, and their Productions; Poets, Novelists and Essayists; Architects and Architecture; Science and its Progress; Sailors, Ships, and Shipping Tragedies; Naval Battles; Military Campaigns;* and so on. And this institute would have authority to guide the provinces in the publication of similar volumes of research selected from county newspapers, every series with a thorough general index, as well as an index in each separate volume. By what other system would it be possible to make easy of access to students and historians the masses of unexplored history that the past work of the news Press has accumulated?

Passing to the consideration of the second subject, Publicity and the State, I begin with three general principles:

(1) Too much advertising is as bad for a business as an excessive pressure from steam would be bad for any boiler unfit to bear it with safety.

(2) A glut of commodities everywhere becomes easier to produce as machines move on through improvements; hence an excess of advertising in all business becomes correspondingly easier, and is therefore increasingly harmful to trades.

(3) The State, then, should be very vigilant towards the use and abuse of advertising.

Only a little publicity aided the seventeenth-century pioneers of journalism. It came first from a few booksellers, whose novelty was very diffident, a mere trickle of salesmanship; but it was copied and improved, and we may view it as the first forerunner of the importance given by to-day's newspapers to literary gossip and criticism and advertisements. Far too much money from publishers goes to the ordinary news Press, greatly to the harm of important reviews and literary magazines. After the seventeenth-century booksellers came the makers of seventeenth-century quack physic and magic tooth-powder. They knew the English character, and their pioneering, though mild and immature, formed a tradition in publicity which has united all later generations of the gullible. Centenarians would be as frequent

as babies are if 20 per cent. of the wonderful medicines boomed in bygone times had been what their makers were allowed to affirm—regenerative. Record-breaking in speed trips from poverty into affluence has been renewed from age to age by astute owners of advertised quack physic; and I become a multi-millionaire in imagined charities when I try to filch a small percentage of the wealth collected in the past by boomed cosmetics, perfumes, soaps, tooth-powders, lotions and dyes for the hair, pencils for eyebrows, and miracles from beauty specialists. Even more is to be learned about the hoodwinking of the British people by reading the old Press advertisements than by noting how rival statesmen have adorned their electoral speeches with rival promises, only to adventure afterwards into a rivalry of timid evasions and shabby compromises. At first, and through several generations, a newspaper was not viewed as a gamble that should try to finance itself profitably from the enterprise of advertisers. This sound idea dates from 1692, when the *City Mercury* was brought out in London, 'published gratis for the promotion of trade.' Its owners guaranteed that they would distribute 1000 copies a week to bookshops and taverns and coffee-houses, and, although this paper contained no genuine news, it lived through two years. If the owners had given away quarterly a good engraved print the idea of a paper for advertisers only might well have attracted the general public.

It was in 1745 that the modern phases of journalism began, their initiation coming from a London venture called the *General Advertiser*, in which brave attempts were made to attract readers by circulating topical news, and to earn a profit by enticing craftsmen and tradesmen to pay for advertisements. Not an easy thing to do then, and for two reasons. Handicrafts were still in vogue, with costs of production that made profit-seeking difficult enough, and the circulation of the *General Advertiser* was never brisk, so it failed to keep advertisers in touch with a sufficiency of new buyers. When publicity is profitable to an advertiser its financial costs are paid for by the public that buys the things advertised; but when it fails the advertiser himself has to 'foot' all the bills, and he fears that ill-luck. At first, then, he views advertising as an addition partly to his costs of production and partly to the ordinary expense of distributing his goods to retail clients; and as for the acquired habit of gambling as an advertiser, it recoils upon him when a trade slump begins and he reacts against the newspapers which he has employed. This means that a tidal flow and ebb of business confidence are active in the dealings of advertisers with these publishers; and although newspapers of to-day are beseechingly loyal to their advertisers, their position is now, but in a hugely magnified

form, as insecure as that of their first pioneer, the *General Advertiser*, whose number of little 'ads.' in an issue was never more than fifty or sixty.

But there is one great difference between the pioneer and the most popular newspapers of to-day: the initiator discovered the new and correct belief that printing news could not 'pay' as a business unless its circulation and its advertisers were mutually and equally helpful to one another. This belief spread so rapidly that the periodical Press began at once to produce new ventures, both in London and in the provinces. Yes, and Dr. Johnson was very pleased with the immature advertising of his time.

To-day, on the other hand, the periodical Press needs fewer and fewer papers and magazines that the revenues from advertising may be amalgamated and become less vulnerable in times of bad trade. The old *Daily Chronicle* devoured the sterling *Westminster Gazette*, for instance; then the *Chronicle*, devoured by the *Daily News*, became the *News-Chronicle*. And now there is a terrific fight between the *Daily Mail* and the *Daily Express*. Will it end in a crushing defeat of one or other, or will it gain another funeral for amalgamation, the coffin in which one paper buries one or two more, and then prints the epitaph? Each offers tempting insurances to the people, and its prize competitions are very attractive; but each has to fight separately against the *Daily Herald*, whose circulation is immense, and whose controllers are artful also. And at last, inevitably, the waywardness of trade—of trade and its advertisers—will win control over this three-fold and vast battle. Advertising, then, moves rapidly with its publishing agents towards a very big climax. In the United States, where its organisation has been wonderfully thorough, it has done very much more harm than good—persuading manufacturers to pour from their improved machines a much bigger supply of goods than retailers could distribute from year to year, then striving to get rid of this danger with a boomed publicity that hurried the people into reckless trafficking with the hire-purchase system. When the financial crises came the United States were pretty far advanced in self-defeat. If every State had levied at the right time a tax on advertising, the mania for wild publicity might have been warned and checked.

In our own country, from early in the eighteenth century on to the middle of the nineteenth, the State said to newspapers and magazines, etc.: 'Thrive if you can, but you must pay tithes to the national Exchequer, day by day throughout the year. Your aim is to live well by pleasing the people, and in your turn you must aid the people by paying a special taxation on the results of your desire to please.' But the taxation went very much too far, as death duties and the income tax go now. It was levied on

paper as on advertising, and there was also a stamp duty. Being overdone, it crippled, and newspapers remained too small, too unenterprising, and with feeble circulations. To give details of these effects would occupy too much time, and would blur the value of main facts. Enough to say that the annual aggregate sales of British newspapers, both daily and weekly, from 1753 to 1854, crept gradually to just 4·4 per head of the population. Imagine that! In 1854—that is, when the population was 27,724,849—the aggregate annual sale of newspapers in the United Kingdom was only 122,178,501. As for the difficult and ravaging taxation, it is recorded that *The Times* in 1828 paid on its annual sales duties amounting to £68,137 7*s.* 10*d.*, as follows :

	£	*s.*	*d.*
On 6703 reams of paper . .	3,351	3	0
On 92,969 advertisements . .	16,269	11	6
3,046,500 stamps	48,516	13	4

The number of stamps gives the number of copies circulated in 1828.

As soon as the taxation was removed finally, in 1855, the news Press went ahead, extending its circulations daily, attracting more and more advertisers, stimulating more and more innovation; but this great improvement was attended by a vigilant increase of proud self-assertion, always ready to make much ado about the liberty of the Press. Some twenty years later John Morley, in his book *On Compromise*, made a reasoned attack on newspapers that seemed to be a just criticism; but now that popular papers are very much more powerful and aggressive I see that Morley overstated his case. He was too anticipative to be topically accurate and fair. The most debilitating influence of Morley's times, that hindered reforms in England and in Wales and Scotland, circulated from the Home Rule Irish members in the House of Commons; its actions and reactions in newspapers were a curse to Great Britain. We are free from it now, and can view our news Press as free from it also, though Mr. de Valera may wish to impose on us a new devil era.

If, as I believe, the news Press will need less and less rivalry between its owners, and if its advertisers will need much more prudence in their publicity, there will be pretty soon another decline in the number of newspapers; then political electors will be better able to view journalism as a concentrated power circulating from a few publishing companies. To judge political and social excitements when they come from a few rival agents is much easier than to judge them when they are split up by competition into many separate and rival activities; and it is easier also to aid what is good in them and to oppose what is bad.

Indeed, the bad will be more concentrated in its action and will thus provoke a more rapid counter-attack from the people. But the State too, I think, should put newspapers under some control, as by forbidding them to interfere during by-elections and general elections. When the commonweal is fit to be trusted with a democratic franchise, fair to all classes and to both sexes, electors are betrayed, not aided, when their voting is played upon by newspaper trickery and hysteria, as it has been in recent years. That democracy is in peril to-day there can be no doubt: it takes too long to achieve too little; and the main reason is that a democratic franchise is viewed by rival newspapers as a multitudinous thing to be coaxed, hoaxed, agitated, perplexed, and shepherded to ballot-boxes.

Benjamin Disraeli carried through his life a belief that the news Press might dethrone the House of Commons. It came to him when he was young, and he put it into a political novel, *Coningsby*, brought out in 1844, when journalism circulated feebly. In this novel Disraeli speaks as Sidonia, and he says:

> Your House of Commons, that has absorbed all other powers of the State, will in all probability fall more rapidly than it rose. Public opinion has a more direct, a more comprehensive, a more efficient organ for its utterance than a body of men sectionally chosen. The printing-press absorbs the duties of the sovereign, the priest, the Parliament. It controls, it educates, it discusses.

This was very flattering to the news Press; and its proprietors, from 1844 to the present moment, controlled by self-seeking habits of mind, have regarded political candidates as their deputies, and have been ready at any moment to speak dictatorially to the House of Commons, but in a jumble of ways. So I for one, a democrat through and through, have remained opposed to every sort of newspaper dictatorship. As long ago as the middle of the 'nineties an article of mine was published on the question 'Is the Newspaper Press a National Danger?' I am certain that the British people, with their elastic fortitude, their indefatigable pluck, their generosity, and their inherited belief in the right of thinking freely and acting independently, possess in two other inherited qualities—a desire to be told the truth and a prudence that favours accommodation—a very much better guide than has ever yet come from variations of the party spirit in political contests noised abroad by ambitious Press proprietors. I believe, too, that if Parliament liberated political candidates from all subservience to newspapers during electoral contests both electors and their chosen deputies would be bound together honourably and firmly, united by mutual confidence and loyalty; for they have no right to trust each other when they are both

overswayed at elections by vote-snatching cries and fears and lies printed by partisan journalists. Nature herself teaches that growth and its varieties are in themselves either quiet or silent, and that there is more or less of danger when a great noise acts either as a motive-power in itself, or as the product of a motive-power, like the noise of an explosion.

As soon as the Great War began our newspapers felt the need of making more and more din: captions extending the full width of their printed pages came into vogue, attended by larger cohorts of vociferous headlines, major and minor, and swift repetitions of the same information, whether right or wrong. But this natural response to the sudden perils of war, after being through a period of months very effective, lost authority little by little, till the people felt tired, bored, suspicious, and very eager to listen again with pride to the quiet, unboastful talk of battle-tried soldiers home on leave for a few days. Tommy preferred ironic humour and chaff to journalist heroics with propaganda. Since then noisy captions and headlines have become a routine, having habituated most people to the nuisance of a bad custom, perhaps as bad for reasoning thought as are excesses in the drinking of cocktails. I should like to see captions and headlines taxed by the State, that they may be contributors to the repayment of war debts; and I think that every newspaper handbill that shrieks in the streets for the people's pennies, or is exhibited by news-agents, should bear a threepenny stamp.

And why, again, should the sales of newspapers be free from daily taxation, unlike the organised amusements that entice the public to theatres, music-halls, films, concerts, and other such money-earning places? The tax could be levied on every 25,000 copies sold, and it should be moderate as a revenue collector, that right enterprise by newspapers be unhindered. Twopence per 25,000 copies, for instance, would be kinder to news Press controllers than the duty on amusements has been to other men of business; also, its collection would be as easy, for a newspaper could put special tax stamps on the period bills sent out to distributors. To these matters I add another: that war debts should be viewed as a cenotaph, not, of course, to commemorate the great dead, but to warn us that our descendants will be overburdened by inheritance if we pass on to them the accumulated costs of 1914–1932. Has this fact been clear to the proprietors of newspapers? If it has been clear to them, why have they failed to tell Parliament that they wish to pay on their circulations a revenue tax that will bring them in line with the men of business who offer other public amusements to the people? They are never tired of applauding their own value as public servants, and the cenotaph of war debts claims a special service from them as taxpayers.

To take off all daily taxation from news Press owners was to place a premium on excessive daily liberty; and in quite a small span of time it began to react against many good magazines and reviews, that found it increasingly difficult to get enough support from advertisers. Since the 'eighties, indeed, all the great reviews have been enfeebled financially by that cause; and there has been a wreckage of good magazines, such as *Temple Bar* and *Atalanta*, the *English Illustrated*, *Longman's Magazine*, *Macmillan's Magazine*, the *Portfolio*, the *Art Journal*, the *Magazine of Art*, and the rest—a considerable number; all of them died because they failed to attract a sufficiency of pounds from advertisers and shillings enough from the national habit of buying newspapers all day long, and from year's end to year's end, a spendthrift in a spate of incessant pennies.

There was a time when a statesman here and there, like W. E. Gladstone, took a personal concern in the welfare of the informative periodicals, literary, artistic, political and historical; and statesmen of to-day, who are frequently keen to improve their incomes by writing as journalists, should be very wideawake towards the need of saving for the nation an adequate number of educational periodicals. All that Milton says about good books and bad is equally true of other publications; so I plead for every periodical that is not a mere pleasure-giver touting for shillings, and that remains an impartial student within the genius of enduring handicraft, invention, and other achievement. No periodical that helps to make bygone times intimately of use to us and present times very much better than a miscellany of news, news, news, should be allowed to die. 'As good almost kill a man as kill a good book,' says Milton:

> who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in the eye. Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit—imbalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life. . . .

If you ask how the least commercial periodicals could be aided by the State without adding to the present-day persecution by economic devilries, a good answer can be given—namely, that Parliament has a right to place on expired copyrights (and patents) a moderate royalty for the State's benefit; and that the money collected from this perennial source should be employed to aid those literary enterprises that are really of public benefit in ways not merely profit-seeking in money. To leave expired copyrights to be exploited only by men-of-trade, whether publishers or theatre managers, is harmfully unfair to the State, and exceedingly unjust to 'the simple great ones gone,' whose genius in expired copyrights has offered in vain to a heedless nation a

Pactolus of revenue for the State's own welfare. Take Shakespeare. During his lifetime he had no real protection against pirate booksellers, and hence he had no desire to see through the Press a definitive edition of his works, lovingly revised, and illumined here and there by the coming of new ideas that ruled over him and that he served; and since the day when he died as a man, how many pennies has his genius contributed in royalties to his 'land of such dear souls, this dear, dear land'? Not a penny, not a farthing! A costermonger cannot make use of the streets for his vagrant industry unless he buys a licence, yet the State permits any sort of money-seeker either to use or to abuse the Pactolus in Shakespeare without paying to the State even a brass farthing of royalty! And Shakespeare, remember, is only the leader of those among his countryfolk who remain from age to age contemporary with the passing generations, and from whose literary well-doing benefits should flow in royalties into the nation's Exchequer.

Here, indeed, would be a fine improvement to be placed forever under the Sign of the Red Pole, where all aspects and phases of the great human drama will continue to make literary and journalistic appeals for money, subject, let us hope, to the same legal justice as will be given to individual men and women. But the trouble is that when circulating influences become almost as prevalent as light and air Parliament is often disinclined to be equally impartial towards them all, particularly when the principal one is the news Press. For a long time it feared to divorce newspapers from the Divorce Court, though their verbatim reporting became a shameless and pestilent invader within all households; and when at last Parliament did do the right thing, leaving newspapers defeated but unabashed, it failed to bring into vogue a censorship like that which dramatists and theatre managers were, and still are, invited to bear uncomplainingly.

If new plays, whose average life in our country is brief, need supervision from an official censor, certainly the news Press requires a Minister of the Crown to make criticisms and to propose improvements, since the overdone and varied sensationalism that newspapers boom resembles a mighty river always in a flooding spate. Besides, either great public influences ought to be treated by the State with equal vigilance and justice, or they should be left free under the country's common laws. To insult one with daily control by leaving another free from daily supervision is cowardly; and to insult British dramatists in that way is an insult also to the British drama from Shakespeare's time to our own. Do you wish to see this wrongdoing continued under the great Sign of the Red Pole?

WALTER SHAW SPARROW.

GOVERNMENT

A CONVERSATION BETWEEN ROBERT HARLEY (SOON AFTERWARDS EARL OF OXFORD) AND WILLIAM PENN: OCTOBER 7, 1710

HARLEY. Is it really your fixed intention, Mr. Penn, to resign the government of your colony? It is flourishing, it is profitable to the Crown, it must be so to you.

PENN. Profit was the last thing I thought of when I begged the grant, in payment of a trifling debt to my father, from his late Majesty King Charles. But misunderstandings, ingratitude, the disregard of my interests there, the abominable cheating of my agent here, have ruined me. As thou knowest, but for the aid of friends, I should still be languishing in the Fleet for debt.

HARLEY. But that is all over, and you are virtual master of a country the size of England. Do we hamper your gain overmuch with mere duties and excise? Or is it the military question? This stupidly protracted war will soon be over.

PENN. It is none of those things, Mr. Harley, but I would wish, in the last years of my life, to possess my soul in peace. I have given myself too much to government, and have been justly punished for it. I am an old man now, and see my error when it is too late. It is the young men that dream dreams, and when I was young I dreamed a noble one which time has falsified—time, and the stubborn spirit of man.

HARLEY. I have had to contend also with the stubborn spirit of woman; but surely the delight of government is to bend, by force or trickery, that spirit to the ends we desire; it is in knowing our cunning, our wisdom, to be greater than that of other men that our sense of power lies.

PENN. But of what use is power, if not to do good?

HARLEY. Oh, precisely, precisely—but have you not done good, Mr. Penn?

PENN. I would wish to think so. I provided a refuge from religious persecution, and I hoped that all would be sweetness and amity; instead, there is faction, defamation, unbridable pride and quarrelsomeness, and folly beyond thought of folly. I believed men were fit to govern themselves; the noble Sidney

taught me to think so; my own Society of Friends—the people called Quakers—seemed to show the way; but I find men are not ready for it yet, though they demand to be their own rulers.

HARLEY. Men continually deceive themselves; few really wish to rule—you and I are of the few—but most think they would do so better than their governors, and all dislike to be ruled: they would choose their masters, and yet be mastered. How would you resolve the problem?

PENN. A few days ago I was turning over the leaves of a small book of maxims I wrote many years ago, and found I had written: 'Let the people think they govern, and they will be governed.'

HARLEY. I never supposed you so Machiavellian, Mr. Penn. Was that your method in Pennsylvania?

PENN. I did not find that in practice my maxim held water. I gave all the power nominally in the hands of my people, reserving only the right of veto—for my colony was a child, it needed to be guided in its steps—but the more power they seemed to have, the more governmentish they became. Thou saidst few men desired power; I found they all hankered after it.

HARLEY. Mr. St. John is for leading men as a huntsman does a pack of hounds; he would show them a quarry and halloo them on to hunt it.

PENN. And what is thy view?

HARLEY. I have no fixed principles; men must be cajoled at some times, frightened at others, at others again crudely forced. Power comes from knowing when to apply the divers methods. Are you for coercives?

PENN. If lenitives will not do, they must be applied, though with regret. But again thou sayest 'power' as though that were the end of government. Power for what?

HARLEY. For what? Why, to win a war, to pass a Bill, to enrich ourselves—with the community, to punish malefactors: one uses power as one does one's legs, to take one where one wishes to go at the moment. Why did you want power, Mr. Penn?

PENN. I wanted it to make men free.

HARLEY. An odd reason indeed. Then your theory of government was no government at all?

PENN. My ideal; but the crimes of men, the degeneracy of mankind, make government necessary. It consorts ill with persons of my religious profession to meddle with any politics.

HARLEY. Then how did you begin your rule?—if I may ask the question in my ignorance.

PENN. I thought that government came from God, that it was a divine institution, and that if worship were free, men's reason would show them what it was convenient to do.

HARLEY. And there again I suppose it was the management of your Society that misled you ?

PENN. That, and the writings and converse of the ingenious Mr. Locke, who led me to imagine that if men would follow their natural reason the divine wishes would be interpreted.

HARLEY. As though reason were not the slave of passion !

PENN. Alas, I found it so. I was forced to change my view. Hardly fifteen years after I had composed the Preamble to my *Frame of Government*, in which I stated the faith I have just told you of, I was brought to conclude that government was in the nature of a contract.

HARLEY. Like Mr. Hobbes.

PENN. Speak not to me of Mr. Hobbes, I beg ; the man was anti-Christ. And in a little pamphlet I wrote on *The Peace of Europe* I remarked that, though we seem to bow to society, it is from society that we hold all that we have. Government, I said, was an expedient against confusion, a restraint upon all disorder.

HARLEY. I have read your pamphlet. A singular notion of yours, Mr. Penn, to constitute Europe into a Diet, or League, to prevent war. I fear your fancy led you into chimerical regions. No, the balance of power is our only hope of peace.

PENN. And it is on that account that we have been at war for eight years—and not all the genius of your Marlborough can bring it to an end. Is it, perhaps, that your power is too well balanced ? And again thou sayest 'power' as though it were an end, not a means.

HARLEY. I very much fear that those who do not regard it as an end will never be able to use it as a means. It is the joy of the game that makes us undergo fatigues, incur obloquy, risk the humiliation of failure. But to return to Pennsylvania : your expedient against confusion was not, I understand, altogether happy ?

PENN. I gave them all, or nearly all, but they clamoured for more, foolishly, intemperately, as though the least restraint irked them. They grew drunk with liberty. They reversed my constitution, until, although I allowed them all the legislative functions, I had to place the executive in the hands of a Council, which gave birth to more faction. They accused me of aristocracy : I thought of Sidney.

HARLEY. Did your views of government undergo any further change ? Pardon my curiosity ; I am eager to learn.

PENN. On my last visit to Pennsylvania I implored my people to consider that government was a merely human and moral thing, relating to society, trade, traffic, and the public good, sustained by virtue and justice. I told them I was grieved to hear some made it a matter of religion.

HARLEY. Ay, indeed, we make it a matter of religion here, with Occasional Conformity Bills, and Dr. Sacheverell. We dissenters, Mr. Penn, must ever deplore that.

PENN. And yet, as I have told thee, I once thought it should be inspired by religion, and still I think that perhaps my views were not wrong. It is that religion is misunderstood, for where do we find, except at Meeting, loving-kindness, Christian charity, the bowels of compassion? I say unto thee, Friend Harley, would God the divine virtue were more implanted and diffused among mankind, that the spirit of inward truth ——

HARLEY. Er, yes, exactly, exactly: my friends wait, Mr. Penn. Will you not join us in a glass of wine?—I have some of your favourite madeira. My son-in-law, Lord Dupplin, is within, and we expect Dr. Swift. You have met Dr. Swift? You do not fear him?

PENN. I have often met Dr. Swift; and I have never been afraid of a church parson.

BONAMY DOBRÉE.

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THE

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GOLD OR STERLING?

Until very recently the world's monetary systems were regarded as one of the sacred mysteries. Matters concerning the ebb and flow of gold in and out of the Central Banks and the ebb and flow of currency and credit resulting therefrom were held to be beyond the range of ordinary human understanding, and were left to be determined by the high priests who presided over such arcana. It was not until the systems had completely broken down that the man in the street and the politician who represents him began to take an interest in a subject which he had hitherto regarded as beyond his ken.

It is one of the defects of perhaps the most characteristic British quality, respect for authority, that we are apt to place unquestioning trust in the expert. The mystery of money we have been content to leave in the safe hands, as it was thought, of the banking experts; and where, in the whole universe, was anything so safe as the Bank of England? It was not only the man in the street who was imbued with this blind faith. A series of transitory Chancellors of the Exchequer knowing little, if any-

thing, of the workings of the Bank rate when they entered the Treasury were only too ready to sit at the feet of the Gamaliel of Threadneedle Street. But the Bank's policy since the war presents a lamentable record of ineffectiveness. It has depended upon a triple alliance of Free Trade, Deflation, and the Gold Standard. After working endless harm, this unholy alliance proved itself a complete failure and broke up. All three systems were perforce abandoned, and the Bank is now apparently without any long-range policy at all. In the words of its Governor, 'One step enough for me. . . . This whole subject is too great for me. I am willing to do my best. . . .'

When in 1925, after we had been 'off' the gold exchange standard for nine eventful years, the Government of the day, presumably on the advice of the Treasury and Mr. Montagu Norman, returned to the *status quo ante* in circumstances very different from those obtaining in a pre-war world, only a few doubted the wisdom of such a move. When a little later it became evident that we had dealt a very severe blow at our export trade, doubts as to the wisdom of the policy concerted between the Bank of England and the Government began to be heard in many quarters. There was, however, no definite current of opinion strong enough to make an impression upon the entrenched position of the authorities who had returned to what was generally regarded as normality. It was not so much the fact of being on gold that seriously perturbed the minds of those who had sufficient knowledge and experience to be critical as the rigid attitude of the Bank of England. Two years ago, when we had already slid a long way down the slippery path of low prices, I pointed out what seemed to me an elementary fact,[1] that it was wholly unnecessary to devote so large a proportion of our available gold supplies as we did to serve as a basis for our internal currency. It would have been quite sufficient to maintain a 10 per cent. gold basis, supported by commercial paper and possibly also silver, instead of one averaging about 37 per cent. But our authorities clung to the old arrangement, protesting that it was inconceivable that we should ever depart from it, and even when the position became entirely hopeless they borrowed large sums at a heavy cost to the taxpayer in order to avert what they conceived to be a catastrophe which the nation could hardly survive. They appear still unable to think of monetary policy except in terms of gold. In the summer of 1931 we might have slid gracefully and with set purpose off gold on to sterling; instead, we allowed ourselves to be pushed off it, and have never since ceased to make spasmodic efforts to get back.

This brief record of recent history is only valuable for the light

[1] In *The A.B.C. of L.S.D.*

it throws upon the dangers of the present position. In spite of all that has happened since 1931, in spite of the fact that the Bank rate (which was described by the Macmillan Committee as 'a most delicate and beautiful instrument for the sound management of our monetary system') failed completely to maintain the stability of the exchanges and to retain in the Bank of England the supply of gold necessary for the working of the system, there are many reasons for fearing that the 'diehards' of Whitehall and Threadneedle Street have not yet learnt their lesson. They appear still to be itching for a return to the system which, under contemporary conditions, has proved unworkable in the past and must continue to prove unworkable until those conditions have been completely revolutionised. I am not voicing merely my own opinion when I make this categorical statement. It is the expressed view of the Preparatory Commission of Experts for the forthcoming Monetary and Economic Conference. It is worth quoting at some length from the conditions which the Commission consider necessary for a restoration of a free international gold standard, because on this point the experts of every school of thought are in complete agreement. First of all, they state that the solution of major outstanding political problems would contribute to that restoration of confidence without which great hesitation will be felt in taking decisions to return to the gold standard. They then proceed to indicate a series of measures for strengthening the position of countries whose reserves are at present inadequate. These may be summarised as follows:

(1) A settlement of inter-governmental debts.

(2) Freedom in the movement of goods and services.

(3) Freedom in foreign exchange markets and in the movement of capital.

(4) A free outflow of gold from countries with a free gold standard.

A further condition is a general understanding about measures to ensure a better working of the gold standard in the future. It is pointed out, however, that international action is not enough unless the proper internal measures have been taken. Each individual country, therefore, must take steps to achieve internal equilibrium in the following matters:

(1) A balancing not only of the State budget, but also of the budgets of public enterprises and of local authorities.

(2) Healthy conditions in the external money and capital market, and at all costs no inflationary note circulation to meet Government deficits.

(3) A sufficient degree of flexibility in the national economy.

This is a formidable list of pre-conditions, and it is quite evident from their Report that the experts of the nations do not consider that they can be fulfilled at short notice. Least of all do they expect that a few strokes of the pen by the delegates who are to assemble later in the year (D.V.) in London are going to smooth out the highly complex problems which they adumbrate in their statement. No unbiassed reader of their Report or of the Reports of the League of Nations Gold Delegation can believe for a moment that the conditions necessary for a return to the gold standard are as yet even remotely visible on the horizon. To take one condition alone—the redistribution of the enormous gold hoards now in the hands of a few countries. Of the world's total gold stocks at December 31 last, valued at £2,443,000,000, the United States and France together held £1,500,000,000, the British Empire £205,000,000; the disturbance caused by the recent payment of a mere £19,000,000 in gold of the debt instalment is sufficient evidence of the impracticability of transferring immeasurably larger sums from country to country without shattering the whole trading system of the world. There is, in fact, not the slightest justification for regarding as practicable a return to the gold standard, as it has hitherto existed, either at the forthcoming World Economic Conference or at any time at present foreseeable.

It is necessary to state this point emphatically, because, although the attitude expressed by the British Government appears to be definite enough, it has not yet made any attempt to shape a practical and constructive sterling policy. A feeling exists in the United States that the recent fall in gold prices has been brought about by the depreciation of sterling. American commercial opinion has apparently persuaded itself that the only cure for the price collapse is a return by the sterling countries to gold, and there is every indication that an attempt will be made to use the War Debts as a bargaining factor to secure such a return. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has stated that, so far as he is concerned, there is to be no bargaining on War Debts, and that fulfilment of the conditions of the experts which I have quoted above are accepted by him as an essential preliminary to our return to gold. He has not yet taken the further positive step, which follows logically from this attitude, of bringing about stabilisation within the sterling area. Here again it is pertinent to quote from the Report of the Preparatory Commission:

> In the field of monetary and credit policy, the objective must be the restoration of an effective international monetary standard to which the countries which have abandoned the gold standard can wisely adhere (p. 8).

The Commission rightly place this question first among those to be tackled before the Conference meets. Indeed, they are emphatic on this point :

> In stressing the necessity for concerted action, we do not wish to suggest that nothing can be accomplished before the Conference meets. On the contrary, the success of the Conference will depend in great measure upon the vigour with which the participating Governments enter upon preliminary negotiations in the meantime (p. 7).

This language is positive enough, and the context makes it plain that the Commission are under no illusions as to the possibility of any early return to the gold standard. There is no such possibility, and as a matter of practical politics it should be an agreed assumption that sterling has come to stay—if not for the whole world, at least for a very substantial part of it.

This is no mere academic matter. The most momentous problem with which we are faced is the problem of depreciated prices. It is a world problem, but for us it is primarily our problem. There would, in my view, be a far greater hope of arriving at some solution of it if we set to work to tackle our end of it. For while we can to some extent control our own economic and monetary policies, we are powerless to settle the affairs of the world. Any man who thinks that we can persuade the democracies of—shall I say, France and Germany, not to mention a score of other nations ?—to unite with us in common action for what we conceive to be the common good is surely living in a fool's paradise. Meanwhile, we have Britain and the British Empire, with a population of some 450,000,000, constituting a large enough area on which to make a start, to say nothing of the many other countries where currencies are already based on sterling.

We have been living for fifteen years under the shadow of impending conferences. Geneva, Lausanne, Paris, Genoa, Locarno, Berlin, London, Washington : hardly have we put one behind us than all action on certain matters has been suspended in view of another one lying ahead of us. There is a great deal to be said for the policy of maintaining close touch with foreign countries on the many problems of the present day which are of mutual concern, but if action is to be paralysed by the recurring imminence of indeterminate consultations, then such conferences only tend to defeat their own objects. We have to recognise that in practice the political knowledge and insight of the politician of any country is limited by his country's frontiers. What passes for wisdom in Whitehall may sound like nonsense in Kansas city. It may be that the time will come when, owing to the closer communications which science is building up between the nations,

the affairs of the world can be administered from a common centre. That time is not yet. The most that we can hope for at present is to stem the tide of excessive nationalism which was set in motion when the term 'self-determination' was let loose upon the world. Meanwhile, if we are to hope for any useful action at international conferences, the best way is to enter upon them with positive policies.

The fundamental objective of our monetary policy was clearly set out by the Macmillan Committee two years ago when it was still inconceivable that we should depart from the gold exchange standard.

> Our objective should be, [runs paragraph 275 of the Report] so far as it lies within the power of this country to influence the international price level, first of all to raise prices a long way above the present level, and then to maintain them at the level thus reached with as much stability as can be managed. We recommend that this objective be accepted as the guiding aim of the monetary policy of this country.

At various times during the past two years it has been stated in irreproachable phrases that the Government's policy was to bring about such a rise as is indicated in this quotation from the Macmillan Committee's Report. Any such statements of the Government's aims are, however, usually accompanied by the reservation that a rise in prices cannot be brought about by monetary action alone. This may or may not be true, but, unfortunately, the implication accompanying the reservation is that no bread is better than half a loaf, and that the British Government had better do nothing, because anything it can do must needs offer only a partial solution of the problem. Great efforts were made to induce the Government to initiate some sort of monetary policy at the Ottawa Conference, but the mountains were in labour and there emerged a pompous little mouse in the shape of a resolution that

> a rise throughout the world in the general level of wholesale prices is in the highest degree desirable. The evil of falling prices must be attacked by Government and individual action in all its causes, whether political, economic, financial, or monetary.

Nothing was done. The policy of masterly inactivity had secured yet another victory. For the truth is that the Treasury-*cum*-Bank of England mentality is still restrictive at a time when it ought to be expansive. The official policy has been admirable in certain respects. We have reduced imports by tariffs and we have balanced the Budget by economies. But on the monetary side our policy has been both timorous and lacking in imagination. We have run from the extreme of extravagance

to the other extreme of non-spending. Deflation carried to excess is no less an evil than excessive inflation. The one index of the success or failure of the Government's policy will ultimately be the figures for unemployment.

The life-blood of the country is, not sound finance, but trade and commerce—a truism that is worth repeating, because it is often forgotten, and indeed seems to be almost outside the purview of the Treasury and the Bank of England. When Mr. Montagu Norman was asked by the Macmillan Committee, 'Have you in view what are the consequences [of a change in the Bank rate] to the industrial position in this country?' he replied, 'Yes, but the main consideration, in connexion with the movements of the Bank rate, is the international consideration.' This reply may, I think, be fairly taken as indicative of the monetary outlook of the Bank of England and the Treasury, both of which seem, by their policy, to be unconscious that the real wealth of the country lies in her products and not in paper balances. To bring down production to the level of present demand may appear to be good finance, but so far from creating employment and consequent demand it has just the reverse effect. To bring demand up to and above the level of present production should be the one positive aim of our policy. How can this be achieved?

The chairman of Lloyds Bank in his speech at the recent annual meeting drew attention to the fact that the total deposits of all the clearing banks had been increased during the last twelve months by more than £232,000,000, and he appeared to think that this was a matter for congratulation. 'Whatever the cause of this increase,' he said, 'the consequence is that the purchasing power of the community as expressed in deposits in the banks has been greatly extended.' He did go on to say that something must occur to induce the owners of this increased purchasing power to put it into use, but he was evidently under the impression that that something was outside human control. In a fine poetic passage he proclaimed that 'Some spark must re-ignite the torch of hope, some outstanding event . . . must strike man's *imagination* and persuade *him* that the darkness is past and the dawn at hand . . .'; and so forth, with all the eloquence of a Lloyd Georgian peroration. His point was that, despite the cheapness of money, the demand for credit is small because there is a lack of confidence, and, like so many who talk on this subject, he was of opinion that confidence is a purely psychological factor inspired from some supernatural source. The crux of the whole matter is that this confidence for which we are all waiting is nothing more nor less than a practical recognition of material factors. The business man lacks con-

fidence to-day because he has not yet any reason to believe that if he uses money to increase his output there is a prospect of that increased output being absorbed. In other words, the key position is held by the consumer, and our problem is to place purchasing power in the hands of the consumer—not the few large consumers, but the millions of ultimate consumers in this country and throughout the world who are immediate spenders and keep in motion the wheels of industry and exchange.

The great advance in prosperity that followed in the wake of the industrial revolution was based upon an ever-widening swing of the pendulum of demand and supply. We did more than anybody else to keep that pendulum in motion by our policy of lending to consumers and thus creating new purchasing power to absorb increasing supply. Our loans were based on gold; but they were not gold, and gold was only a useful, but not an essential, adjunct of the monetary system which we so skilfully and so successfully managed. By clinging to the gold standard in circumstances in which we were no longer able to control a system based upon it we stood by helplessly while the delicate mechanism of international currency which we had kept wound up for the preceding century ran itself down. The pendulum swing has shortened and slackened, and it is inconceivable that a policy of 'wait and see' is going to restore its normal acceleration. No gold key can rewind the mechanism of exchange, and we must substitute for it some new key by which we shall be enabled to get back to the normal standard of international buying and selling. We who believe that currency should be the servant, and not the master, of commerce and industry believe that it is just as feasible to-day to organise a sterling currency system as it was last century to organise a system that rested on a gold foundation.

It is pertinent to ask: If the Washington and London Conferences do not produce a rise in wholesale prices, what then? What is to happen to our 2,750,000 unemployed? For let there be no mistake about the real issue for us. As a nation our first concern is the well-being of our own people. In critical times like these we are concerned with international affairs only in so far as they have a bearing upon our own welfare. 'Ourselves alone' is an indefensible watchword for any nation; 'ourselves first' is not only legitimate, but, in the present state of the world's evolution, the only effective practical policy. It is true that our own distressing position to-day is due to world conditions, but politicians who use this phrase too often leave it to be assumed that the world they mean is a shadowy region outside us, accessible only, if at all, to conclaves of polyglot politicians, whereas

the portion of it over which we can exercise direct economic influence is to-day of very considerable magnitude. There is to my mind not the slightest doubt that the most rapid progress towards a solution of our own and the world's economic deadlock is to be found in the monetary sphere. All other methods of approach having proved abortive and offering little hope of any speedy practical result, it is the clear duty of the Government to give immediate consideration to methods which, though they have in the past been regarded as unorthodox, may yet prove to be the only admissible orthodoxy of the age in which we live. Our world is changing, and it is not unreasonable to suggest to those who are responsible for our economic health that they should at least scrutinise with a new eye remedies propounded in responsible quarters for a disease which all the old specifics have failed to cure. The disease is stagnation of trade. The diagnosis reveals that there is no lack of productive capacity or consumptive demand, but that the medium of exchange has broken down. Gold has ceased to perform its function, and there is no visible prospect of its functioning again in the near future as the basis of the currency system of the nations. The alternative, *de facto* if not yet *de jure*, is sterling, but sterling is still regarded by the true believers rather as an unwanted illegitimate child whose early demise is much to be desired. We hover, therefore, between two systems, and, as was flagrantly revealed by the futile resolution passed at Ottawa, are, in fact, without a constructive monetary policy.

Yet the right course is obvious enough, and, given the courage to embark upon it, it presents no inherent difficulties. The steps to be taken are:

(1) A positive declaration that our monetary policy is to be conducted until further notice on a sterling basis.

(2) The establishment of an exchange base for the sterling union to secure stability in the moneys and therefore the exchanges of all adhering countries.

(3) The raising of prices by a steady expansion of our cash resources and of the volume of currency in circulation, combined with a reduction of taxation to give initial impetus.

Courage is needed, because a positive declaration that we have said good-bye to gold and have no further use for it except as a decorative metal will bring about an immediate drop in the exchange rate with the gold standard countries. This need not alarm us after our experience of the autumn of 1931, for the potential self-sufficiency of the sterling area will ultimately determine the course of world prices.

A constructive movement by Great Britain to establish a

working headquarters for sterling is what half the world is waiting for. There is no reason to defer action until the World Economic Conference meets. Not only the Empire but all the countries now in convoy with sterling would respond readily to a lead which offered a stable foundation for the restoration of their trade. The events which followed Great Britain's departure from gold make it clear that the interests of these countries are linked so closely to Great Britain's purchasing power that if we find a stable medium of exchange they will conform to it. The most practical immediate step would be the establishment of an Empire Exchange Base, or conceivably even an International Sterling Bank, which would act as a general headquarters or pooling centre for the Central Banks of the countries taking part. It would, in other words, bear exactly the same relation to the Central Banks of the nations on sterling as the Bank of England bears to-day to the joint-stock banks of Great Britain. The member banks would start by depositing marketable State securities and providing mutual credits by arrangement, and each Central Bank would undertake to redeem its own notes by a draft upon its balance at 'G.H.Q.' The exchange rate between the various units of currency would automatically remain uniform so long as the Central Banks' credit at the base was secured. The only novelty about such a system is its magnitude. It has long been successfully operated on a small scale by the various currency boards which exist for the Crown Colonies, East and West Africa, Egypt, etc. Following on this would come the fixing of the rates of exchange between the sterling union and the gold standard countries, which is the kind of matter well suited to the agenda of the coming World Economic Conference, since it at least offers some prospect of arriving at a practical result.

It is relevant to call attention at this point to certain other measures of control which are necessary if we are to acquire the mastery of our money market that present conditions demand. We must take steps to protect ourselves against the hazards of foreign balances, the advances and withdrawals of which recently created such disturbances to our exchanges. There would be no great difficulty in exercising such control. The profits earned by the City on such advances are negligible. The nation needs the same power to stop borrowing from abroad as the Bank of England possesses to stop external lending. Similarly, steps should be taken to prohibit foreign holdings of Government securities, the unloading of which on the market has the same effect as the withdrawal of foreign balances. We do not want foreign money, and we do not want the exchange value of sterling to be manipulated by foreign speculators. Its exchange value must be based upon

the demand for it as determined by the balance of trade, visible and invisible.

There remains the fundamental matter of the raising of the wholesale prices of primary materials, which has been, or ought to have been, the main aim of our policy for the past two years. There can be only two ways of securing a general rise in prices—one is to reduce production, the other to increase consumption. You can reduce production by destroying stocks (as the Brazilians have done with their coffee) or by eliminating the producers least fitted to survive a prolonged period of depression. That is the process we have been successfully pursuing for the past few years, so successfully, indeed, that we have taken 2,750,000 workers in this country alone out of the ranks of production and transferred them to the Unemployment Insurance Fund. The name given to the process is deflation, which means a deliberate increase in the value of money in terms of commodities, or, in other words, a decrease in prices. This process, unless accompanied by a corresponding decrease in wages and fixed charges, can only lead, as it has in fact led in this country, to progressive discharges of workmen, which is an alternative form of wage reduction. The connexion between the workings of the monetary system and unemployment has apparently never been perceived by our monetary authorities, or, if it has been partially perceived, has not yet been admitted as the basis of policy. Now that we have come near to breaking point the time is overdue to reverse the deflationary process in order to produce the reverse effect.

The medium of exchange bore too high a value in terms of commodities. By a happy accident we were saved from catastrophe when, through being forced off the gold standard, the pound was reduced in terms of gold by 33 per cent. That inflationary godsend has restored us, against the will and judgment of our monetary dictators, to a position in which we alone have stood firm while conditions all over the world went from bad to worse. The logic of the present situation is obvious. By controlled inflation we can so increase wholesale prices in the sterling area as to give new purchasing power to the primary producers and thus set up a snowball demand for our manufactured products. This is the quickest and most straightforward, and, indeed, under present conditions the only effective, means of restoring the pendulum of supply and demand between nations. It is based upon the principle of adjusting the instrument of exchange to capacity-output and potential demand, in contradistinction to the present policy of reducing output to the level of an artificially lowered demand. The immediate need is a radical readjustment of our monetary outlook. It is no longer

sufficient to determine our financial policy mainly, if not solely, by reference to the mechanism of international exchange. A stable money market is no index of prosperity if it is acquired at the cost of an unstable employment market.

J. S. WARDLAW-MILNE.

AMERICAN POLICY AT THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

One of the dangers that besets the forthcoming World Economic Conference is the failure of most Europeans to appreciate the American point of view and the proposed policies, dependent upon it, that will be tabled. As a fairly recent visitor to the United States of America, and as one in constant touch with some important sections of American opinion, I propose to describe the present mental attitude of the public on the other side of the Atlantic, and the reasons for it.

Except among economists and students of the world business situation, the debts controversy has overshadowed the forthcoming Economic Conference in the eyes of the public. This is, however, more true of the European side of the Atlantic than of the American. In spite of the diminishing army of advocates of American self-sufficiency, the Economic Conference is taken very seriously. Rather more has been done to educate public opinion in preparation for it in the United States than has yet been attempted in Europe. This may sound paradoxical, but the explanation is that the depression, the bank failures, and the tremendous change that present conditions have created in the American public mind have acted as a stimulus. However backward American public opinion may be on the closely related subject of inter-governmental debts, that section of the citizens of the United States which is prepared to consider economic problems has been allowed to expect real results from the forthcoming Conference. The senators and congressmen, from agricultural districts particularly, have been holding out hopes to their constituents. These agricultural districts, which are predominant in the power they hold in American politics, have been particularly hard hit by the fall in world prices; and here we come to another paradox. For in Great Britain there have been some compensations in the decline in the wholesale price level. We need to import large quantities of foodstuffs and raw materials, and the drop in wholesale prices has been some compensation for the shrinkage in money-incomes. To a lesser extent France, as an importer of raw materials and of certain

foodstuffs and an exporter of highly finished manufactured goods, has also benefited. It is true that both ourselves and the French, in the long run, stand to suffer by the decline in the purchasing power of foreign markets, especially where this purchasing power depends on the sale of primary commodities. But the fall in the price of cotton, wool, metals and the like has had some advantages for manufacturers.

But although the United States are an exporting country, and, in good times, sell great quantities of manufactured goods abroad (though foreign trade only represents 10 per cent. of the total production of the whole country), they are very largely exporters of foodstuffs and raw materials, with the result that certain basic industries have been particularly hard hit. Thus there has been a far heavier relative fall in the world price of cotton, wheat, copper, and tobacco than in manufactured goods. The districts producing these commodities are demanding drastic action, for their position is desperate. Except perhaps for the English ship-building and cotton-spinning districts, there is no other example of such tremendous depression as exists at the present time in the cotton- and wheat-growing States. The industrial belt of the United States is still comparatively narrow. Though the steel industry, for example, is producing less than 15 per cent. of its capacity, this does not affect more than half a dozen towns, and there are other industries in the urban districts which are keeping their heads above water. Also, the town working population is mobile. The wheat farmers and cotton planters, on the other hand, are fixed in the soil. They cannot leave their land even if they would. Wheat last December was at the lowest price it has touched for a century. In the meantime the standard of living and the expenses of the farmers have increased tremendously. A State where the staple industry is wheat-growing—and there are eight such States—is thus far harder hit than any of the industrialised States. Furthermore, the trade in grain and flour, which was substantial in the Asiatic markets, has been seriously cut into by the competition of the cheap Australian cereals owing to the fall in the value of the Australian pound. The farmers, at their wits' ends what to do, have turned to their political representatives, bankers and other leaders in a search for explanations. They are told that the United States producer is suffering because of disordered exchanges, that the countries in the 'sterling' areas are able to undersell them through the unfair advantage of depreciated money, and that this is one of the matters that will be dealt with at the forthcoming World Economic Conference. The Americans have not had such close acquaintance with international conferences as we have, and they have been led to hope for great

things from it. The American manufacturers also are complaining of unfair competition from countries with depreciated exchanges, not only in foreign markets, but also in their own home markets. Hence yet another demand from this quarter for special tariff legislation against the exchange dumping. We see the same phenomenon in Canada, where tariffs against exchange dumping are in actual operation, and against this country. President Hoover also has authorised certain tariff increases in recent months for the express purpose of keeping out goods produced in the countries with depreciated exchanges.

But for the Democratic victory in the elections last autumn there would have been still further measures to raise tariffs against the low-exchange countries. But the Democrats stand, in theory at any rate, for lower tariffs. The Bills introduced in February last to bring about a general raising of such tariffs were rejected by the Ways and Means Sub-committee of the House of Representatives. The members shrank from risking the censure of the public. Nevertheless, the cry of world depression is raised by all those in responsible positions who are put on the defensive by the hard times. We may therefore expect certain drastic proposals at the Conference from the American representatives. At the beginning of the slump in 1929 the American public was taught that it was only temporary, that it was due to speculation, or to too rapid expansion; and that it would pass, like other depressions, in the well-known trade cycle. But now the same excuses are being put forward as were used by the Labour Government in Britain three years ago and are still used by the National Government—that is, the excuse or explanation of world causes. In spite, therefore, of the meagre results in terms of actual and concrete proposals emanating from the Preparatory Commission of Experts at Geneva, American eyes are turning to the forthcoming Conference in hope and expectation. We in Europe, particularly in Great Britain, are inclined to put the principal blame for our present troubles on intergovernmental debts; but in the United States the debt problem is visualised as something apart, and it is well that this fact should be realised. There are plenty of American economists, bankers, and a few politicians who are bold enough to preach the need for a drastic scaling down, if not cancellation, of intergovernmental indebtedness. But they do not characterise these debts as the main cause of depression. Their argument is that disordered exchanges are the primary cause, and that it was not the pressure of the payments to Washington that caused Britain to leave the gold standard, thus giving the lead to so many other countries, but, rather, the prospect of an unbalanced Budget shaking the confidence of foreign depositors in the City of London

and causing withdrawals of deposits. All nations are inclined to regard the mote in their neighbour's eye and ignore the beam in their own eye. This is also true in regard to the American attitude towards tariffs.

There has been a loud outcry about the Ottawa Conference, particularly as it affects American trade with Canada. It is as well for us to realise the American attitude here. The argument is that immense sums in capital have been invested in Canada by American citizens for the opening out of the country, development of industries, and the like. Now, it is declared, an attempt has been made to divert the internal commerce between the United States and Canada, north and south, across the Atlantic, between Britain and Canada, in an east and west direction. To put ourselves in the shoes of the Americans, consider the case of the Argentine. Here great sums of capital have been invested by British interests in developing that country. Supposing the Argentine entered a Pan-American Zollverein and an attempt was made to divert Anglo-Argentinian trade to the United States. We should feel aggrieved; and that is just how the Americans feel about the Ottawa Conference, particularly in relation to Canada. Another grievance also is the complaint of discrimination against Canadian wheat carried over the American railways to American ports for shipment to Britain. This is not allowed to qualify for quota purposes, as not being of Empire origin. Therefore, though the Americans are sinners themselves, and black ones at that, in their high tariff policy, they look to the Economic Conference as a means of winning concessions for American commerce in other high tariff countries. We may be certain, then, of this. The United States Government will strain every effort to have the Economic Conference assembled, and, once assembled, to obtain substantial concessions to American opinion in several directions. The total of foreign trade in the United States is down by 70 per cent. since the beginning of the depression; and, by hook or by crook, some means must be found to revive this foreign commerce.

Of the three proposals that may be expected from the United States two have been touched on already. They are tariff concessions to American goods and the stabilisation of exchanges, which, to put it quite simply, means persuading Britain and the other countries off sterling to return to the gold standard. On these two there is unanimity of opinion. The third proposal is a matter of acute controversy in the United States themselves, and that is for some means of raising the wholesale price level.

The predominance of opinion in Britain would appear to be opposed to any speedy return to the gold standard, even with

a devaluated pound. The industrialists, and particularly the exporters, are against it. Some of the most prominent joint-stock bankers are opposed to a return to gold. The Treasury and the Bank of England are understood to be in favour; but only subject to important provisoes to ensure that the gold standard is properly worked—in other words, that the countries holding the bulk of the world's gold will play the game, lend freely abroad, lower their tariffs, and not corner the supplies of the precious metal. We in Great Britain have become used to being off the gold standard. We only returned to it in 1925 after being virtually off gold for eleven years; and when we left it again in the autumn of 1931, all the engines of propaganda were used to convince the people of this country of the advantages of being off gold. We have succeeded in managing our currency with comparative success. But the United States are far more firmly wedded to the gold standard. Sterling has never legally been measured in terms of gold. It is a measure of value, not of a certain weight of metal. In the United States the dollar is legally tied to gold and represents a certain weight of the metal of an agreed fineness. Nearly all legal documents contain a proviso that payments, where payments are due, shall be made in dollars of a certain worth in gold. Moreover, the Americans had their experience of inflation after the Civil War, and have not forgotten it. Even attempts to persuade the American public to accept bimetallism have made little headway. Furthermore, the gold standard in the United States is regarded as a definite safeguard against certain abuses. As one prominent American banker said to me on my last visit, 'We have a mixed, unstable, largely unassimilated population, and they cannot either trust themselves or be trusted. You in England can live under a managed currency without panic or apprehension. Here in America, if we went off gold, everything would blow up.'

The mere threat of America being forced off the gold standard in the spring of 1932 was the cause of very widespread fear and deep apprehension. A few cargoes of gold exported from America's vast hoards sent cold shivers down the spines of all the business community. The visit of Monsieur Lavalle, as Prime Minister of France, in October 1931 was a great shock to American opinion. Monsieur Lavalle came to discuss economics and debts. At the same time, whether by accident or design, gold began to leave the country. It was freely rumoured that Monsieur Lavalle had hinted that the French banks were in a position to embarrass the Federal Reserve Board by withdrawing deposits in New York, and even to compel the Americans to leave the gold standard. These rumours did much harm.

We may therefore expect a very sturdy endeavour to be made by the American representatives to persuade Great Britain to agree to revert to the gold standard within a specified period. And here there may be an attempt to link up the War Debts question with the Economic Conference. That will be a most serious threat to the Conference. Responsible Americans know the danger, and they fear the result may be that Britain will default on the payment due in June; and in that case all the other debtors will default. The private banking interests are mortally afraid that there will then be a general default by commercial debtors and that the holders of the bonds invested in the post-war years and before the slump on the continent of Europe and in South America will suffer. The American investor has been through a very bad time in any case, and the American leaders who are hoping to persuade him once more to entrust his savings to them are anxious not to undermine public confidence further. A year ago hoarding, with its deflationary results, was a real danger to the whole economic structure in the United States. Further defaults leading to losses to the investor will, it is feared, lead to a resumption of hoarding. Furthermore, the more enlightened leaders of America know well that creditor nations will have to resume lending abroad sooner or later, and the sooner the better. The economically backward countries need capital if markets are to revive, and every effort will be made to avoid the catastrophe described above. For they must have the support of the American investing public to resume payments.

What of the most constructive proposal that has yet emerged from the discussions that have raged round world economics during the last half-decade, the raising of the wholesale price level? This was the device advocated by the Macmillan Committee in 1931. That it would be extremely difficult to do it by unilateral action is admitted. During the greater part of the last year the Federal Reserve Board engaged in very substantial open market operations, pumping money into the credit system and hoping to bring about a revival of trade by that means. The only result was to improve the liquid position of the still solvent banks. If the process had been continued long enough, no doubt the Federal Reserve Board would have won and the banks would have had to lend more freely to industry; but the nerves of the open market operators failed them. Then there were the operations of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Between February and June last year nearly $3,000,000,000 were lent to banks, corporations, and railway companies. Bank failures were checked (the weaker banks had closed, having failed in 1930 with a loss of deposits of $1,692,000,000). The railways would, it was stated, have been unable to keep going without the help so

freely given; though, according to information now disclosed, of the $264,000,000 of public money lent to the railways $44,000,000 went back to the banks to pay off loans. The complaint made by the general public of the United States is that these immense sums of public money went to support the larger and more powerful institutions, and, though they stopped further serious failures, they did little to revive business.

These were the two principal efforts made by President Hoover's Administration to bring about reflation. A direct unilateral effort was also made by the American Government to keep prices from falling further by buying up immense quantities of cotton and wheat and keeping them off the market. The time came when even Congress revolted against the operations of the Farm Board; the purchases ceased, and the Government has been left with the stocks which are unsaleable and prices have continued to fall. America has learnt the lesson that unilateral attempts at price raising by reflation or any other method are doomed to failure. Increasing heed, therefore, is being given to those who boldly advocate a devaluation of the dollar by reducing its gold content by legislation and so directly expanding the currency. Sixty-two per cent. of the Federal Reserve Banks' note issue is covered by gold bullion or coin as compared to a gold cover of 24 per cent. held by the Bank of England. It is obvious that on this immense gold basis a much higher pyramid of currency and credit could be erected. But this type of proposal is met by very strenuous opposition. There are two directly opposed policies in conflict at the present time in America. The one is in favour of raising prices by some form of inflation (concealed, if possible), and its advocates hope that this policy may be adopted internationally. The other school of thought believes that the only salvation lies in what are known as readjustments. They admit there is too wide a gap between the price of raw materials and the finished article; that the farmers are poor, not because their produce fetches such a low price, but because the manufactured articles they must buy are so costly. They declare, therefore, that the whole standard of living in America must come down in order to build up once more from the bottom. There must, they insist, be a cutting down of all costs of production, a lowering of wages and the price of services, and, of course, a continuance of cheap money. But the advocates of this policy realise that they are directly opposing the mentality of their own public. A high standard of living is part of the American gospel. Despite the 12,000,000 unemployed and the poverty of the agricultural districts, the workers in jobs still live at a higher standard than those of any other country in the world, with the possible exception of Australia.

How ready the Americans are to believe that, in spite of all that has happened, prosperity is really round the corner is shown by the reception given to the preachings of the Technocrats. There is nothing new in their theory; but it was presented in a novel manner. It was only the economic doctrine of Plenty, known in Europe as the New Economics, expressed in different language and with the wealth of statistics and figures so beloved of the Americans. But it swept the continent like a prairie fire and was only checked by very strenuous counter-propaganda. So there are in the United States these two conflicting schools of thought, the one declaring that there must be inflation in order to raise prices, the other pinning its faith to economy, the cutting down of costs of production, and all the other specifics of 'sound economics.'

If the reflationists win, the price problem will be seriously tackled at the forthcoming Conference. I believe the reflationists will win. Thus, at the beginning of the present year, the Glass-Steagall Currency Act was renewed with practically no opposition. It will be remembered that this Act of Congress permits the Federal Reserve Banks to hold Government scrip as collateral security for an additional note issue. This Act certainly opens the door to a controlled inflationary policy. Senator Thomas has introduced an amending Bill which not only pushes the door wide open but would pass 'currency management' through it. Let us see what Senator Thomas's proposals are:

> My Bill, [states the senator] which is proposed as an amendment to the Glass Bill, provides for placing of additional money in circulation, so that money will become more plentiful, and thereby cheaper, and to the extent that money is cheapened commodity, real estate, and security (stock) values will rise. Sufficient money will be placed in circulation to bring prices up to the 100 level, or the level existing in 1926. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorised to have printed Treasury notes and to pay out such notes for current expenses until the level is reached. It is further provided to have printed bonds for possible use of the Treasury in the event of the level rising above 103, and in such event the Treasury will be authorised to begin selling bonds to withdraw the excess currency in circulation and thereafter to keep the level of commodity prices within a range of 97 low to 103 high.

And Senator Thomas has powerful backing. Thus Senator Borah, speaking in February, said:

> With commodity prices near the bottom and still slowly falling, with the purchasing power of the masses near the minimum and still diminishing, with taxes increasing in amount but diminishing in returns, with the value of the dollar depreciating and mortgages and taxes responding accordingly, there is no such thing as balancing the Budget, except on paper and temporarily. In 1929 the national income was about $85,200,000,000; in 1932 about $37,500,000,000. *Our national income now is about equal to the taxes of the people, city, State and national together, with*

the interest falling due on private indebtedness. We have already reached the point when, measured against interest and taxes, the income of the nation is about zero. To put a tax on the poorer people until we have done something to raise and stabilise the prices of commodities is not wise from an economic standpoint, and socially it is an iniquity.

At the present time we are on the gold standard in this country. The rest of the world, except France, which, owing to certain reasons not necessary to discuss here, does not affect greatly our situation, is on a managed-currency basis. While our dollar climbs in value their currency is accommodated to their economic situation. The result is that we are not only losing our foreign markets, but we are losing our domestic markets. Important lines of business are actually being closed because they cannot compete in the markets with the products coming in and deluging our home markets from countries on a cheaper-currency basis. The fish business on the Pacific coast is being literally ruined. The countries off the gold standard are literally taking over the fish industry. The farmer also is feeling the effect of the competition. In the same way other important lines of industry feel the effect of it. To talk about balancing the Budget and laying on heavier taxes without any accompanying programme to meet this situation is to invite further depression, further distress, if not something worse. It is going to be difficult—and, I believe, impossible—to balance the Budget of the taxpayers. Is there any way to bring about the latter until you devise a plan for increasing the prices of commodities ? Is there any way to do that, except through reflation, through adjustment of the money problem ?

Even 'Big Business' in the United States realises that some drastic action must be taken. Thus the larger insurance corporations are suspending the foreclosures on farm properties, especially those cultivated by owner-occupiers, where interest payments cannot be kept up. In February the Prudential Insurance Company of Newark announced the suspension of foreclosures on 37,000 such farms. Not all were within the Union. Many hundreds were in Canada. An investment of $200,000,000 was involved. Iowa is one of the worst hit agricultural States. During the years 1929 to 1932, 40,000 farmers in that State lost their holdings through their inability to keep up the payments on mortgages. Now the New York Life Insurance Company and the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company of Newark have decided to take no further action at the present time. This action of the great insurance companies is not pure philanthropy. The farmers themselves had begun to take direct action. They attended forced sales *en masse*, intimidated genuine bidders, and bought up entire farms for a few dollars each in order to hand them back to the former occupiers. Other examples of direct action have been the 'farmers' strike,' when efforts were made to hold produce off the market in order to raise prices. Roads have been picketed by armed men, lorries carrying produce held up and turned back and, in a few cases, burned. Even more sinister has been the action of poverty-stricken farmers in Texas

and Nebraska, who have raided market towns in numerous armed bands, commandeered stores and such foodstuffs—coffee, sugar, and the like—as they do not produce themselves, and paid in I.O.U.'s! These doings and events have alarmed even Wall Street, and have certainly disturbed Washington. Strong international action in the directions indicated is expected to follow the Economic Conference; and the United States representatives will press for such action.

Yet the agricultural communities, taking them as a whole, are strongly conservative. It would be a mistake to suppose that a large section of the Americans are on the point of armed revolt. For example, the proposed three years' moratorium for all private debts in the State of North Dakota was voted down by a large majority in the referendum. This referendum was held during the Presidential and Congressional elections last autumn. The movement for the moratorium began during the primary elections in June of last year. Sufficient signatories were found to have this proposal placed in the primary ballot. It was then proposed for a five-year period, and was not to apply to debtors who could be shown to be in a position to pay. In spite of the reputation of North Dakota for 'radicalism,' and in spite of the intense depression in this almost entirely agricultural State, the measure was defeated. The powerful Farmers' Union then redrafted the measure on a three years' basis and inserted other modifications, such as the payment of 1 per cent. interest a year on all suspended debts. The redrafted proposal found a place in the general election ballot last November. A raging, tearing propaganda was organised, both by the advocates of the moratorium and by their opponents. The radio was used, much money was spent on posters and newspaper advertisements, and the whole subject was thrashed out at scores of public meetings. The result was a still heavier defeat for the modified moratorium.

The lesson here would seem to be twofold: first, that the American people, taking them as a whole, are opposed to any policy that appears too unorthodox; and secondly, that indebtedness is still regarded as an obligation not to be lightly discarded. Apply this mentality to the foreign debts owed to the United States Government, and it will be realised how difficult is the task of the advocates of cancellation. The transfer of the war debts to the shoulders of the American taxpayers—for this is what it would mean in theory and in fact—appears inconceivable to the ordinary citizens of the Union, no matter what the economists, bankers, and a few politicians may advocate. Indeed, the advocacy of cancellation, or of writing down, or even of an extended moratorium on the part of many of the best known bankers and financiers, is its own condemnation in the eyes

of hundreds of thousands of American 'small-town' citizens, farmers, and working men. Wall Street has become an object of intense suspicion and even of hatred. By 'Wall Street' is meant not only the Stock Exchange operators, but the financial houses, large banks, and money interests generally. These 'interests' are largely blamed for the slump and for unemployment. They are accused of trying to let Europe off lightly for the sake of their investments and loans. Furthermore, the difficulties of transfer are not understood. The majority of the voters and—dare one say it ?—the majority of Cabinet Ministers, members of Parliament, and economists in Britain did not understand it in 1918 when the country voted for 'making the Germans pay' and astronomical figures were talked about for reparations.

We have moved forward from that state of mind. The American public, whose newly experienced poverty only began in 1929, still lags behind in understanding. And, this understanding being absent, the sums in dispute seem comparatively small. Figures are quoted by demagogues showing how if every Englishman drank one less glass of beer a day, or every Frenchman went without one daily glass of wine, the interest on the debt would be forthcoming. This is a telling point in a theoretically 'dry' country. It is not explained that beer or wine thus saved could not be exported to the United States as a payment in kind. The arguments about the sums spent on armaments are now familiar to us on this side of the Atlantic. They are not so easily countered; for they appeal to yet another sentiment—the ingrained pacifism of a very large section of the American people. In these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Government at Washington has endeavoured to keep the question of war debts off the agenda of the Economic Conference. Foolish as the suggestion to exclude debts from the conversations may have sounded to us in Europe, there are solid reasons for it, when the state of American public opinion is considered.

Now, whatever pious endeavours may be made to keep the question of debts out of the arena, it is bound to crop up, and all the more responsible American leaders realise this. They will probably get over the difficulty of their uninformed public opinion by declaring that the debts will appear of least magnitude both to creditors and debtors if prices can be raised and credit revived. One of the most telling of the arguments on this side of the Atlantic is that the debts were contracted for goods delivered when they were worth three times as much in money as they would be at present, and that therefore the real value of the debt has been trebled. We in Europe blame the debts for the depression. In America it was explained to me again and again by men in responsible positions that the American people would

have been more generous but for the slump, and that, in consequence, it was useless to talk of cancellation until trade had revived. All the arguments used by Europeans with reference to inter-governmental debts are used to-day by private debtors in the United States, particularly with regard to mortgages on land. The American farmer in debt to his bank admits that falling prices may have added to the burden of the European debtor, but they have also added to his. If the American taxpayers have to shoulder the whole of the burden at present expected to be borne by Europe they will have to find from somewhere $1,100,000,000. These same taxpayers are unable to pay the existing internal taxes, which represent about 25 per cent. of the national income.

We must not judge American taxation by the amount of the Federal imposts. By far the most onerous part of the burden is represented by State, County and City taxes. With one or two exceptions, all the American cities are heavily in debt and most of them are insolvent. New York is being 'carried' by the banks, who are making loans from time to time on conditions, but always only just in time to prevent the largest and wealthiest city in the United States being forced into bankruptcy. From Chicago to New Orleans and San Francisco to Philadelphia it is the same story. Extravagance, corruption, misgovernment, and graft have imposed a burden on the American cities which would have strained their resources in prosperous times. Now the burden is unbearable. And this is only one example. The taxpayers everywhere, especially the small men, are finding the greatest difficulty in times of reduced incomes in meeting their obligations. To talk to these people of shifting the burden from the shoulders of the European debtor to their own is not practical politics. The Lausanne Agreement reduced Germany's reparation payments by 90 per cent. Unless it can be made to appear as part of a larger settlement, including such solid advantages as tariff concessions, there seems to be no possibility of persuading the American public that 90 per cent. of Europe's indebtedness should be wiped off. The best the American leaders hope for at present—failing a sea-change in the attitude of their public—is that some *quid pro quo* can be presented as compensation.

This article does not attempt to deal primarily with the debts question. It is a matter of urgency that the debts should be put into cold storage in order to give the Economic Conference a chance of success, for our next payment is due on June 15. Presupposing such a temporary arrangement over the debts, the Economic Conference may yet accomplish much, especially if the reflationists in America carry their own countrymen and the French can be brought into line. But the American politicians

must be enabled to return from the Conference with what appear to be substantial advantages for their countrymen, if they are not to be repudiated as the late President Wilson and his colleagues were thrown over after Versailles. The holding of the Conference in London, if this is finally decided upon, will make the task of the American delegates still more hazardous. If the Europeans mean to make this Conference a success—and presumably this is the intention of our leaders—then very considerable concessions to the American point of view and to American policy must be granted.

J. M. Kenworthy.

TAMMANY REMAINS

It is almost a commonplace that the mayoralties of the greater cities of the United States make better copy for English newspapers than do those of English towns. There are indeed many Englishmen who are familiar with the names of 'Big Bill' Thompson, 'Tony the Bohunk' Cermak, and 'Jimmie' Walker, but would be hard put to it to relate the present or recent holders of the mayoral office in Birmingham or Manchester, or even in London. It is natural to attribute such a state of affairs to the picturesque personalities of the above-mentioned American mayors and to the sensational episodes which for the last decade have kept their cities so prominently in the news. But it would be a mistake to assume that the fame of certain American city mayors is merely adventitious. The Mayors of New York and Chicago really are more important people than the Mayors of London and Birmingham. They are so because the greater American cities have acquired *de facto* a status very different from that of their counterparts in England, France or Germany, because in actuality they come very near to being city-states.

In the United States to-day New York, Chicago, and several other big cities enjoy a semi-independence in many ways comparable to that of the Lombard and Hanseatic cities within the Holy Roman Empire. Under modern conditions they cannot, of course, have either the military or the economic self-sufficiency which belonged to the ancient and mediæval city-states. Nevertheless, with their local police forces and judiciaries, their numerous directly elected officials, their huge concentrations of business and wealth, their swollen budgets and their inflammable civic patriotisms, they have far outgrown that subordinate position which we assume as proper for the municipality in its relation to the national State. Several of the recent interventions of American Federal and State Governments in the affairs of big cities have had more of the appearance of the 'paramount power's' activities in the domains of the Indian Princes than of the normal operations of a modern State within its own territory; a foreign invasion could hardly have aroused a greater violence of feeling in certain quarters than the outrage of an

inquiry into the administration of New York City by a commission set up by the Legislature of New York State.

There can be little doubt that the tendency of the American big cities towards a virtual autonomy has been a natural outgrowth from the federalism of the United States Constitution itself. If decentralisation and a division of powers is good as between the Union and the States, why not also as between a State and its cities? The American citizen is accustomed to a co-equality of separate powers which seems to a European to be almost a negation of national sovereignty. In the words of an authoritative account of American institutions,[1] 'Throughout the territory of each State two governments operate—the Nation with its administrative and judicial organisations for the enforcement of National law, and the State with its administrative and judicial organizations for the enforcement of State law.' What more natural than to extend this principle to municipal affairs? It has indeed been so far extended that the inhabitant of Manhattan may be said to be subject to three Governments, of co-ordinate rather than of superior and inferior authority—to the United States of America which rules him from Washington, to New York State which rules him from Albany, and to New York City which rules him from the City Hall, or rather from the building on Union Square which is the new headquarters of Tammany.

It is true that the cities have no constitutional position corresponding to that of the States; they are not units which go to compose the States in the way that the States are the units which compose the Union. But the States have delegated so much of their governmental business to the locally elected officers of counties and cities that there has been every opportunity for the greater urban agglomerations to grow into very definite political entities. The growth has been stimulated by two main factors—first, by the externality of Federal and State Governments to the big cities, due to the fixing of their capitals in remote and unimportant places; and second, by the abnormal separation and antagonism of town and country arising out of the differences in origin and 'nationality' of population and out of the over-representation of the rural and 'sagebrush' States in the Federal Constitution.

The force of the first of these factors is fairly obvious. Every schoolboy knows that Washington is the capital of the United States, but the forgetful one who thinks it must be New York shows the deeper sense of reality. New York *is* the capital, and in so far as its ascendency is really disputed, it is not by Washing-

[1] *Encyclopædia Britannica*, art. 'United States: Constitution and Government,' by Walter F. Dodd, Professor of Law, Yale University

ton, but by Chicago. It is impossible for the New Yorker, amid the stupendous buildings and roaring traffic of Lower Broadway, to think of the little, sleepy, classic-elegant town on the edge of the South as the centre of the nation's life. The very idea is absurd, necessary though it may be to a federal constitution of the American type. In the United Kingdom and France, unitary States, London and Paris are the centres of things both political and economic; the German Reich is a federation, yet Berlin, the largest German city, is the capital both of the Reich and of Prussia, its largest component. In America the political and economic centres have been artificially separated, but while the President and Congress inhabit the quiet seclusion of the District of Columbia, almost every Government department at Washington has had to be duplicated in the real metropolis. As an American journalist writes [2]:

> With one-fifth of the nation's wealth concentrated in New York City, it is only natural that relatives should come flocking into Gothamtown to partake of its hospitality. Uncle Sam is the most prominent of these relatives. He is, in fact, perfectly at home in New York. He has brought along a good part of his possessions and evidently intends to stay around a long time.

The location of the seat of government of the Union away from the economic centre of gravity would be by itself a striking phenomenon, but, as if on a thorough-going principle of governing major centres of population from minor ones, it is repeated in almost every State which contains a city of the first rank. Thus the capital of New York State itself is not New York City, but Albany; that of Illinois, not Chicago, but Springfield; of Pennsylvania, not Philadelphia, but Harrisburg; of Michigan, not Detroit, but Lansing; of Ohio, not Cleveland, but Columbus. In these days of telephones, radio, and rapid transit the factor of distance is not so important as it used to be, but even so, there are considerable disadvantages in the separation in each of these States between the political capital and the headquarters of commerce and industry, and both practical and sentimental considerations make for a compensatory strengthening of self-government in the big cities.

To the fact that no one of the biggest cities is the seat either of the Federal or of a State Government must be added, as a stimulus to the development of urban autonomy, the unrepresentative character of the Federal Constitution from a national point of view. For while the House of Representatives and the President himself are elected on a system which counts the population per head, the Senate, which in practice is the more

[2] Harold Keller in *New York, the Wonder City*, published in 1932 by Wonder City Publishing Co. (New York).

powerful of the two Houses of Congress, consists of two senators from each of the forty-eight States irrespective of population. This arrangement, designed originally to protect the interests of the several States, has produced a grave disproportion in national representation. The States range in size from Texas, which is four and a half times the size of England and Wales, to Rhode Island, which is about as big as Sussex, and in population from New York with over 12,500,000 inhabitants to Nevada with less than 100,000. Six States have populations of over 5,000,000 and eight have less than 500,000. But all have equal representation in the Senate. Thus the balance is heavily weighed down in favour of the rural and wilderness States against the populous, urbanised ones ; for senatorial purposes one dweller in the deserts of Nevada is equivalent to 1400 New Yorkers. It is true that the American farmer has derived remarkably little benefit in the long run from the 'rotten boroughs' of the Union ; it is rather the banks, railroads, mining, oil and public utility companies which have known how to profit from the political power of the deserts. But the urban masses are certainly at a disadvantage under the Federal Constitution, and it is inevitable that they should distrust a centralisation of powers at Washington and look rather to local self-government for the maintenance of their interests.

With big cities, population and wealth crowded into a few States which are heavily outnumbered by their thinly peopled, or almost uninhabited, partners in the Union, there is bound to be in America a strong contrast and a certain antagonism of urban and rural. The antagonism, however, would be comparatively mild if the urban and rural populations were homogeneous. But they are not. Rural America is almost universally Protestant by inherited religion and mainly Anglo-Saxon by ethnic origin, the non-Anglo-Saxon elements being either negroes or else Scandinavians or North Germans—the types of European immigrants who have most nearly amalgamated with the older American stock. In the cities the Protestant and Anglo-Saxon elements are well represented, but there are also large minorities, and in many cases majorities, of Catholics and Jews, representing immigrants from Ireland and Southern and Eastern Europe, who came to America during the period of industrialisation, and did not go on the land, but congregated in the rapidly growing urban centres. These immigrants and their children have learnt to speak English and to regard America as their own country, but they have never been really assimilated to traditional Americanism ; they have neither been turned into good Baptists and Methodists, nor have they become adequately rugged individualists. As Jews and Catholics they have formed difficult minorities in a land where religion counts for far more both in

public morals and in politics than it is constitutionally supposed to do; the statistics of sectarian membership in the United States show rather over 4,000,000 Jews and nearly 20,000,000 Catholics as against more than 30,000,000 Protestants of various denominations. As proletarians, too much captivated by the lure of American equal opportunity to be good material for Socialism, yet too poor and rootless to be real enthusiasts of the 'American system,' these same immigrants have always felt their distinctness both from the rural and from the older-established urban elements, and in seeking to advance their interests have instinctively concerned themselves with the politics of the cities where they are concentrated rather than with State-wide or nation-wide affairs, which are the proper sphere of the Hoovers and the Roosevelts, the Hefflins and the Smoots, the Ku Klux Klan and the Methodist bishops.

With all these factors operating to isolate the big cities from the rest of the country, groups of astute city politicians, affiliated to one or other of the two great national parties, have gradually built up local governments which resemble miniature republics. The oldest, most famous, and most successful of all these groups is the ruling faction of New York itself, the ancient confederacy of Tammany Hall. Here in New York, with a population of 7,000,000, paying one-fifth of the total income-tax revenue of America, flourishes the greatest of city-states under the benevolent guidance of Messrs. Curry, McCooey, and O'Brien.

'An' it's a pretty good game, is politics,' says Big John Kennedy, the Tammany leader in A. H. Lewis's novel *The Boss and How He Came to Rule New York*, 'and can be brought to pay like a bank.' He might have said 'better than a bank,' for in a land where banks have failed by the thousand politics still pays dividends. The dividends are not what they were, but the Great Slump has brought no unemployment to the experts of political corruption, and in this year 1933 Tammany remains in control of New York, the world's most redoubtable Vicar of Bray. The bitter disappointment of a nation has swept away the Great Engineer, the magician Insull has forsaken the Windy City for the Violet-crowned, the oracles of American Business are silenced and new voices prophesy Technocracy. But neither three years of economic catastrophe nor the probing of Counsel Seabury into the open secrets of the golden 'twenties have convinced the average New Yorker that there is any person or institution likely to look after him as well as the matter-of-fact politicians of Tammany Hall.

To the outsider it may seem incredible that the revelations of last year should not have spelt the complete ruin of the notorious political faction which they implicate. But

Tammany corruption has already been exposed many times by official investigations and with no permanent result. In 1871 Tammany was driven from power by a revolt of citizens exasperated beyond endurance, and Boss Tweed was tried and convicted for a *régime* of corruption which is estimated to have stolen from the city approximately $200,000,000, a huge sum by the standards of the time. Yet Tammany was back in power again after two years. Later on came two forerunners of the recent Hofstadter inquiry, the Lexow Investigation of 1894 and the Mazet Investigation of 1899; these, according to M. R. Werner's *Tammany Hall*, 'were the most valuable contributions to the political history of New York City that were ever made by a legislative body,' and they 'succeeded by means of their more than thirty thousand pages of fascinating testimony in bringing into high relief the entire system of Tammany Hall in most of its ramifications.' But the 'thirty thousand pages of fascinating testimony' did not break the system. There was, indeed, a temporary reverse; Tammany was defeated at the elections of 1894, and the curious may read a book published in the following year under the title *The Triumph of Reform: a History of the Great Political Revolution of November* 6, 1894. But in 1897 Tammany returned to power, and its supporters paraded the streets carrying toy tigers and singing the refrain 'Well, well, well, Reform has gone to Hell!' Since 1897 there have been two anti-Tammany reform administrations in New York City, in 1901–3 and in 1914–18. But each time Tammany came back as strong and as corrupt as ever.

Tammany is as old as the Republic itself, for the society was founded in 1788, though it did not engage in politics before the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was originally a social and charitable organisation, and from its activities in this character its technique of political corruption gradually developed. To-day its practice is informed by the accumulated experience of generations, a lore handed down from teacher to pupil and skilfully adjusted to changing conditions. In an article entitled 'A Century of Tammany, the Inherited Spirit of Graft,' a critic wrote in 1903:

> It is more than Croker [then Tammany Boss]; it is Croker preceded by Kelly; it is Kelly preceded by Tweed; it is Tweed preceded by Wood; it is Wood preceded by the Forty Thieves; it is the Forty Thieves preceded by the Land Grafters; it is the Land Grafters preceded by scores of earlier grafters; it is that set of earlier grafters preceded by Aaron Burr—the first leader of Tammany, the first great grafter of a hundred years ago.

Since 1903 the noble tradition has been adequately maintained. Croker died in 1922 after a career which was never

marked by thrift, and left an estate of over $5,000,000—not a large fortune by American standards, and yet a considerable achievement for one who had begun life in poverty in the New York slums and had had no profession but municipal politics. And where the Boss takes the lion's share countless followers take some smaller share, so that many a public official with no legitimate source of income outside his post, but in good party standing, may have a bank balance equivalent to two or three centuries' salary.

The secret of Tammany's power is revealed by Werner in his *Tammany Hall*:

> The efficiency which the Tammany Hall organization attained under John Kelly and has maintained ever since was due to the fact that the organization consisted of groups of men who were working at the business of politics every day in the year. The Boss, when he was not taking his vacations during the months when there were no pressing problems, could be found in his office in Fourteenth Street every day, where the district leaders could consult with him on the affairs of their neighbourhoods. These district leaders, on the other hand, never took vacations. Everybody in the district knew the leader, for it was his business to know everybody. His duties consisted of getting jobs for the people in his neighbourhood, paying their rent when they could not afford to do it themselves, getting them out of trouble when they were arrested, and keeping them amused with outings in summer and dances in winter.

During the last century Tammany controlled elections largely by actual violence and fraud; ballot-boxes were stuffed, supporters were engaged to vote repeatedly under different names, and hostile voters were kept away from the polls by force, while the police who owed their jobs and their perquisites to Tammany declined to interfere. More recently political technique has become less crude. Tammany now relies almost entirely on methods which make its ascendency and opulence a vested interest of the New York poor. The numerous small benefits and petty services which the district leaders render are keenly appreciated by the recipients and are paid for many times over by the revenues which their votes bring to Tammany. According to Werner,

> 'Big Tim' Sullivan [a district leader; died in 1913] gave a Christmas dinner to about five thousand men every year at his political headquarters, 207 Bowery. Turkey, goose, duck, mince pie, beer and coffee were served to anybody who appeared. The diners were fed in relays of 250. . . . It was estimated that he distributed more than twenty-five thousand dollars a year to the poor of the Bowery. . . . But the political profits of his district were estimated at between seven and eight times as much as he gave away.

Along with the appeal to the pocket of the average elector

the Tammany politician flatters him by renouncing all claim to social or intellectual superiority.

Tammany [says Norman Thomas] has been guilty of many crimes, but never of the fatal blunder of being highbrow or high hat. Its leaders dodge any taint of snobbery as they would a plague. No organisation ever is likely to permanently defeat Tammany which does not in its own way come in equally close contact with the people.

The dangers of snobbery for a political career in New York were aptly pointed out by 'the Tammany philosopher,' George Washington Plunkitt, in words recorded by his biographer, W. L. Riordan.[8]

Puttin' on style don't pay in politics [said Plunkitt]. The people won't stand for it. If you've got an achin' for style, sit down on it till you have made your pile and landed a Supreme Court Justiceship with a fourteen-year term at $17,500 a year, or some job of that kind. Then you've got about all you can get out of politics, and you can afford to wear a dress-suit all day and sleep in it all night if you have a mind to. But before you have caught on to your life meal-ticket, be simple. Live like your neighbours even if you have the means to live better. Make the poorest man in your district feel that he is your equal, or even a bit superior to you.

Plunkitt likewise warned political aspirants against highbrow tendencies:

Another thing that people won't stand for is showin' off your learnin'. That's just puttin' on style in another way. If you're makin' speeches in a campaign, talk the language the people talk. Don't try to show how the situation is by quotin' Shakespeare. Shakespeare was all right in his way, but he didn't know anything about Fifteenth District politics.

Tammany Hall can use rhetoric on occasions, but it has always been well understood there that words may be superfluous in politics. Said Plunkitt in one of his contributions to philosophy:

No, I don't send them campaign literature. That's rot. People can get all the political stuff they want to read—and a great deal more, too—in the papers. Who reads speeches nowadays, anyhow? It's bad enough to listen to them. You ain't goin' to gain any votes by stuffin' the letter-boxes with campaign documents. Like as not, you'll lose votes, for there's nothin' a man hates more than to hear the letter-carrier ring his bell and go to the letter-box expectin' to find a letter he was lookin' for, and find only a lot of printed politics. I met a man this very mornin' who told me he voted the Democratic State ticket last year because the Republicans kept crammin' his letter-box with campaign documents.

[8] William L. Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, A Series of Very Plain Talks on Very Practical Politics, Delivered by Ex-Senator George Washington Plunkitt, the Tammany Philosopher, from His Rostrum—the New York County Court-house Bootblack Stand—and Recorded by William L. Riordan*. (New York, 1905.)

The finer political art is revealed by Plunkitt in the following passage:

> If a family is burned out, I don't ask whether they are Republicans or Democrats, and I don't refer them to the Charity Organisation Society, which would investigate their case in a month or two and decide they were worthy of help about the time they are dead from starvation. I just get quarters for them, buy clothes for them if their clothes were burned up, and fix them up till they get things runnin' again. It's philanthropy, but it's politics, too—mighty good politics.

Over and above its benefactions and services, its genial demagogy and sociability, Tammany makes itself popular with a large section of the electorate—and fills its own coffers at the same time—by a wise indulgence towards weaknesses of human nature which America's 'social engineers' have long been endeavouring to eliminate by legislation. As Werner puts it:

> New York has always contained a large pleasure-loving population, whose habits have been somewhat pagan. Any attempts to control too rigidly the desires of this population were of profit to Tammany men, who were the instruments for safe violation of the law. In return they received a money consideration. In that way, the moralist was satisfied, for there was the law on the statute books; Tammany men were more than satisfied, for the profits from violation of the law were large; and the people who wanted their vices were also satisfied, except that the cost of living that way increased.

The Prohibition Law has of course provided the most conspicuous examples of this collusion; its 'enforcement' has crowded New York with speakeasies and enriched Tammany politicians and policemen with graft of millions of dollars annually. The situation is aptly summed up by a New York magazine: 'The Law says: No intoxicating liquors shall be sold in this country. We say: Oh yeah?' The 'Oh yeah?' is worth many votes to Tammany. Tammany unofficially lets the too gay New Yorker go his way in disregard of the Anti-Saloon League, the Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals, the Civic Decency Committee, the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, and other organisations which seek to make his city better behaved than Calvin's Geneva. In consideration of the rigour of the laws under which they live there are many New Yorkers who have no desire for an incorruptible police force. And in consideration of the share it gets in the graft from law violations the police force has no desire for a reform of the city administration.

Benevolence towards speakeasies and their like is vote-catching as well as directly lucrative for Tammany; the people who have a violent objection to speakeasies are in New York a minority who would be anti-Tammany in any case. But the

greater part of Tammany's graft comes from law violations which are more secret and less widely beneficial than lapses from the high ideals of the Eighteenth Amendment. There are considerations on city contracts, collusive manipulations of the real estate market, informal permits to corporations to evade legislation inconvenient to their enterprises, bribes for fraudulent tax assessments and valuations ('the creamiest graft of all' when business is good), 'frame-up' prosecutions, where they are prudent, and spun-out lawsuits immensely profitable to lawyers, splittings of fees with doctors and engineers in municipal employ for admission of faked charges against the city treasury, and last but not least, a vast number of jobs to be distributed to Tammany supporters in accordance with their party loyalty and services. The cost of 'running the city' in 1931 was nearly $670,000,000—a budget greater than that of any State in the Union and second only to that of the Federal Government itself—and of this $190,900,000 went in the wage bill of 131,000 employees. In the days of the Prosperity there was plenty of money and pickings for all, while the government was carried on with sufficient competence to satisfy those who argued that the city could only attract able men into its service, in competition with private business, by winking at perquisites. With the coming of the lean years there is less dough, and the banks have refused to grant credit except on condition of drastic cuts in the budget. However, Tammany does its best on its now straitened resources; it blames economies on the greed of the bankers, and renews its power from the fact that in a time of general unemployment the masses are more than ever dependent on it for jobs or relief.

And what of the future? Are there forces at work which are likely soon to threaten seriously the power of Tammany and the independence of New York. It would be rash to attempt a forecast of the next four years in the United States, yet there are signs that the economic crisis has lasted too long and cut too deep for any easy return to 'normalcy,' and that there will be a national demand for far-reaching reforms to be carried out by the Federal Government, involving a return to the *régime* of the war years when Washington governed almost dictatorially and Tammany was temporarily in eclipse. It is more than likely that during the next decade the central power of the Union will be driven to intervene more actively than it has ever yet done in the affairs of the great cities, and it is certain that such intervention will be strenuously resisted in the name of cities' rights. Any attempt at national economic planning, whatever form it may take, any move to bring order into the chaos of laws and jurisdictions, any serious endeavour to put an end to the vast scandal of racketeering, must raise this issue.

The opposition to Tammany within New York is characterised by a national as opposed to a local consciousness; its deficiency in civic patriotism was manifest in the great blunder made last year by Judge Seabury, counsel to the Hofstadter Committee, which was in any case an Albany creation, when he denounced Tammany in a speech at Cincinnati, and then extolled the municipal administration of Cincinnati to New Yorkers. Unfortunately for the reformers who hold that municipal officials should be content with their salaries and that policemen should enforce the law, it would take more than the eloquence of Samuel Seabury to make New Yorkers eager to learn from Cincinnati. Has not New York 216 buildings of more than twenty-five floors, and one of them the highest in the world? And as for virtue, has it not 1580 churches, valued at a total of $251,000,000? And where is Cincinnati, anyway?

The anti-Tammany reformers are disposed to agree with the dictum of Methodist Bishop James Cannon Junior, of Virginia, that New York is 'the place where Satan's seat is.' But they despair of winning over the New York electorate to this view, and therefore they tend to invoke the higher unities of the American system, to appeal from the people of Manhattan to the wider public of rural and small-town America, to seek aid from outside Tammany's domain. They would have New York delivered from the folly of her own voters and paternally ruled from Washington and Albany where rustic virtues prevail over urban ochlocracy. The fundamental issue was raised last year when, the voters of Kings County having elected to the office of sheriff a certain McQuade after he had conspicuously failed to explain the size of his private fortune in testimony before the Hofstadter Committee, the City Affairs Committee, a voluntary association of 1500 reform-desiring citizens of New York, demanded his removal by the State Governor. The demand led to an open letter controversy between the Governor and the leaders of the City Affairs Committee which has provided a unique series of documents for the student of contemporary American affairs, documents important not only because the Governor was Franklin D. Roosevelt, now President-elect of the United States, but also because in them the whole orthodox theory of American local government is called in question.

The situation at the time was somewhat complicated. The Tammany organisation is a branch of the Democratic Party, and fights for Democratic ascendency at Albany. The Governor of New York State has been a Democrat since 1922 (Al Smith, 1922–8; Roosevelt, since 1928), but the Republicans have maintained a majority in the State Legislature and carried the State in the Presidential elections of 1924 and 1928. A Democrat

Governor at Albany has the function of acting as a shock-absorber for Tammany in the State's too virtuous hinterland, even if he cannot prevent such inconvenient interferences as the Hofstadter Committee, set up by the Republican-controlled State Legislature in 1931 to investigate alleged abuses in the administration of New York City. Roosevelt, however, was not quite single-minded as a protector of Tammany, for he already had his eye on the White House and did not wish to be too closely identified with Tammany in the sight of the nation at large. Hence there seemed to be a possibility that he might be induced to take some action against what the reformers described as 'the unspeakable corruption of government in New York.'

The Hofstadter Committee was a legislative commission of inquiry, not a court of law; it could not be said to 'convict' any of the public officials it examined. The City Affairs Committee, however, took the view that it was the duty of the State Governor to act on the findings of the commission, and 'as an executive and not a judge' to use his power of removal 'to oust an unfit public servant even when he has not committed an offence reviewable in a court of law or clear-cut enough to be adjudged at the polls.'

On March 17 of last year the Rev. J. H. Holmes and Rabbi S. S. Wise, respectively chairman and vice-chairman of the City Affairs Committee, wrote to the Governor enclosing a copy of charges already sent by them to the Surrogate of Queens County as cause for the removal of Mr. Theofel, chief clerk of the Surrogate's Court, and asking the Governor to 'use your utmost interest and influence' to secure the removal. The charges were based on Theofel's admissions in testimony before the Hofstadter Committee. On March 25 Holmes and Wise again wrote to the Governor, requiring him, likewise on evidence obtained by the Hofstadter Committee, to remove Mr. McQuade, who had recently been elected Sheriff of Kings County on the Democratic ticket in spite of his inexplicable bank account.

Roosevelt replied to these appeals by open letter on March 30. With regard to Theofel's case he wrote:

> This is a time of stress and of much hysteria in all parts of the nation, and it is my belief that at such a time one of the first duties of good citizenship is to sustain the American principles of justice. . . . You have asked the Governor with grave impropriety to exert pressure upon—'to influence'—a high judicial officer solely upon your own *ex parte* charges, and before this judicial officer has had any opportunity to investigate these charges himself. By making this demand upon the Governor of the State you have shown a regrettable disregard of a fundamental of American constitutions and laws. This disregard makes more difficult the task of those of us who, in this State and in the city of New York, are trying to

arouse a greater interest on the part of the average citizen in the proper methods of securing more efficient and more honest local government.

Referring to the demand for McQuade's removal, Roosevelt continued:

Your request is peremptorily denied for the clear and cogent reason that you seek to establish a new form of government utterly repulsive to the representative form under which we live . . . you ask the Chief Executive of the State to set up a new rule: That he should remove from office any county official because of any act committed at any time prior to his election, even when such act was one of full public knowledge . . . you make me wonder if you are willing to admit two facts. First, the elective system, which extends not only to the high offices of the Federal and State Governments but also to local offices, allows to the registered voters full opportunity to select any citizen, no matter what you or I may think of the qualifications of that citizen for the office. It is true that the elective system sometimes results in the choice of officials unqualified or even unfit, but there are only two possible means of avoiding this: the will of the electorate to select better qualified officials or else the complete abandonment of the elective system itself.

The second fact is that if our system of government were changed so as to give to the Governor the duty of overriding and nullifying a definite elective choice by removing an elected official for acts committed prior to his election, with full public knowledge thereof, such change would create in Albany a power so dangerous in the hands of an unscrupulous Governor that the will of the electorate could be wholly destroyed. Such a power would result in no improvement of government, but on the contrary in the destruction of the elective system through the resulting disregard and lack of interest in the affairs of local government by the citizens of every county.

From this defence of his position the Governor then proceeded to attack the two ecclesiastics:

Let me tell you two gentlemen straight from the shoulder, that I am becoming convinced from your letters that corruption in public office and unfit servants in public office are both far less abhorrent to you than they are to me. . . . The time which you two gentlemen now spend in bringing charges and asking your Governor to perform unconstitutional functions and to ignore the principles of representative government could be more profitably spent. If you would exert yourselves patiently and consistently in pointing out to the electorate of New York City that an active insistence on their part would result in better qualified and more honest and more efficient public servants, you would be rendering a service to your community which at the present time you are not performing.

In another passage of the same letter the Governor admitted that

in New York City and other communities of the State there are altogether too many public officials who are using their offices for private gain, even though such use may not be a legally criminal offense. It is that type which I seek to prevent from ever holding public office.

The *New York Times* of April 1 commented on this letter in an editorial, and declared that

> It marks a great advance over anything which he [Roosevelt] has previously said in public, defining his attitude towards crooked politics and scoundrelly officials. . . . This is a courageous and heartening attitude for the Governor to take. Many of his friends in this city had almost begun to despair of his assuming it. They felt that they needed his help. They hoped that he would see his way to express sympathy with the Seabury investigation and that he would not, by official silence, even seem to countenance Tammany attempts to brazen out the successive disclosures.

That the *New York Times* should have found the Governor's vague disapproval of corruption in public office 'a courageous and heartening attitude' shows clearly how little it expected of him in the way of criticism of his Democrat friends at Tammany Hall. Perhaps the City Affairs Committee itself had expected no more, but it certainly did not find his attitude 'courageous and heartening.' On the contrary, its leaders whom he had rebuked attacked him in turn with scathing invective. Referring to their charges against Theofel, Holmes and Wise in an open letter to Governor Roosevelt wrote:

> You are shocked that anyone should suggest that you 'exert pressure' upon 'a high judicial officer.' This, sir, is the sheerest quibbling. You know perfectly well what we meant in our appeal. We meant and we mean that, had you been worthy of your high office, as alert to the people's interest as to your own political advancement, you would months ago have summoned the Surrogate of Queens County into your presence and demanded that he act on the facts brought to light by the counsel for the Hofstadter Committee. . . . Your own culpable inaction was at once the cause and occasion of our plea. You pretend that Surrogate Hetherington is a high and independent judicial official. You know that the Surrogate and scores of other officials in Queens County are the creatures of John Theofel, the Democratic leader of Queens, put in office by his power and kept in office for his advantage. Mr. Theofel himself has publicly admitted that he put the Surrogate in his present position. If you do not command or force action against Mr. Theofel, how can you expect his political underling to do so?

The attitude implied in this argument is poles apart from the Governor's. Roosevelt takes his stand on the Law and the Constitution; Holmes and Wise are referring to the actual facts of government in New York City, facts which are common knowledge but are not formally recognised as belonging to the political order. The Law and the Constitution make no provision for the case of 'a high judicial officer' who is the nominee of his own subordinate. When, therefore, the Governor 'pretends' that the Surrogate of Queens County is 'a high and independent judicial official,' his contention is in theory perfectly correct; to deny it is to deny that the reality of government corresponds to

the *de jure* structure. And that, of course, is just what Holmes and Wise do deny. But the burden of proof is on them, and formal proof is no easy matter even with the disclosures made by the Hofstadter Committee, for the great party organisation which in fact governs has no legal responsibility for the acts of its government.

The same impatience at legal 'quibbling' is shown by Holmes and Wise in their retort to the Governor on the McQuade case:

> Dare you say, sir, that the citizens of Brooklyn had a fair chance to weigh the guilt or innocence of Mr. McQuade at the last election? Let us remind you that the disclosures before the Hofstadter Committee concerning Mr. McQuade's unexplained bank accounts were not made until October 7, which was two full months after he had been designated for his present office by the Democratic party convention. . . . His nomination on the Democratic ticket in Brooklyn, as you well know, was equivalent to election.

The phrase 'as you well know' was incautious. Governor Roosevelt, of course, did not know anything of the kind. The sovereign people chooses its representatives in perfect freedom and with full deliberation. To suggest that nomination on the Democratic ticket in Brooklyn 'is equivalent to election' is a blasphemy against the elective system, and shocking to all good citizens. The facts are notorious, but they cannot be publicly and officially admitted.

Holmes and Wise conclude their letter with a fiery denunciation of Roosevelt's whole policy as Governor:

> If we have seemed to bombard you, it must be because any activity in the public interest appears like a bombardment to an official sunk in a stupor of indifference or lost in the absorption of planning and plotting for his own political advantage. You say that you are 'becoming convinced' that 'corruption and unfit servants in public office' are even more abhorrent to you than to us. Your record belies this boast. The Tammany brand is as clear on that record as the stripes of a tiger. You removed Sheriff Farley for his unexplained bank accounts only when Judge Seabury forced you to this action, and then you replaced the Tammany leader of the Fourteenth District with the Tammany leader of the Fifteenth District. . . . When Judge Mancuso retired under fire you appointed Judge Amadeo Bertini in his place, although the New York County Lawyers' Association declared that Bertini was not fitted for the position of judge of the Court of General Session. You appointed Bertini on recommendation of Tammany Leader Charles L. Kohler, and Bertini promptly revealed his calibre by refusing to waive immunity before a grand jury that was investigating a $100,000 transaction that followed his appointment. . . . Never once, during all the months in which disclosure has been piled on disclosure of the unspeakable corruption of government in New York, have you denounced those Tammany leaders who hold power in your party and office in this community.

It was not long after the close of this correspondence that there was actually a breach between Roosevelt and Tammany. The Tammany delegation at the Democratic Party Convention tried to 'stop Roosevelt' and secure the Presidential nomination for Al Smith, in which move they failed. The quarrel, however, was not lasting. The wickedness of New York, revealed by the Hofstadter investigation, was purged by the sacrifice of Mayor Walker, who retired gracefully from the scene, and the Tammany stalwarts swung into line to save the nation from another four years of Hoover. And in November one and the same wave of Democratic victory brought Franklin D. Roosevelt into the Presidency of the United States and Tammany's new nominee into the mayoralty of New York.

G. F. Hudson.

THE TRIPOD OF PEACE

YEAR I of the great disarmament palaver has concluded with a record of achievement amounting to exactly nothing in the way of reduction and limitation of armaments. The original Draft Convention, the fruit of six and a half years' moil and toil in the Preparatory Commission, was quietly dropped at the outset. In view of the fact that the Convention, as Mr. Hugh Gibson, the United States delegate, once observed, failed to contain any feature of real disarmament, it was not much loss. But if the Convention proved to be a boojum, it did at least illustrate the fact, which still seems to have escaped the numberless self-appointed guides of 'public opinion' in Great Britain, that disarmament is first, last, and all the time a political problem—not a technical problem, and certainly not an occasion for high moral sentiment.

Since then we have had a plethora of disarmament plans and projects from the Great Powers in turn, each of them having for its chief effect the rattling of skeletons in the various national cupboards, but none offering the slightest chance of general acceptance. We have witnessed, in fact, the spectacle that has occurred whenever disarmament has been pursued as an end in itself. The only agreement which has been registered up to date is on certain measures for the regulation of war, which, as every realist must recognise, would inevitably go by the board if that dread emergency should supervene.

There is no mystery about the reasons for the complete deadlock. Of the divergencies of national policy disguised as differences of technical opinion the most conspicuous in the original Draft Convention was the Franco-German clash in respect of Article 53, which the Germans took to mean, and the French Government at that time undoubtedly intended to mean, the reaffirmation of the *status quo* in armaments as between victors and vanquished laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. The sequel has shown that this itself is only a token and symptom of the organic and functional disorder which has hitherto paralysed every attempt to heal the sores of Europe. The Paul-Boncour Plan was generally welcomed at first, even in Germany, as meeting

the German claim for equality of status, but further examination has shown that the method proposed amounted to little more than the recognition of the *fait accompli* of German re-armament; while, as frequently happens, the much-trumpeted formula of December 11 has been interpreted in opposite senses in France and Germany, with consequent recrimination, so that the last state of that issue is worse than the first. We are back again at the point where European politics were at the time of the Hague Conference in 1899, and the high hopes that were placed in the new international *régime* of which Geneva is the symbol have been dashed to the ground by the experience of twelve years, culminating in a war of the most flagrant old-time character in the Far East.

No wonder that the British Government is setting about the task of devising some face-saving protocol which will make it possible to ring down the curtain on the Conference and to concentrate on the more practical and immediate task of riveting the pieces of broken China, which, failing prompt action by the Western Powers, are likely to be mended with a generous application of Russian glue. That is presumably the meaning of the British programme of work, which may be summed up as follows:

(1) It repeats the first article of the Five-Power agreement of December 11, that brought back Germany into the Conference, with the extension of the solemn pledge against 'resort to force' to *all European States;* which is all very well, but is only another form of words for the second clause of the Kellogg Pact. (British Governments have a way of leaving out of account entirely that fundamental pledge of total abstinence.) To the ordinary man it seems quite clear that this reaffirmation of previous undertakings, which is Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's latest hobby-horse, does more harm than good. There is a law of diminishing returns in respect of treaty pledges as in economics. (2) The British Government once again exhorts the continental European States to 'study . . . with a view to their mutual security . . . the possibility of reaching political arrangements' for mutual assistance. Again a gratuitous piece of advice, for which Great Britain is not likely to get much thanks, since the best minds have been engaged on that study for over twelve years, while the political situation has gone from bad to worse. (3) The British Government advocates a Convention which would in fact replace Part V. of the Treaty of Versailles. This amounts to a concession of the principle of the equality of status, but not a word is said of the 'system which would provide security for all nations,' for which any conceivable French Government will unquestionably stipulate.

That is the meat of the British dish. The rest is bones, at which the technicians are to be asked to pick as they have been picking for years, mixed with a little gristle from the Hoover dish, on which the Effectives Committee will break its teeth in attempting abstruse calculation as between the 'police component' and the 'defence component' of the existing land

forces for each country. In all this there is no promise of any all-round reduction of national armaments. The Japanese, indeed, in their latest proposals, blandly invite the other Great Powers to abandon the world conference method and confine themselves to special arrangements in the Pacific, Atlantic, etc., whereby 'limitation' should be translated into a slight relative *increase* in the strength of the Japanese navy.

Perhaps the most unfortunate development of the last few years has been the tendency in England and America to attribute the deadlock in pacific effort at Geneva to French obstruction. Every kind of argument is adduced to substantiate the charge. The French demand for 'security' is gratuitously interpreted as being one for a British guarantee of the territorial *status quo* in Europe. That was indeed the purpose of the Geneva Protocol and of previous French proposals. The average Frenchman, quite apart from any political prepossessions, has a tendency to think in terms of a static world, to regard peace in terms of a firm guarantee for the upholding of the law and the treaties. But the Paul-Boncour Plan and the recent debates in the Chamber and Senate on the latest subsidy loan to Austria were a clear indication that France is prepared to modify her policy of standing pat on the letter of the Versailles Treaty. It can hardly be expected that a French Government, at this juncture, should initiate a full-dress international debate on treaty revision, but anyone who is in touch with Frenchmen, and not only politicians of the Left, knows that French opinion has travelled a long way on this question.

Let it be recalled that M. Franklin Bouillon, in the debate in the Chamber on the Herriot Government's disarmament plan, was unable to obtain any support for the rider that he proposed to insert about maintaining inviolate the sanctity of the Versailles Treaty. The recent congress of the *Ligue des Droits de L'Homme*, held in Paris at the end of December, was remarkable evidence of the shift from what one might call the Poincaré position. This Ligue, with a little under 200,000 active supporters, is fully representative of French democratic radicalism, which has moved slowly but surely towards an appreciation of the need for liberating the architects of a new order in Europe from the 'shackles' of Versailles. The congress had before it a draft resolution by the Central Committee, definitely accepting treaty rectification as a question of immediate urgency, and formulating suggestions for making effective Article 19 of the League Covenant. Specific reference was made to the unjust cutting up of certain territories, to the drawing of certain frontier lines, and, above all, to section 231 of the Treaty of Versailles—the war-guilt

paragraphs. The resolution was approved unanimously, and one may safely conjecture that positive official proposals on the question are only awaiting a favourable turn of the European kaleidoscope.

Because, under M. Briand's tuition, the major portion of his fellow-countrymen have—privately, at least—come to recognise the appalling danger (described in Major Polson Newman's article in the January 1933 issue of *The Nineteenth Century*) of a Europe once again divided into two armed camps, it is lamentable that the British Government and the British people should still be under the impression that when France insists that any reduction of armaments must go *pari passu* with a definite measure of security she is angling for British military and naval support of the European *status quo*.

All experience goes to show, indeed, that security and disarmament are like Siamese twins. Any attempt to separate them is sure to be fatal to both. To that extent the French thesis is unimpeachable. On the other hand, it is essential to place these twin goals on an international plane. The nations' representatives hitherto, flanked by their military experts, have continued to work within the obsolete diplomatic tradition of each nation seeking protection for itself—*i.e.*, security against successful attack in the event of war, instead of security against war itself by an all-in policy of peace risks. The French, however, who are nothing if not realists, have at length seen, apart from a few nationalist stalwarts, that security, interpreted, as it was recently by Herr von Papen, to mean a state of military and naval preparedness for defence against any possible combination of Powers, means the inevitable armament race, and ultimately, money permitting, the hegemony of a country possessing such extensive frontiers requiring to be 'defended' as Germany. M. Paul-Boncour, in interviews and articles, has laid great stress on the fact that the military organisation section of the French Plan has for its aim 'defensive armies.' But the thing is a contradiction in terms. For, as Mr. Henderson said in his Burge Memorial lecture of 1931 ('Consolidating World Peace'), 'all armaments are defensive weapons in the eyes of those who believe that the only sure guarantee of peace is to be effectively prepared for war.' If only the peace-mongers and drummers of disarmament would come down from the clouds of high-falutin' sentiment and look at the facts, they would see that national defence, which is still regarded by most of them as perfectly right and proper, is only the obverse of the medal of preparedness for war—against some particular Power or combination of Powers. It is psychologically incompatible with any reduction of armaments. No more insidious anodyne, indeed, was

ever prescribed than the supposititious distinction, so dear to the Continental democrat, between the professional army intent on aggression and a conscript 'nation in arms' preoccupied only with self-defence. President Hoover's declaration last summer, by the way, about his country's requiring 'an army and navy strength such as would guarantee that no foreign soldier shall land on United States soil' was a naïf admission that the 'security' complex of the wicked European nations is shared by the United States Administration.

There is in this country an instinctive sympathy for the German claim for equality of rights. What has not been realised, at any rate until recently, is that acceptance of the German case without the counterpart of effective international security, which is the *sine qua non* of any reduction of armaments, is simply reversion to the law of the jungle in international relationships. The Germans are certainly entitled to claim a comparable state of 'armed security' to that enjoyed by other nations. General von Schleicher, in his famous article in *Heimatdienst* on August 30, 1932, can hardly be blamed if, following the lead of apostles of disarmament in England and America, he confined himself to negative criticism of the work of the Disarmament Conference. The General has remarked disingenuously that 'we are prepared to arm our forces with knives and cardboard shields if our neighbours do the same'; though as a realist he must be perfectly well aware that the other nations are not exactly itching to make a bonfire of their peculiarly aggressive weapons of war—those which, as such, were taken away from Germany in 1919.

Let us be frank and recognise that the genuine and general desire for disarmament to-day springs, not so much from any ethical renaissance, but from an all-pervading fear, nurtured by our experiences of 1914–18, and heightened by the ghastly pictures of 'that next war' painted by the experts and latterly by Mr. Baldwin. And just as fear is, whether we like it or not, the dominant motive in the individual man's attitude to the question of war, so we ought to make no bones about recognising that fear underlies the policies of the various social groups called nations in which it is our destiny to live. The remedy, therefore, cannot lie in any preaching of 'confidence' which every known fact belies. Nor is there any hope, in Europe, from the relative principle of armament limitation based on faith, hope and parity, such as has hitherto 'worked the oracle' in regard to the limitation of Anglo-American naval armaments. It can only be in working for the removal of that fear.

In view of the menacing situation in Central Europe, the French are as ready as any other nation now for an all-round reduction of armaments. But, given the fact of political

nationalism and the persistence of militarism, they are likely to go on insisting that nothing can be done unless and until other countries, particularly Great Britain, recognise, by deeds as well as words, that, as Mr. Henderson in his address on February 6 to the International Club at Geneva put it, ' their supreme national interest [is] the strengthening of the new system of international law and institutions which since 1920 they have been striving to build up.' Do those who have defended the British Government's shilly-shallying on the question of Japan's plain breach of her obligations ever realise the effects of her bad example in Europe?

The alternative is clear—either a return to the pre-1914 international anarchy, each nation retaining unchecked the power to make war, or constructive effort in the light of collective responsibility, which is the basis of the League Covenant, involving, in the words of M. Henry de Jouvenel, ' a sum-total of protection such as to discourage any aggression and to end the insecurity which condemns each State to rely only on itself.'

A recent volume [1] by a well-known French pacifist, M. Monteilhet, throws favourable light on the historical background of the French thesis. The author shows how the phrase ' peace through disarmament '—the theme, we are often told, to be chanted by all good and true pacifists—has been wrenched from its original context, which was nothing more nor less than the international security for which the French Government stands. His point is that disarmament cannot be treated apart from the question of the establishment of an international *régime* of law and order. He reminds us of the fundamental proposition, which in 1917–18 appeared to everyone to be the necessary conclusion to Armageddon, that peace and international security were to be attained by the destruction of armies and their replacement by police forces. President Wilson's Fourteen Points were only the supreme expression of the general determination to eliminate the inter-State duel which we call war from the relations of the international society. One has only to read the documents published in Mr. David Hunter Miller's book, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, to realise that the original phrase about a ' war to end war ' was very much more than mere rhetoric. General Smuts did not exaggerate when he said that ' the horrors and sufferings of this war have produced a temper of the peoples which must be reckoned with as a fundamental fact of the political situation in Europe to-day.'

The war system was to be superseded by a supra-national system of peace based on organs of justice and power, an international authority endowed with what President Wilson called

[1] *La Paix par le Désarmement*, by J Monteilhet (Marcel Rivière: Paris, 1933).

'the organised major force of mankind.' This was to be done by abolishing the contending national armies of century-old tradition, starting with the German, their place being taken by very much similar units of police which should suffice to safeguard the *internal security* of the State-community. *External security,* on the other hand, in the minds of these heralds of the new age, from President Wilson downwards, was to be protected by a similar international police force.

How vested interests and the genuine and widespread fear of Bolshevism wrecked this high endeavour I need not go into here; it is admirably described by M. Monteilhet. At all events, the distinction between 'army' and 'police force' was blurred. M. Tardieu, speaking of army adjustments, put in his claim for the army's function—'the traditional *rôle* of defence against an external enemy'; so that the idea of internal security was translated into '*securité du pays.*' (In view of what has happened in the Far East, it is interesting to recall that the actual amendment replacing the term 'domestic safety' by 'national safety' in Article 8 of the League Covenant was made at the suggestion of the Japanese delegate.) The net result was that the 'peace,' so far from being a 'peace without victory,' demanded in the President's speeches in 1916, became what the Germans have always called it, a *Diktat,* and it left the German army in a state of suspended animation pending an examination of the whole question of the reduction and limitation of armaments—an entirely new term—which M. Clemenceau was successful in postponing.

All unwittingly the Germans, in raising the issue of *Gleichberechtigung,* have forced the makers of policy in other countries to take stock and see exactly where they stand in regard to their promised building-up of a new order. Clearly re-armament by the Germans and the ex-enemy Powers, whether sanctioned by a so-called treaty or not, is the dire alternative to effective provision for collective safety from war.

Without a firm substructure of international security such as the League of Nations, in the mind of President Wilson, was designed to supply, the whole edifice of international peace is built upon the sands. There will be no disarmament, no appeasement of political strife in Europe, until the representatives of all States at Geneva have tackled the problem of the 'organisation of peace,' as the French rightly call it, in all its complexity.

If, then, it be granted that international security must be the ground-plan of peace through disarmament, the Herriot Plan is the first serious effort to repair the damage to the original structure of the League, caused by the withdrawal of the United States from the responsibilities undertaken for them by President Wilson

at the Peace Conference. That defection, as we know, has rendered it impossible for any British Government to do more than lip-service to the idea of mutual protection, which is explicit in Article 16 of the Covenant, but implicit in the whole document. Only the other day the British representative at Geneva told the world for the *n*th time that 'this country cannot undertake any more commitments in Europe beyond British membership of the League and the Locarno Treaty.' He seems to have overlooked the fact that no such commitments are being asked for. The French long ago gave up any hope of obtaining either an Eastern Locarno or a Mediterranean Locarno. Mr. Eden himself admitted that the Herriot Plan asks no more from Great Britain than that she shall fulfil her obligations under the Covenant. From the United States no more is asked than a pledge that the U.S.A. will not actively assist a law-breaker.

Now, as long as the attitude of the United States to any breach of the collective system for the prevention of war was an unknown factor, there was some excuse for deviation from what Mr. Eden has styled 'the ambitious ideal of universal effort towards mutual assistance.' But after the declarations by responsible American leaders that some procedure for common action by signatories of the Kellogg Pact is its logical corollary, that argument no longer holds water. The Stimson doctrine of non-recognition and the experience of American co-operation which the Sino-Japanese conflict has afforded have once more transferred the onus to Europe—and specifically to Great Britain.

Fear is the chronic mass-emotion harnessed to political facts which is responsible for the international tension in Europe. The first thing to do, therefore, is to organise mutual assistance which can be swift and sure to obviate that fear. The proposal in the French Plan for national contingents to be maintained within the various States, but earmarked for the service of the international community, is patently unreal. Precisely at a moment of crisis a Government would have every temptation to refuse to allow its forces to be involved. The French have hitherto hankered after this idea of co-operation of armed forces, which is the method of Article 16 of the Covenant, as it was the guiding principle of the Geneva Protocol. But the experience of the last twelve years does not suggest that this will be the way forward. Centralised force, primarily in the shape of an international air force, as indeed the Herriot Plan premises, is the only practical solution. It is bound up with the idea of internationalising civil aviation, as the latest British programme at Geneva, following Mr. Baldwin's outspoken speech in the House of Commons, appears to recognise. It will take time, no doubt, to build up an international air police force. But

one thing is certain: as long as national military air forces are maintained, there can be no 'security' in Europe.

At any rate, something more than mere verbal allegiance to the collective system for the prevention of war is badly needed, or else it is all up with the League of Nations as an instrument of international security in Europe. Large sectors of British opinion cling to the illusion that the Locarno guarantees are the maximum extent of their country's commitments to the collective system. Such persons deliberately overlook the fact that Great Britain, like every other signatory of the Covenant, is committed to the *principle* of sanctions. A legal guarantees system such as the Locarno Treaty is really irrelevant to the main issue on which Continental nations are seeking light and guidance —namely, whether or not the notion of corporate responsibility governs British policy. For, rightly or wrongly, British enthusiasm for Locarno has been interpreted on the Continent as masking a desire to 'contract out' of the society of nations without incurring the odium attaching to formal repudiation, and the British Government's attitude throughout the proceedings in connexion with the Manchurian conflict has been calculated precisely to confirm that opinion.

Since 1924 the work of the committees at Geneva has proceeded on the assumption that the formula for peace had been found—namely, arbitration, security, and disarmament. On the surface, much of the quarrelling has been as to the order in which these *desiderata* are to be achieved. But it is clear to anyone cognisant of the actual political situation in Europe to-day that this formula is inadequate. Peace, if it is to be more than an interval between wars, rests on a tripod, of which international security, treaty revision and disarmament, to use the current jargon, are the feet. Only by some concerted effort on the part of members of the League to translate into practical terms the principles of the League Covenant embodying these three ideas will the world be saved from the threatening cataclysm. The positive task of this generation is to build up an international polity of this nature on the basis of ordered force. Force there must be, if only in the background, this side of the millennium. The whole question is one of international organisation, so that force may be restricted to the police function.

As long, of course, as the Covenant system was riveted to the Treaty of Versailles, which manifestly in other respects differed little from the kind of 'peace' usually imposed by victors on the vanquished, the British instinct to oppose the sundry logical plans for organising peace by collective force that were presented by their French neighbours was right enough. Oddly enough,

in contrast with the static conception of peace, the most satisfactory definition has been supplied by the man who, perhaps more than any other of his fellow-countrymen, is identified with French ideas—namely, Lord Davies, author of *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*. It is ' the establishment of an international *régime* which can bring about in a peaceful manner the adjustments vital to the world's growth.'

How necessary this dynamic element is to any solid construction has all along been appreciated by people in this country. Discussion of treaty revision, however, has hitherto been on the wrong plane. There has been plenty of it, and, for the most part, ill-informed and unwise. What is wanted is, not that the diplomats and experts shall make another patchwork quilt of European frontiers, but that they shall work out, within an international framework, an ordered and peaceful process of change. This aspect of international relationships has been almost entirely neglected. With the exception of a little book by Sir John Fischer Williams,[2] I know of no serious English work on the subject. Who knows whether, if there had been some *impartial*, *permanent* and *non-diplomatic* organ of the League of Nations in existence, the world would have been spared the war hysteria of Japan, whose legitimate grievance against Chinese policy in recent years is fully appreciated in this country. As it is, the greater part of the literature dealing with the establishment of a new international order fails to draw the essential distinction between justiciable and political disputes. The antithesis of ' law ' and ' war,' for example, so beloved of our American cousins, completely blurs this distinction.

As Sir John Fischer Williams says, the essence of political disputes is that ' a change in existing rights . . . is sought. . . . The political dispute . . . may relate to any subject. Its nature is determined not by the objective criterion of the subject-matter in connection with which the dispute arises, but by the subjective criterion of the mental attitude of the disputants.' Clearly almost all the open sores in Europe to-day come under this heading of political disputes. Yet little or nothing has been done to translate into terms of practical policy and institutions the admirable principle of Article 19 of the Covenant, providing for reconsideration by the League Assembly of treaties which have become inapplicable, or the ' consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.'

It is true that under Article 11 it is ' the right of each member of the League to advise the Assembly or the Council of any

[2] *International Change and International Peace* (Oxford University Press, 1931).

circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace.' But in practice, as the Far Eastern dispute has shown, the diplomats are never likely to avail themselves of this opportunity. In any case, the Assembly, as an amendment to Article 19 of the Covenant put forward during the discussion of the League of Nations Commission in Paris made clear, can only recommend. It has no compulsory authority, either under that article or under Article 15, where a formal report is made of the facts of a dispute similar to the report now being made with regard to Japanese action in Manchuria. There was a proposal at the Assembly of 1930 to give compulsory force to a unanimous report of the Council (exclusive of the parties) under Article 15, but, although it obtained considerable support, it never reached the stage of a formal amendment. Events have shown, however, that procedure by trial and error in this fundamental question of peaceful change is wholly unsatisfactory. The alternative of *ad hoc* conciliation commissions is no less so. It will probably be necessary for the statesmen of Europe to contemplate establishing a panel of international magistrates—*i.e.*, men of recognised international standing, appointed, not as representatives of their States, but as experts in international business, on the same principle as are appointed the expert Colonial administrators on the Mandates Commission.

There is something to be said for the procedure suggested by the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* in the resolution to which I have already referred—*i.e.*, setting up 'an international jurisdiction of an unquestionable impartiality to investigate and report on any requests for treaty adjustment.' The resolution also provided that a claim should go forward, if supported by a two-thirds majority in the Assembly; while the report of this kind of permanent 'Lytton Commission' should be referred back to the Assembly, which might again take a decision by a two-thirds majority. Unquestionably, this procedure is in line with the original intentions of President Wilson and the other sponsors of the Covenant. In a somewhat bitter attack on the League as it is [3] we have been reminded recently that President Wilson's first drafts knew nothing of a Council, a body whose 'spiritual origin,' according to this German publicist, 'does not lie in the idea of the solidarity of nations, but in an alien and hostile idea, the destructive notion of the concert of Great Powers.' Dr. Beer exaggerates, of course. Of the need for an executive body similar to the Council there can be no two opinions. But in view of the obvious clash between diplomatic manœuvring by the representatives of the Great Powers and the firm stand by

[3] *The League on Trial*, by Dr. Max Beer (George Allen & Unwin, 15s.).

representatives of the smaller States in the course of the protracted discussions of the Manchurian muddle, what he says should be borne in mind.

The Times wrote recently in a leader that the League ' is in fact an international Committee whose task it is to co-ordinate the diplomacy of all its members ' ; in other words, a concert of Europe *redivivus* and expanded. If that were all there is to it, then all hope of removing the devastating fear underlying the policies of European States and of giving substance to the ideal of the peace-makers would have to be abandoned.

The time has come when the British Government, no longer being able to plead the absence of the United States from the League as an excuse for her refusal to help in making effective the collective system for the prevention of war, must give evidence that it understands the purpose for which the League was devised. No one in his senses pretends that, as things are now, with an international community devoid of any security in the way of sanctions, Japan's direct method of taking the law into her own hands could be prevented. But the British policy of ' conciliation,' put forward as the only alternative to coercion, has only succeeded in making the League ridiculous, and incidentally in alienating both parties to the dispute.

With dogged persistence, ever since the war, the French have been contending that the League, if it is really to be the instrument and symbol of a new order, must be something more than a forum of conciliation. And they have based their arguments on agreed principles, not merely on intellectual conceits, unsupported by facts. British opinion, on the other hand, has always tended to regard the League as simply a settled method of conference. It is the natural attitude of people thinking in terms of the British Commonwealth of Nations. And, indeed, the League's founders were at pains to spare, as much as possible, the susceptibilities of the ' sovereign independent ' States. But in Articles 8, 10, and 11 of the Covenant they quite definitely affirmed the principle of collective responsibility for the prevention of war—*i.e.*, the principle of sanctions. Not that the League is bound by any means to the maximum and drastic penalties mentioned in Article 16. It can take ' any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations ' (Article 11). But such action, necessarily connoting alternative and graduated means of war prevention, must necessarily be concerted *in advance.* Sanctions cannot be improvised.

The argument, so persistently heard, that those articles of the Covenant envisaging collective action in the common interest presuppose a super-State is entirely misleading. In the minds

of those who look upon the League as something more than a vehicle for pre-war diplomacy under the mantle, as it were, of post-war aspirations the League would remain what it is nominally at present—an agency of co-operation between independent Governments. Only these Governments would have committed themselves in advance to the undertaking as a co-operative society of 'any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations' and would have worked out a comprehensive, elastic and sure procedure for prompt and effective action. Not otherwise is the purpose of the Herriot Plan. That plan, as it stands, goes a long way towards meeting the obstacles that have hitherto stood in the way of any concerted action on the basis of the Covenant. It lacks, of course, the essential complement of any scheme for international security—namely, machinery for treaty revision. But is not this a great opportunity for the British Government to offer the only kind of leadership which can appease political strife in Europe, by acceptance of the French case for international security, *on condition that* the French Government in its turn accepts the principle of treaty revisability? And the two countries could then join in a united effort to produce the necessary machinery for making Article 19 of the Covenant effective.

It is fair to say that the post-war Governments have hitherto neglected equally the need for a solid structure of international security and the establishment of permanent machinery for effecting peaceably such changes in national rights as new conditions demand. This problem must be attacked simultaneously—the two-fold problem of treaty rectification and the organisation of international security. Great Britain is cast for the *rôle* of bridge-builder. Any disarmament which is more than a saving of money can only come *after* there is general agreement on the main issue, the upholding of the basic idea of collective responsibility. In this respect, let us be frank, Great Britain, and not France, is the nigger in the woodpile.

There has unfortunately been no concerted or sustained endeavour to convince the British people that if it would have peace it must pay the price. Lord Cecil did, it is true, on one occasion beseech a wireless audience to recognise that peace and disarmament, so vociferously demanded in Great Britain and America, are not to be had for the asking. He declared that there was a price to be paid for peace, and that that price was the genuine acceptance of the obligations for collective responsibility undertaken when Great Britain signed the Covenant. The unthinking, however, interpreted Lord Cecil's reference to 'security' as a hint that this country should simply revert to an Anglo-French alliance, which was the last thing he intended.

So Lord Cecil said no more. And the fundamental political issues barring the way to any progress in Europe were left unresolved.

The remarks of General Smuts, in his 'Practical Suggestion' submitted to the Peace Conference—and he can hardly be accounted a supporter of 'Continental' ideas—on the actual function of the League, deserve to be reprinted here:

> But while we avoid the super-sovereign at the one end, we must be equally careful to avoid the mere ineffective debating society at the other end. The new situation does not call for a new talking-shop. We want an instrument of government which, however much talk is put into it at the one end, will grind out decisions at the other end. We want a league which will be real, practical, effective as a system of world-government. The scheme which I have seen, and which brings representatives of all the independent States of the world together in one conference to discuss the most thorny of all subjects and requires that their decisions to be binding must be unanimous, is from that point of view not worth discussion. It means that there never will be any decision issuing from the league; that nobody will take the league seriously; that it will not even serve as camouflage; that it will soon be dead and buried, leaving the world worse than it found it.

The reason for the impotence of the League of Nations is not that it is tied to any system of 'sanctions.' On the contrary, there are no effective sanctions in existence. Nor is it simply a question of an ever-failing education in world citizenship. It is quite simply our refusal to recognise that there can be no peace, no healthful national life, except in an organised community of nations, endowed with the necessary organs of peaceful change and an instrument of power to enforce justice. The French Plan points the way, and the Manchurian affair points the moral.

W. Horsfall Carter.

THE IRISH FREE STATE ELECTIONS

MR. DE VALERA's success in his sudden appeal to the Irish Free State electorate has been more decisive than the final results would seem to indicate. Proportional representation always prevents such violent fluctuations as occur under the simple system which has operated so long in England. The Free State constituencies all return at least three members, and in some cases eight or nine, so that the official Opposition can always count on retaining at least one seat in three; whereas under the English system all three seats might be won for the same party by a local majority in each district if there were anything like a 'landslide.' Moreover, the distribution of surplus votes after the most popular candidates have been returned tends to equalise matters still more. Candidates who would have no chance of election on the first count frequently gain so much by the transference of surplus votes to them that they are eventually elected, although they would have no chance whatever in a straight fight for one seat.

Bearing these considerations in mind, Mr. de Valera was certainly entitled to expect more than a bare majority of only one over all other parties, in view of the extraordinary increase in the poll for his party. Compared with the elections of a year ago, Mr. de Valera's party increased their total of first preferences from 565,000 to 687,000, while Mr. Cosgrave's party dropped from 447,000 to 421,000, and the Labour Party also dropped from 98,000 to 79,000. Many of Mr. Cosgrave's former supporters, it is true, voted this time for the new Centre Party, which polled some 127,000 first preferences as compared with roughly 40,000 first preferences for the Farmers' candidates last time. But the alliance between the new Centre Party and Mr. Cosgrave's Cumann na nGaedheal is certainly not closer than the alliance between the Labour Party and Mr. de Valera's Fianna Fail. If the combined figures on each side are contrasted, Mr. de Valera can show that Fianna Fail and Labour together polled 766,000 first preferences, while Cumann na nGaedheal and the Centre Party together polled only 545,000. These totals of course omit the Independent candidates, of whom nine have been returned to

the new Dail. The first preferences for Independent candidates totalled some 69,000. But, even if all these are credited to the Opposition, Mr. de Valera can fairly claim that he has received a clear mandate, in an election which has been fought on a clear issue and with much less intimidation than had been expected. A closer analysis of the results makes Mr. de Valera's triumph all the more convincing. His newspaper the *Irish Press* summarises the position as between the two main Opposition parties quite fairly in pointing out that 'Fianna Fail has a strong lead over Cumann na nGaedheal in all four provinces: Leinster, 24 to 18; Munster, 25 to 15; Connacht, 18 to 11; and Ulster, 8 to 3; National University, 2 to 1.' (The figures for Ulster, of course, refer only to the three counties—Donegal, Cavan, and Monaghan—which are included in the Irish Free State.) Moreover, the electoral fortunes of Ministers and ex-Ministers make a remarkable contrast. Mr. de Valera's own poll in County Clare was higher than ever before, while Mr. Cosgrave's poll in Cork City was substantially less than last time. All but one of Mr. de Valera's Ministers were elected on the first count, and most of them at the head of the poll. Mr. Cosgrave's former Ministers, on the contrary, had much greater difficulty in securing election. Two of them in County Kerry were only elected at the last count, while Mr. Hogan in County Galway was also nearly eliminated. Mr. Blythe, who had been Finance Minister for nearly ten years and Vice-President in Cosgrave Governments since the death of Kevin O'Higgins, actually lost his seat. So also did Professor Hayes, who was Speaker of the Dail until a year ago, and has since been one of Mr. Cosgrave's principal supporters.

In face of such results there can be no question that Mr. de Valera has carried the country with him. The whole situation in regard to a possible settlement of the present dispute between the British Government and the Free State will have to be reconsidered in the light of the election results. Nothing could be more misleading than the facile assumption that Mr. de Valera has achieved this very notable victory merely by reviving anti-English hatreds in Ireland, or by creating a legend that Mr. J. H. Thomas is responsible for all Irish troubles at the present time. The election has been won on a definite programme of political and economic reconstruction, which has apparently gained acceptance in all parts of the country. The economic and social problems vary so much in different parts of Ireland that, broadly speaking, three distinct problems have to be included in any programme for reconstruction. The total population of the Irish Free State is just under 3,000,000, of whom roughly 500,000 live in Dublin City or County. There is only one other city of considerable size—namely, Cork, with a

population of nearly 80,000. Limerick, with some 40,000 people, comes next in size, and then Waterford with less than 30,000. These are the only cities large enough to be treated as county boroughs; and between them they include roughly 650,000 of the 3,000,000 people in the Free State's twenty-six counties. Outside of these four cities the problems of modern industrial life, as they are known in England, scarcely exist.

But while the Free State is thus overwhelmingly agricultural outside four cities (of which Dublin alone can be counted as a city of large population), there is a strongly marked dividing line between the life of the West and of the Midlands. The whole centre of Ireland is a plain which possesses great natural advantages for grazing, except for the large central tract known as the Bog of Allen and some other marshy lands. These midland counties have in fact been gradually devoted almost entirely to grazing cattle; and they are consequently the most thinly populated counties in Ireland, although their land is the most fertile. West of the river Shannon, however, the country is mostly mountainous and infertile; and here, for historical reasons, the population is much more dense. That fundamental problem confronts every effort to improve economic prosperity in Ireland, and it is, in fact, the chief explanation of Mr. de Valera's recent success. The paradox of this maldistribution of Irish population is so immensely important in Irish politics that a few sentences of explanation are necessary, even at the risk of being accused of obsession with past grievances. The explanation is primarily the fact that Cromwell ordered most of the Catholic families 'to Hell or to Connaught,' and that their descendants are still living in the barren counties west of the Shannon because they were driven from the fertile lands less than three centuries ago. Other causes (chief among them being the Irish land system, which exploited land without regard to any other interest than making profit) have still further denuded the fertile midland counties of peasant families and replaced tillage by grazing, with consequent depopulation. Hence the cattle trade, which plays so large a part in the present dispute between the Irish Free State and the British Government, affects chiefly the depopulated counties of the Midlands and the South; while the densely populated and barren counties of the West have suffered comparatively little from the cessation of the export trade. If this fundamental factor in the situation had been borne in mind, it may be doubted whether the British Government would have been so ready to impose its crippling import duties upon the cattle trade, and upon the other agricultural exports which are derived chiefly from one section of the Irish farmers. It is the graziers and the large farmers—who have generally been staunch

supporters of Mr. Cosgrave—who have felt the devastating effect of the 'blockade' duties; while the small farmers of the West have been scarcely affected by them. The 'West,' in this connexion, is not only the province of Connacht, but the whole western seaboard from Donegal to Kerry and West Cork. It has been the chief economic problem in Ireland for generations. Lord Balfour, when he was Irish Secretary nearly fifty years ago, realised its seriousness and established the Congested Districts Board to try and improve conditions. The term 'congested districts' was adopted by him to describe those parts of Ireland (which, in fact, covered the entire West from Donegal to Bantry Bay) where the population was greater than the available resources could adequately supply. Many schemes were initiated to redistribute the little holdings of the small farmers, to supply them with materials and piers to assist sea fishing, and to encourage rural industries. But the problem still remains almost unchanged—of a large population living in extreme poverty upon barren land, with a great number of small holdings (many of them having less than 15 acres) out of which the peasantry have to provide their own simple needs.

One may reckon this whole western seaboard, with its primitive and self-contained social and economic life, as being roughly the 'West' of Ireland. Within that area approximately half the whole population of Ireland, apart from Dublin, live under such conditions. Clare, which has been Mr. de Valera's principal stronghold since it first elected him in 1917, is a typical county of the kind; and the West has all along been the chief source of Mr. de Valera's political following. His programme has naturally been largely influenced by the needs and the ambitions of the West. The export trade to Great Britain plays a surprisingly small part in relation to its normal life. Its people still live in extreme poverty, and for years many of the younger generation have had no alternative but to emigrate, either to America or to Great Britain, to find a means of living at all. Even money plays a very small part in the economy of the West. The few necessities of life are provided for their own consumption by intensive farming of their small and infertile holdings. In recent years there has been a slight improvement in the marketing of poultry or eggs, wherever they can be produced beyond the requirements of the families themselves. But even for such marketing barter still plays a considerable part, with the local shopkeeper as the indispensable middleman and source of credit in bad seasons. The one serious payment which has been required is the half-yearly instalment of land annuities, which are the equivalent of the old rents. To provide this payment of rent small farmers have usually kept a few cattle wherever they could afford it;

and the sale of a calf or of a few pigs has usually provided the amount of cash needed.

Obviously the one important assistance which Mr. de Valera could bring to people living in such conditions was the promise of reduction in rents. His campaign to abolish payment of the land annuities has been actively waged for at least six years, and he has gained ground steadily in the West as a direct result of that campaign. A year ago many small farmers were still sceptical as to whether he would dare to act upon his electioneering promises. But since Mr. de Valera has shown that he seriously intended to withhold payment of the land annuities, it is not surprising that he has gained ground still more in the recent election for that reason. To some extent the fall in prices has been felt by the small farmers who had a small surplus to sell; but they have apparently decided that it is well worth while enduring a temporary fall in prices (which would have occurred in any event during the past year) in the hope that Mr. de Valera will succeed in at least reducing their land annuity payments. The negotiations with London during the past year have indeed revealed that the British Government was willing to listen to any friendly appeal for remission of the land annuities. And the small farmers of the whole West have undoubtedly good reason to thank Mr. de Valera for what he has done to alleviate their difficulties. Mr. Cosgrave realised this so fully that during the election campaign he attempted to outbid Mr. de Valera by promising complete remission of land annuities for the next two years. There was at least a chance that the small farmers would accept his higher bid. But they have apparently felt that Mr. Cosgrave did nothing to help them in the matter for ten years while he was in office; and they have remained sceptical as to his ability—or perhaps even as to his sincerity—in making his belated promise.

That Mr. de Valera would gain seats in the West was therefore to be expected. The problem of the Midlands is more complicated; and the most remarkable feature of the election results is that he has gained ground in precisely those counties which have been most seriously hit by the 'blockade.' But here also Mr. de Valera's programme had covered the problem. Those who had followed his propaganda must have been prepared for his success in the grazing districts. His strongest and most immediate appeal was, of course, on the ground that he was saving the country from having to pay a tribute of £5,000,000 a year to England. But the key to his whole economic programme is his determination to increase tillage in the fertile Midlands, and so provide more employment. He has been met, of course, with many technical objections—that wheat cannot be

grown profitably in Ireland; that a subsidy on wheat will only lead to substituting one crop for another; that tillage cannot be made to pay; and so forth. These arguments may indeed be quite sound, but Mr. de Valera has presented quite a strong case against them by showing how rapidly tillage has been promoted in other countries much less fertile or less favourably placed than Ireland. It is no wonder, therefore, that his programme has made a deep appeal to the badly paid agricultural labourers in the grazing counties, and that they have voted for him, in the belief that he will compel the big farmers to adopt more tillage, under threats of confiscating their lands if they refuse to employ their stipulated quota of labour. Moreover, his campaign has raised hopes among the labourers and the 'landless men' that they may even acquire land through the failure of graziers to obey Mr. de Valera's orders. One of the most striking speeches after the election was made by a well-known deputy who declared that the election had been fought 'against the bullock,' and that the dispossessed were at last to inherit the land again. Mr. de Valera himself put the same case with great force again and again when he said that for generations young men and women in Ireland have been reared for export as though they were cattle, and that he was determined to end that system by compelling the large farmers to employ more labour.

The election results in the midland counties show how powerfully that appeal has worked. Mr. de Valera has increased his poll everywhere in the grazing counties; and on the whole he and the Labour Party together hold fully twice as many seats in those counties as the Opposition. Needless to say, the large farmers and the graziers have been in revolt ever since the 'blockade' duties on Irish agricultural exports were imposed. The English newspapers have been full of reports of their emergency meetings and of their impassioned resolutions of protest. And in England, where one thinks of farmers as well fed and sturdy yeomen with an intense repugnance towards revolutionary programmes, it has been naturally assumed that the Irish 'farmers' would throw out Mr. de Valera's Government by an overwhelming vote. But in fact the substantial and prosperous farmers in Ireland are few in number, and the agricultural labourers have discerned new hopes of gaining possession of their lands. Even in places where many labourers have suffered very severely through dismissal owing to the collapse of the cattle trade, the labourers have been more inclined to vote for Mr. de Valera as their future saviour than to blame him for the loss of their miserable wages.

So in the Midlands as well as in the West Mr. de Valera could safely count upon the support which he has received. A different

problem had to be faced in the cities and the larger market towns. Here, if anywhere, Mr. Cosgrave might hope to gain ground because of the widespread unemployment resulting from the 'economic war.' In Dublin especially the loss of the cattle trade has created appalling unemployment; and on a smaller scale also in Cork and Waterford and Wexford. But in regard to the cities Mr. de Valera had already won great popularity by the many bold measures introduced by the first Budget of his Government last spring. His grants of milk for necessitous children; his large schemes to provide work in relief of unemployment; his reckless promises to provide money for housing of the workers and to clear the slums—these measures have gone far to allay discontent, and especially to raise new hopes. At the same time his persistent propaganda in favour of creating new Irish industries has convinced many people that his proposals at least deserve a trial; and an increasing number of people are definitely hoping to benefit by protection of the home market. How far these ambitious schemes can ever materialise, or how the next Budget is to be balanced, or how the Free State Government is to raise even a small loan to finance its always growing deficit, are questions which economists take more seriously than the electorate which has just returned Mr. de Valera to power.

The realisation that these troubles would inevitably become much more serious before long was certainly one of the chief reasons why Mr. de Valera made his sudden decision to appeal to the electorate. He has shown most remarkable gifts as a political strategist ever since he assumed office without even commanding a clear majority last year. The timing of this recent election showed the same skill in strategy. An election before Christmas would have been unpopular; yet he was confronted with a really formidable menace in the rise of the new Centre Party. The full effects of the 'economic war' will not be apparent until the next Budget is introduced this spring. By that time it will be known also how far the destruction of the export trade has diminished agricultural production for next year. The deficit will certainly be enormous; and even with crushing increases in direct taxation Mr. MacEntee can scarcely be expected to balance his Budget. There may quite probably be real difficulty in raising money, even on short-term bonds, to tide over the emergency which is sure to arise. Nevertheless, Mr. Cosgrave had for a whole year been forced to hold his hand. He had not even yet applied for writs to fill the constituencies where by-elections were overdue, when Mr. de Valera suddenly announced the dissolution of the Dail early in January.

There were clear signs that the new year would bring about a concerted counter-offensive. Mr. Alfred Byrne, the Lord

Mayor of Dublin, has long been regarded as one of the shrewdest judges of probabilities in Irish politics, and he has a unique knowledge of conditions among the working class in Dublin. When, shortly before Christmas, he announced his hope that a coalition might be formed to defeat the de Valera Ministry, it looked as though he had reason for believing that the time for action had arrived. Mr. Cosgrave, who is also extremely astute and is an intimate friend of Alderman Byrne, gave the proposal his blessing. Before long Mr. Frank MacDermot and Mr. James Dillon, as independents, launched the new Centre Party, which was ostensibly to win support from both the main rival parties and to pursue a pacific policy. Had they been given time to complete their plans and to organise a serious campaign, they would undoubtedly have been a serious danger to Mr. de Valera's Government. The conviction has long been widespread that normal conditions cannot arise in Irish politics until both Mr. de Valera and Mr. Cosgrave have left the stage. A new party, led by two able young men with fine family traditions, might easily have attracted a following which would have weakened Fianna Fail as well as Cumann na nGaedheal. But in fact Mr. de Valera turned the new movement to his own advantage by most dexterous management. Leaving it time to gather so much momentum that it could not be suddenly suppressed, he announced a general election when negotiations for an alliance between the Cosgrave party and the new party were in progress. Both parties had been drawing up lists of suitable candidates; but no agreement had been reached as to which would withdraw in favour of the other. In the result, both parties put up rival candidates in many constituencies, and thereby split the Opposition vote. The Centre Party did, in fact, gain a number of seats, but they were all at the expense of Mr. Cosgrave's party; and Mr. de Valera's triumph was assisted by the division of his opponents.

What Mr. de Valera may be expected to do in the new Dail remains very much a mystery. Even his Cabinet colleagues are believed to know very little of his most important decisions until he actually announces them. But certain features of his policy are inevitable corollaries of his general programme. No one who is familiar with his propaganda can have been surprised by his recent concentration upon achieving the reunion of Ireland. There has never been a stage in the Sinn Fein movement when the unity of all Ireland has not been regarded as the indispensable basis of any settlement. Failure to recognise that unity was the feature of the Treaty in 1921 which made Mr. de Valera repudiate it, and led him into the civil war of the following year. In every vital stage of his negotiations with London since a year ago

Mr. de Valera has himself raised his demand for Irish unity wherever any possible pretext made it possible. There has never been the slightest idea on the Republican side of considering even a completely independent republic for the twenty-six counties of the Irish Free State as a settlement of the Irish demand. The Free State is, from the Republican point of view, a purely artificial and temporary creation, just as the present 'Northern Ireland,' with its arbitrary area of six counties, is an artificial creation, the author of both creations being Mr. Lloyd George. Mr. de Valera himself, and still more the extremists of his party, would far sooner lose everything that has been gained in the way of political independence than admit for a day that Ulster is not part of Ireland. That Ulster must be included in some permanent arrangement as an integral part of Ireland is the first axiom of their political faith. So the fact that Mr. de Valera has said comparatively little about the 'republic' in the election campaign and in his subsequent speeches may reasonably be taken as indicating his desire to approach the Ulster question in as conciliatory a spirit as may be possible. It is many years since he made his famous assertion that 'we are not doctrinaire Republicans.' What he does claim, and may be expected to fight for without compromise, is the right of Ireland as a national entity to enjoy the same political independence as is enjoyed by Holland or Belgium or Switzerland. Once that right were recognised, however, there is no reason whatever for believing that Mr. de Valera would approach the future from an anti-English angle. On the contrary, he has repeatedly shown his appreciation of the close geographical connexion between the two islands and of their natural community of interests. But until the claim to political independence has been vindicated, and so long as that claim is resisted by British Governments on any pretext, he must be expected to treat England as the enemy which denies her freedom to Ireland.

A more actual problem, for the time being, is the fact that the British Government not only established the partition of Ireland by creating the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1920, but is still pledged to perpetuate that partition which violates the principle of Irish unity. The difficulty of retracing the steps then taken is very obvious. But there is likely to be little peace in Ulster during the coming years unless negotiations are seriously undertaken to find a basis of agreement. In that connexion the most important statement made by Mr. de Valera since the election was his solemn declaration that he 'would make great sacrifices' to achieve Irish unity. What formula he has in view, or what symbols of unity he would be willing to accept, while agreeing to very wide powers of local self-government for Ulster,

will no doubt be disclosed in negotiations when they are undertaken, as inevitably they must be before long.

Meanwhile, one of the most important factors in the whole situation is frequently overlooked. Mr. de Valera has far more reason for desiring to remain within the British Commonwealth, at any rate while the question of Irish partition is being fought out, than for leaving it. Were he to declare an independent republic at once, he would cease to command that extremely powerful leverage upon London which he now enjoys through the active sympathy of certain Dominions. In Australia especially, owing to the great influence of Irish elements in Australian politics, he could count upon very powerful backing in any quarrel over Ulster which might conceivably involve the British Government in armed conflict with the Free State. In South Africa still more he can count on genuine and admiring sympathy for almost any effort he makes. Even in Canada he has established influential connexions since the Ottawa Conference. Add to these influences within the British Commonwealth the enormous influence upon American opinion which can be quickly mobilised in favour of Sinn Fein whenever relations between the American public and the British Government become strained. Knowing that these various forces can be mobilised in case of certain contingencies, Mr. de Valera has embarked upon the new phase of his political programme. He is well aware of the traditional attitude of Ulster Unionists towards the claim that Ireland must be made whole again. But in the industrial cities of Ulster, Labour to-day is by no means as responsive as it used to be to the beating of Orange drums. The recent railway strike has shown that; and there may be other strikes in Ulster, particularly in those services which are a reminder that Ireland is essentially one economic unit. Lord Craigavon's Ministry is certainly not likely to encourage Mr. de Valera's advances. There may even be repetitions of the once familiar outbursts against the Nationalist districts of West Belfast and elsewhere. Such outbreaks, however, would provide Mr. de Valera with excellent material for propaganda in the Dominions and in America; while they would greatly assist his own campaign in the Free State to achieve the recovery of *Hibernia Irredenta*.

DENIS GWYNN.

THE RIDDLE OF GERMANY.

For the third time since the summer the German people—sovereign since the autumn of 1918 and prolific since then in organisations to further the effective exercise of sovereignty—is invited to express its will by means of a parliamentary majority. The situation gives point to the old Bismarckian gibe: 'Show me three Germans and I will show you four parties.' In the latest disturbed phase of Germany's political history there has been one clear expression of opinion. A majority of the electorate definitely preferred Hindenburg to Hitler. Since then the old President has laboured strenuously to give effect to that preference. He has failed and has confessed his failure by appointing Hitler to the most important office in the Reich except his own. At long last there has emerged the first Cabinet since Brüning's fall to possess any real promise of stability, and its first act is an experiment which its critics admit to be hazardous. It is asking an electorate whose members are longing for a firm, strong Government to confirm it in power! By such devious ways and such dubious means does Germany achieve one of those compromises so natural to the political genius of Britain. No wonder that British opinion, still strong in its traditional belief that a free Parliament is competent to solve every political issue, contemplates the German situation with a bewilderment that readily hardens into suspicion.

Yet in the fundamental fact of the situation there is no matter for surprise. Nothing in its history or its experience has qualified the German people to become a parliamentary democracy, and this psychological condition accounts for the remarkably divergent courses pursued by the French and the German republics. It must be admitted that the historic muse sometimes likes to bewilder her votaries. Here were two forms of government of apparently similar type. Both came into being in the hour of military defeat. Under both, public opinion turned for guidance to an honourable and trusted soldier. But here the parallel, to all seeming so exact, abruptly breaks down; for whereas one unsuccessful tussle with the Chamber drove MacMahon to resignation, Hindenburg is unchallenged when he sends Reichstag after Reichstag about its business.

There is no mystery about the course of events in France. Sovereignty undoubtedly resides in the popular Chamber, which is almost indissoluble within the limits of its term, which keeps the strictest hold of Cabinets and even of Presidents, and which is always, though perhaps after a twelvemonth of experiment, capable of creating a majority, whether along the lines of electoral cleavage or not. But in Germany power is emphatically not with the Reichstag. At best it keeps Governments in office because its elements hate one another too much to combine to destroy them; at worst it is so conscious of its impotence that it dare not meet but sheepishly awaits the dissolution decree. Yet neither in theory nor in fact is Germany an anarchically minded country. If sovereignty does not reside in the Reichstag it must be sought elsewhere. Where, then, is it to be found? The temperament of a people is independent of its forms of government, and the Germans have themselves insisted on their continuity by maintaining, with general approval, the word '*Reich*' as the abiding label of a State transformed from empire to republic. They are a people who for centuries have displayed, and struggled to combine, two incompatible qualities—a passion for abstract knowledge and a capacity for practical achievement. No synthesis yet devised is wide enough for them. Hence on the one hand they despise foreign solutions of their social problem and let their thought become dangerously ingrown, and on the other acquiesce very readily in an authority which, by firmly imposing its will, can keep their contradictory impulses within tolerable limits. At best, however, their life is full of paradoxes. Set in the heart of Europe and lacking natural frontiers, they are exclusive; and while cherishing an ideal of unity which no disaster can shatter, they cling obstinately to local sovereignties. It is less remarkable that they came late into the company of national States than that they ever entered it at all, and the system which served them well for close on fifty years deserves sympathetic scrutiny, even though its life was short as history counts time.

The Empire was made by the army, and the army itself was both Prussian and aristocratic. Its officers were landowners and the sons of landowners, administering with modern technique but feudal temper properties which stretched on across the great European plain until their owners, changing their nationality but not their spirit, became the Baltic barons who upheld the Tsar's throne. In the Germany of the 'seventies the agrarian interest represented by these dominant figures was of supreme economic importance, and their political influence was no more than worthy of their place in German life. But as German industry progressed the agrarians were in no mood to surrender

their political power. It endured to the end of the Empire and has even survived its fall. When Bülow was making one of his tactful efforts to escape from gathering difficulties he expressed a wish to have the words 'He was an agrarian Chancellor' inscribed upon his tombstone. Certainly the epitaph 'He was not an agrarian Chancellor' might be carved on the broken column which marks General von Schleicher's place in the political graveyard. It may even be doubted whether all Hindenburg's victories and the immense prestige which his character has won for him would suffice to keep him firmly where he is, did not his birth and sympathies assure him the support of his fellow soldier-squires. During the life of the Empire, however, two other forces began to challenge the sovereignty of the agrarians. There were the big business men, thanks to whom Germany had become not merely rich and strong, but a world-power. There were also the people. Education and prosperity had begun to stir them from their old unquestioning obedience, and their nascent ambitions were cautiously nurtured by the leaders of the Catholic Party and violently stimulated by the Socialist chiefs. Here, then, were aspirations which could not be ignored, and it is among William II.'s claims to statesmanship that he encouraged them to find satisfaction in his own person. His patronage of the great industrialists was by no means to the taste of the Junker nobility which had exalted the old Prussian monarchy. That the king should keep in friendly touch with the head of Krupp's was all very well, for Krupp's was a business of immense military importance. Besides, the lady who inherited it could make a good marriage. But Ballin, really no more than a commercial traveller on a large scale, was a person of a different order, and the Kaiser's Ocean-Jew, as he was called, found that commands to the palace did not open the doors of exclusive houses. The Emperor was, however, undisturbed by mess-room criticism. In his foreign tours he showed that he was something of a commercial traveller himself, and though the industrial magnates sought neither seats in Parliament nor places in the Cabinet, they had the Emperor's ear, and through him exercised increasing pressure on the course of German policy.

With the masses William II. was less fortunate—less fortunate, indeed, than he deserved, considering that his refusal to begin his reign with the renewal of the repressive anti-Socialist law was among the prime causes of his breach with Bismarck. Throughout his reign he endeavoured, often in his characteristically theatrical way, to prove to the mass of his subjects that he was properly mindful of his responsibility for their welfare. It was on grounds of a loyalty which he had a right to claim that he challenged the Social Democrats. Their growing influence

exasperated him and led him at least once into language of tactless and undignified defiance. To be ignored not for personal reasons but because he was part of a system was more than he could endure, and there can be little doubt that he impressed himself on the minds of men who regularly voted against him, so that even after his fall he was often referred to more in pity than in anger. But there is also no doubt that the Socialist conception of his superfluity was firmly maintained against him and that throughout his reign there was a great organised mass of his subjects to whom disloyalty to the throne was an article of political faith. Worse perhaps than the disloyal were the lukewarm, and of the Catholic Centre it could fairly be said that it struck a bargain with the Empire and accepted the Emperor on terms. These terms were that the policy of the State should never run counter to the conceptions of the Catholic faith. The quarrel with Bismarck had shown that the Catholic element in the Reich was too strong to be suppressed, and from the middle 'seventies onwards it was the aim of the Centre's leaders to make government impossible without their support. The distribution of the population made the party strongest in all the frontier districts except towards Denmark, and it thus had a basis for its claim to be the cement which held the Reich together. That claim was maintained after the Revolution and, until Dr. Brüning's fall, with success. Whether it is still well-founded the future will show.

This much at any rate is certain, that under the Empire there were two parties and two only—the Socialists and the Centre—which, alike because of their numerical strength and because of the wide area over which that strength was distributed, could claim to be national forces and as such entitled to a share in the country's government. To some extent the demands of the classes on which they relied were satisfied by the figure of the Kaiser. With his removal the whole impulse towards popular sovereignty should have centred in them, and, in fact, did sufficiently so centre to enable them to combine, even if a little uneasily, in the same Government. Unfortunately for their prospects the tendency to party fission, which is always a feature of German politics, again asserted itself. Before the Revolution there were two national parties in Germany. To-day there are four, the Socialists and the Centre being balanced, and even outbalanced, by the Communists and the Nazis. It may fairly be claimed that, even in Germany, democracy is on the march. But it elects to march in four armies—whose soldiers tend to fight one another *en route*.

There is indeed a possibility that three of them will combine. The Socialists have already been taught by experience to co-

operate with the Centre, and the Communists, threatened with extinction, may bring themselves to co-operate with the Socialists. A real democratic majority would then result, but it would have no permanence about it. The three armies might unite against the fourth, but would fall to squabbling among themselves when they had routed it. In particular, the 'united Marxian front' aspired to by all who can range themselves under the red flag would fall to pieces in the moment of victory. For the differences between Socialists and Communists are profound. They are not the right and left wings of a party of progress, but are divided, and have been divided these forty years, on a fundamental question of principle. It is the issue obstinately raised by Lenin and not likely to be let fall again as long as the Kremlin's present masters retain their power. Is Socialism a piece of party tactic to be forwarded by such alliances as the situation of the moment may make desirable? Or is it—to borrow a term of a parallel creed—totalitarian? Is Socialism a form of majority rule, or is it a minority dictatorship? To compromise, as the German Socialists have compromised, is to admit that the bourgeois social order is not utterly evil; to make that admission is to deprive Communism of the very ground of its existence. There can be no accommodation, except momentarily and in the face of violence, between views so essentially divergent. It is, however, to violence, whether concealed under the forms of law or not, that the Nazis are prepared to resort. They form a strong minority, but know that their strength has now more or less reached its limit. The forces against them, fundamentally divided though they may be, are nevertheless a majority. Nothing but force—the suppression and dispersion of organised Communism—can alter even the appearance of things, and the German mind, never more critical than in politics, is not to be deceived by appearances. Nevertheless, it is to this device that the Nazis must resort to make good their claim to speak for the people, and it is in this artificial and truncated form that popular sovereignty has at last established its titular control of the German governmental machine.

Big business—the other new aspirant to power—is enthroned beside it. It, too, has had its experience of political vicissitudes. At first it continued in its old ways and sought to hold the President's ear as it had held the Kaiser's. It pinned its hopes to the enigmatic figure of Hugo Stinnes, who eagerly assumed the part assigned to him. Once—at the Spa Conference—he came into the foreground and himself dealt with the representatives of the ex-enemy States in the vital matter of reparations. But for the greater part of his short time of prominence he preferred to pull effective strings from behind the scenes. To him and to his

colleagues, engaged as they were in conducting Germany's international trade, the course of the country's foreign policy was matter of absorbing concern. The Foreign Office was therefore the department of State which claimed their interest, and with the appointment of Dr. Simon—an associate of Stinnes and perhaps his nominee—to the Foreign Secretaryship it seemed as though the business men had made good their claim to take over the substance of the power which the soldiers had perforce surrendered. But Stinnes' career ended in eclipse, and as financial catastrophe drew near the conduct of Germany's international relations, and with it the determination of Germany's future, passed into other hands. When the inflationary storm was over business found its interests safe in the hands of Gustav Stresemann, who was, however, representative of much more than business interests. His death reopened the old question of the status of the great industrialists in the new Germany. It is at this stage that Herr Hugenberg—in many aspects Stinnes' successor—emerges into prominence, and with his appearance the ambitions of his class are diverted into a new field. Herr Hugenberg has dealt in rough-and-ready fashion with the fabric of Germany's international relationships. His tendency has been to substitute defiance for accommodation, and he has shown no particular concern for the liquidation of Germany's foreign credits. In his opinion, whatever menace may threaten from across the frontiers may be ignored, may even be courted, provided some escape is found from the dangers presented by 6,000,000 unemployed. For him and, as he sees it, for all employers of labour the dominant need is for economic stability at home. Accordingly he now takes office as 'Crisis Minister' pledged to restore prosperity to German industry and German agriculture and prepared to co-operate with whatever authoritative forces will give support to a drastic policy of economic betterment.

In this alliance of democratic enthusiasm and business management, which to Germans trained in the Socialist tradition must needs appear unnatural and abominable, there is a third element. The officer-landlord has returned if not to his old predominance in the State at least to a commanding position. Hindenburg, as President of the Reich, decides the form and the life of Governments, and his attitude, it is evident, will determine the reaction of the Reichswehr towards events. Moreover, the man who holds second place in the Government and, what is more important, administers the key-State of Prussia has been drawn from obscurity by Hindenburg's will and, whether in or out of office, functions as his adviser and emissary. Add that the Foreign Office is in the hands of a Junker of the finest intel-

lectual type, and the new Germany begins to wear a face markedly resembling the old. Nevertheless, there has been a change. Both democracy and business have direct representation in the Government such as was never granted them under the Empire, and though the association in which the three aspirants to sovereignty are now assembled is manifestly uneasy and probably unstable, the same criticism could be passed on the successive partnerships of Kaiser and Chancellor throughout William II.'s reign. What is certain is that the present association will get a parliamentary majority. It will get it in one of three ways. It may command a majority by surpassing the previous Nazi record at the polls; it may, with its eye on the past, contrive a majority by securing the toleration of the Centre; or it may hack its way through to a majority by proscribing the Communists and so robbing the opposition of a hundred votes.

What is significant, however, of the present state of Germany is that the majority, in whatever way it may be attained, will count for nothing. The sovereign parliament, in the very act of asserting its sovereignty, will abdicate; for the first and perhaps the only business of a Reichstag able to function will be to endow the Government with more or less dictatorial powers. The tide of German thought is now definitely set towards authority, though whether of the Right or the Left is in dispute; and unless authority is vigorously wielded by the Nazi-Nationalist-Junker coalition it will be claimed by the Communists, with civil war as an incident to their pretensions and anarchy as its outcome. In such a situation debates and resolutions are meaningless. Wars, Bismarck once told the Parliament of his day in words which every German remembers, are won, not by speeches and majorities, but by blood and iron. There is a war—a war of ideas—in progress in Germany now. It, too, will be won—such is the firm conviction of those in power—by blood and iron; though, if the iron be resolutely wielded, little blood need be shed.

But the end is not so near nor so clear, however obstinately the competent but limited Junker mind may argue to the contrary. The realities of German politics are very different from the idiom—anti-semitic, anti-capitalist, anti-foreign—in which Germany's political controversies are conducted. That, indeed, is why the German Reichstag, elected in the terms of those controversies, is by almost universal agreement negligible. For the German mind, true even in its present mood of authoritative practice to its metaphysical bias, is grappling with a fundamental problem. Is society to be constituted on the basis of private property, or is the denial of private property to be the foundation of social life? That issue has been clearly joined, not merely

because the German temperament finds it philosophically absorbing, but because Germany's geographical position makes it practically insistent. There the country lies on the map, stretched out to cover the gap between France, where private property is most widely distributed and most reverently cherished, and Russia, where private property, whether in land or capital, has been dramatically abolished. Europe is not wide enough to hold the ideas which inspire these contradictory social conceptions. They are too big and too hostile to be kept within national frontiers, and indeed both France and Russia are ready enough to hold their respective cultures up as models. They must needs clash across Europe, and are already clashing in the perplexed Balkan world, in which France has now staked out claims far in excess of her political needs. But their natural battlefield is Germany. The German Communists definitely look to Moscow, and although both Nazis and Nationalists would indignantly repudiate any debt to French thought, they owe more than they realise to the tradition of 1793.

It may be, then, that this election which is meant to give Germany that firm hand at the helm for which the country yearns will settle nothing—will, in fact, do no more than marshal the vanguards of opposing forces. Students who seek to turn the light of the past upon the bewildering present should beware of the use they make of the double-edged doctrine that history repeats itself. In spite of an illusive beginning, the history of the Third Republic has not repeated itself across the Rhine. But it does not follow that the doctrine should be discarded. Once Germany became the battlefield of the ideas by which the religious structure of modern Europe was determined. It is Europe's economic structure that stands at the hazard now, and the rival theories are already at grips on German soil. That history always repeats itself in some form or other is profoundly true, if only because the problems of whose attempted solutions history is the record are eternally the same. But the pattern of repetition is fluctuating and varied, and it may be that the parallel to Germany's present situation is to be sought, not in the campaign of liberation nor in the years of national revival, but in the dim, grim precedents of the Thirty Years' War.

HAROLD STANNARD.

WORLD AGRICULTURE

THE dislocation of agriculture in every community where production from the land rises above subsistence level is part of the general dislocation of economic life the world over. But as 'each branch of world economy has its own special problems, and its own responsibility for the orderly conduct of its business,' a Chatham House Group set itself to study the main facts of the production and consumption of farm products and to consider the expedients 'adopted by Governments and by groups of producers in the hope of averting disaster.' The results of its work are now available.[1]

Indeed, the world to-day is faced with a situation with no historical parallel, for with the largest population ever known, with a standard of living in the more socially developed countries which has been rising for a century, with the technique of food production at its maximum and food in abundance, there are hungry millions in every quarter of the globe. Statements such as these are common enough, and they are true in their general sense. The inference is that there is something wrong with a world economy which prevents the flow of the products of agriculture into the channels where they are most required, though the extent of the dislocation may vary between nation and nation according to the political action taken by each to help or to hinder the exchange of goods. But it must not be forgotten that those who generalise about world economics have usually in their minds no more than that section of the world by which their own lives are affected, and, in talking of world agriculture, they unconsciously include great parts of it to which their observations have no application, for they are referring only to those countries which have a surplus available for barter. 'It is worth while to stress the fact,' says the Chatham House Group, 'that the great majority of mankind are employed in tilling the soil, and there can be no general prosperity while they are suffering from acute distress.' In point of fact, the 'great majority' of

[1] *World Agriculture: an International Survey.* A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (Oxford University Press, 1932. 12*s*. 6*d*. net.)

those engaged in tilling the soil are tilling it to supply themselves. According to the Chatham House estimate, more than 60 per cent. of the agricultural population of the world is located in Asia, and the addition of Africa and Russia accounts for more than three-quarters of the world's farming population. What proportion of these are wholly self-suppliers, or trading only within the limits of their own localities, it is impossible to say; but it is certainly very high, and the whole of this class of agriculturists is entirely unaffected by the incidence of agricultural prosperity or depression in more highly organised communities. In short, the problem of world agriculture, as the term is generally employed and as it is used here, is, like cancer and many other evils, a problem mainly of civilisation.

Further, it must be remembered that the problem is one of very recent growth. Less than a hundred years ago the import of food into Europe was limited to a few products of the tropics, of which sugar was the most important, while the exchanges between European countries themselves were almost negligible. England took wine from France and Portugal, she exported wool, and there were fluctuating deliveries of corn from the Continent, the Corn Laws notwithstanding. But in general the European nations were self-sufficient in their food requirements. In this country the demands of the rapidly increasing non-agricultural population were still being met by the expansion of the farming area and the improvement of farming technique. The open fields, which characterised so much of the corn-growing districts of England, had given place to inclosures, and a general all-round improvement in the standard of tillage had followed. Much of the common grazings, also, had been inclosed and large parts of them brought under cultivation; and lastly, there were great areas of waste lands and woodlands, once marginal or outside the requirements of a smaller nation, which were actively reclaimed during the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first part of the nineteenth. Lincoln heath, the Lincolnshire and Yorkshire wolds, are examples of districts well known to-day for their high standard of arable farming, which were rabbit warrens or wastes in Arthur Young's day, and Wychwood Forest, to take an example of another class of land, was grubbed up, equipped and colonised only in the middle of last century.

Technical improvements in husbandry were contributing, also, to the expanding demands of the population. The theory of land drainage was better understood, the improvement of livestock was going on apace, better varieties of seeds and better implements were available. The industrial demand for food had given agriculture in England the greatest stimulus that it has ever known. But there was obviously a limit to the expansion

of production which was possible in this country, and the high-water mark had been reached by the 'seventies. About that time there began a revolution in world agriculture, though it is impossible to give it an exact date and the process is still going on. But the annihilation of distance by the development of transport on sea and land, the opening up of the prairie provinces, the demand of the settlers for manufactured goods which only England was in a position to supply and which could be paid for only in the products of the land, broke down national self-sufficiency in food supplies in this country and made England dependent, ultimately, upon the agriculture of other countries to an extent unknown anywhere in the history of the world since the collapse of the Roman Empire. A combination of causes brought it about that in a few short years the supremacy of the English corn-grower in his home market was shattered, and it has never been recovered.

The agriculture of the New World, on the competitive scale which it reached so soon, was conducted on an entirely new principle. In England land was limited but labour was plentiful, and, by the time of the collapse, intensive cultivation of the soil had doubled the natural return of unimproved land. In the prairie provinces land was limitless and labour was scarce, and the competition of these countries would have developed very slowly had it not been for the invention of labour-saving machinery. Beginning with the reaper, every succeeding improvement or invention—the self-binder, the tractor, the harvester-thresher—has extended the acreage which one man could control. In the place of the highly diversified intensive agriculture which had been evolved all over Europe, and nowhere more completely than in England, the prairies developed a highly specialised form of production, concentrating on one commodity produced in the cheapest possible way. The large acreage, handled by machinery, compensated for the low return, and in a very few years cheap American wheat had changed the style of farming in half the counties of England. Except for the war years, when feverish attempts were made to regain the lost corn acres, there has been a continuous reorganisation of the home agricultural industry, in the direction of the abandonment of cereal-growing to the prairie countries of North and South America, and the increasing concentration on the production of those commodities which, by their perishability, enjoy a protected market. Only one acre of wheat is grown now where four were grown fifty years ago. The import of grain and the reciprocal trade which it induced was followed by the development of the imported meat industry, first made possible by the invention of refrigeration and then of chilling. The former opened the

English market to the produce of the Australian and New Zealand flockmasters, while the latter gave the English consumer high-quality beef from the South American ranches. Trade and population again were stimulated, but the competition of the squatters and the ranch-owners was less felt by English farmers than had been that of the prairie wheat-growers. Population by this time had passed the number which could be fed on home-grown supplies of meat, and, moreover, the superiority of the home-killed commodity was clearly marked, particularly in the earlier years of the import trade, and gave it natural protection.

At the beginning of this century, then, agricultural expansion in the New World was still going on apace. Emigration from Europe was continuous, and in spite of industrial expansion in the United States, which was providing an increasing home market for the food products of its farmers, all the new countries depended upon the export of food and the raw products of agriculture (apart from exports of gold from some of them) to maintain their balance of trade. England was their principal market, for, in Europe, national economy in the various States had developed in four principal directions. Britain, and perhaps Belgium, endowed with great industrial resources, had abandoned themselves to unfettered industrial expansion and the free exchange of their manufactures with the food and raw materials of other countries. France and Germany, possessed of much mineral wealth but being bad neighbours, sought by all possible means to retain their self-sufficiency in food, and succeeded, of course, only at the expense of the rate of their industrial expansion and the standard of living of their agricultural population. Other countries, again, notably Denmark and the grain-growing countries of Central and Eastern Europe, resembled the New World in that they, too, depended upon an export of surplus food to maintain their foreign trade. Lastly, there were the primitive peoples in the odd corners of Europe who lived a self-sufficient life. Britain and Belgium, naturally enough, stood with doors wide open to the food products of all the world. France and Germany were equally determined on their exclusion. The food-exporting States of Europe reacted variously, for whereas the wheat-producing countries, Russia and Rumania, for example, had to compete as best they might with prairie produce, others, notably Denmark and Holland, turned this competition to account by admitting the cheap grain and concentrating their own efforts upon the production of animal and horticultural products for the great British market.

During the present century the course of world agriculture has made some notable advances. The work of the scientists, particuarly that of the economic botanists, has added largely to the

world's reserves of tillable land. In North America the limit to cultivation was the length of the growing season between the break-up of winter and the descent of the autumn frost. Anything which would speed the ripening period of the wheat plant, even by a few days, would move the limit of cultivation northward to a line which included many millions of new acres. In South America the problem was disease, and measures for the effective control of rust would add enormously to the available wheat surplus of that continent. In Australia rainfall was the limiting factor, and if the plant breeders could give the wheat-belt farmers a variety with shorter straw or less leaf surface, which would evaporate less moisture, an expansion of the potential wheat-growing area was assured. In North America and in Australia, at all events, the desired results have been achieved; new, quick-growing wheats have pushed the limit of cultivation northward into the Arctic Circle; in Australia the introduction of a drought-resistant variety has doubled the area of the wheat-belt.

Another great advance to be recorded is that in tropical agriculture. Tea, coffee, and sugar were old-established industries, but the introduction of the rubber tree of Brazil into the British and Dutch East Indies resulted in a new agricultural industry, the production of plantation rubber. In a few years it knocked the wild Brazilian product off the market, and with the expansion of the motor industry it attracted the investment of many millions of capital. But it is in tropical Africa, perhaps, that world agriculture has experienced its greatest accession, in the production of oil seeds and cocoa cultivation, whilst in other places the cultivation of cotton and coarser fibres has made signal progress.

> It is fair to say that the development of these countries in the last thirty years has been as important as was the development of Argentina, Canada and Australasia in the second half of the nineteenth century. . . . Forty years ago, butter, olive oil, beef fat, and lard were practically the only edible fats available in Western Europe; to-day the oil from cotton-seed, ground-nuts, sesame, palm kernels, coco-nuts, soya beans, etc., provide margarine, cooking and salad oils, soap, candles and lubricating oils.[3]

And, of course, a variety of cattle cakes and meals in great quantities are derived from the residues of the crushing processes, to supplement the linseed and cotton cakes and meals which formerly were the only available foods.

Nor has this increase in the world's agricultural production increased the competition which other countries have to face. Most of the products of Colonial farming are new; they represent

[3] *World Agriculture*, p. 170.

an addition to European food supplies and they promote reciprocal trade in European manufactures.

Agriculture proved itself too big a thing to be affected permanently in any of its manifestations by the Great War, and ten years after the end of it world agriculture seemed to have settled down upon a fairly stable and satisfactory basis. The tillers of the soil have never reaped the great financial rewards common in industry and commerce ; but to the majority of them farming is a mode of life much more than an investment for capital, and farming, the world over, may fairly be said to have been giving them the life they expected. The primitive races of Africa and Asia and the peasant States of Europe were living, most of them, hard enough, but they had never known other conditions, and their self-sufficiency was such that changes in world economy affected them little. Farmers in the industrially organised countries had arrived at an adjustment with the agricultural States of the New World, and, except where political action interfered with the free flow of commodities, it may be said that about five years ago there was a fair measure of international stability in the agricultural industry of the world. Any fear of food shortage, such as had been predicted a generation before, had been removed from humanity at large, while within the industry itself commercial farmers in different parts of the world had reached a *modus vivendi*. North America had stepped in to supply the corn which formerly Russia had provided. Britain, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, were giving their people the advantage of the cheap bread corn from the prairie and concentrating more and more on livestock products and other commodities to which perishability gave a natural protection. Among the great nations, only Germany and France were living under conditions which did violence to John Bright's conception of an ideal world. Here and there, no doubt, there were small clouds on the horizon. In England the farmers' dependence on wage-labour, relatively highly paid and organised industrially with regulated hours of work and overtime, was a handicap to competitive production, particularly in arable farming, for their rivals were the peasants of the Old World, or the family-farmers of the New, knowing nothing of wages boards or trade unions. Denmark, which had gained for her pig and dairy products a unique position in the British market, was casting apprehensive glances at the dairymen of New Zealand and Australia, who were steadily increasing both the quality and the quantity of their export to England. And English capitalists interested in the new plantation industries of the Far East wondered sometimes how long their dividends could withstand the encroachment of the cheap, if slovenly, native producer who had been attracted

into the rubber industry particularly, and was a growing menace to more costly management. As Sir Hugh Clifford said of the West African native cultivators, the extraordinary cheapness of their production saves them, in spite of their happy-go-lucky methods of cultivation.

Then, almost suddenly, the whole situation changed, and first of all the crop farmers, but soon afterwards the sheep and cattle men, found their world tumbling about their ears. In an incredibly short space of time the growers of wheat, maize, cotton, coffee, tea, and rubber found themselves possessed of immense unsaleable stocks. In Brazil the Government defaulted on its foreign loans and the railways were reported to be firing their engines with coffee beans. In the United States a great State financial institution, hastily set up to purchase farmers' stocks of wheat and cotton, availed nothing to stay the slide in prices. In the Far East the abandonment of restriction of production on the British-owned rubber estates led to the accumulation of vast stocks which can only be liquidated by the abandonment of numbers of estates to the jungle, and the loss of many millions of capital invested in them.

It is quite impossible here to discuss the causes of these disasters, which are, as the Chatham House Group says, merely a part of the general dislocation of the economic life of the world. It is desirable, however, to contest one suggestion too often made concerning the present crisis—that the world is suffering from over-production. On this point the Group is perfectly clear and adduces valuable evidence, pointing out that the rate of increase of production in recent years shows no abnormality when contrasted with the rate of increase in population. Clearly, the problem is one of maldistribution, not one of over-production.

But the over-production theory calls for examination in another sense. For while it is agreed that there is no limit, for example, to the capacity of women to buy and enjoy clothes, except the limit of their means, it is often asserted that the capacity of the human stomach to absorb food imposes a definite limit upon its production. This contention begs two most important questions—the question of means to purchase and the question of substitution of articles of diet. Bread is the cheapest food there is. In the days of lower wages and standards of life the consumption of bread per head was high ; the farm labourer going to his work in the 'eighties would often take a loaf of bread and nothing more, and that was his food for the day. With a rising standard, the substitution of other foods increases, and generally these are of a kind which require more labour and more capital in their production than does corn. The demand for meat, for dairy and poultry products, for fresh fruit and vegetables

varies directly with the consumer's economic condition, and while his stomach may not be very elastic in the literal sense, the elasticity of his demand is limited only by his purchasing power. The history of tea-drinking is a case in point; once the luxury of the rich, tea is now the beverage of the poorest in many countries. Until the rice-eating nations are enjoying wheaten bread, until all the children of industrial Europe are drinking their daily pint of milk, until their parents are getting the lighter and more varied diet which is now regarded as a necessity rather than a luxury, there should be no talk of the inelasticity of the consumers' demand for food.

Be this as it may, world agriculture to-day has all the appearance of suffering from over-production. The Chatham House Group relates in some detail the measures which the various nations are taking for the amelioration of the situation, and all of them so far ineffective. It is only possible here to consider what this country is attempting for its farmers in the face of the world crisis in agriculture. Before it arose, it is not too much to say—indeed, it has been said already—that the tendency in world agriculture was for production, all over the world, to sort itself out on an economic basis. That tendency had not developed without hardship in particular cases, as when the prairie wheat first invaded the British market in quantity. In general, however, it was working fairly well, and changes in the economy of world agriculture were effected gradually enough to obviate dislocation. Russia, it should be noted, was temporarily off the map, and her future influence quite incalculable. It is in the nature of agriculture to change slowly when it changes at all. But the recent cataclysm was too swift and too severe; it has defeated all attempts at adjustment, and the State has stepped in to attempt the restoration of stability in the various branches of the farming industry. Something, of course, was called for, and alternatives were not easy to find. There is a real danger that, in seeking to restore financial stability to British rural industry, steps may be taken which may hinder or even prevent for a time the natural evolution of world agriculture. Financial stability, in short, may prove synonymous with economic stagnation, for in the measures taken by Britain to secure the home market for the home producer it is inevitable that restrictions should be imposed upon producers in other countries for that market. The tendency may be to stereotype world agriculture for a time, and to stay its evolution.

On the other hand, this attempt at national planning may be the first step in the regeneration of a healthy agriculture. A striking parallel for much recent agricultural experience may be found in the history of the Roman Empire. The urban population

of Italy preponderated dangerously over that of the rural, and, as in England to-day, the consumers of food largely outnumbered the producers. The standard of living afforded by the land in Italy was low relatively to that derived from other industries, and this still characterises agriculture the world over. The peasant farmer was farming generally for a subsistence, and where he produced a surplus for the market it was confined to luxury products. This is true, largely, of the English small-holder to-day, whose saleable output consists, in the main, of dairy, poultry, and horticultural produce. The Italian yeomen had disappeared, for they sold out to capitalists during a land boom, very much as the English yeomen did nearly 2000 years later. Rome was supported by the corn of Egypt and Africa, while in Italy grain was neglected, and agriculture tended more and more to the production of wine and oil. England to-day presents an exact parallel, *mutatis mutandis*. Domitian's restrictions on the expansion of vineyards and his order for grubbing up a proportion of them had a parallel in the Kentish hop-gardens during the war. The British schemes subsidising land settlement had been anticipated in classical times by Nerva. And if Nero's short way with landowners was more direct, it was no more certain than the policy of the British Government these forty years; their elimination, which he contrived by death, is now achieved by death duties. It may be said that agriculture failed all over the Roman Empire, but it failed in Italy first. If the measures now in hand can infuse a new and healthy life into British farming, they may mark the beginning of a world revival by the substitution of a planned order for the natural evolution which, though it seemed good enough, has been unable to resist the general economic upheaval.

The difficulties in the way of establishing a planned order in displacement of the economic order, naturally evolved, are immense, for it would be hard to find even two countries whose circumstances and aims are identical. Consider, for example, the importing countries of Western Europe. The home producers in all of them alike are suffering from the fall in world prices, but a straightforward protectionist policy would operate very unequally in its effect upon the national economy of each. French national life, based upon a peasant agriculture, might not be affected very much by a further raising of the high tariffs which protect her farmers; the country is nearly self-sufficing already. Britain, however, where agriculture is much more depressed, is dependent for half her food upon other countries, and a tariff policy sufficiently drastic to satisfy her farmers would raise the price of all food to a point which the nation neither could nor would stand. And so there has been evolved for England the

quota system, which seeks to establish the volume of the home production of any commodity, for which a market is then guaranteed at a price which will be remunerative to the efficient producer. The deficiency in the national requirement of the commodity will then be supplied by the exporting countries who have catered for our market hitherto, rationed, each of them, according to the volume of their supplies in recent years.

But consider now the countries living by the export of their food surpluses. No tariffs can be effective to help them, for they have nothing to protect their agriculture against. On the other hand, the tariffs and quotas imposed by other countries can only embarrass them by restricting the demand for their products, so that to the difficulties created by low prices will be added those of a dwindling market. In such cases various other expedients have been tried, some temporary, such as the disastrous hold-up of the Canadian wheat crop by the Canadian Wheat Pool in 1928, which only served to make a market for the subsequent Argentine crop, and the operations of the American Federal Farm Board, directed also to keeping up prices by taking grain and cotton off the market ; others intended to be more permanent, such as the coffee valorisation scheme of Brazil and the payment of bounties on export which have been tried by various countries.

At this stage no pronouncement can be made upon the success which is likely to attend these and other efforts which will surely be made in many countries to raise the position of the farmer. Although the breakdown of the economic evolution of world agriculture can only be attributed to a strong manifestation of nationalism all through the world, and the new agricultural policies of Britain and other countries are themselves the outcome of the same spirit, there is nothing in the situation to suggest an economic war in world agriculture. The interdependence of the nations of the world is such that conscious planning of its agriculture by any one of them must take account of the production and circumstances of many others, and the result may be to bring about a general improvement in the status and economic life of the food producer. The Chatham House Group draws attention to the lives of utter poverty dragged out by many millions of Asiatics, and even in the most highly organised of modern States the agriculturist leads a harder life and enjoys less consideration than do his opposite numbers in industry and commerce. Any changes which may result from the conscious efforts which are now being made in all countries can only be for the good of the greatest and only essential industry.

C. S. Orwin.

IMPRESSIONS OF PERU

THERE are three Perus. Each is as distinct as if it were a different country. There is the flat coastal belt dominated by Lima, which Prescott calls a jewel justifying the career of Pizarro; there is the Sierra, where the passes rise to 16,000 feet and the inhabitants, sullen or savage, regard everyone born outside their own narrow valleys as 'foreigners'; and, lastly, there is the Montana, where Peru drops suddenly from the barren mineral mountains spattered with galvanised iron camps and smelters to the tropical forests.

Lima is delightful although, flattened between the last of the Cordillera and the sea, it is mist-ridden. The city is too old to be a typical South American capital. It is still to a large extent Spanish. The great churches and the streets, shadowed by discreet wooden balconies, suggest Toledo or Seville. Lima, seat of the old viceroyalty, headquarters of the Conquistadores, used to dictate religion to the Chaco and industrial terms to the River Plate. She was the centre of whatever civilisation Spain sent west, and she cannot forget her past. Her streets are haunted by the ghosts of cavaliers whose horses were shod with silver, of quixotic rascals and adventurers to whom gold was more important than the Cross. The viceroys were little less powerful than the Kings of Spain. Hidalgos and grandees, courtiers and courtesans, soldiers and priests and slaves, thronged their capital and intrigued for a share of the legendary wealth which had caused the downfall of the Incas. The Inquisition cast a shadow over the city, and for two centuries its victims, in yellow sleeveless robes with ropes round their necks, were driven through the streets of Lima towards the flames which put an end to their tortures.

Lima belongs to the past. She sold the honour and the courage of her warriors for gold. She was the goal of traitors and of those who sought to win by intrigue that which the Pizarro brothers had taken by savage force. Lima must be exhausted by her own cruelties. She has known too many tortures and too many breaches of faith. At the moment the son of the last president and the presidential candidate of the Third International are both in prison. Yet within a few years other 'ghosts' may

walk the streets where gold was once less valuable than the wine, the shoes, the cloak, or the sword bought with the ingots representing a king's ransom. For the educated youth of Peru is in the hands of Moscow. Its 'ghosting' is dictated by men as ambitious as the Conquistadores who destroyed the Communism of the Incas in favour of a Spanish dictatorship. The next revolution may eliminate a feudalism which has survived imperial rule and replace the ancient system under the dictatorship of the Kremlin instead of the Children of the Sun.

For in Peru Communism is no new thing. Some 250 years before the Spanish conquest Cuzco was the centre of a Communism as effective as it was complete. Directing it was the Inca, a being as far removed from the common people as his divine ancestor, the sun. Under him were the nobility of his own blood, who wore a particular dress, spoke a dialect known only to the royal caste, administered provinces, commanded armies, owned the best lands, and were exempt from taxation, which was always in the form of labour. Invested with some of the holiness pertaining to their despotic sovereign, they alone were admissible to the highest ranks of the priesthood and were considered incapable of crime. The land was divided into three parts—the first for the sun, the second for the Inca, and the third for the people. Each man was allotted sufficient soil to support himself and his family, but labour was communal. The whole population worked on the lands devoted to the sun. Then they tilled those belonging to the poor, the sick, the widow, the orphan, or the soldier on active service. Afterwards they could cultivate their own ground, and, lastly, they attended to the property of the Inca. Llamas belonged exclusively to the sun and to his descendant the sovereign. Their wool was stored in public warehouses and divided among the people to be spun and woven for royal, national and individual use. On the people rested the responsibility for supplying their own needs and those of the priesthood, the army, the nobility, the religious orders, and the royal house. All the mines belonged to the Inca, who was himself the State. The gold and silver they furnished were only used for the decoration of palaces and temples. The people were supplied with the raw materials necessary for their support, but their labour belonged to the State. They could not starve. They could not be less prosperous than their neighbours. Each household received wool, cotton, seed and other necessities in exact proportion to the number of its members. The old and infirm were supported at the expense of the community. Nobody had anything to fear so long as he kept the law, but he could never improve the conditions in which he was born, lived and died. There was no money in the country and no private property

among the people. Even when the four great provinces of the empire, reached by four highways which can still be traced, stretched from Ecuador to Central Chile, no man could grow rich, just as no man could become poor. There were neither beggars, merchants, speculators, nor private benefactors in the empire of the Incas. There was no charity. The State came to the rescue of the unfortunate and replaced them on a level with their neighbours, but idleness was a crime because it robbed the exchequer. Labourers, miners and artisans, the oldest women at the looms, and the youngest child with a distaff were required to work for the authority, which, without differentiating between districts, sexes, ambitions or individual characteristics, fed, housed, clothed, supported and generally looked after its subjects.

In the days when Pizarro and his 500 horsemen marched towards the City of the Sun, their path cleared by the murder of Atahualpa and the presence of his arbitrarily chosen successor, a prisoner in their ranks, Cuzco is said by some chroniclers to have contained 200,000 inhabitants. The palaces of the sovereign and of the nobles, the walls, galleries and temples, the convents of the Virgins of the Sun (one of the six orders of Incan nuns), the great fortress of Sachsuhuaman which protected the city, and the colossal Coricancha (the 'House of the Sun') were built of stone blocks, some of them 30 feet long. But the roofs were always made of straw. The buildings were one-storeyed, and their splendour, which tempted the Spaniards on a trans-continental Odyssey, during which they suffered almost as much agony as they inflicted upon their Indian victims, consisted of the interior adornments, which were of precious metals. On the western wall of the temple, Coricancha, the image of the sun was emblazoned upon a vast golden disc, studded with jewels. The walls of the sanctuary were covered with sheets of the same metal. The cornices of doors and windows were made of it, and a great frieze of gold, let into the stonework, encompassed the outside of the building. All the vessels and instruments were of gold, and there was a garden in which golden fountains were surrounded by ears of corn, flowers, trees, beasts, birds and reptiles, cunningly wrought in the same precious substance. Adjoining the main building were chapels dedicated to the moon, Mama Cuilla (Mother of the Incas), the stars which formed her court, thunder and lightning, ministers of vengeance, and the rainbow. The first of these was decorated entirely with silver and the last copper, gilded and painted with all the colours of the heavenly arch. Opposite the god, as he blazed upon the walls of his temple, were the life-size golden images of twelve dead Incas, and above them the actual mummies of the sovereigns,

so preserved that, when the Spaniards entered the city in 1533, they appeared to be still living.

To-day Cuzco is a confessional of the centuries. In its narrow streets may be traced the various stages of the drama which began with the martyrdom of the Indian, continued with civil war between the conquerors, and reached an apparent end with the revolution which freed Peru from Spain. The victim has always been the countryman who staggered beneath the weight of Incan ingots 500 and 600 years ago as to-day one sees him Atlas-wise with shoulders bent beneath a cabinet or a wheelbarrow. The Indian puts everything on his back and remains unmoved. He has been made into a synthetic Christian. The threats and promises of the Jesuits drove him from the Temple of the Sun to the cathedral. There, with his plug of coca deforming his cheek, he prostrates himself before the Black Christ. Outside the violently decorated rococco building a policeman set upon a platform restrains llamas from following the devotions of their masters, while a student scribbles his communistic sentiments across the statues of saints.

The Place of Arms is as haunted as the streets of Lima. According to Cieza de Leon, this arcaded square, surrounded then by golden chains and sacred to the White Company, was the scene of sacrifice and festival. When a sovereign died, the high priest stood facing the sun with a bowl of fermenting maize held up towards the deity. A procession carrying golden idols and shrivelled ancestral mummies moved to the music of flutes. Among the crowd were monks who were also eunuchs, dancers in silver masks, astronomers, flagellants with flesh scarred by their own whips, boys whose ears had recently been pierced to show they had passed the test of chivalry and were of an age to fight for the Inca. There were Indians from the provinces, each in his distinctive dress, warriors wearing the plumed casque, and nobles with ears pulled out of shape by the immense rings which showed their rank. What torments and what horrors must have been enacted within the square which now dreams around a flower-garden! Here Indians were massacred by Spaniards, and here the Conquistadores, besieged by Manco, last and most gallant of the Inca sovereigns, waited helpless while the thatched roofs of the city burned around them. Here the vengeance of the Pizarros upon their seventy-year-old rival Almagro, royal Governor of Cuzco, was completed, for although the veteran of a hundred battles was ignominiously killed in prison, his head was subsequently severed from his body in front of an awed and resentful multitude in the Place of Arms. Here, too, according to a Spanish chronicler, the body of Juan Pizarro lay in state after his gallant assault upon Sachsahuaman. Here the treasure of the Incas was

divided among a greedy host, and here, when their convents were destroyed to make way for the mansions of the *Deus*, wandered the wretched Virgins of the Sun. For 6000 of these nuns, from among whom were chosen the concubines of the Inca, together with three times as many serving-women, were reduced to starvation or prostitution, thereby rousing a protest from one gentle Spanish priest to whom the Cross was more important than the Church.

Nothing now remains of Cuzco's palaces and temples except fragments of their incredible walls and, in the monastery of those Dominicans who established themselves with sword and spur on the ruins of the Incan holy of holies, a room full of biblical oleographs and somewhat stuffy drapery. This was once the 'robing chamber of the sun.' In it the god faced an open door through which he was saluted by the rays of his own emblem shining across plaques of gold. The neighbouring temple of the moon is reduced to a few dovetailed stone niches, in one of which must have stood the image 'made from tears shed by the sun.' In place of the agony and the terror, the cries, the blood and the gleam of naked weapons which attended the slaughters of Atahualpa or Pizarro, there is to-day a spurious peace in Cuzco. The lovely, slender arcades are steeped in pale sunshine. The roofs are littered with old tiles, so that they look like crumpled velvet. Archways lead into a succession of courts, each one more remote from modernity than its predecessors. The eucalyptus trees quiver like finely tempered steel. In the evening it seems as if the town were surrounded with the faint grey-blue of spears. Only in the churches is there a hint of the old violence. The Black Christ is a melodramatic figure liberally bespattered with gore. Blood pours from the crown of golden thorns and spurts fountain-like from the diamond nails which pierce hands and feet; it drips from an inordinate number of wounds evenly distributed over the body. Does it suggest to the kneeling Indian that Christianity is more savage than the general blood-letting advocated by their Communist advisers?

Up to a certain point the Indian will always be led. He has been led by dynasties of whom we know nothing, but the relics of whose civilisation persist in the carvings at Tiahuanaco, in Bolivia, and the adobe reliefs at Chan Chan, in Peru. He followed his Incan rulers towards the sun and the mines that supplied their gold. He followed the Jesuits, with fire and honey on their lips, towards an unknown god who approved of agriculture and clothing. He followed Spanish governors and prince-bishops and rose against them because other leaders, half-castes and freemasons, promised him independence. When he had had enough of lords and priests, he followed demagogues. The local intel-

lectuals, fruit of a university where the masters are over-ambitious and underpaid, told him he was oppressed—which has always been the truth—so two years ago he followed the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, which talks a great deal about the Brotherhood of Man (in capitals) and puts into practice in the Sierra some of the less conspicuously fraternal ideas of this powerful organisation which polled 106,000 votes at the last election. The result was that he was shot down, not singly, but in hundreds, by an army which did not understand about the brotherhood of man, and which objected to mutilated corpses where there should have been crops! At the present moment the Indian of the Sierra is superficially quiescent. He is earning a few pennies a day, and he spends most of them on buying raw spirit. The labour tax introduced under the last President (Leguia) has been suppressed by the present Government, so that he is no longer exploited by being made to work double or treble the prescribed period without wages or tools, at the mercy of a contractor intent on making a fortune before the next elections. But he is to all intents and purposes a serf without education, health or understanding. Is it remarkable, therefore, that the Indian is now inclined to follow with a blank, unsmiling face the Communists who promise him land, leisure and plenty? The last revolution in the Sierra will be the work of half-castes and demagogues, with 'tongues of silver' like the Jesuits, with Incan gold in their hands, but it will be directed by the Third International.

In contrast to the Indian the whole population of white Peru, barely 10 per cent. of the race, is influenced by the past, in which its fortunes were founded, and from which, in many cases, it drew its prestige. In this it is sharply differentiated from the rest of South America. Argentina and Uruguay are new countries. Chili is impregnated by old-established German and English blood. Bolivia is a mountain land, protected by her inland position from those modern evils which develop in and spread from coastal clearing-houses. Her people are friendly, intensely hospitable and simple. Few of them are used to wealth. Still fewer are connected with a historical past. Consequently, Bolivia, inactive though she may be and stunned by the fall in the metal market, contains elements of potential prosperity. But Peru, lovely and prolific, with her memories of imperial rule, her ancient culture and her ancient blood, suggests a slow but inevitable decay. Her energy is gone. It was dissipated in the Middle Ages, when she overthrew the Incas and established the Crucifix on the ruins of the Sun God's temples. It was exhausted in the wars which freed the west coast from the temporal if not the spiritual thrall of Spain, and in the succeeding struggles with

neighbouring republics, for Peru has had no influx of new blood. She is all Spanish and Indian, with a slight tincture of negro in some classes. The half-Germans, half-Italians and half-Irish, so numerous in the newer and more virile countries, are almost entirely absent in Peru, where there is no social link between the national and the alien. Peruvians do not mix with foreigners, and they are still more interested in genealogy than in industry or agriculture.

At least three-quarters of accessible Peru, probably more, is in the hands of big landowners, but they do not live on their properties. In a 300-mile ride—from Cuzco to la Mejorada on the Lima railway—we found no landlords at home. The farms were nominally managed by half-Indian 'administradores,' who rose at midday and let the land look after itself. A certain amount of sugar-cane was grown in order to make aguardiente, for which raw spirit there is always a local sale. The farms were filthy and the Indian hovels worse. Apathy reigned throughout the province. Nobody had forage or food to sell. It was almost impossible to hire transport. There was nowhere to lodge except 'infamous inns,' where our muleteers insisted on sleeping on the saddlery in case it should be stolen. The advent of strangers caused anyone who feared he might be asked to rent floor space to barricade himself in his house and pretend he was on a journey. Yet this mountain track is the main route between Cuzco, the centre of Peruvian tourism, and the railway leading to the capital.

The Sierra typifies all that is most backward in Peru. This enclosed mountain zone is even further removed mentally than geographically from the feudal civilisation of Lima. It is entirely inhabited by the Quechua Indians or meztizos.[1] The former are a distrustful race, intensely suspicious of strangers. They have been exploited for generations, and in turn they have been led into sporadic and disastrous revolution by creoles, freemasons, and demagogues. They are now fertile ground for Communism, which, sowed by the Alianza Popular Revolutionaria Americana, will be reaped by the Third International. The Indians of the Sierra work unlimited hours on farms and in sugar-cane plantations for 5*d*. a day, which is not in any sense of the word a living wage. Their children are 'adopted' by shrewd Peruvian or Cholo [2] families, with the result that they toil without wages until they are old or worn out. Under the late President (Leguia), who was responsible for the making and upkeep of a number of new highways, there was a labour tax which forced the Indians to work for

[1] Quarter-caste.

[2] Half-caste Indian and Spanish.

fifteen days annually on road construction. In effect, they were obliged to labour as long as the contractors chose to withhold their certificates, often without tools. This tax was suppressed by the present Government, with the result that President Sanchez Cerro can rely on Indian support, unless it is undermined by the Communism of hunger, largely responsible for the recent outbreak at Trujillo; but main roads will soon cease to exist.

Tropical Peru is a series of vast unexplored forests, penetrable chiefly by river. A spectacular road leads down from Oroya, the copper town on which depend the famous Cerro del Pasco mines, by way of the Chanchamayo Gorge (precipitous and beautiful) to the last sugar and coffee plantations, outposts of civilisation in uncharted forest. The most productive of these is Perene, belonging to a British company, which has done much to improve conditions of labour in a region inhabited by Chunchos (savages). The highest railway in the world, belonging to the Peruvian Corporation, links Oroya with Lima by means of a pass, 15,802 feet high, and a series of stupendous curves which constitute a remarkable engineering feat. Along this line the climate changes from semi-arctic to semi-tropical. At one end there is excellent cattle country, where the large estates measure up to 250,000 acres. At the other is cotton, sugar or fruit. For Peru can grow anything. She is potentially self-supporting. She has coal at Cerro del Pasco, as well as a number of important minerals, and unlimited oil in the north. Every kind of crop could be produced at different levels. There is particularly good wheat land near Arequipa, but production and development are arrested by the character of the people.

There is no immigration, no attempt at colonisation, and, outside the hospitable hereditary society of Lima, a general dislike of foreigners cultivated by Church and State. Americans are the most unpopular, because of the new taxes imposed in the United States upon petrol and copper; but Peru epitomises, officially and individually, the Chauvinistic nationalism which, throughout South America, is inclined to penalise foreign capital and foreign enterprise. From 1919 to 1930 Leguia was President of Peru. He beautified the capital and opened up the country with money borrowed from abroad. He is said to have been honest and his extravagance was well intentioned, but, as he was surrounded by men intent on making fortunes as quickly as possible, the country was on the verge of bankruptcy when, in 1930, the army revolted and put into power Colonel Sanchez Cerro at the head of a military junta. He resigned in February 1931 in order to be eligible for the Presidency, and to this he was elected eight months later. He had a majority of 54,000 votes

over his opponent, Haya de la Torre—an avowed if insincere Communist, connected with the Third International and leader of the Aprista Party (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana).

Sanchez Cerro is a little man of strong will and of the lower class. He looks thirty, though he is said to be ten years older, and is obviously of Indian descent. He is determined and intelligent, but he was put into power, in spite of early Socialist utterances, by the Civilista or Conservative Party, which had no suitable candidate of its own. Possibly, therefore, he is hampered by the need to conciliate feudalism as represented by the big landowners, while the land-hungry class, which commands greater voting strength, is demanding small-holdings and nationalisation. Leguia was intent on communications, colonisation, and the attraction of foreign capital. Consequently the present Government makes a parade of its anti-foreign sentiments. It has put an end to Leguia's road contracts and plans for colonisation, although the President told me that he hoped eventually to build a new railway from the coast to the Amazon zone which would make settlement possible in a tropical province. It is also planned, as soon as the money for irrigation is available, to establish carefully selected small-holders on 7½- to 35-acre plots near Arequipa, where the land is suitable for wheat. But the Government is hampered in these and every other scheme by the fact that there is no money in the exchequer. Moreover, the accessible part of Peru is limited to the plateaux fed by the Cuzco and Oroya railways, in addition to the narrow coastal strip. These are the only areas which would, at present, repay development, because, as various British and European pioneers have already discovered, the cost of mule transport from the interior allows no margin for profit. Tropical Peru may be an agricultural El Dorado, but, until Sanchez Cerro builds his railway, unexplored Amazonia is likely to remain as isolated from coast and market as the Mountains of the Moon.

A more immediate problem with which the Government is faced is the spread of the Aprista movement. Peru has a population of approximately 11,000,000, but she has only 350,000 voters. The vast proportion of her people, Indian and half-caste, are illiterate. Ill-paid, workless, or discontented because the price of their meagre produce has fallen, they are at the mercy of agitators with promises dripping like honey from their lips. The Aprista Party has taken advantage of this fact. Its leader is a man of good family and an intellectual. He is said to have chosen the Communist part as a short cut to political success, and, though he is at present in prison for arranging the attempted assassination of the President in a Lima church a year ago,

and his brother, Augustin de la Torre, one of the instigators of the recent Trujillo revolution, is being hunted by the police, it is generally expected that an Aprista Government will be in power within the next few years. For the moment, however, Sanchez Cerro's position has been strengthened, first, by the savagery of the Trujillo rising, when prisoners were massacred and adherents of the Government tortured to death, and, secondly, by the strong and sensible measures immediately adopted by his Government. But Peruvian authority depends on the army, the police, and the numerically excessive bureaucracy, which changes with each succeeding Government. Practically the whole revenue of the country goes on the upkeep of these three systems, in effect largely parasite; for each is not only unwieldy in size, but on occasions an active danger to the country. If the army is not paid up to date it starts a revolution, generally in a province isolated from the capital. Since every official knows he will lose his job as soon as the Government changes, the only thing he cares about is to make as much money as possible while in office. Police pay is generally in arrears, and the men, lazy, arrogant, and privileged, are not above exploiting their position among defenceless peasants. Yet, as in other South American countries, it is impossible for any Government to reduce these uneconomic forces without losing the votes which they control.

Peru is suffering from the slump, not only in minerals, but in every natural product. The famous Cerro del Pasco copper mine is producing one-fifth of the normal amount of ore. Its output has been reduced from 3000 to 600 tons a day. This entails a great deal of unemployment in the region and the semi-paralysis of the excellent educational and medical work done by the American company, which has paid in the mines approximately four times the local agricultural wage, thus raising the standard of living throughout the district. At present employment has dropped to a fraction of the usual figure, and the next step must be closure, which would seriously affect the British railway, dependent to a large extent on mineral freights from Oroya to Lima. The agricultural exports of Peru are chiefly wool, sugar and cotton. The prices of all these have fallen to such an extent that the erstwhile rich regard themselves as most unfairly ruined, because their farms or plantations can no longer support them in idle luxury in the capital. The world crisis has particularly affected Peru because of the character of her people. She is more closely linked with Spain than other South American republics. Spanish news predominates in the Press. Her disregard of time is Oriental. 'To-morrow' or 'next week' are the local translations of 'immediately.' The average man's word means as little as a Government contract or the obligations

attached to foreign loans. That Peru has defaulted on her external debts may not be her fault, but that she finds default a matter for self-congratulation and is likely to regard it as a basis on which national contracts can be regulated may make it difficult for her to obtain further concessions. On the other hand, it must be remembered that she is more sorely tried by disruptive internal elements than any other South American republic, and, in spite of her political nationalism, which she parades as a weapon of defence against 'outrageous fortune,' so small a portion of her people realise they are Peruvians. The rest are tribal Indians, or villagers who think of themselves as belonging to their own particular district and to whom Lima is as foreign as New York or London.

It was this element which turned the Trujillo revolution into an orgy and filled the streets with the dismembered corpses over which in his triumphal entry, so soon followed by his death, rode Barretos, the Communist, wanted by the police for four murders. It is these same Cholos who numerically control the polls, for the tribal Indian can neither read nor write, and is therefore not entitled to vote. The students supply the intellectual impetus. Their enthusiasm suggests to the unthinking masses that A.P.R.A. stands for a new and profitable religion. Every educated youth from Cuzco to Trujillo is obsessed by the 'brotherhood of man' and the need of imposing it by force upon unwilling capitalists. The university is closed, which means that, instead of writing notes for lectures, the students are free to scrawl 'Long live the Apristas' or 'Success to the Communist Party' on any convenient wall.

If Peru is to combat the apathy of her landowners, the enthusiasm of humanitarian intellectuals, the discontent of the ignorant and long-exploited masses, she must increase the percentage of her white stock and invigorate it by hardy European emigration. Of all countries in South America Peru needs farming immigrants intent on production for personal use, and a gradually increasing home market, rather than for export; and, owing to her anti-foreign political propaganda, of all countries, at the moment, she has least to offer. The only other source by which foreign wealth is likely to come into the country is by means of tourists, and here Peru is in a strong position. The liners of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company or the Grace Line link England and America in delightful fashion with the west coast of South America. Excellent railways connect Lima or Mollendo with the unrivalled tropical beauty of the Chanchamayo Valley or with Cuzco, gem of the colonial period and centre of Incan ruins. Peru is lovely and old and full of history. She has cathedrals to rival Spain and cloisters copied from the

courts of Moorish palaces. The Inca Empire was no more tragic or romantic than the centuries of intrigue, commercial, religious and political, which followed it, and each of these has left its mark in the beautiful ghost-haunted cities of Peru, which belong so much more to the past than to the present.

ROSITA FORBES.

BODY-LINE BOWLING

SINCE cricket became a game and gradually developed the competitive spirit till it reached the County Championship stage (which, incidentally, was instituted by the Press) and has become more and more a commercial proposition, with inevitable danger to the spirit of the game, there have been three radical changes as regards the method of delivery by the bowler.

Until about 1820 all bowling was under-hand. It is probable that no other type of bowling would have been safe, as the wickets were very rough; in fact, some old authorities lead us to believe that the pitch was marked out by a chain and the grass cut with a scythe. No pitch in those days would have been safe to play on, with such long, uneven grass containing many rough tufts, had over-arm bowling been indulged in. Just over a hundred years ago, however, round-arm bowling after much discussion was allowed and remained in vogue for the next fifty years, by which time hand rollers and mowing machines were beginning to be used, and consequently the actual pitches began to improve in a marked degree. In 1870 Willsher, a famous left-hand Kent bowler, instituted the present style of over-arm bowling; until then no bowler had the right to bowl the ball above the height of the shoulder. There was a big outcry and he was accused of throwing. His style, however, won the day. It was just about the same date that the pitches had made a great advance, and the counties were just beginning to play a series of matches against each other. New clubs were coming into being and several of our leading public schools had recently been founded, whilst the colleges at Oxford and at Cambridge were beginning to play against each other and gradually getting grounds of their own.

All this development of grounds tended to sharpen the wits of the men who prepared the wickets, and the advance of machinery and science about this time was a contributory cause of the very real improvement in the pitches. It was doubtless this gradual improvement in pitches and the condition of grounds, which, though greatly to the advantage of the batsman, was correspondingly detrimental to the bowler, that first led to the adoption of round-arm bowling, thus enabling the bowler to get

a little of his own back. It was in 1820 that the bowler was allowed to bowl round, but it was not until 1870 that he was allowed to deliver the ball with the full arm above the shoulder.

Types of batting have altered to a certain extent with the improvement of grounds. Up to the middle of last century scoring was very low indeed compared with the scores made during the latter part of the century. The late W. G. Grace, who was born in 1848, was chiefly responsible for many of the great scores, which he began to make about 1870. His style of play, although excellent in every way, was essentially a forward one; in fact, from the day when he was first recognised as a great player up till the arrival of Ranjitsinhji, now the Jamsahib of Nawanagar, our leading and successful players relied more on forward play than they do to-day. It was really the famous Indian batsman who was responsible for the development of correct back play, ably backed up by that great student of the game C. B. Fry. The Jamsahib demonstrated that correct and sound back play was of the greatest importance against first-class bowling, and that any ball that could be played forward might be hit really hard if the batsman was at all quick on his feet, his point against firm-footed forward play being that there was a fraction of a second between the time the ball pitched and the moment when it came into contact with the bat, when the stroke automatically became a 'blind one.' These outstanding batsmen were supreme in their own styles, W. G. Grace being, if anything, a greater player to fast rather than slow bowling. They had all practically retired before the advent of 'googly' bowling, although they may have played one or two games with B. J. T. Bosanquet, who invented it, having obtained the idea by spinning a tennis ball on a billiard table.

Much has been written recently about leg-theory and body-line bowling, but very few, if any, writers have explained its cause and the probable ultimate effect it will have on the future of the game. Leg bowling is certainly not new, except in the case of really fast bowling such as Larwood's. Root, the late Worcestershire and England bowler, who was just above medium pace, had been the most successful bowler in England with the exception of Freeman; he obtained more wickets than any other bowler between 1920 and 1930, and that, too, mostly on the Worcester ground, which is one of the best, if not the best, in the country. This type of bowling, with the majority of the fieldsmen placed on the leg side and several of them close to the wicket, is difficult to score from if it is bowled accurately. If adopted by really fast bowlers it is dangerous to a great majority of batsmen who are not in the top class of batsmanship, as well as being a

menace o the best interests of what one understands the word 'cricket' to mean.

One of the chief causes of the advent of this type of bowling is the modern style of batting employed by quite a number of so-called first-class players known as the two-eyed stance, which is really a misnomer and should be called the two-shouldered stance. This position at the wicket, with the batsman's feet pointing towards the bowler and presenting a full chest, encourages the bowler, because he has a double target to aim at, in contrast to the old style of batting with the left shoulder facing down the line of the wicket. This modern stance was largely brought about by the introduction of 'googly' bowling—*i.e.*, the delivery of a ball with leg-break action which at times comes straight through or breaks from off. The batsman, not knowing which way the ball would turn, got in front of his wicket with his body facing the bowler, hoping in that way more easily to detect the break and also to cover with his bat the ball that came through straight.

During the last two tours of the Australians in this country Mr. J. W. Trumble, who himself was a member of the 1886 team over here, was very emphatic in his protest against the super-excellence of the wickets in Australia (and in a minor degree over here), his contention being that under these conditions the bowler had practically no chance and that everything was done for the batsman with no thought for the bowler, so that unless the batsman and bowler had a fifty-fifty chance the game would become a farce. Scores were becoming so huge and so few matches were finished, that interest in the game was sooner or later bound to be affected. If the introduction of this so-called leg-theory bowling teaches batsmen to give up the two-shouldered stance and to adopt the style practised by the late W. G. Grace, V. Trumper, Sir Stanley Jackson, A. C. MacLaren, and those famous Nottingham professionals the late Arthur Shrewsbury and William Gunn, it may prove to be a blessing in disguise. As matters were, till Larwood and Bowes did such damage and wrought such havoc the bowler was at a discount as regards his powers of retaliation. Now that he has presumably found a means of attacking the batsman in a way that makes him uncomfortable because he finds himself comparatively helpless, owing chiefly to his wrong position at the wicket, there comes an outcry on the batsman's behalf.

I have had a great deal of experience in coaching all classes of cricketers during the last twenty-five years. I was coach to the Kent players from 1910 to 1931, except for the first two years after the Great War, and during the last two years I have had charge of the Faulkner School of Cricket and coached one of the

most famous preparatory schools in the country. From my experience as a player who has met and played all the really fast bowlers both in this country and from abroad up till the beginning of this century, I unhesitatingly say that if this type of leg-theory bowling is developed by really fast bowlers with the majority of the fieldsmen placed on the leg side it is not in the best interests of the game; and this applies equally to club, village, and all other types of cricket.

It must be remembered that there has been a great dearth of fast bowlers in this country during the last twenty years; in fact, one might almost say that Larwood is the only really fast English bowler during this period. Formerly there was hardly a first-class county that did not possess a really fast bowler, and the best and the great majority of them were over 6 feet in height. Larwood, in spite of his recent fine records, is lacking in the inches that usually appertain to a fast bowler; consequently his 'yorker' is not so difficult to play. Still, the fact remains that last summer he headed the bowling averages, a feat which no fast bowler has ever before accomplished in this country. He obtained over 100 wickets, and at the same time he was handicapped by having very little bowling during May, which was a wet month.

It takes but a short experience in coaching to exemplify the fact that self-preservation is indeed the first law in human nature, and this applies to occupations of every class and every age. I do not consider that I over-estimate the case when I say that it is necessary for the average young batsman to begin training before he is ten or eleven years old, and that it takes a year of patience to try and make him stand up to his wicket to play any ball at or just outside his leg stump, even if the bowling is quite slow. His first natural instinct is to take one or two steps away from the wicket and to make a cross-cut stroke, rather after the fashion of an old farm labourer who still preserves the art of scything. The average club cricketer, and even the average county player, is, in a great majority of cases, weak in his leg stump. The reason for this is that the quick posturing of the front foot is essential in stroke play either forward for the straight drive or opening for strokes on the on or off side of the wicket. It is far easier to make ground to a straight or off-side ball than to do so to one coming at the body or just outside the wicket. Practically the only chance of scoring without getting out, if a really fast bowler places the majority of his fieldsmen on the leg side, is to let the wide short ball go by and to place the back foot towards the off stump with the body leaning towards point. This type of batsmanship can only be done by a very small section of our leading players to-day. If he were a really first-class

player the batsman might draw his body away towards leg and cut a short ball, as there would be hardly any fieldsmen on the off side while body bowling was being indulged in. I played in a good many M.C.C. matches against several of the first-class counties at Lord's during the early part of this century. That very famous batsman Major E. G. Wynyard frequently played with me, and I was always struck by the way in which he dealt with a really fast bowler when the wicket-keeper stood back; he invariably stood two yards or so out of his ground. This was probably the best way of dealing with the fast bowler in those days. But against this new type of body-line bowling directed on the leg side such play would be absolutely useless, because foot work cannot be brought into play sufficiently quickly to bring the bat across, outside the line of the body, and thus attack the bowler.

There have been suggestions that this type of bowling might be abandoned if an alteration were made in the l.b.w. rule, but it must be remembered that some seasons ago there was an agitation amongst cricketers for an alteration of the l.b.w. rule, so that any ball that pitched on the wicket or outside the off stump and would have hit the wicket would put the batsman out. At present only the ball that pitches on the wicket, and would in the opinion of the umpire hit the wicket, puts him out. The new rule, which was framed as the result of the agitation, was tried in the minor County Championship matches, but, although it helped the bowler slightly, it did not lessen scoring to the extent that those who were responsible for the agitation had hoped, and the old rule was reverted to in the following year. The fact is that on a true, fast or easy-paced wicket few bowlers are able to turn the ball at all, and it is only the highest class batsmen who are able to use their legs sufficiently well as a second line of defence, when the bowler is really able to turn the ball on a loose, crumbling or a difficult, sticky wicket.

Those who are advocating a change from the present l.b.w. rule to the one tried twenty years ago with the idea that it might help the bowler to aim more on the off side of the wicket and possibly minimise the body-line and leg-theory bowling are apt to forget that the two types of bowling are so entirely different that, although this innovation might encourage off-side bowling, particularly spin bowling, which applies mainly to slow or medium-pace bowling, it would dispense with the necessity of a fast bowler, who under modern conditions of batsmanship is proving most effective. To remedy the existing state of things many suggestions have been put forward, those most strongly advocated being the alteration of the l.b.w. rule, the limiting of the number of fieldsmen on the leg side, and the drawing of a line across the

wicket beyond which the bowler would be forced to pitch the ball.

All these may be possible improvements, but none of them really meet the exigencies of the case. It is obvious that some definite alterations must be made in the rules which govern bowling, for should the leg-theory and body-line bowling come into general use in cricket, the game will become not only dangerous but exceedingly dull. Even supposing that it were left to the umpires to discriminate as to what bowling was in their opinion dangerous or too fast, or to adjudicate as to the number of fieldsmen a fast bowler might be allowed to utilise on the on side of the wicket, this would be placing an unfair burden upon their shoulders and at the same time would create a bitter feeling amongst the opposing cricketers. The game of cricket has very little wrong with it. One hopes that this leg-theory and body-line bowling will not be developed by really fast bowlers, for this would cause both players and spectators to be deprived of a great deal of the pleasure and artistry of the game.

After all, cricket is a game, and by a great many it is considered the king of games. It will be a thousand pities if this recent innovation creates bitterness, jealousies, and strife. Even as matters now stand, too much of the spirit of commercialism is gradually creeping in, to the detriment of the real spirit of the game. It is now up to the powers that be in general, and to the captains of all classes of cricket in particular, to see that the sporting spirit for which the British Empire has always been so renowned shall remain unimpaired, and that we shall honour our traditions and continue to play cricket in the accepted meaning of the phrase.

G. J. V. WEIGALL.

GEORGE HERBERT: A TERCENTENARY

It was on a Friday in 1633 that Joshua Mapletoft, a nephew by marriage of Nicholas Ferrar, brought the news to Little Gidding that Mr. George Herbert was past hope of recovery. John Ferrar, in his Life of his brother, quotes from a memorandum in Nicholas's own hand telling how they afterwards learned that Herbert died 'about the hour, wherein we received this news.' This contemporary testimony is welcome, because no other is available about the exact day of Herbert's death. His burial is recorded in the Bemerton parish register as occurring on March 3, 1632 (Old Style). As March 3 in that year was a Sunday, we may infer from Nicholas Ferrar's paper that Herbert died on Friday, the 1st of March. In those days burial commonly followed death at short interval, except when the body was embalmed for a stately funeral, as in the case of Herbert's kinsman, William, third Earl of Pembroke, who was buried in Salisbury Cathedral a full month after his death in London.

Herbert's burial was no pageant in 'the pittifull little chappell' across the road from Bemerton Rectory, but a gathering of his neighbours, whose affection he had so completely won. Among them was Dr. Humphrey Henchman, precentor and canon residentiary of Salisbury, who joined in the laying-on of hands at Herbert's ordination to the priesthood, and who long after, when he was Bishop of London, told Izaak Walton that 'he laid his hand on Mr. Herberts Head, and (alas !) within less than three years lent his Shoulder to carry his dear Friend to his Grave.' John Aubrey, who is most to be trusted when he deals with Wiltshire families, and who was of kin to Mrs. George Herbert, has more to tell. 'He was buryed (according to his owne desire) with the singing service for the buriall of the dead, by the singing men of Sarum. Francis Sambroke (attorney) then assisted as a chorister boy ; my uncle, Thomas Danvers, was at the funerall. . . . He lyes in the chancell, under no large, nor yet very good, marble grave-stone, without any inscription.' It was fitting that 'the singing men of Sarum' should be there, for Walton tells us that Herbert's 'chiefest recreation was Musick,' and that 'he went usually twice every week to the Cathedral Church in

Salisbury; and at his return would say, That his time spent in Prayer and Cathedral Musick elevated his Soul, and was his Heaven upon Earth.' Aubrey had it from a friend at Dauntsey, where Herbert lived for about a year with the Earl of Danby, 'that he had a very good hand on the lute, and that he sett his own lyricks or sacred poems.' Still better testimony is Herbert's own apostrophe to 'Church-musick,' telling how it freed him for the time from consciousness of the many bodily pains to which he was increasingly subject:

> Now I in you without a bodie move,
> Rising and falling with your wings.

The thought had already been anticipated by Richard Hooker, whose book was evidently congenial to Herbert: there is a kind of music, writes Hooker, 'that carrieth as it were into ecstasies, filling the mind with an heavenly joy and for the time in a manner severing it from the body.' No biographer appears to have noticed that Herbert's burial day was Quinquagesima Sunday, which has a singular fitness for the country parson who could summarise his ideal in the words 'Now Love is his business and aime,' and for the poet whose feeling quickens at every mention in his poems of the Divine love.

The Herbert of Bemerton days is better authenticated than those suppose who are suspicious, not without reason, of Walton's idealising pages, which were not published till thirty-seven years after Herbert's death. 'Holy Mr. Herbert' is no invention of Walton's, but is a contemporary estimate of his later years. His eldest brother, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, says of him: 'His life was most holy and exemplary; insomuch, that about Salisbury, where he lived, beneficed for many years, he was little less than sainted.' Nicholas Ferrar, who, though he appears to have seen Herbert seldom, had other opportunities of estimating his character, wrote within a few months of the author's death, in his preface to *The Temple*: 'his faithfull discharge [*i.e.*, of his ministry at Bemerton] was such, as may make him justly a comparison to the primitive Saints, and a pattern or more for the age he lived in.' The mind and character of the man in these later years are still more transparently revealed in *The Country Parson*, which he wrote at Bemerton, 'that I may have a Mark to aim at'; unconsciously it is himself that he portrays. There is no sufficient reason for calling in question the received opinion about Herbert's character after he had made his submission and given himself to his calling; it is a character of rare moral beauty and spiritual depth.

It is not the less necessary, for the understanding of Herbert and his poetry, to recognise that this ultimate character was an

achievement, won after a prolonged struggle, often intensified by failure in health and spirits. This inner conflict is the clue to *The Temple*, as Herbert himself is reported to have stated when on his death-bed he entrusted the manuscript to Edmund Duncon with these words:

> Sir, I pray deliver this little Book to my dear brother Farrer, and tell him, he shall find in it a picture of the many spiritual Conflicts that have past betwixt God and my Soul, before I could subject mine to the will of Jesus my Master: in whose service I have now found perfect freedom.

Let it be allowed that Walton, after his manner, took some freedom in reporting conversations of long ago, but Duncon was still alive to correct him if the words were seriously misreported, and Walton was not above correcting his mistakes in later editions of the *Lives*. Even if Walton had concocted the sayings by inference from *The Temple* poems and Ferrar's preface to them, which, so far as it goes, supports Walton's account, he could not have laid bare their essential quality more exactly. It is the poignancy and duration of the conflict which save the poems from tameness, the common bane of religious verse, and throw into contrast the poems of stress and the poems of happy content. The extreme sensitiveness of Herbert's temperament makes his moods both intense and various, and the short lyric is the perfect medium for reflecting this highly individual and subtly changing emotion.

Seeing that the personal note is so dominant throughout *The Temple* poems, it becomes the more worth-while to take stock of all that can be discovered about the poet's life. Born on April 3, 1593, George Herbert was the fifth son of Richard and Magdalen Herbert of Montgomery Castle. It was a cadet branch of the Herberts, who were among the socially most distinguished families of their time. But they were not born to ease and affluence, as Magdalen Herbert was left a widow with ten children when George was three years old, and she had all her sons 'brought up in learning,' as her eldest son tells, and encouraged them to adopt a profession. The Court and the camp held most attractions for men of their breeding. Edward, after fighting in the Low Countries, took to diplomacy and became Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Three of his brothers were soldiers of fortune and met early deaths. The brother next above George was a gifted scholar, who died Fellow of New College at the age of twenty-five. Henry, the brother to whom George was throughout life most attached, became Master of the Revels and was knighted. Weak health, if no other reason, would have stood in the way of George Herbert's following the call that came to so many of his race to 'chase brave employments with a naked

sword throughout the world.' But the successful careers of Edward and Henry doubtless attracted him, and till he was past thirty he could never wholly surrender the idea. It is the world that is Herbert's constant temptation, 'brave glorie puffing by in silks that whistled.' His mother, pious and discerning, marked him out for a humbler calling, which in the end he was to follow. From Westminster School George Herbert and John Hacket, the future Bishop of Lichfield, passed with scholarships to Trinity College, Cambridge, and quickly won academic distinction. In his first year at Cambridge Herbert sent his mother as a New Year's gift the two sonnets which declare his early ambition to be a sacred poet. He challenges the fashionable love-poetry of those who 'wear Venus' livery,' and contends that the Divine love can incite the poet 'as well as any she.' It was not long before that John Donne, still a layman, had turned to sacred verse, and sent to 'the Lady Magdalen Herbert' his sequence of 'holy sonnets' called *La Corona*. Herbert's letters during his Cambridge days, mostly to his stepfather, Sir John Danvers, do not show him at his best. There is, indeed, a very steady affection for his mother, and for a sister afflicted with a long wasting sickness. There is, too, the scholar's love of books: 'if a book of four or five shillings come in my way, I buy it, though I fast for it; yea, sometimes of ten shillings.' And his brother Henry sends him from Paris a parcel of books costing several pounds. He tells Sir John in his twenty-fourth year 'how I am now setting foot into Divinity, to lay the platform of my future life,' and he makes the cost of books and the need of special diet for his poor health reasons for an increased allowance: 'I protest and vow, I even study thrift, and yet I am scarce able with much ado to make one half-year's allowance shake hands with the other.'

Meanwhile academic honours came fast. Already Fellow of Trinity, he was elected Prælector or Reader in Rhetoric on the foundation of Sir Robert Rede; neglecting Cicero and Quintilian and the other prescribed authors, he discoursed on a Latin oration of King James I. It is an ominous choice, and his former schoolfellow, Hacket, has a scathing reference to it. Already Herbert has his eyes on the road to Court favour. The surest avenue to such promotion for a Cambridge scholar was through the office of Public Orator, who would be brought into personal relations with the King and other distinguished visitors to the University. Sir Francis Nethersole, who held that office, was leaving Cambridge to serve the Queen of Bohemia, and his predecessor, Sir Robert Naunton, had become a Secretary of State. Already appointed deputy to Sir Francis, Herbert aspired to succeed him. When Nethersole hints 'that this place being civill may divert him from

Divinity,' Herbert allows that divinity is still his aim, but that it is compatible with the oratorship. He set his heart upon the office, secured it, and retained it till his mother's death seven years later. He knew only too well that he could 'trade in courtesies and wit'; the Latin letters which he was instructed to write to those in high place whom the University desired to honour or to ingratiate were of the kind usually expected of an Orator, and did not come behind those of his predecessors in extravagant compliment, if sometimes also Herbert excelled in neatness and wit. Perhaps the most outrageous example of flattery was the epigram assuring King James that, now that he had given his *Basilicon Doron* to Cambridge, she need no longer envy Oxford her new library. Joseph Mede, Fellow of Christ's, in a letter to his cousin Sir Martin Stutevile, describes the visit of King James in March 1623 to see a Latin play, *Loyola*, by John Hacket, at Trinity; during dinner the Master of Trinity, Dr. John Richardson, drew the King's attention to a new epigram of Herbert's, and the Bishop of Durham, who as Dean of Westminster had befriended him in his school days, also read it at table, while a friend of Mede read what he could over the bishop's shoulder. The King on leaving took notice of the young Orator, and afterwards more than once invited him to his lodging at Newmarket. With his birth and connexions, his ready gift of languages, modern as well as ancient, his distinguished bearing and charm of manner, Herbert had now everything except health to advance his prospects. He began to neglect Cambridge and discharge his duties as Orator by deputy. Walton, often charged with undue leniency to his heroes, is on this matter frank enough, and he gives his view that 'all Mr. Herbert's Court-hopes died' with the death, in rapid succession, of two of his most powerful friends and of King James himself. S. R. Gardiner suggests, further, that Herbert 'had no favour to expect' from James's successor because of the courage he had shown in his Oration on Prince Charles's return from Spain by declaring his preference for peace at a time when, in Gardiner's words, 'it was no secret that the Prince had come back bent on war.' It would be too much to say that the door was blocked to State employment, but at least these rebuffs were enough to cause Herbert to canvass his position afresh. He retired for a while to a friend's house in Kent, and on his return to London announced his decision to take orders. The date and place of his ordination to the diaconate have not been discovered, but Herbert is described as deacon in the Lincoln Chapter Acts in the record of his institution by proxy to the prebend of Leighton Ecclesia in Lincoln Cathedral on July 15, 1626. A month before, Nicholas Ferrar, who was of the same age as Herbert and who had pursued with success a secular

calling, was ordained deacon on his settling with his kinsfolk, to the number of about thirty, at Little Gidding, in Huntingdonshire, to live under an almost monastic rule.

Herbert had now burnt his boats, so far as State employment was concerned, but it did not follow that he would give himself to an active ministerial life. He had overcome his own pride and his friends' feeling that he had 'lost himself in an humble way.' Indeed, Herbert in his new-won and sincere humility shrank from going further, like his friend Ferrar who 'durst not presume to step one inch higher'; Herbert's diffidence is clearly seen in two poems of exquisite feeling, *Aaron* and *The Priesthood*. There was, besides, the recurrence of ill-health, accompanied by wracking bodily pain and depression of spirits. Biographers have overlooked one reference showing how acute and dangerous this failure of health was; four years before, Joseph Mede, writing from Christ's College, mentions the death of the junior proctor, and adds: 'Our orator, also, they say, will not escape, being at death's door.' Although Herbert was to make a temporary recovery from this and later illnesses, he was clearly unfitted for a heavy charge, and yet he fretted at his inactivity, as may be seen in the two poems entitled *Employment*:

> All things are busie; onely I
> Neither bring hony with the bees,
> Nor flowres to make that, nor the husbandrie
> To water these.

The conscience of the age would have allowed Herbert to regard the Lincoln prebend as a sinecure, but in this matter he showed himself scrupulously sensitive. Nicholas Ferrar is our authority—and there can be no better—for the fact that Herbert was anxious to transfer the prebend to Ferrar, whose home at Little Gidding was only five miles distant from Leighton Bromswold, 'where the corps of the prebend lay.' Herbert, while deriving the small income of the prebend from property at Leighton Bromswold, had no pastoral responsibility for the parish, which had its own vicar. Ferrar dissuaded him from resignation, and instead induced him to undertake the restoration of the parish church which 'had layen ruinated almost twenty yeares.' Even Magdalen Herbert, with all her piety, sought to deter him from a project which she believed to be beyond his strength and means, but he assumed the burden and carried it through. Some of his last letters show his continued concern about the raising of funds and the execution of the repairs; in his will he remembered the claims of Leighton Bromswold Church, and Ferrar, in the preface to *The Temple*, describes the reparation as 'successfully effected.'

Little is known of the years between Herbert's entering holy orders and his going to Bemerton, and perhaps there was little to tell. He was living in retirement, sometimes in Essex with his brother Henry, and later 'for a year or more' at Dauntsey, in Wiltshire, with his stepfather's elder brother, Henry Danvers, Lord Danby. We may, however, assign to those years a considerable number of his poems. Professor George Herbert Palmer of Harvard did a notable service to the study of Herbert; he was the first to recognise the fact, with all its implications, that the manuscript in Dr. Williams's library, containing seventy-three poems which were later to appear in *The Temple*, was almost certainly completed before Herbert went to Bemerton. We have, therefore, the material for knowing what was passing through Herbert's mind in those years of disappointment and indecision, and, with less certainty, we can assign to the Bemerton years most of those *Temple* poems which are not in the Williams manuscript. It becomes at once apparent that no single characteristic clearly divides the earlier and later poems. Herbert's devout and tender piety and his loyal regard for the ordinances of the Church are equally evident in both groups. And throughout life he is sensitive to moods, which we may also suppose to have been not a little affected by the fluctuating changes in his health. The twin poems to which he gives the name *The Temper* might be renamed *Moods*: they represent Herbert's concern at the ebb and flow of the feelings, and his slow learning of the truth that they matter less than the steady direction of the will, which is more within a man's control than the feelings with their dependence upon physical condition: after uttering the wish 'If what my soul doth feel sometimes, My soul might ever feel!,' he more wisely surrenders it:

> Yet take thy way; for sure thy way is best:
> Stretch or contract me, thy poore debter:
> This is but tuning of my breast,
> To make the musick better.

Some of the happiest and most serene poems are found in the earlier collection, such as *Easter*, *Sunday*, *The Elixir* and the entirely beautiful *Love bade me welcome*, which fitly ends both the Williams manuscript and *The Temple*. On the other hand, the note of struggle which is so apparent in the earlier poems, such as the first *Affliction*, biographically the most important of all, will be heard again in the Bemerton poems. The craftsmanship can hardly be said to differ in the two groups, although the revision of the Williams manuscript poems before their appearance in *The Temple* often shows notable improvement; yet there are poems as perfectly accomplished in the earlier group as in the later.

Two events brought Herbert at last to anchorage—his marriage and his acceptance of Bemerton; the one paves the way for the other. At Dauntsey he became betrothed to Lord Danby's kinswoman, Jane Danvers, and they were married at Edington, near Westbury, in the fine church built by William of Edington, the predecessor of William of Wykeham in the see of Winchester. After a year at Baynton, the Danvers house in that parish, came the offer of Bemerton. According to Walton, it needed the combined persuasion of his kinsman the Earl of Pembroke, Bishop Laud, and King Charles to overcome Herbert's diffidence. The last rector, a pluralist, had not resided on his cure; there was a tumble-down parsonage, and two churches to serve, both of them small and undistinguished and in need of repairs—Fuggleston St. Peter, at the entrance to Lord Pembroke's park, and Bemerton St. Andrew, opposite the rectory, a bare mile from Salisbury. The nearness to Salisbury made it possible for Herbert to be instituted in Salisbury and installed at Bemerton on the same day, April 26, 1630, soon after his thirty-seventh birthday. He was ordained priest by Bishop Davenant in the following September. The repairs to the rectory and churches were at once put in hand; Herbert mentions in a letter to his brother Henry that he is 'more beggarly now than I have been these many years, as having spent two hundred pounds in building.' This, however, did not prevent his making a home for two orphaned nieces, and when there was a difficulty about getting his brother to take in the third niece, she too was brought to Bemerton. The few Bemerton letters are more pleasing than those written from Cambridge. Nothing can exceed the delicacy and good sense with which he discusses with his brother the provision to be made for the nieces. There are also three letters to Ferrar, and a pretty note in which he sends 'a priest's blessing, though it be none of the court style' to Anne, Countess of Pembroke and Montgomery, then at Court. Evidently his nature had mellowed with the years, and there is a fragrancy about these letters which did not distinguish the earlier ones.

Herbert, then, had arrived at the goal for which his mother had always designed him, though she did not live to see him settled at Bemerton. His devotion to his calling, once he had accepted it, is evident, not only from the stories which Walton collected from his own acquaintance in Salisbury, but more authentically from *The Temple* and its prose counterpart *A Priest to the Temple, or, The Countrey Parson, his Character, and Rule of Holy Life.* There is no detail in the occupations of the parish priest, which he does not consider and prescribe for: 'he holds the Rule, that Nothing is little in Gods service: If it once have the honour of that Name, it grows great instantly.'

Two qualities are specially noticeable: his eminently good sense, expressed in his neat, gnomic and often humorous way, and his unfailing charity. Some of the methods he advocates might not be successful with men of less social gifts than Herbert. Of the country parson's dealings with parishioners who are on bad terms with one another he says: 'Sometimes, where he knowes there hath been or is a little difference, he takes one of the parties, and goes with him to the other, and all dine or sup together. There is much preaching in this friendliness.' We may guess that Mr. Herbert, with his perfect courtesy and quick understanding, was welcome in any house, and that any guest he brought was welcome for Herbert's sake. Into the services of the church he brought his sense of order and beauty as well as his conspicuous reverence. 'The Countrey Parson hath a speciall care of his Church, that all things there be decent.' He must see to it that it is kept spotlessly clean, 'and at great festivalls strawed, and stuck with boughs, and perfumed with incense.' In what he has to say of the services we may recognise Herbert himself. 'The Countrey Parson, when he is to read divine services, composeth himselfe to all possible reverence, . . . knowing that no Sermon moves his people so much to a reverence as a devout behaviour in the very act of praying.' 'The Countrey Parson being to administer the Sacraments, is at a stand with himself, how or what behaviour to assume for so holy things.' 'The Countrey Parson preacheth constantly, the pulpit is his joy and his throne.' Twice every day, as Ferrar relates, Herbert said the offices in his humble little church, never failing to have a congregation, while the labourers in the fields, as Walton tells us, 'let their Plow rest when Mr. Herberts Saints-Bell rung to Prayers.'

No one could have written as Herbert did in verse and prose of the pastoral life without experiencing much of its inward happiness. Some of the later poems, such as *The Odour* and *The God of Love*, breathe a spirit of content, others, like the antiphon *Let all the world in ev'ry corner sing*, *A true Hymne*, *The Call* and *King of Glorie, King of Peace*, have a note of exultation. A quickening of spiritual fervour and a revival of hope find expression in *The Flower*, a poem specially loved by Coleridge:

> And now in age I bud again,
> After so many deaths I live and write;
> I once more smell the dew and rain,
> And relish versing: O my onely light,
> It cannot be
> That I am he
> On whom thy tempests fell all night.

The last line reveals the intensity of the mental suffering he had gone through. Nor is that suffering wholly past; rather, it will

revive in new forms. If he no longer doubts the rightness of the decision, there is soon much to make him question its utility. What good was it to have arrived at the priesthood, if he was so soon to be incapacitated by sickness? In *The Crosse* he exclaims:

> And then when after much delay,
> Much wrastling, many a combate, this deare end,
> So much desir'd, is giv'n, to take away
> My power to serve thee.

This was but 'taking me up to throw me down,' 'To have my aim, and yet to be Farther from it than when I bent my bow.' But it is to be noticed that in this poem, and others of even sadder and more poignant utterance, like *Home* and *Longing*, there is never rebellion, but a fundamental loyalty, an acceptance of the Divine will, whatever suffering and frustration it may impose. Herbert comes nearest rebellion in that wonderful poem *The Collar*, which Professor Pierre Legouis has recently cited as among the earliest English examples of *vers libre*. It must almost certainly belong to the time before his bodily health finally broke, because of its immense vitality, the longing of the natural man for a full existence, unhampered by restrictions; the passionate lines run riot with gathering pace and momentum, but at their very height they are arrested by the Divine call:

> But as I rav'd and grew more fierce and wilde
> At every word,
> Me thoughts I heard one calling, *Childe*:
> And I reply'd, *My Lord.*

When later it is no longer vitality but its lack which threatens to thwart the high purpose of 'this deare end' and to close his days in uselessness and pain, the sense of frustration and of fruitless suffering at times overpowers him. Those who know only the poems which are commonly found in the anthologies will not have suspected the intensity of these darker moods:

> With sick and famisht eyes,
> With doubting knees and weary bones,
> To thee my cries,
> To thee my grones,
> To thee my sighs, my tears ascend:
> No end?

Yet in the midst of this suffering and disappointment his loyalty to the Divine will never fails. If the joy that came to him when first he descried the Divine love was short-lived, it was so real that its memory has never faded, and its reality is for him an earnest of ultimate fulfilment:

If thy first glance so powerfull be,
A mirth but open'd and seal'd up again;
What wonders shall we feel, when we shall see
Thy full-ey'd love!
When thou shalt look us out of pain,
And one aspect of thine spend in delight
More than a thousand sunnes disburse in light,
In heav'n above.

And if we are disposed to think that it would have been better to bear his pain in stoic silence, we may note Professor Palmer's wise reminder that Herbert 'published none of his poems, and that in poetry he probably found one of his few defences against pain.' Moreover, the unfaltering faith displayed in these poems of the dying Herbert is at least as conspicuous as their sadness. Nor did Herbert's life close in gloom and disillusion. The testimony about the last weeks of his life is singularly trustworthy. Ferrar had two excellent sources of first-hand information. Edmund Duncon, sent by Ferrar to convey the sympathy of the Little Gidding community, visited Bemerton twice in those last weeks. Arthur Woodnoth, Ferrar's first cousin and intimate friend, was with Herbert for the last three weeks of his life, closed his eyes in death, and was his executor. A saying of Herbert to Woodnoth on the day of his death is quoted in Ferrar's preface to *The Temple*, and there can be little doubt that Woodnoth was Walton's chief authority for his own fuller account. On the Sunday before his death Herbert called for one of his instruments and sang to its accompaniment passages from *Sunday* and *The Thanksgiving*. Here at the close those twin arts music and verse, both as dearly loved by Herbert as by Milton, wed their divine sounds and were 'pledges of Heaven's joy.'

Herbert, as he lay dying, made little of his acts of mercy, of his pastoral life, or even of his poems, but, after 300 years, that short ministry of three broken years is still a fragrant memory, and the man is the more endeared to us for the very fidelity with which he laid bare the long story of his inner life, with all its faults and its ardours, in *The Temple*. There is hardly a poem of his we can safely dismiss as dull; the dulness may be in ourselves, if we miss the play of his subtle humour, a piercing shaft of self-analysis or a winged aspiration.

F. E. Hutchinson.

GEORGE MOORE

IT is the Nouvelle Athènes on the Place Pigalle. The time is somewhere in the seventies of last century; and in that famous café an impressive, dark man is telling a story to a group of listeners. The story-teller is Villiers de L'Isle Adam; and among the listeners is a young man whose excessive care to appear completely Parisian might suggest to the observant that he was a foreigner. As Villiers finishes the story the door opens and Manet walks in and sits down next Degas and near the young man with the untidy beard, the clear complexion, and the wide-open, innocent, unblinking, never satisfied eyes. They begin to talk about painting, and they go on until midnight, when Catulle Mendes arrives; then they talk again about painting, and literature and the new life of the Paris studios and salons, until someone suggests that they should go, and they wander, still talking, along the Place Pigalle. The young man goes back to the apartment which he shares with a friend, and talks and sleeps and dreams of what he will do in literature. It is some months now since he decided to abandon painting; and since that decision he has read furiously, as he never read again, the poets of the romantic movement in France, the new poets, Rimbaud, Verlaine, Gustave Kahn, Mallarmé and the rest, Zola, Huysmans, Céard, and above all Balzac.

> Although I am apt to love too dearly the art of my day, and at the cost of that of other days, I did not fall into the fatal mistake of placing the realistic writers of 1877 side by side with and on the same plane of intellectual vision as the great Balzac; I felt that that vast immemorial mind rose above them all, like a mountain above the highest tower.

In that image one can recognise the hand of George Moore, a critic of astonishing felicity when he is praising whom he loved, just as he was of a purblind and irritable insensitiveness if he approached greatness that disagreed with him.

Page after page in *Confessions of a Young Man*, which he published in 1888, bear witness to the swiftness of Moore's response, whether of attraction or repulsion, to the people, the books, the echoes which he encountered. He was a young man in

the twenties when his father died, and he left London for Paris. It was a conversion rather than a journey; and Moore exhibits all the ardent intolerance of the convert. He indulges in extravagances which must have amused him in later years. His birthplace arouses in him a 'sensation akin to nausea,' and as his country is Catholic, so he has 'a brutal loathing for the religion I was brought up in.' He will love England, dear Protestant England, in order to spite County Mayo, and in his diatribes against Catholicism he is reduced—he who has seen the loveliness of Chinese and Japanese art at the Goncourts' and at Zola's—to using 'Chinese' as a term of abuse to fling at popery, and can even whip himself into the Belfast rhetoric of 'Look at the nations that have clung to Catholicism, starving moonlighters and starving brigands. The Protestant flag floats on every ocean breeze, the Catholic banner hangs limp in the incense silence of the Vatican.' The implied choice by George Moore of a life on the ocean wave rather than a pleasant study in the great palace is a very pretty piece of play-acting. I have quoted this, because it is important to emphasise that nearly all George Moore's conversations and opinions were the result of intense emotional reactions, to persons or to qualities. If this is not remembered, his development as an artist, his changes in taste and thought are difficult to understand. It is true he changed much less than is sometimes imagined. He was always, in spite of his adherence to naturalistic doctrine, at heart an æsthete whose gospel can be found in Pater's *Marius the Epicurean* and *Studies in the Renaissance*. Long before he had mastered his own instrument of style he wrote, in criticism of *The Story of an African Farm*, that art is 'rhythmical sequence of events described with rhythmical sequence of phrase.' That was not, of course, all that he demanded of the novel. He admired Dickens and Balzac, whereas Flaubert and Henry James bored him; but he could not allow that he, or any other man, had succeeded properly in writing fiction as it should be written until the rhythmical sequence was secured.

He was an æsthete, too, in the more vulgar sense of the word. That was insufficiently understood by an age which took for granted that the subjects and the manner of his early novels meant—well, Heaven knows what the Mudie-ruled public of the 'eighties imagined was implicit in the writing of naturalistic fiction, according to the French formula; but it is clear enough from contemporary attacks that Moore was credited with moral rather than æsthetic failings. Yet the man whose first period ends with the writing of that triumphant piece of naturalism *Esther Waters* was one who had nurtured himself on the idealistic poets. Shelley was his first love, and he was led by that to read 'nearly all the English lyric poets,' a statement not to be taken

quite literally, but no doubt an honest recollection of the author's boyhood preference. Hugo's poetry in France captured him before he opened the hectic pages of Baudelaire, Verlaine, Rimbaud, Laforgue, Mallarmé. He fell a hopeless victim, too, with a desperate decision that we to-day find hard to comprehend, to the novel which enthralled Swinburne, which Beardsley was the first delicately to mock in exquisite drawings, Gautier's *Mademoiselle de Maupin*. It must have been under the inspiration of that costumier of genius, that magician of false mosaic, that George Moore furnished his apartment in the Rue de la Tour des Dames.

> Our salon was a pretty resort—English cretonne of a very happy design—vine leaves, dark green and golden, broken up by many fluttering jays. The walls were stretched with thin colourful cloth, and the arm-chairs and the couches were to match. The drawing-room was in cardinal red, hung from the middle of the ceiling and looped up to give the appearance of a tent; a faun, in terra-cotta, laughed in the red gloom, and there were Turkish couches and lamps. In another room you faced an altar, a Buddhist temple, a statue of the Apollo, and a bust of Shelley. The bedrooms were made unconventional with cushioned seats and rich canopies; and in picturesque corners there were censers, great church candlesticks, and palms; then think of the smell of burning incense and wax and you will have imagined the sentiment of our apartment in Rue de la Tour des Dames. I bought a Persian cat, and a python that made a monthly meal off guinea-pigs; Marshall, who did not care for pets, filled his room with flowers—he used to sleep beneath a tree of gardenias in full bloom. We were so, Henry Marshall and George Moore, when we went to live in 76, Rue de la Tour des Dames, we hoped for the rest of our lives. He was to paint, I was to write.

Certainly Moore wrote but little of any value until he was away from that decorative room, back in London, in lodgings off the Strand. The poems of his early days, the first play, these one hopes no industrious editor will ever rediscover or reprint. Moore soon found that his proper work, at least at that time, was to write novels; and, in quick succession, we have the books of his first period—*A Modern Lover*, *A Mummer's Wife*, *A Drama in Muslin*, *A Mere Accident*, *Spring Days*, *Mike Fletcher*, *Vain Fortune*, and *Esther Waters*, which was published in 1894. To this period also belong *The Confessions*, published in 1888, *Modern Painting*, of 1893, and *Impressions and Opinions*, of 1891.

Anyone who came to these books, even to *Mike Fletcher*, with knowledge of the later work of Moore would find in many of their pages indications of the very different author whom he knows and admires. It would have been a very far-sighted critic who predicted George Moore's development from any or all of these books. Indeed, it could not, I think, have been done except by a man with an imaginative insight into certain varieties of the artistic temperament, a man who read with rare intelligence the

Confessions and *Impressions and Opinions*. For from these books can be gathered the one most important fact about Moore as man and artist—his excessive impressionability. In a sense it would be true to say that Moore never had an idea of his own. He had extraordinarily little power of invention—a lack which he shares with Shakespeare, though we like to think Shakespeare was too casual, rather than unable, to invent. He had no permanent convictions about his art, except that you must not have permanent convictions. (This is perhaps not true of the years when he was an old man, apt to believe he had always preached what he was then practising.) He had very firm prejudices—he wrote of Hardy in 1888 what he said of him in 1930—and few principles. He had—and this is what matters—an incomparable, inexhaustible capacity for receiving, and an amazing industry and patience in seeking the best manner in which to render his impressions. It was always believed by his friends, and sometimes declared by himself, that he read very little; and in his lack of knowledge was found the reason for some of his more capricious opinions—he had not sufficient ground for that comparison which is necessary in criticism. Yet at one time he evidently read a good deal—I suspect mostly in those years in Paris. We not only have his own statements in *The Confessions*, we have the evidence of his early books. All the better ones have their models. Occasionally, as in his first novel, *The Modern Lover*, Moore has practically taken a specific author for his model; he himself considers that this book owed its character to Zola and the Goncourts. It seems to me to be far more akin to Guy de Maupassant's early work (it was published in the same year, 1883, as *Une Vie*); and no one can fail to realise how remarkably it anticipates *Bel Ami*. It would be of interest to know if Maupassant had read his young acquaintance's tale about Lewis Seymour. In other stories of this period the debt is not to any particular author, but to the manner and the theory of the predominant school in French fiction. For myself, I think it can be argued that *Esther Waters* is the greatest of naturalistic novels; for while *Madame Bovary* is a greater book, it makes concessions to a romantic ideal which Moore refuses. *Esther Waters* is better than anything of Zola's, because while Moore writes according to the naturalistic formula he does not *feel* according to it. The naturalistic formula demanded that the author's emotions should be excluded from the novel for the sake of truth. Let us consider this for the moment. It does not follow that you can have a truthful novel written by a man who has not, previously to the writing, experienced emotion; for emotion is a necessary condition of all observation. Now while Zola sentimentalises, moralises or denounces after the event, and writes tracts of

genius, Moore felt before the event, purged himself of his emotions, and then told his tale. His power to do this, unmatched by any novelist, is due to his power, unmatched again by any author except Sterne, to treat George Moore as an object of observation. So the Moore who writes *Esther Waters* can control the Moore who observed and was moved by her story. (The novel should be compared, by all who are interested in Moore's power to retain his hold on anything once seen and known, to the sketch of his lodging-house 'slavey' in *The Confessions*.)

I have no space to write in any detail of Moore's early work, and must concentrate on those books in which can be seen the Moore who was to be one of the greatest artists of his time in English prose. His early prose is uncertain, packed with strange words and locutions, ungrammatical, often ugly, but nearly always with that odd quality of a living and individual voice which makes us forgive faults otherwise unpardonable. The construction of some of his stories was ungainly and unnatural; and his taste—he never learned discretion, nor tried to—was too often rather extravagant. Here, however, he was always dependent on his latest friends or the last 'ordaining word': 'Shelley,' 'France,' 'Naturalism'—all in turn, he says, 'led to the creation of a mental existence,' and the last word blessedly estopped him from the composition of poems of passion. In *Modern Painting*, a book that can still be read with pleasure, he championed the cause of artists who seemed in his day as extravagant as Braque and von Klee seem to many to-day. In those essays and in *Impressions and Opinions* he exploited to the full the French school of criticism, as in the novels the French school of fiction. His critical essays are the adventures, not always of a soul, but always of a wit, of an intelligence and of an engaging impudence among masterpieces or among works that were not masterpieces. The essay on Balzac is excessive in its generosity, but it remains a splendid tribute to the greatest French novelist; and the essay on Ibsen's *Ghosts* has a sensitiveness and an appreciation of spiritual values that one could have hardly have expected Ibsen to arouse in George Moore. How good, for instance, is this!—

> Scenes between mother and son, be what they may, scenes of forgiveness, of expostulation, of counsel, of love, are to me the most strangely pathetic life can afford. There is something strange, mysterious, something not quite expressible in words in such confidences, and in such confidences the root of the play *Ghosts* is set.

While the masterpiece of this period is certainly *Esther Waters*, one of the greatest interest to the student of George Moore's development is, perhaps, *A Mere Accident*. It was published in 1887. It is written under the influence of Huysmans (whose

A Rebours came out in 1884), of whom Moore wrote: 'Huysmans goes to my soul like a gold ornament of Byzantine workmanship; there is in his style the yearning charm of arches, a sense of ritual, the passion of the mural, of the window.' As a novel *A Mere Accident* can hardly be said to exist. It is the story of John Norton, a young landowner determined to become a monk, who suddenly changes his mind and finds himself, to his surprise and hers, engaged to a young girl of seventeen. She is outraged by a tramp and kills herself; and John determines, 'The world shall be my monastery.' (In a later version, printed in *Celibates*, John returns to the religious life.) What is exciting in this book is the early part in which George Moore describes Norton's passionate addiction to later Latin writers—Tertullian, Prudentius, Ambrose, Walafrid Strabo, Angilbert—and gives quotations from their works that show a real love of the subject. It is true John Norton has evidently been to school with Huysmans' des Esseintes; but the young man has read for himself, and enjoys Tertullian in spite of his elder's disapproval. John Norton's enthusiasm for Prudentius makes him utter the shrewd judgment that the Latin poet's hymns, 'by the dramatic rapidity of the narrative, by the composition of the strophe, and by his wit, remind me very forcibly of the English ballad.' Of real importance, too, is John Norton's library:

> there were complete editions of Landor and Swift, then came two large volumes of Leonardo da Vinci. Raising his eyes, the parson read through the titles of Mr. Browning's work. Tennyson was in a cheap seven-and-six edition; then came Swinburne, Pater, Rossetti, Morris, two novels by Rhoda Broughton, Dickens, Thackeray, Fielding and Smollett; the complete works of Balzac, Gautier's *Emaux et Camées*, *Salammbo*, *L'Assommoir*; add to this Carlyle, Byron, Shelley, Keats, etc.

The bookcase containing these was faced by one full of the Latin authors of John's adoration—Tertullian, Jerome, Augustine, Lactantius, Prudentius, Sedulius, Fortunatus, Duns Scotus, Hibernicus exul, Angilbert, Milo, etc. The unexpected appearance of the great anti-Thomist, Duns Scotus, is a characteristic piece of Moorish carelessness.[1] Why I insist on the importance of this early book is that no one familiar with it could have imagined that George Moore was at any time a complete, whole-hearted devotee of the naturalistic discipline. He was always, in the Paterian sense, an æsthete.

It was in the winter of 1899–1900 that I first met George Moore. Familiar as I was with much of his work, especially with

[1] In the revised edition of the story (1895) Duns Scotus and others disappear. Also Newman and 'the dramatists of the Restoration' are added to the modern bookcase.

Modern Painting, *Esther Waters*, and *A Mummer's Wife*, I did not as a boy take that interest in the art of prose, or in the craft of the novel, which I gave to poetry and the art of poetry. It was in Yeats' room, at the back of St. Pancras Church, that I met him. I knew nothing of his Parisian background, and none of his London friends except Mr. Yeats, who was starting his campaign for the Irish National Theatre, and had recently found Synge. I had not then read *Evelyn Innes*, the novel published in 1898 and dedicated to 'Arthur Symons and W. B. Yeats, two contemporary writers with whom I am in sympathy.' Had I known of that dedication I might have been, even in my youthful enthusiasm, diverted for a moment from the entrancing conversation of the man whom I thought then, and still think, the greatest of modern poets. Moore was then forty-eight years old, clear-skinned, a drooping moustache revealing the lines of his childish, rather greedy mouth, and with eyes round, surprised and continually unsatisfied. To his friendship with Yeats we owe the middle and the later Moore. I do not mean that, had it not been for his passionate admiration, his almost slavish discipular attitude to Yeats, he would not have gone on writing; but I do not believe his work would have taken the direction, or had the supreme quality it gained, had it not been for his acquaintance with the Irish poet. The writing of *Esther Waters* left him with nothing further to do in the pursuit of naturalism. A novelist of great invention can go on filling the same formula with new figures and fresh incidents; but Moore, who had so little invention, consumed his insatiable energy and patience in finding new ways of writing, in the perfecting of ways which he found suited to him. As in Moore temperament exceeded character, so in Yeats character exceeded temperament, or at least thoroughly controlled it; and Moore's development cannot be understood except by those critics who can appreciate the overwhelming influence which the younger man had over the elder. First, naturalism disappears. That creed, once so ardently accepted, completely vanishes. And more than naturalism died. Yeats argued that, if nobility and beauty were to be restored to imaginative literature, even the milder realism of traditional English authors must go; and with it was to be banished the attempt to achieve verisimilitude in style and in characterisation. To be life-like was to be false. He was ready in this crusade to jettison not only 'Erewhon' Butler and Shaw, but also the Ibsen of the prose dramas, whom he regarded as a traitor to the great tradition of the poets. Then, Moore's Parisianism had to be killed. Literature was to be national, and the literature written by Irishmen should spring out of Irish legend, history or contemporary life. An Irish theatre was to be

created; and Irish authors were to go home to Ireland. In retrospect Moore has made delightful comedy out of his Irish period; but the amusing fantasy of *Hail and Farewell* must not be allowed to blind the critic to the fact that the book gives an entirely false account of Moore's own behaviour. He sat at the feet of Yeats. The poet's burning conviction, constancy of character, and practical intelligence held him completely captive. Once it had been Shelley, then France, then Naturalism; in 1897 and for ten years or so after it was Yeats and Ireland. That this, the latest religion, was the strongest, is evident. One of the plainest testimonies to the strength of Yeats' influence is that Moore, who would rewrite (often with extreme skill) his early work, would never either reprint or rewrite *Evelyn Innes* or *Sister Theresa*, the books which show how great a personal effect Yeats had upon him.

There must always, of course, be something in a man's own nature to account for a great conversion, however dominant is the personality of the preacher who converts. Those who read the early Moore carefully will find hints that make this amazing conversion, his artistic submission to Yeats, not at all unaccountable. For instance, he had an instinctive sympathy with Yeats' ideas about the theatre. In *The Confessions* there is a passage which shows that.

> I went to the Lyceum and there I saw that exquisite love-song—for *Romeo and Juliet* is no more than a love-song in dialogue—tricked out in silks and carpets and illuminated building, a vulgar bawd suited to the gross passion of an ignorant public. I noted all that with the hatred of a passionate heart, and I longed for a simple stage, a few simple indications, and the simple recitation of that story of the sacrifice of the two white souls for the reconciliation of two great houses. My hatred did not reach to the age of the man who played the boy-lover, but to the offensiveness with which he thrust his individuality upon me, longing to realize the poet's divine imagination; and the woman, too, I wished with my whole soul away, subtle and strange though she was, and I yearned for her part to be played by a youth as in old times: a youth cunningly disguised, would be a symbol; and my mind would be free to imagine the divine Juliet of the poet, whereas I could but dream of the bright eyes and delicate mien and motion of the woman who had thrust herself between me and it.

The man who wrote that obviously could not remain true to naturalism without being false to something very deeply rooted in his artistic temperament. Yet he was so constituted that he could not, apparently, find his own method; and while of his early work only the books written according to the naturalistic formula are satisfactory either in construction or characterisation, much even of work so governed is shapeless, feeble in outline, and without perspective. It was to the influence of Yeats that Moore owed the discovery of his own style. Yeats forced him

to discipline himself, persuaded him to forsake a manner in which he would never be completely himself, was the Socratic midwife for the delivery of those masterpieces, tragic and comic, for which Moore will be remembered. If the Yeats of *Hail and Farewell* is one of George Moore's greatest comic representations, the George Moore who wrote the book was a creation of W. B. Yeats.

I used to get the impression in those years of the Boer War that neither Yeats nor Lady Gregory were very anxious that George Moore should come to Dublin. They behaved as a wise director will with a penitent whose emotional determination to enter on the religious life he distrusts and wishes to test. Still, to Dublin Moore went, and to his return to that country of ' priest-ridden moonlighters ' we owe much lovely work, including his three greatest—some of the stories in *The Untilled Field*, *The Lake*, and the three volumes of *Hail and Farewell*. Moore was fond of saying that he left England because of the Boer War: he was finished with ' The Brixton Empire.' I do not think the Boer War would have driven him to anywhere—except perhaps to Paris; he could not be separated from the inspiration and direction of Yeats. No one who saw the two men together at that time could doubt that what possessed Moore was not a disgust with London, but a fixed determination to follow Yeats; and if Yeats said Ireland, Ireland it must be. In the preface to *The Bending of the Bough* (1901) he gives his reasons for returning to his own country. Art belongs to the youth of a country, and cannot flourish in great empires. Norway and Belgium have produced ' the great dramatic poets of modern times.'

> Then whither in the flight from England will art betake herself? Eastward there are the Russian and the German empires and behind them the Chinese. All Europe has been visited and art never returns to where she has once been; even Italy cannot be cited in disproof of this, for in Italy in Roman times art was a Greek inspiration, and all the Roman statues were the work of Greek artists. So whither will art go? In what country will art suddenly appear? In the Soudan, or in the Transvaal? Or will art rest for a space in this forlorn Atlantic island, re-knitting herself to the tradition which existed before England was, in gold ornaments and scroll work, and in many tales of chivalry? Will there be a re-blossoming of the ancient language, or shall we save some accent of Shelley's tongue which has declined into neologisms and archaisms? That art has left England there can be no doubt. Art has left France, and Germany and Russia; it is still in Norway, and when it leaves Norway it must find another small nation, one which has not yet achieved its destiny—a nation such as Greece was before Marathon, such as England was before the Armada and again before Trafalgar.

Dates and facts were never a strong point of Moore's, nor history of any kind, and it would be waste of time to inquire from

him when he believed the Armada sailed or Trafalgar was fought, or whether the arts he praised came before those engagements. Anyhow, in 1900, if there were still a few artists in England, George Moore went to Ireland.

Of the work inspired by that sojourn—was it an exile or a home-coming ?—the loveliest is *The Lake.* It is the only novel in English which successfully challenges comparison with Turgenev's, and I think excels the Russian master's in its quiet, in its serenity, in its evocation of natural and imaginative beauty. To the same year as *The Lake* (1905) belongs *Memoirs of my Dead Life*, and in that volume is some of Moore's most exquisite prose, prose that has at once the charm of talk and the profounder beauty of meditation. *Resurgam* and *A Remembrance* are among the most memorable things he ever wrote, full of that strange longing which, as he often says in the history of Evelyn Innes, is the fate of those who are brought up as Catholics and forsake the faith. The last paragraph of *A Remembrance* has in it a Virgilian tenderness. The friend he has loved has been buried.

> The crowd dispersed quickly; the relatives and the friends of the deceased, as they returned home, sought those who were most agreeable and sympathetic, and matters of private interest were discussed. Those who had come from a distance consulted their watches, and an apology to life was implicit in their look, and the time they had surrendered to something outside of life evidently struck them as being strangely disproportionate. The sunlight laughed along the sea, and the young corn was thick in the fields; leaves were beginning in the branches, larks rose higher and higher, disappearing in the pale air, and as we approached the woods the amorous cawing of the rooks reminded us that she would never hear the pleasant sounds of the spring-time again, and that our lives would not be the same. And dropping behind the chattering crowd that in mourning weed wended its way through the sad spring landscape, I thought of her whom I had loved so long, and of memory as a shrine where we can worship without shame, of friendship, and of the pure escape it offers for our natural instincts; I remembered that there is love other than that which the young man offers to her he would take to wife, and I knew how much more intense and strangely personal was my love of her than the love which that day I saw the world offering to its creatures.

The last fifteen years of Moore's life were astonishingly prolific. In them he wrote not only his long narrative pieces—*The Brook Kerith*, *Héloïse and Abélard*, *Ulick and Soracha* and *Aphrodite in Aulis*—but he carried yet further the personal mixture of criticism, gossip and conversation which he had started in *The Confessions* and perfected in *Hail and Farewell.* There are also *The Story-Teller's Holiday*, and some experiments in essay, drama, and translation that no student of his work will care to miss. Nothing in this period lacks 'quality,' to use his own word: what we miss rather is substance. When we examine

Moore's criticism we discover that, if we put aside—and it is a strange and important exception—his faithful admiration for Balzac, he always underestimated the need for substance in literature. If the quality of the telling revolted him or left him indifferent, he could not read the book. That is the only source of his contempt for Scott, Charlotte and Emily Brontë, and of Thomas Hardy, the source of his denigration of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. It accounts, too, for the low estimate that he formed of Shakespeare, and never truly recanted, in spite of some compliments, and of his delight in the dramatist's 'pure poetry'—that is, the comparatively minor work, untroubled by thought. Or perhaps it would be truer to say that if, in addition to a quality that did not attract him, a novel also had that terrible imaginative power which appears to leave the artist at the mercy of his fable, Moore then could not tolerate him. It is an ironical thing that this man should twice have been driven himself to attempt two subjects which, for their proper presentation, demanded precisely the qualities that he could not tolerate and did not possess. A subject of deep religious and passionate significance can be handled, no doubt, by a supreme imaginative artist in a mood of recollected calm : there is white, smokeless heat, as in Sophocles and Ibsen, as well as red, fulgurous heat, as in Shakespeare and Dostoevsky. But Moore had no desire for heat. It was this dislike of heat which made him able to put forward the absurd claim that Anne Brontë's *Agnes Grey* was the 'most perfect prose narrative' in English literature. Anne was the only one of the Brontë sisters who was the natural governess, a woman who was born to discipline, to gossip quietly, to the making of sedate and not always unmalicious comment on her employers. George Moore, with all his genius, had a great deal of the governess in him. He was a naughty governess. He loved the backstairs. He enjoyed the ambiguous position of the Victorian governess, the retailing in the drawing-room the stories which he had heard in the servants' hall. He deprecated passion, excitement, vehemence, and lack of control ; indulgence in any of these might lose a governess her position. She is right to dislike and avoid them. Indulgence in any of them might have lost Moore his incomparable position as a maker of pictures, a teller of tales, an inimitable recorder of what men and women looked like. Even when he portrays, and portrays consummately, people suffering, in agony, it is a portrayal, not a revelation. We are not allowed to know what they suffer, or to believe that Moore knew what they suffered. We are shown what the artist saw ; and all he saw was how the sufferers appeared in their passion or their pain. Though he had failed as a painter, he retained the painter's talent to express surface ; if the surface did not always

express the truth of the person or the objects painted—well, that was because Moore could not safely see below the surface. He tried it, and it upset him, and made him incapable of saying what he saw, of recording what he had heard—which was the task which fascinated him beyond all others.

I cannot then rate *The Brook Kerith* or *Héloïse and Abélard* as high as do some of Moore's admirers. When Moore says 'My admiration for Landor is without limit; I place him above Shakespeare,' he is defending himself. For where Landor fails, Moore fails. In the ability to distinguish characters, in the portraying of a suffering and ardent nobility, in the invention of intense situations appropriate to high and tragic persons—of these there is no trace in this master of a superbly flowing narrative style, not always free from a certain garrulous monotony. He had his own excuses for beginning *The Brook Kerith* with the story of Joseph of Arimathæa; the real reason is evidently that even George Moore hesitated before bringing on to his tapestry the Figure which, had he been properly seen and apprehended, would have torn that pattern into tatters, so he decides to concentrate the reader's attention on another figure, of whom we have small knowledge. When Jesus does enter, he is nothing; free from the occasional vulgarity which mars Renan's Galilee pastoral, Moore's reconstruction of the most tremendous character in history is as frail and as ineffective. It is, this book, Watteau in the wilderness; and the Paul who spoke before Felix, and on the mount of Ares, is but one of the greater patrons of the *Nouvelle Athènes*. So in *Héloïse and Abélard* George Moore attacks a legend as lurid and as full of sustained terror as the legend of Orestes, and he turns this, too, into pastoral prettiness. In spite of his prolixity, one is reminded by this book of Moore's admiration for Maeterlinck; for here, too, as in the early Maeterlinck, the people are, as it were, veiled and masked. They go delicately, and with formal gestures, though in a larger landscape and breathing a more spacious air than Maeterlinck's people; but they have little of pulse or heart-beat. The masterly quality of the decorative prose no one can deny; but never, surely, has one of the world's quickest stories, full of sharp moments and of breath-taking impulses, of darting rage and pity, been taken at so slow a pace. It is as if 'Onward, Christian Soldiers' were sung to the tune of 'Abide with me.'

In the account of his friendship with Pater in *Avowals* Moore admits, in excuse for a particularly foolish piece of behaviour of his own, to 'a certain incurable frivolity.' There are certainly plenty of examples of this to be found in his work, often where he would not have discerned it. It is in a fundamental sense frivolous to write so definitely and so indiscreetly about people,

when you have as little power of understanding character as Moore had. It took him years to understand men whom he saw very often. He does not seem to have realised Pater's intense shyness until after his death. With men of profound imagination he almost always fails, though A. E. conquers his mocking spirit by a sheer simplicity that appealed to Moore's sense of natural beauty. When he is painting a man of small calibre he often attains a felicity, a brightness, and a sureness almost unequalled by any portrait-painter. How admirable is Gosse in *Avowals!* The acidulated snobbery of the man is exquisitely rendered, and we are not infrequently reminded that it was of Gosse that the earlier Moore wrote in *Confessions:* 'Literary clubs have been founded, and their leather arm-chairs have begotten Mr. Gosse.' I am not sure, however, whether Moore realised how extraordinarily comic he and Gosse are as they gravely dispose of Thackeray as lacking in sympathy with Nature and animals and as 'without human sympathies,' an author whose surfaces only are admirable; how silly in his condescension is Gosse solemnly recording his disapproval of the orphanage in Ibsen's *Ghosts.* Moore must, however, have seen the frivolity of such a passage as this; it is mere running-on, the lightest chatter of the mind, only mildly entertaining:

> A sort of Keats, I said, without Keats' talent. And fell to thinking that to die at twenty-four is a poetic act; and out of my meditation the thought arose, why it should have arisen I cannot tell, but I did say to myself: Kirke White's name is not good enough for a poet, but it might have made a good English novelist. A better name it certainly is than any we discover among our novelists—only colourless names, dry-as-dust or vulgar names like mackintoshes, names that are as squashy as galoshes. Trollope! did anybody ever bear a name that predicted a style more trollopy. Anthony, too, in front of it, to make matters worse. And Walter Scott is a jog-trot name, a round-faced name, a snub-nosed, spectacled, pot-bellied name, a placid, beneficent, worthy old bachelor name; a name that evokes all conventional ideas and formulas, a Grub Street name, a nerveless name, an arm-chair name, an old oak and Abbotsford name; a name to improvise novels to buy farms with. And Thackeray is a name for a footman, for the syllables clatter like plates, and when we hear it we say: we shall want the carriage at half-past two, Thackeray. And Dickens is the name for a page-boy, surely.

Like all people with few and weak convictions, George Moore was bigoted in his opinions, and found it hard to believe that opinions with which he disagreed might be soundly based. This is very amusingly shown in his record of a discussion with Henry James at Miss Mary Robinson's (the poet, Madame Duclaux) about Pater's *Marius the Epicurean.* James had complained that in *Marius* 'although the whole of the first volume is given over to praise of Pagan civilisation, a large part of the second is

turned over to an equal admiration of Christianity.' And Henry James' point was that 'we cannot admire opposites equally.' This distressed Moore very greatly; and neither he nor James, also a man of no convictions, ever seem to have dreamt that their opinion might be wrong, that the opposition which they assumed to exist might be a false fancy to Pater, who belonged in spirit to that school of Catholicism, represented by the Alexandrine Clement and by many mystics in later ages, who believed that Christianity embraced the best of Paganism. Apart, however, from its liveliness and wit, what sound things can be found in *Avowals!* I would especially recommend to George Moore's younger admirers the praise of Rudyard Kipling's style, praise which is at once discriminating and generous. It is a fair criticism that Kipling 'sees more than he feels,' and from a critic of Moore's fidgety scrupulousness this is an encomium worth having:

> I envy Mr. Kipling his copious and sonorous vocabulary, especially his neologisms; he writes with the whole language, with the language of the Bible, and with the language of the streets. He can do this, for he possesses the ink-pot which turns the vilest tin idiom into gold.

Of Moore's plays a word will suffice. I have never seen a copy of *Luther*, his earliest effort, written in collaboration. The dramatic version of *Esther Waters* makes a good, rather Surrey-side drama; but the later Moore, to whom the one coherent and perennially entrancing character was George Moore, had too slight an interest in human nature and its passions to write a great play. He might, I believe, have succeeded in highly sophisticated farce—given us a companion-piece to *The Importance of Being Earnest*; and indeed, with a little adjustment of angles, *Elizabeth Cooper* (later rewritten as *The Coming of Gabrielle*) would have been a farce instead of a rather stiff comedy of ill-manners and misadventures. He did write farce in conversational narrative, as in the portrait of Sickert and his frustrated wedding; but he does not seem to have had the kind of blunt patience necessary to the practical dramatist. From the date of *The Brook Kerith* his natural mode of expression is the soliloquy, and a play all soliloquy could only be written by a supreme poet. While the lighter works of his later period will always have an amused circle of vainly interrupting readers, as pleased as the friends in Ebury Street, who were cast for the thankless *rôles* of ventriloquists' dummies, I do not think that the more serious work of those last fifteen years will be read much except by those who are devoted to pure quality of prose. Such readers Moore will always have, as Landor will. The sustained beauty of the prose is greater than Landor's; it is not the greatest prose, because it has not the abundant vitality of such prose as Browne's, or Donne's, or

Charles Lamb's, or of Yeats'. Henry James told Moore that *A Mummer's Wife* was too long; and his later books suffer from his extreme delight in hearing his own voice, in watching the pattern of the tapestry grow. He is a master of everything in prose except the ultimate problem of the shape of the completed work. This is seen in his short stories: in *Hugh Monfert*, perhaps the best of the stories in the volume called *In Single Strictness*, he decides the length by some purely external standard. It could have been much shorter, or a full-length novel. Too often the reader feels that a book only ends, not because the subject is exhausted or the content fully exposed, but because the author is exhausted or has been distracted to something else.

There can be few great authors who have been more industrious, more determinedly applied to the task of mastering their art. There is no author who, from such unpromising beginnings, found himself a style so suitable, so lovely, so supple. The sentences move with the effortless grace of a snake through water; the paragraphs are noiseless rivers in a landscape whose beauty is hushed and unforgettable. Moore's memory of things long past is livelier than most men's apprehensions of the present. He secretes things seen and things heard, and transforms them into things of beauty, or fancy, or ceremonial sorrow or pure mischief. His progress to the perfection which he achieved only seems sudden to those who are unacquainted with some of the books he suppressed. You can hear the music of the later Moore in not a few passages of *Evelyn Innes* and *Sister Theresa*, and in earlier books he disclosed, in a fumbling and uncertain way, what he would do when he could. It is false criticism to draw a distinct line of cleavage between the odd, early efforts and the consummate mastery of George Moore's mature work; of him, more than of most artists, is his own word true: 'We grow into ourselves, if we grow.'

R. Ellis Roberts.

CORRESPONDENCE

'THE BETRAYAL OF MONTENEGRO'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—It is with some surprise that I find an article in *The Nineteenth Century* by a Prince Milo of Montenegro. I lived before the war many years in Montenegro and knew the old King and his sons. Legally the title Prince was confined to the King's direct descendants, and, failing them, to the next heir male. There are two grandsons of the late King—the sons of Prince Mirko—still alive, and, according to the only published pedigree of the Petrovitch family (*vide Spomenica*, Cetinje, 1926), there are also three sons of the King's first cousin, Voyvoda Marko, one son of Voyvoda Shako, and a grandson of Voyvoda Bozo still living.

There was no Prince in Montenegro previous to 1852. The head of the country was always a celibate bishop. Milo Petrovitch, according to the same pedigree, can claim relationship to the late King only through a common ancestor in the seventeenth century and is not recognised in the *Almanach de Gotha* as having the right to a title.

Yours faithfully,
M. E. DURHAM.

36, Glenloch Road, N.W.3.

SIR,—Will you allow me to point out that the Montenegrin gentleman whose article was published in the last number of the *Nineteenth Century and After* is presumably Milo Petrovitch-Njegushi, and that, according to the genealogical tree circulated by himself, he is sixth in descent from one Rade, the brother of Danilo I. (born 1671)? This Danilo is the great-great-uncle of Stanko (born 1817), who in his turn was the grandfather of the late King Nicholas. It was only in 1852 that the princely title was introduced into Montenegro; its assumption then caused Turkey to declare war on the Montenegrins, and it is obvious that the title has never been borne by the ancestors of the branch that descends from the above-mentioned Rade. Milo Petrovitch-Njegushi would therefore appear to have no right to the title of prince.

Yours faithfully,
HENRY BAERLEIN.

The Bath Club,
34, Dover Street, W.1.

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THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

CONTENTS FOR APRIL

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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*

No. DCLXXIV—April 1933

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT?

Nearly eighteen months have passed since the National Government was returned to power with a majority unprecedented in modern times. Since then the balance of the Budget has been enforced by drastic economies and even more drastic taxation. The confidence of the financial world in England's stability has been fully restored at home and abroad. A gigantic scheme of debt conversion has been carried through with unexampled success. The disastrous economic drain of free imports has been stopped, and a comprehensive system of national protection established. The Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa has crowned thirty years of effort and inaugurated a system of effective mutual preference throughout the Empire. The situation in India has markedly improved under firm and sympathetic handling.

And yet, there can be no disguising the fact that the National Government has lost much both of popularity and of authority. It commands no enthusiasm, and only such qualified and negative

confidence as is based on the absence of any practicable alternative. It was, of course, obvious from the outset that measures of economy like the Means Test would be widely resented and vigorously exploited by the Opposition, and that an overwhelmingly Tory House of Commons would look with misgiving on some of the measures and policies inherited from the time of a Socialist Government. The real trouble is, however, not there. The Government is strong enough to disregard attacks both from left and right. The real danger comes from that great mass of non-political opinion in all classes which gave the Government its mandate, believing that it would be exercised with the clear and united conviction, with the high confidence, and with the unremitting vigour which a great national crisis demands. It is that body of middle opinion which is beginning to criticise the Government as slow and uncertain in action, lacking in strong purpose, inclined to be discouraged by the difficulties of its task; to suspect, in fact, that Mr. MacDonald and his colleagues really have no very definite views, do not quite know where they are, or where they mean to go.

What lies at the root of this disappointment? It certainly is not the lack of individual ability on the part of the members of the Government, either on the floor of the House or in their departments. It lies, I believe, in two things: first of all, in the actual composition of the Government; and secondly, in the structure of a Cabinet system unfitted to cope with the demands of a critical and complex situation. It was Voltaire, I believe, who once remarked that what was wrong with the Holy Roman Empire was that it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. The trouble with the present National Government in this country is that it is not sufficiently national, nor sufficiently a government to meet the urgent needs of the hour. It is still, even after the shedding of the extreme Free Trade wing, no more than a coalition of very divergent elements, nor is the machine which it endeavours to work one which is calculated to develop a common outlook or the habit of looking ahead.

To understand the first source of weakness it is necessary to go back to the circumstances in which the National Government came into being. By 1931 the country was drifting rapidly towards economic disaster. For ten years British industry had struggled to hold its own against the threefold handicap of over-taxation, free imports, and of a currency and credit deflation imposed in order to secure a return to the gold standard at the pre-war parity. On top of this had come the tremendous world deflation which was started by the American boom and collapse of 1929. British production was breaking down, and in the process the sources of our national revenue were drying up at the very moment that the

strain upon that revenue was being enormously increased by the cost of supporting an ever-growing army of unemployed. The remedial measures taken by the Socialist Government were only calculated, under Free Trade conditions, to aggravate the drain upon the national resources, and to hasten the progress towards budgetary insolvency. The ever-widening adverse gap in the balance of visible trade was no longer made good by the dwindling figures of our invisible exports. We continued to invest abroad, only it was not with our earnings, but with money deposited at short call; and in that respect we were in the position of a man who, already overdrawn at his bankers, continues to indulge in speculative investment with the help of the moneylender.

The full seriousness of the situation was revealed in June 1931 by the publication of the Report of the Macmillan Committee. That Report raised not only new and urgent issues of monetary policy, but also, by implication, the direct alternative of a change in tariff policy or of a drastic general wage reduction. But just because it dealt with matters outside the purview of ordinary politics, its grave warnings passed unheeded. A few weeks later appeared the Report of the May Committee on the administrative expenditure of the Government. That document dealt, not with the underlying economic issues, but only with their secondary symptoms as revealed in the imminence of an unbalanced Budget. Neither the monetary nor the fiscal problems came within its purview. Accepting as its basis of calculation both the existing price level and the existing figures of unemployment, it could offer no other solution than a sweeping reduction of expenditure, and more particularly of the expenditure on unemployment. Writing early in August for this Review[1] on these two Reports, away from England and with no knowledge of the storm that was to arise in the next few days, I summed up the situation in a passage which stated both the case for a real National Government to meet the economic crisis and the case against a coalition, brought together with no other object than that of dealing with the purely consequential symptom of an unbalanced Budget:

> No Government can ignore either the warnings or the positive recommendations of the May Committee. But no Government can decide to what extent those recommendations can and must be carried out unless it has first made up its mind whether it accepts the main conclusions of the Macmillan Committee and has further decided how far, and by what means, it can give effect to those conclusions. The importance of these considerations is emphasised by much of the loose talk which is current about the desirability of a National Government to carry through a policy of economy. Nothing could be more unfortunate, at this moment, than a national concentration upon a secondary object which would in any way

[1] 'National Policy and the Monetary Crisis,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1931.

weaken concentration upon the only policies which can save us. A National Government prepared to carry out a tariff policy bolder and more far-reaching, especially on the agricultural and Imperial side, than any which even the largest Unionist majority would dare to introduce, and to give to that policy a truly national sanction ; a National Government that would tackle the monetary question on really big Imperial lines . . . ; a National Government that could ruthlessly prune away waste, but yet make it clear that it stood for the maintenance of a high wage standard, and lent no countenance to the idea that we look to sweating, either public or private, as the way to salvation—such a National Government, if attainable, might be well worth having. But a coalition of all the most negative and timid elements in all the 'old gangs' in order to prevent the country coming to a clear decision on the fundamental issue of economic policy, that, indeed, would be a crowning disaster.

The May Report, thrown at the public without a word of guidance from a helpless Government, and naturally made the most of by its opponents and critics, burst like a bomb. A panic removal of short money from London by foreign investors revealed the insecurity of our attachment to the gold standard. With its fetish imperilled the City screamed loudly for the immediate carrying out of the May Report at all costs as the only chance of securing French and American funds to shore up the tottering idol. The Socialist Government, swallowing all its principles in its terror, stretched compliance to the point of disruption. The Conservative leaders, infected by the bankers' panic, threw away the chance either of office for their own party with a free hand to carry out the constructive policy which they believed essential, or of securing the acceptance of that policy by the Socialists, who were not disinclined, it seems, to swallow even a tariff on top of drastic economies, if only they were spared the cutting down of the dole. But the tentative feelers in that direction were disregarded, and 'the May Report, the whole Report, and nothing but the Report,' became the only issue. On that negative basis, with the tariff issue ruled out, and the monetary issue not even thought of, a Coalition Government came into being and proceeded to balance the Budget.

Balancing the Budget helped to restore confidence, even if it failed to 'save the pound,' the illusory object for which the Coalition had been formed. But it was only a stop-gap, and the real issue of policy then arose. On that issue the Coalition was hopelessly divided. The need for decision was urgent and should have been faced at once. Mr. Baldwin had secured the acceptance of coalition from his party on the clear understanding that it was a purely temporary measure—the general idea was for two months at the most—and that the 'major issue' of national economic policy should then hold the field. But, once stuck to the MacDonald Tar Baby, the Conservative leaders found dis-

entanglement increasingly difficult. Coalition, with its greater assurance of office and a large majority, soon came to be regarded as an end in itself, and Mr. MacDonald, as the embodiment of the idea, become indispensable and so master of the situation.

A fortnight of high comedy followed. The Conservative leaders insisted on an election, and Mr. MacDonald was not in a position to refuse. Nor was he unprepared to go with them in a policy. But policy, in his view, was a minor matter compared with the maintenance intact of the Coalition. 'The Coalition, the whole Coalition, and nothing but the Coalition,' to give yet another variant of the old slogan, embodied his conception of what was essential to the maintenance of his position against a Tory majority. Accordingly formula after formula, deliberately devised by the Conservative leaders with the object of retaining the Prime Minister and Sir John Simon, and getting rid of Sir Herbert Samuel and the Free Trade doctrinaires, was debated and side-tracked. In the end the problem of agreeing on a policy was dismissed as insoluble. The happy solution was discovered of doing without, and of going to the country with only a label, the word 'national,' leaving everybody free to advocate what policy they pleased. The Conservatives consoled themselves with the thought of being in a stronger position to secure their policy after the election. Sir Herbert Samuel accepted, prudently realising that it was only under the label that he could hope for the return of any of his supporters, and hopeful of carrying on an effective rearguard action against Protection from within the Cabinet until such time as it might suit him to pass into open opposition. The handful of personal followers of Mr. MacDonald were only thankful to be provided with so ample an umbrella in the electoral deluge.

The label worked like a charm. The public, weary of the futility of the late Liberal-Socialist combination, of its failure to deal with unemployment, of the waste of parliamentary time on purely partisan measures like the Electoral Reform Bill, responded eagerly to the idea of a Government in which all party issues should be superseded by the national interest. Moreover, the word 'national' suggested, not only a form of government, but a political outlook, the abandonment of theoretical and internationalist doctrines, for a national and Imperial conception of economics and politics. The swing to economic nationalism was in any case so overwhelming that it would have returned a purely Conservative Government on the straight issue of a tariff with almost the same majority. It is significant that out of eighty-one cases where Free Trade Liberals stood as rival 'National' candidates against Conservatives only six were returned, including two Cabinet Ministers whom it was not 'playing the game' to oppose. The great mass of the electorate,

indeed, assumed that the return of a National Government and an immediate change in fiscal policy meant the same thing, and were not seriously perturbed by the studied vagueness of the Prime Minister's manifesto and speeches. That 'national' in the eyes of the Prime Minister, and, increasingly, even in those of his Conservative colleagues, meant coalition as such, rather than an active and vigorous national policy, was the fundamental misunderstanding from which the present disillusionment has sprung.

The Government was returned by an almost incredible majority in a situation of extreme urgency where everything depended on prompt and decisive action. But it was just as incapable of immediate agreement upon a policy after the election as before it. This time, however, the upper hand was with the Conservative leaders, and even more, perhaps, with their rank and file, and gradually in driblets and by devious and illogical ways the majority got what they wanted. A complete tariff had been worked out with the greatest care by the Conservatives in opposition ready for immediate application. But the Minister who had framed it was not allowed to go back to the Board of Trade, where a semi-converted Free Trader, with no knowledge of the problems involved in framing a tariff, was put in his place in order to preserve that reasonable impartiality between decision and indecision which the Coalition demanded. The Tory tariff—a much better and more scientific measure than we have yet attained to —was discreetly forgotten, and the process of 'inquiry' began.

To pacify the House of Commons an Abnormal Importations Act was hurriedly passed imposing for six months exceedingly high duties on a variety of minor articles where the anticipation of a tariff appeared to have encouraged increased importation. Agriculture protested against its exclusion, so another little Act was rushed through dealing with a few horticultural products. In February the Chancellor of the Exchequer, superseding for this purpose the President of the Board of Trade, introduced a Bill providing for a 10 per cent. tariff covering almost the whole field of importation and setting up an Advisory Committee empowered to add such further duties as might seem good to it. The real task of framing the tariff, a matter involving not only the competitive position of individual industries, but general considerations of monetary, revenue and social policy, was consequently thrown at the head of this wholly inexperienced body, in addition to its normal and proper function of adjusting details in a general scheme laid down as a matter of national policy.

No one, of course, would have invented such a procedure for its own sake. Its only justification was the political one that it made it easier to push the Free Traders in the Cabinet along step by step. Even so they were only persuaded to stay by the

notorious 'agreement to differ,' a confession of impotence profoundly shocking to public opinion, which was not in the least reassured by the statement that foreigners would not sleep safely in their beds unless the integrity of the Coalition was maintained. So the dissidents remained, exercising the embarrassing and paralysing influence of their possible resignation until after the Ottawa Conference when they finally departed, and 'not a dog barked at their going.' In fairness to them, however, it should be added that the hesitations and inhibitions about dealing with meat at Ottawa—the one really weak spot in the negotiations—were due not to them alone but also to other members of the Cabinet who were quite prepared to swallow an avowed policy of dearer meat so long as it was not brought about by duties.

From the purely political point of view the evolution of policy just described was perfectly natural, and, admitting the supreme importance of coalition as an end in itself, reflects credit on all concerned. But unfortunately that is not the view the hard-pressed industrialist or agriculturist has taken of it. He had hoped for immediate action in November 1931. Instead of that, much of 1932 passed before industry as a whole knew where it stood, while foreign dumping continued on a scale which frustrated for months the effects of the duties when they were conceded. The agriculturist is only now coming in any measure into his own, and even so the natural assistance which duties could afford to him and to the taxpayer are withheld in connexion with the new schemes for marketing reorganisation and quantitative regulation. It would be a mistake to under-rate the greatness of the changes already effected, or the undoubted benefit they have conferred upon industry and agriculture. But in considering the state of public opinion it is essential to recognise frankly how much disappointment and disillusionment has been created by the methods required to maintain a Coalition established on a false basis in the panic of August 1931.

Another source of public weakness, due to the same underlying cause, has been the fact that the great change of policy which has been carried through has never been wholeheartedly expounded or defended. The issue between Free Trade on the one side and Protection and Imperial Preference on the other was not a mere detail of trade policy. It was essentially a conflict between two wholly different philosophies of national life. Under normal conditions the victory of the new dominating idea would have been reinforced and consolidated by wholehearted advocacy and the endeavour made to carry it into every field of national and Imperial activity. It was thus that the great Free Trade, *laisser faire* doctrine swept England after the repeal of the Corn Laws. But in the present instance consideration for the weaker

brethren in the Coalition restrained advocacy throughout to a minor key. Great fundamental changes were introduced, more or less apologetically, as abnormal expedients arising from a purely temporary set of conditions, and defended on detailed grounds such as the need for revenue, or the maintenance of the balance of external payments, and not on broad grounds of principle. Even more perplexing to the public, many Ministers, not least of them Mr. Baldwin himself, have habitually used the language and arguments of the Free Trade school when dealing with the international position, and created the impression that they would be quite content to abandon a national and Imperial economic policy for an international one if only other countries would respond. A recent declaration by Mr. Chamberlain that we should need a tariff to maintain our standard of living even if the rest of the world became Free Trade stood in refreshing contrast to the uncertain utterances of his colleagues.

It is in that sense that the Government, even after the disappearance of the uncompromising doctrinaires of internationalist economics, is still, as I said at the beginning, very far from being wholeheartedly national. To-day the issue which underlies all others is whether our policy, in every field, is to be shaped by the acceptance of the idea of national strength and development, expanded to the Empire scale, or based on the hope—the vain hope, as I believe—of inducing the rest of the world to abandon its nationalism and establish its trade, its finance, or its security upon an international basis. I believe the general trend of public opinion, on this wider issue as on the narrower tariff issue, is far ahead of the Government, and it is the inability of the Government to come to a clear conclusion and strike a more definite note on that issue which accounts, in no small measure, for the lack of enthusiasm which it inspires.

The handling of the monetary problem by the Government has suffered from the same uncertainty. No less urgent than the fiscal situation, the monetary situation called for bold and immediate action. The tearing apart of gold and sterling enormously simplified the problem, once it was realised how much of the world had gone with sterling and how completely that fact had disposed of the fear—not unnatural in the first weeks—of an uncontrolled fall in sterling outside and an uncontrollable rise in sterling prices at home. The opportunity for definite concerted measures to re-establish a reasonable wholesale price level for the British Empire, and for such other countries as were prepared to join the sterling group, was one which should have been utilised to the full, both at Ottawa and elsewhere. But it is difficult to see that the Government, as such, have ever had a monetary policy, beyond postponing action in the hope that the Inter-

national Conference would help to find a solution. One indispensable element, it is true, of such a policy was supplied by the great Conversion operation of last summer and by the policy of cheap money which it made possible. By degrees, too, and under pressure from behind, the Government appears to be realising that the policy of contraction and deflation adopted to deal with the panic of August 1931, even if it may have been necessary at the time, cannot be pursued as a permanent policy without disaster. But there seems little recognition as yet of the fact that the urgent need of the moment is not balancing the Budget, but the remission of taxation and the stimulation of creative expenditure.

In the field of foreign affairs and defence the same fundamental issue of a national and Imperial *versus* an internationalist policy still remains to be settled. Here the National Government can hardly be blamed for the web of unreality and make-believe in which this country's policy has been entangled by successive Governments in their anxiety to live up to the atmosphere of Geneva. But they certainly have not tried to disentangle themselves. They have contributed to the general farce of the Disarmament Conference a peculiarly farcical proposal of their own for the abolition of all air forces and for the international control of civil aviation, which would be so fatal to the security and peace of the Empire, if there were the slightest chance of its acceptance, that it is difficult to believe that it can have been intended as anything else but an ill-timed ' gesture.' A shade less unpractical, but probably no less unacceptable, is the cut-and-dried scheme which the Prime Minister has now thrown at the heads of the startled nations. Is it too much to hope that after the failure of the Disarmament Conference and the Manchurian fiasco the pilgrimage to Rome may possibly have paved the way to a return to commonsense ?

I have endeavoured to show how in dealing with the problems before it the National Government has been weakened in policy and in action by the circumstances in which it came into existence as a coalition of discordant elements wholly at variance on the most vital issues. That weakness has been greatly diminished by the resignations of last autumn. But it still remains to be seen how far the elements that are left can really get together and develop a common and a national outlook. Even if this should come about, there still remains the second source of weakness to which I referred at the beginning of this article—namely, the incapacity of a Cabinet of a score and more of busy departmental Ministers either to think out a definite policy or to secure its effective and consistent execution. It is a commonplace of scientific organisation, long since recognised in all the fighting services, that where the same body is responsible for the day-by-day conduct

of administration, as well as for the planning of policy for the future, the latter function is bound to be neglected. It is only by the creation of a special policy department, a General Staff, freed from all current administration, that it is possible to secure forethought and effective planning. So far, however, with the exception of one brief interlude to which I shall refer in a moment, we have never recognised that this principle applies at least as much to politics as to war. We attempt to direct the affairs of a great nation by weekly meetings between departmental chiefs, all absorbed in the routine of their departments, all concerned to secure Cabinet sanction for this or that departmental proposal, all giving a purely temporary and more or less perfunctory attention to the issues brought up by other departments. Every Cabinet meeting is a scramble to get through an agenda in which the competition of departments for a place is varied by the incursion of urgent telegrams from abroad or of sudden questions in the House of Commons for which some sort of policy or answer must be improvised. The one thing that is hardly ever discussed is general policy. There are departmental policies, modified somewhat sporadically by Cabinet criticism. There are emergency or hand-to-mouth policies as sudden happenings compel a hurried discussion and some sort of a decision. But there is very little Cabinet policy as such on any subject. No one has time to think it out, to discuss it, to co-ordinate its various elements, or to see to its consistent enforcement.

In quiet times it may have been possible to do without definite policy, trusting to commonsense and improvisation. But the method breaks down hopelessly in a serious crisis where clear thinking on difficult and complex situations, definite decisions (not formulæ of agreement), and swift and resolute action are required. That was our experience in the Great War. The Asquith Coalition Government suffered from many of the failings of the present Coalition in so far as its members differed profoundly on at least one vital issue affecting the conduct of the war. It carried through Conscription in the same dilatory, devious, piecemeal way as the present Government carried through Protection. But apart from this issue it was obviously failing to prosecute the war effectively. As early as February 1916 the late Sir Mark Sykes and myself urged in the House of Commons that the only Government that could carry on the war was a Cabinet of four or five men entirely free from all departmental responsibilities, concerned only with policy and in a position to give their whole time, individually or collectively, to the thinking out and shaping and execution of policy.

It was this solution which Mr. Lloyd George adopted ten months later. As one who has sat for some six years in ordinary

Cabinets, but who was also privileged to attend, as one of its secretaries, most of the meetings of the War Cabinet in 1917 and 1918, I can say without hesitation that there is no comparison between the two systems in efficiency, grasp of the problems before it, or driving power. The War Cabinet was kept in touch with the administrative departments by the attendance of departmental Ministers and experts at Cabinet meetings, but only for such items of the agenda as they were directly concerned with, or by its individual members presiding over inter-departmental committees. But the decisions were those of the War Cabinet alone, and the policy was that of the War Cabinet and not of the departments. The change of system was, in my opinion at least, one of the factors which contributed most to the final victory.

I believe that a similar change of system is called for to-day. The problems created by the economic crisis are at least as complex, at least as deserving of close detailed study, at least as insistent upon clean-cut, bold and swift action, as any of the problems of the Great War. What is needed is a Cabinet of not more than five, no one of whom should have any departmental duties. While individual members might to some extent specialise on kindred groups of subjects, one on trade and finance, another on social problems, another on defence, another on Imperial and foreign affairs, yet it would be essential that they should all contribute effectively to the formation of a common Cabinet policy and to its exposition in Parliament and in the country.

The time is ripe for such a reform. Its introduction might give new vitality and new unity to the National Government. I believe that the country on the whole still wants a National Government. I doubt whether it would wish either India or the recasting of our system of social insurance entrusted to a purely Right Wing Conservative Government. It certainly does not yet wish for a Socialist Government, even if it is by no means so anti-Socialist in its general outlook as the last election might have seemed to suggest. But it undoubtedly will return a Socialist majority at the next election if the present Government fails to grapple with its task more vigorously, more confidently, and in a more definitely national and Imperial spirit than it has done hitherto. On the other hand, if the National Government can pull itself together, bring the machinery of government more up to date, and present the country with a policy both intelligible and inspiring, I see no reason why it should not look forward to a second lease of power, and, more important still, to so shaping the course of the national life that it will continue on that course whatever may be the surface fluctuations of politics during the next generation.

L. S. AMERY.

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE

The whirligig of time certainly brings in his revenges. It was never thought that the epoch of sovereign nation-States would pass in a night of tranquillity. It was hardly to be conceived that the League of Nations, with a complete system of international law and sanctions, would be born without travail and with no commotion. But no one—not even Lord Grey, murmuring in the summer of 1914 'The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime'—no one could possibly have imagined that a world war of four years' duration, fought 'to make the world safe for democracy,' would have accomplished within fifteen years of peace not only the ruin of ancient empires but also the complete discredit and collapse of democracy, its principles and its machinery, over an entire continent. That monarchies like those of Germany and Austria-Hungary should have been overthrown was not to be wondered at. That the ineluctable concomitants of the League of Nations should prove to be the despot, the oligarch, and the military dictator, and that these should first capture and then apotheosise the nation-State with all its sovereign appurtenances, was indeed beyond the bounds of all conjecture. Finally, that within a decade and a half of the conclusion of peace the very alignment of national forces in Europe should emerge apparently the same as it was on the eve of 1914, but that in 1933 those European forces, apart from Great Britain, should be even more equally matched, this seems like some master-stroke by the President of the Immortals. Yet this peace-time Europe contained the seeds of its own dissolution within it. In the words of Spinoza, '*Pax enim non belli privatio est.*' The Treaty of Versailles, however, stabilised mere absence of war in Europe, and therefore as insecure a foundation for the League of Nations and the new international order based upon it as was the Balance of Power in Europe from 1904 to 1914. Is the end to be inevitably the same? That is what we are all asking, because it is what we all fear.

Recent events in Germany have set the match to the powder, but that powder has been lying about ever since the Treaty of

Versailles was signed. It has been the thankless task of every 'croaking Cassandra,' from Mr. Keynes in 1919 onwards, to foretell the ultimate overthrow of the Weimar Constitution through force, engendered by the popular German identification of that Constitution with the dooms pronounced at Versailles and with the treatment of the Germany of Weimar ever since. The Allies were purblind. They short-sightedly permitted the German populace to visit the vials of its wrath upon Ebert, Rathenau, Stresemann, and Brüning in its fallacious conviction that such men were to blame for the ignominy and thrall to which the nation had not only been subjected once, but to which it was in a perpetual state of subjection. This widespread identification, by the mass of the German people, of the Treaty, with its German 'liberal' signatories, was carried even farther by the course of events. Inflation, the Ruhr episode, Reparations, minority treatment—all these forced the small trading class, threatened alike by big business and by high interest rates, to make common cause with the disgruntled ex-officer and Junker squire. Not that Nazidom and Nationalism are the same, but they have a common hatred of the parties which, to them, stand for everything foreign to the pure German spirit. (Von Papen's own interpretation of his Chancellor's duties was 'to realise the spiritual unity of the German people'!) Thus it came about that, from the very outset of Weimar Germany, the seeds of its ultimate dissolution fell upon fertile ground. Not only were the very appurtenances of Western (*i.e.*, English) democracy suspect, but they were declared antithetic to the nature and ends (*Sinn und Wesen*) of German institutions and philosophy. This is indeed true. Not for nothing was the Prussian State the incarnation of the Deity and the logical outcome of the romantic and the idealist. Fichte's philosophy of the *Geschlossener Handelsstaat* had been the forerunner of List's protectionist imperialism ; and our exclusive tariff walls saw their first stones laid in Germany when the Reich was at last achieved in 1871. It was back to this kind of unity, plus the expanded market of a vast *Mitteleuropa* inherited from pre-war foreign policy, that the post-war German nationalist looked. Germany was to be mighty again, and, as ever, by *Machtpolitik* ; but this time she was to be self-sufficient. That postulated immediate recourse to Junkerdom, the breeding-ground alike of primary and military products, of wheat and rye, of the officer class as well as of the common soldier. To these was, however, added the disgruntled lower middle-class element of the industrial districts and of the big towns, which gradually came to form the backbone of the new Nazi movement.

Over and over again the fissiparous ex-Allies refused to make a single concession to the Social-Democrats, the Centre, or the

People's Party. These poor parliamentarians, feeling the very Constitution rocking beneath their feet, could well have done with some gesture, some concrete 'gain' to offer the great German electorate to consolidate that Constitution. But one after another the dismal occasions passed: Geneva Protocol, Preparatory Disarmament Commission, Naval Conference, Disarmament Conference—nothing tangible for Germany. Locarno was obviously for France. The Young Plan and the Hague Agreements meant less than nothing with a falling price level It needed the slump to bring the Hoover Moratorium; and that was as much the effect of the growth of the Nazi movement as of the slump. Meanwhile Italy fostered the ex-associates of Germany within her 'system,' and so drew ever nearer to Germany on each point of difference with France. Finally the Powers seemed to awaken to the fact that German democracy was doomed—either by Communists or by Nazidom. Then everyone got busy at once. That was the worst step of all; for as Germany gained more and more, so the Nazis increased in numbers and prestige by leaps and bounds. Most ironically, the actual negotiations were still conducted by the hated representatives of Liberalism or Social Democracy; and still the Nazis could not help gaining strength, for it was at last obvious that what rational and democratic procedure had not been able to win, the impressiveness of brute force, coupled with the obvious threat of a nationalistic, militaristic, 'tribute-freed' Germany under Nazi rule, had actually cowed the Allies into yielding. Thereafter came Lausanne, and therewith the phenomenal rise of the Nazi movement. By this time the ex-Allied Powers were powerless. The more they gave, the more they proved the Nazi case—'Bully for it, and you'll get it!' The more they refused to give, the more they exasperated the German people into the Nazi fold. How could the German people in this dilemma become anything else but the catspaw of the Nazi, the militarist, the monarchist, the Junker? How could German democracy—and therewith, not the Social-Democrats alone, but also the liberal parties of the separate States, and, indeed, those very States themselves—continue to exist before a tidal wave which swept all before it? With Communism on the other flank, between the devil and the deep, the German people chose. It remains to be seen what it chose!

Meanwhile the League of Nations, which had once purported to be the guarantor of peace, international justice, and order, had fallen upon evil days. One of its members invaded another, even levied war on the other in spite of ultimate and unanimous condemnation by the rest; but no common action resulted. It served to stage a striking come-back for the United States, which in itself was worth while, even though it drove Russia again from

co-operation with the League. In the Disarmament Conference on July 23, 1932, Germany and Russia voted against the Resolution embodying the 'Conclusions of the first phase of the Conference,' while Italy and seven other members abstained from voting. The last representatives of a tottering German Constitution still asked for 'equality of treatment' in the matter of armaments. All they got was a refusal from France, and a pontifical homily from England on the law of contracts in the gravest Simonian manner. It drove them to desperation, and they had to throw up the sponge. When von Papen fell, to be replaced by the blunt General von Schleicher, there was no mistaking the issue. Hurriedly the Powers gave in on December 11, 1932. The Peace Treaties were recognised as altered in principle already. Part V. went by the board. But it was too late. Democratic Germany saw what extreme nationalism could achieve, and, with one set of extremists proscribed, came to the heel of the other set and meekly bent its back to the familiar rod of oligarchic militarism. The Weimar epoch was over. All Europe knew that, having sown the wind at Versailles, it had now to reap a whirlwind which, arising from Munich, had in a bare decade blown away the work of fifty years in Germany, and with it the hope of European peace. Never in the history of Europe has the *status quo ante* been so rudely reasserted.

With eventual equality of status guaranteed to Germany and with all the powers of the entire Reich in the hands of extreme nationalists, with Nazi storm troops in the demilitarised zone and with all the Nazi battalions incorporated into the police force, with Mussolini supporting Hitler and with the latter broadcasting his hortatory and minatory fulminations while actually flying over the Polish corridor, could any sane observer expect anything, even a *ridiculus mus*, to be born in Geneva? After all, to be faced with a combination of forces comprising Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Turkey and Greece, and to have at best a tenuous hold on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia, was no firm basis for French 'security' nor for those French 'sacrifices' which Mr. MacDonald continues to demand. At the same time, however, came the unfortunate *obiter dictum* of the British Foreign Minister in the House, to the effect that he was out to prevent his country from being involved in any European war at all costs! French distrust of Britain's will to implement Locarno is at once comprehensible. How can one expect France to forego a single gun, tank, submarine, or bomber if we ourselves impugn the security which we have always maintained inheres in Locarno? One can understand the deep popular aversion in England from participation in another war on the European continent; it is not surprising that the *Daily*

Mail and the *Daily Express* should merely affirm that aversion, *tout court.* But, as the sober *Economist* pointed out in a leading article entitled 'War or Peace,'[1] it is not our choice alone to make or not to make war. China did not want war with Japan, but she certainly got it. Could Britain 'buy off' the impact of a European war by a species of modern Danegeld? The precedent is ominous. Self-defence is the *ultima ratio* of war, and if every other justification for war is abolished, that will surely remain, even if only as a guerilla warfare in a disintegrated sovereign State. So with Britain. She is not only in Europe, but of it willy-nilly, if from no earlier date, then at least from that day in November 1903 when Sir Francis Bertie said to Count Mensdorff: 'For us France is more important than Germany or Russia or any other Power. If we are certain of France, no one can have designs upon us.'[2] And our integration with Europe was complete long before that. Cambon was able to say in July 1914: 'Les anglais interviendront, mais ils le feront quand il sera trop tard!'; and, though it was not too late on that occasion, no realist, let alone a *Realpolitiker*, can believe that we could remain neutral in another major European war for more than a week or two. The question of Britain's attitude to the Disarmament Conference thus boils down to her will to play her part in some general scheme for European security. That means, inevitably, that before any nation in Europe will give up even a hand-grenade Britain must give better evidence of her will to implement her engagements, not under the Covenant alone, but also under Locarno. It is of no use for British Ministers to imagine that they, of themselves, can (*a*) prevent a European war of any magnitude, or (*b*) prevent Britain's becoming involved in one, unless we take part as one Power in a general European concert to '*keep* the peace.' This means not only willingness but also readiness instantly to utilise all sanctions in common with other concerting Powers, even, in the last analysis, the sanction of war, which both the Covenant and Pact admit.

In fact British foreign policy, through fear of being involved in the war to which Versailles has been driving Europe, has well-nigh achieved that war. It did precisely the same thing in the decade before 1914, when Germany was never sure of Britain's attitude over the Entente. Then it was the fatal fear of 'being involved' which made us fly to our favourite position on the fence. As a result, and in the event, we had to collapse with it. Since then, the advances in the technique of sudden warfare in conjunction with the development of aircraft equipment on the

[1] March 18, 1933.

[2] Quoted by Professor A. F. Pribram in his *England and the International Policies of the European Great Powers* (Oxford University Press 1929).

Continent have altered things; and our attempts to be 'a friend to both sides' are calculated rather to make us the enemy of both, when, as Mr. Churchill has said, we can least afford to be involved, and when the fence has proved 'uncommon rickety'! But Mr. Churchill thinks that a colossal Air Force, together with greater expenditure on other defences, will ensure our benevolent neutrality. In the event, it would not prove benevolent to anyone; and it would consequently prove anything but beneficent to ourselves. That is a matter of hard fact. On the other hand, Professor H. A. Smith thinks [8] that the doctrine of neutrality has in no way been circumscribed by the Covenant of the League, nor by anything else since 1918. He seems to imply that Britain can remain neutral in the event of another European conflict. We may be entitled to; but if we argue from that justification to the conclusion that we *can* and should, we perpetrate a palpable *non sequitur*. The League has made a factual, as well as a juridical, difference. Although Italy and Greece have made a treaty guaranteeing each other's neutrality in the event of any attack upon one of them, and although both are members of the League, that does not, to my mind, invalidate the prior claims of the League upon both its members, whatever treaty has since been signed between them. The one called upon can certainly refuse to answer the League's call; but it *ipso facto* makes itself an enemy of the remaining members, and incurs the same penalties as its presumed partner.

All this can be reduced to a simple statement: Britain must do what her Premier exhorted the assembled delegates at Geneva to do—namely, face the facts. The facts, for both the short and the long run, are the antithetical claims of two 'systems' which to-day, more clearly than at any other time since the war, sunder Europe into the very 'armed camps' which we fought to abolish once and for all. Britain, then, must face these claims in the light of her own obligations, and must come down fairly and squarely on one side of the fence or the other for the first time since she left Versailles. Nothing else will do. Any other course will breed a disaster of whose ultimate dimensions we are ignorant, but as to the effect of which we can be under no delusion. It will reduce Europe to a welter of barbarism, from which we in Britain can in no conceivable way escape. What, then, are the rival claims,—the facts of the European situation,—which we in Britain must face, and upon which we must make our unequivocal declaration of policy?

The rival claims are embodied in rival systems. Let us take them in order. First, there is the French system, comprising, beside France, Poland and the Little Entente Powers. It is the

[8] *Contemporary Review*, March 1933.

first in chronological order, for it exists to secure to each sub-division—France, Poland, and the Little Entente—the gains arising from the war. To that end it certainly has sought to cement the structure of Versailles upon the living Europe for good and all. But, contrary to what one might think, it is not a particularly strong system. For Poland has an irredentist enclave within it, in the shape of the Ukraine, bordering on Russia whose minority treatment is more enlightened; Poland is therefore liable to rearguard attack by either Russia or the Ukraine. Czechoslovakia is a long spearhead into Germany, liable to be outflanked, though the strongest State of the Little Entente. Roumania is the most dubious of the French allies, economically the weakest, and having in her possession the Bessarabian bone of contention with Russia. Yugoslavia, though strongly welded to France by finance and by military instruction, is actually the weakest link in the French system, and, as before the war, the perennial powder-magazine of Europe. Yugoslavia is internally seething; and externally she is completely encircled by Italy's system of alliances—Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and (if recent rumours and appearances are the obverse of economic agreements) Austria. Thus the French system as a whole suffers from being two blades of scissors minus a connecting screw. There is no possibility of effecting junction, apart from the naval supremacy of France; and Italy is bent on disputing the Mediterranean. Again, to avert the possibility of Russian attacks upon the rear of the French allies, France has pushed through treaties of non-aggression with the Soviet Union, not only for herself, but also for Poland and the Baltic States. Roumania, however, has obstinately refused to negotiate with the Soviet Government unless her right to Bessarabia is recognised, and this has prevented her from concluding the treaty, much to the chagrin of the French and to the internal dislocation of Roumanian politics. It will be seen, therefore, that if the French system received a British coping-stone, the edifice would be impregnable, for the dominance of European waters would be secured both in the Baltic and the Mediterranean.

Taking now the second system, which we can characterise as the Italo-German system, this comprises Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and Turkey. If this system be shaded on a map of Europe it will at once be seen how strategically superior its situation is to that of the French system. It is cut across only by Roumania and Yugoslavia, and even then the line curls round through Italy across Albania and Greece to Turkey and Bulgaria. In fact, it is the pre-war German Foreign Office's plan of *Mitteleuropa*, minus the link which is now Yugoslavia. Recent events in Germany have subjugated Bavaria,

and Dr. Dollfuss is hoping to stave off a Nazi or Heimwehr *Putsch* in Austria by a *bourgeois* dictatorship. His position, as dictator, is particularly unhappy, between two opposing factions. In any case, the distance across the Brenner from Italy to Germany is forty-two miles as the crow flies, and Austria, even if unwilling, is clearly going to play the part of Belgium if ever Italy and Germany need to effect a junction. (It may be effected before the need arises, if events move in Austria as spectacularly as they have moved in Germany in the last month.) Thus, with Yugoslavia encircled but for a doubtful Roumania, almost anything could happen in Central Europe, giving, in fact, the entire southeast of Europe, from the Austro-Italian frontier down to Turkey, into the control of the Central Powers. This may explain the French willingness to listen to schemes for the rehabilitation of Austria-Hungary under Otto of Habsburg as a buffer State between Germany and Italy; but, even so, the interests of the new buffer State would appear, on paper at least, to lie rather with Italy and Germany than with the French system. That may also explain the conspicuous success achieved by Italian foreign policy in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

There we have our two systems—the one concerned to maintain Versailles, the other concerned to overthrow it—with Britain trying to 'keep out of it' and exhorting both sides, as a friend, to give up squabbling (about nothing !) and to lay down (or not to manufacture) arms. The French reply is brief and to the point: Are you prepared to support, with whatever armaments we all agree to, the common purpose of maintaining peaceful settlements in Europe ? However paradoxical this may sound, it is sensible; for France is undoubtedly right in her view that, if disarmament of a formal kind came to-day, the Italo-German system would upset the apple-cart to-morrow, and no one could stop it. It may be objected that, presumably, Italy and Germany would have no arms. The answer to that is that Herr Hitler denies that his storm troops are an armed force ! Or, again, it may be objected by a British observer that it would be just as well for the apple-cart to be upset, since the Versailles pippins were a rotten lot, anyway. The answer to that is that if the cart goes over it may not be used the second time for apples, but for a barricade ! So that, whichever way we look at it, we are driven to the conclusions—(*a*) that Britain can evade neither responsibility for, nor participation in, another European conflagration; (*b*) that Britain's engagements under the Covenant and the Locarno Pact, as well as her own interests, bind her to maintain France intact[4]; (*c*) that the Peace Treaties must

[4] Prince Lichnowsky 'always reported that England would not allow a

be immediately modified, but peaceably, and by arrangement; (*d*) that a general and considerable measure of disarmament can only be achieved by making armaments unnecessary as a means to national ends; (*e*) that in the present state of Europe (*c*) and (*d*) are only realisable if Britain comes down definitely on the side of the fence which is labelled 'Law and Order.'

Now it is no minor matter that Mr. MacDonald, after addressing his homily to the bad boys of Geneva, went straight off to Rome to talk with Signor Mussolini; for Mussolini is the one who lent Herren von Papen and Hitler a pair of broad shoulders when they needed to scale the armaments wall. Britain at the apex of the French system, Italy at the crux of the German, there we have the 1933 situation in Europe, almost a replica of 1914. When, therefore, we hear that Signor Mussolini has accepted Mr. MacDonald's disarmament plan in principle, we are at liberty to hope. It was Delcassé who weaned Italy from Bismarck's Triple Alliance. It was Delcassé, again, who fostered King Edward's effort to bring about the Entente between England and France. Now Italy—*Roma rediviva*—stands again at the parting of the ways. But so does Great Britain; and it would appear that Britain must guarantee her friend France something, while Italy guarantees her friend Germany something, in the hope that the two antithetical military systems of Europe may be reconciled and that peace may be secured. To talk of the League's being 'run' by a Holy Alliance of Great Powers within it is vain. It is their unholy fissiparity which has nearly wrecked the League.

It has unfortunately been only too easy to be a Cassandra in post-war Europe. In an article in this Review over a year ago [5] I outlined a foreign policy for Great Britain under three heads:

> First, . . . Britain, in a case where the Council has failed to implement its obligations, should not concur in a gentle laxity to preserve decorum, but should act quite independently of the League together with such League members and non-members as will co-operate to preserve peace against a flagrant aggressor. . . .
>
> Secondly, . . . Britain should now stand clearly for Treaty revision by majority agreement, but should offer France the *quid pro quo* of some substantial guarantees against any violent disturbance of the revised European order.
>
> Thirdly . . . Britain should make this second tenet of her foreign policy dependent upon a dual programme of disarmament: No Continental commitments of any kind, past, present, or future, for Britain, without an immediate measure of disarmament coupled with a future progressive programme of disarmament. . . .

second Sédan.' Gooch: *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy* (Longmans, 1930: Introduction).

[5] 'Wanted—a Foreign Policy,' March 1932, p. 268.

I went on to say that if some such policy were not followed, there would inevitably ensue the bankruptcy of the Disarmament Conference and a consequent revolt in Germany. Again, in an article in this Review last August [6] I attempted to show the dangers attendant on the ignoring of the German danger-signals, on the stalemate at Geneva, and on the misconstruction put upon Britain's efforts to achieve 'Confidence Pacts' between Great Powers. It was there remarked that we were liable to antagonise Germany and Italy, without obtaining the sacrifices from France which would enable us to make a success of the Disarmament Conference.

Now, as was said at the beginning, the whirligig of time has brought in his revenges. Germany has little respect left for a League which fastens Versailles upon Europe; dallies with Japan until condemnation is wrung from the Council, and then does nothing; admits of equality of status in armaments, under threat, rather than disarm; and which finally has to depend upon four- and five-Power pacts to get the Powers to move. In the present temper of an absolutist Germany it is not to be wondered at that the energetic and positive *Realpolitik* of Hitler and Mussolini should prove preferable to the friendly homilies of the British Premier or the legal precepts of the British Foreign Secretary, nor that France should put her trust in steel and concrete. Neither France on the one side nor Germany on the other have till now been able to deduce any meaning or hope of practical assistance from the British pronouncements, policies, and programmes. This is more than a pity. It is a tragedy *in posse*; but Britain, and no other European Power, can prevent the rot in Europe from becoming a tragedy *in esse*.

What, then, is to be done, which remains undone? First, Britain must make it clear categorically that she abides by the Covenant and by Locarno, to the extent of putting every available man and weapon in the field. Secondly, Britain must reaffirm Locarno for France alone in a new protocol, but on certain clearly defined conditions as to disarmament—*i.e.*, French territory is to be protected by all Britain's forces (but French territory in Europe alone) if all disarm in certain particulars and to certain agreed figures. Thirdly, Britain must carry this programme of disarmament on to its logical conclusion by securing the modification of the Treaties, by peaceful means in certain cases of crying need. This may seem impossible; but if Britain secures the co-operation of Italy beforehand (and this it could achieve by securing French disarmament *at a price*) Germany would find her prop for the bludgeoning of Europe suddenly gone. To deal with a Nazi Germany committed to unbending nationalism and

[6] Lausanne—and After, *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1932, p. 139.

expansion is a far graver problem than to deal with the Polish corridor on rational lines, when France is given better security than she can find in her own system, and Poland also.

Thus Mr. MacDonald's proposals, as they stand, are suspect to most European nations. 'What are you giving up?' they ask. We have replied, that we have already given up so much, and that we want to keep out of the next European *imbroglio*. Signor Mussolini will not change his German orientation as long as he sees that Britain, after all her post-war engagements, is going to cut and run at the first sign of a spark. 'That way madness lies' for the entire Continent; we already possess in Germany a pretty foretaste *in petto* of what we may expect if Britain's equivocal foreign policy continues along that road; we could never avoid a final catastrophe. But signs are not wanting that Signor Mussolini has now realised—(*a*) the threat to European peace inherent in a Germany which, in Captain Göring's words to the new Reichstag, 'has returned from Weimar to Potsdam'; and (*b*) the profound identity between British and French interests on the Continent. His proposals, as far as they can be assessed, attempt to reconcile these two facts, and indeed recognise that the key-positions in European politics are held by Italy and Britain. This promises a great deal; but it implies British recognition of European obligations. The Sibyl has called on us twice. Each time she has gone away, her offer rejected. Each time she returns she has less to offer. As far as Britain is concerned—which is precisely as far as the entire continent of Europe is concerned—she has called for the third time. If we let her depart now without coming to our decision, then there is nothing else for it but to build our dug-outs and buy our gas-masks and admit that Mr. Churchill was right. But it is the tenour of this article that we ought not to do that before we have proved that the implementing of our obligations toward a European system, and for a world order in the creation of which we ourselves played no inconsiderable part, is either impossible of achievement or else beyond our powers. I have tried to show that it is not the former. I am loth to believe it is the latter.

D. GRAHAM HUTTON.

THE AMERICAN BANKING CRISIS

It is the common experience of the human race that a general malady attacks each one of us in our weakest place, and this is true not only of the physical illnesses which afflict the human frame, but also of those economic ills which attack the body politic. The severe economic illness from which the world has been suffering for the past four years is no exception to this rule, but, on the contrary, goes a long way to confirm it. It began with an assault upon the top-heavy structure of speculation which had been built up in the New York stock market; and no one can deny that in 1929 this was susceptible to the ravages of mortal disease. From there the malady spread to Central Europe, and here the ground had been well prepared by the Peace Treaties, the reparations burden of Germany, the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire, and the multiplication of new independent States, each with its own political and economic aims and desires, its own commercial and financial system, and, above all, its own tariff barriers. Next we ourselves in England were attacked; and, in view of our high and rigid level of costs, of our attempts to minimise the evils of unemployment rather than to effect a ruthless cure, of our traditional *rôle* as lender and banker to the world at large, and finally, of our insistence upon the maintenance of a high standard of living in face of a dwindling export trade, no one can be surprised that with us the disease took the form which it actually did. Our monetary system was overthrown; we had to scale our pound down to conform to our changed circumstances, and we had temporarily at least to abandon our liberty to buy from the world and lend to the world without any check upon our desires. And now the malady has recrossed the Atlantic, and has once more attacked the United States in its most vulnerable point. If six months ago anyone had suggested that by March 1933 America would be virtually off the gold standard with all her banks closed down, he would have been in some danger of being certified as a lunatic. Yet, looking back, not only over the last six months, but over the whole course of American banking history, it is clear that the American banking system was fundamentally unsound, and that sooner or later a general

breakdown followed by drastic reconstruction almost *ab initio* had to come.

The real weakness of American banking is that of the way in which the United States has grown and is governed. Her history as a great nation only dates from a century ago, and sound banking tradition and experience is a plant which takes much longer to gain its strength. The American continent did not spring into being as an economic entity all at once, but was gradually settled and developed bit by bit, as progress spread westwards. Banking grew and spread in the same piecemeal fashion, and numbers of banks naturally came into being to meet local and immediate needs. Such banks were founded and have since been operated by men of no special banking experience, men who became bankers because a bank was needed, and because they were ready to meet this need just like any new local demand. Finally, there is the all-important distinction and line of demarcation between Federal and State rights. The State Governments jealously regard banking as falling within their province, and have steadfastly resisted all attempts of the Federal Government to encroach upon this part of their domain.

In such circumstances it was inevitable that the operating unit in the American banking system should be the small, independent, local bank, run by local men, subject to local pressure, and yielding no more obedience to central authority than it could help. The British system of a few big strong units, operating hundreds of branches and drawing their strength not from a limited area but from the resources of the whole country, was legally impossible because no State would tolerate banks within its own boundaries being owned, controlled, and operated by a bank whose headquarters were in a different State hundreds of miles away. Conversely, no American bank could in practice operate branches in forty-eight different States, each with its own code of banking law and banking rules and regulations. It is no exaggeration to say that, even if it had been legal to operate nation-wide branch banking, the attempt would quickly have broken down. The upshot was that the American banking system so developed as to consist of all sorts and conditions of banks, from the big New York house of world-wide repute to the small country bank run by men who might or might not know their job, but who in any case were dependent solely upon the fortunes of the immediate locality. Even where such a bank tried to acquire some 'reserve'—*i.e.*, assets not belonging to the locality—it had neither the knowledge nor experience to guide it in its acquisition.

This, however, is by no means the end of the story of America's banking troubles, for money does not respect State boundaries,

and some means had to be devised of superimposing upon this mass of independent banks the means of transferring funds from bank to bank and from customer to customer across the width of the continent. The system which grew up was that of correspondent banks, for each small country bank would maintain a balance with a bigger bank in the neighbouring city, while these bigger banks would keep balances in their turn with the large banks in New York and other important centres. Superficially this practice might appear to give the American banking system many of the advantages of the British branch-banking system, but in actual fact it possessed fatal defects. In the first place, each bank was allowed to regard its balances with its correspondents as part of its cash reserves, and it is easy to see that this meant the duplication and pyramiding of bank credit upon a far smaller cash basis than was supposed to exist. Secondly, when pressure did arise, no bank had the smallest hesitation in calling in its balances from its correspondents, so that every banking panic involved the banks not only in withdrawals of cash by their customers, but also in withdrawals by each other. This is entirely different from the fundamental principle of British branch-banking, in which all the offices of a big bank are for this purpose regarded as a single unit, with cash made instantly and automatically available to every branch, both big and small, in accordance with its needs.

All these defects came to light in the American panic of 1907. This was primarily a currency panic, and brought to notice not only the defects of the American banking system, but also those of the currency system, for in 1907 there was a definite shortage of currency, while for many years it had been a common experience for the country's miscellaneous and chaotic supply of currency to be badly distributed, so that at times there was an actual currency or exchange premium in one part of the country as compared with another. In the following years a definite attempt was made to put the banking system in order by the establishment of the Federal Reserve system. This is the present-day basis of American banking, and until the present crisis was believed to have placed American banking upon a sound foundation and to have made further banking crises impossible.

Under the Federal Reserve system the whole of the United States is divided into twelve Reserve Districts, each with a Federal Reserve Bank at its head, which acts as the central bank or bankers' bank of the District. Most of these Districts include a number of States, and indeed the State and District boundaries are by no means coterminous. The twelve Reserve Banks are in their turn under the somewhat loose control of the Federal Reserve Board at Washington.

The Reserve Banks have the right to issue currency, and under the original terms of their constitution it was provided that at least 40 per cent. of their note issue should be backed by gold, and the balance by approved commercial bills or other forms of commercial self-liquidating securities. Government securities were not eligible, presumably because it was thought desirable to relate the note issue to the state of trade. Each Reserve Bank also kept balances for all member banks within its area, just as the Bank of England holds part of the cash reserves of British banks, and was also empowered to rediscount approved bills for member banks—which the Bank of England does not do directly for British banks. Member banks are bound to hold reserve balances with the Reserve Bank of the District up to various prescribed proportions of their deposits. Thus all member banks had to maintain balances equivalent to 3 per cent. of their time deposits, while the minimum reserve against demand deposits varied from 7 per cent. for country banks to 10 per cent. for 'Reserve City' banks and 13 per cent. for 'Central Reserve City' banks.

The establishment of the Federal Reserve system marked a great step forward. It gave the United States a uniform and nation-wide note issue, though other forms of paper currency remained current; it enacted that member banks should hold certain minimum reserves, not pyramided upon each other with correspondent banks, but lodged with the Reserve Banks; and it provided member banks with a means of obtaining cash by rediscounting their bills. It had, however, several serious defects. The first was the inability of the Reserve Banks to issue currency against Government securities. This made the volume of currency dependent upon the state of trade, for when trade contracted and prices fell, the amount of eligible backing to the note issue shrank. This in turn both forced the Reserve Banks to lodge gold against currency beyond the minimum requirement of 40 per cent. and prevented them from expanding currency just at the time when trade and prices required such a stimulus. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that this defect was partly to blame for America's excessive sterilisation of her gold hoards during post-war years. The fact was not that she did not, but that by law she could not, expand her note issue in proportion to her gold acquisitions.

In the end this defect had to be remedied, for under the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 the Reserve Banks were permitted to issue currency against Government securities. This Act was passed in a hurry to meet an emergency arising from heavy gold losses and the dearth of eligible backing. But by this time the main mischief of deflation had been done. The other fatal defect was

that only National banks were bound to become members of the Reserve system. National banks have certain privileges, including the right of note issue, and so have to conform to certain standards and rules, including membership of the Reserve system. The huge mass of State banks, however, were not bound to become member banks, and, indeed, many of them were not fit to join the Reserve system. Once more the right of each State to manage its own banking system had proved the overriding factor, and the result was that only about one-third of American banks in the aggregate became members of the Reserve system. The remaining two-thirds had been allowed to escape the reforms, and remained as regards their general powers and reserve requirements subject solely to the legislation and inspection of their particular States. The result is that the United States has never had a unified banking or monetary system subject to control from the centre, such as exists in most countries to-day.

It was this semi-developed banking system which had to withstand the stresses and temptations of the post-war years; and here it is necessary to revert once more to the lack of banking tradition and experience. Unlike British bankers, American bankers are hedged around by legislation, of which the reserve requirements to which they are subject form but one part. Up to a point this acts as a safeguard, but it prevents American bankers from developing the British sense of self-reliance, self-control, and responsibility. Where the law left them free to break loose there was nothing else to restrain them.

In one way, indeed, the American financial system encouraged licence. Whereas a British banker lends his call money to bill-brokers against bills of exchange, the American bankers lend their call money to stockbrokers against all kinds of stocks—good, bad and indifferent; where the British banks finance trade, the American banks financed speculation. From this it was an easy transition for American banks themselves to become deeply involved in the issue, purchase, sale and holding of stocks, and many American banks created special 'security affiliates' for this very purpose. Had it been possible to make a comparison four years ago of the security holdings of a British and an American bank, the result would nine times out of ten have been most illuminating.

Again, it must be remembered that the United States is not yet a fully developed or settled country, and a half-settled country always gives scope for speculation in real estate. Human nature being what it is, thousands of bankers up and down the country were unable to resist the pressure put upon them by their customers to grant loans against real estate as collateral. Besides this, the normal business of most bankers consists of making

loans or taking up notes against local agricultural or industrial produce. Thus when the crisis came the vast majority of bankers had one foot deeply buried in the stock markets and the other in the fortunes—in every aspect of the word—of their particular locality, including its produce and prospects. Both in their stock market operations and in their local activities nine bankers out of ten had heavily discounted the promise of the future, in which in 1928 every American citizen believed. Even the Reserve Banks themselves were not free from blame; for by their easy money policy of 1926–29 they had encouraged the nation and its banks to discount the future.

It is easy to understand what was to happen during the subsequent four years. The collapse on Wall Street, the collapse of trade, the collapse of markets, and the collapse of prices not only ruined the producing community, but ruined many of the banks which had taken so heavy a stake in the continuance of prosperity. Nor had most of the banks the big inner reserves, accumulated out of the profits of two generations, which the British banks had behind them in the crisis. Instead, deluded by the laws which imposed upon them certain minimum cash reserves, they had plunged heavily with the remainder of their own and their customers' money, and had no margin in hand out of which to meet their loss. The result was that by the end of 1932 most of them held assets or collateral consisting of a mass of frozen loans, worthless securities, unsaleable farms, and plots of land whose development and value depended upon the return of prosperity.

During 1932, when the real mischief had been done, palliatives were put in hand. One has already been mentioned—namely, the granting to the Reserve Banks of the right to issue currency against Government securities. This right was freely used, for in six months the Reserve Banks bought $1,000,000,000 of 'Governments.' It had been hoped that the result would be an expansion of credit, a recovery of prices, and a revival of trade, but by this time the American banks were in such difficulties that they used this extra credit to alleviate their own troubles. Bank borrowings from the Reserve system (*i.e.* rediscounts) were reduced by $335,000,000, and a further $85,000,000 was absorbed in additions to member bank balances with the Reserve Banks. Gold losses to foreign nations offset another $300,000,000 of the Reserve Banks' purchases of 'Governments,' so that the Federal Reserve Banks' note circulation only expanded by $225,000,000. Much of this new currency must have gone into hoards, and so was not available to revive the trade of the country.

In the same year came the foundation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. This was an institution which derived its

funds from Government sources and made loans to banks, financial institutions, railroads, and other approved borrowers who were in difficulties. Between February 2 and December 31 it granted loans amounting to $1,525,000,000, of which $300,000,000 was repaid during that period. Loans to banks totalled $851,000,000, of which $256,000,000 was repaid. This, again, was only a palliative, which had to succeed quickly in liquefying the finances of the country, if it was to succeed at all. Unfortunately, Congress in its wisdom decided that the names of borrowers must be published. Every elementary student of banking knows that a bank depends for its existence upon the maintenance of the confidence of its customers, and that if it becomes known that a bank has been in need of help, such news very often proves a death sentence to that bank. Moreover, American banking was already suspect, both because of the gradual appreciation by the public of the facts recounted above and also because of the long record of bank failures, which had reached formidable dimensions since the 1929 collapse. The result was that the publication at the end of 1932 of full details of American bank borrowings from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation proved the last straw. The confidence of the nation in its banks was finally destroyed, the people rushed with one accord to withdraw their money while yet there was time, and the whole banking system broke down. The proclamation of a general banking holiday was the only alternative to complete and final collapse.

It remains to consider the future, and here history is being made as I write, and still more will have happened by the time this article appears. Moreover, I have not yet seen the full text of the Banking Bill, and have depended upon cabled summaries. Still, the Executive appear to have been granted fairly full powers, which include the mobilisation of hoarded gold, the calling in from circulation of gold certificates, the control over external gold movements and foreign exchange dealings, the issue by the Federal Reserve Banks of emergency currency backed by Government securities and eligible assets of individuals or firms and the promissory notes of member banks. Congress has also passed an Economy Bill, which deals drastically with civil service salaries and war veterans' bonuses, so that the budget deficit is also being dealt with. During the week beginning March 13 solvent banks were gradually allowed to reopen, and, to judge from the rush by the public to deposit money, some measure of confidence has been restored. A similar restoration of confidence was also noticeable in foreign centres, for, notwithstanding the prohibition of gold exports now in force, the leading exchange rates were quoted on the resump-

tion of dealings at much the same point at which they stood immediately before the closure. There was, in fact, a momentary appreciation of the dollar, due to 'bear' covering and the replenishment of dollar balances by foreign houses. Dealings on Wall Street were resumed the same week, but call rate was raised to 5 per cent., mainly as an intimation that the banks wished to discourage borrowing for speculative purposes. Foreign exchange dealings were subjected to much the same restrictions as were in force in England at the end of 1931. Purchases of foreign exchange are limited to reasonable commercial, travelling and personal requirements, and to the discharge of commitments outstanding at the time of the holiday.

Still, the most that can so far be said is that the American nation has for the moment recovered its nerve, and is prepared to trust its money to the banks on the assumption that the whole banking system will forthwith be put in order. This colossal task has still to be undertaken, and at the moment all that can be done is to indicate possible lines of approach. First, it is clear that, like other nations, the United States will have to forego the luxury of a free internal gold circulation. The gold coin and bullion and gold certificates which are now being called in will not re-emerge, and the main currency will probably be that issued by the Federal Reserve system, including both Federal Reserve notes, backed partially by gold, and Federal Reserve Bank notes, which can be purely fiduciary. Whether the minimum gold backing of 40 per cent. to Federal Reserve notes is maintained remains to be seen; but there is little doubt that the Glass-Steagall Act will be extended, so that Government securities will remain eligible as backing for currency at least for an indefinite period. There are also distinct possibilities that silver will be brought into greater use as currency, and if this helps to raise the price of silver, it will have important consequences, not only for world silver producers, but also for world trade with the Far East. It is conceivable that one consequence of the American crisis may be the emergence into circulation of India's silver hoards, just as the British crisis brought her gold hoards into circulation last year.

The very moderate exchange restrictions are likely to remain in force until matters become more settled, and it will probably be a long time before unrestricted gold exports are permitted. It is possible that some form of licensing will be introduced; or the right to ship gold may be confined to the Reserve Banks, acting by themselves or through appointed agents. This, again, is at the moment pure guess-work; but whatever happens, it is unlikely that any obstacles will be put in the way of legitimate international trade or investment.

The real problem is that of the internal banking system, and in particular that of the hundreds of banks which are now bankrupt and which ought not to be allowed to reopen. It is impossible to say what are the aggregate of deposits which these banks represent, but if these deposits simply disappear, the result will be not only ruin to the depositors immediately concerned, but also a definite disappearance of purchasing power—in other words, still further deflation. The reaction of this upon American trade and prices—and, indeed, upon world trade and prices—is easily imagined, and it is also clear that one of the chief consequences of such additional deflation would be to place still more banks upon the danger list. This means that the purchasing power so lost will have in some way to be made good. Theoretically, if the Reserve Banks are empowered to issue additional currency, or even to maintain the present volume of currency, the banks still in existence will be able to build up upon it the same volume of bank credit as before. In practice, however, this is a slow and uncertain process, which may well result in the creation of idle and not active bank deposits. Neither the United States nor the world can await an entirely automatic solution of this character, for the maintenance of confidence depends now on a speedy rehabilitation of the economic machine.

Incidentally, on March 15 there was another reason for speed. Most of the banks had been reopened, gold was returning from hoards, the American people had recovered their nerve, and business everywhere was, superficially at least, resuming its normal course. In these circumstances it appeared at that time fatally easy for President Roosevelt to do nothing and simply to let matters drift. Fortunately, I have good ground for believing that a scheme of reconstruction is being matured. The fact that some banks still remain closed shows that the Administration are exercising discrimination and are in effect giving a clean bill of health to the banks now open. Pending the completion of a general scheme of reconstruction, this is as much as can be done at the moment. But I am convinced that President Roosevelt will not rest upon his laurels.

To a foreign observer the broad lines of reconstruction appear fairly clear. An excess of hampering legislation, defining in minute detail a banker's powers and duties, must be avoided, for a banker must learn to be self-reliant and be enabled to base his decisions as much upon the character of his customers as upon their exact position when reduced to the terms of a common form. On the other hand, the days of the vast mass of small unit banks have gone, and amalgamation and branch-banking must come. How far it would be politically practicable to establish a common code of banking law over all the forty-eight States is a difficult question

to answer, but at least branch-banking should be established within the boundaries of each State, and such new State banking organisations should be compelled to become members of the Federal Reserve system. There are, indeed, strong arguments in favour of extending the area to be covered by a branch-banking system so as to include not merely each single State, but the wider area comprised within the majority of the twelve Reserve Districts. I am not at all certain that this would not be the happiest compromise between America's banking needs and the rights and traditions of the forty-eight States—namely, the recognition of each Reserve Bank as the central bank and *sole* bankers' bank of its District, coupled with the establishment of branch-banking systems stretching over the whole of that District. It would not be necessary to enact that there should be only one branch-banking system in each District, for several could exist and compete with each other like the 'big five' in Great Britain to-day. This radical change might, incidentally, involve the disappearance of the distinction between National banks and State banks, and if one consequence was that the national banks lost their right of note issue—because they became merged with State banks into the new branch-banking system—such a consequence would at least make for the simplification of American currency. Indeed, to an Englishman, it appears an obvious reform that the Reserve Banks should have the sole right of note issue.

Once American banking is consolidated in some such way the days of the inexperienced local banker will be over, for he will have ceased to be the uncontrolled head of his own bank, and will at most be the local manager, subject to removal by head office in case of need. Again, the local branch will no longer be dependent upon local affairs and subject to local pressure. Instead it will draw upon the resources of the new system, and can refer awkward questions to the general management at head office. On such lines American banking will be free to develop soundly and to distribute equitably the new credit which must be created to replace that lost in the banking crisis which reached its culminating point a few weeks ago. If so, then we can say that by rehabilitating her banking system America has completed one more of those awkward tasks which form part of the general work of world reconstruction, and we can say, too, that because the March crisis forced America to face up to this task, it in the long run promoted world recovery. But if President Roosevelt allows America's banking affairs to drift on in the old way, the outlook for America and for world recovery will be dark indeed. President Roosevelt has been given a great opportunity to rank with Washington and Lincoln in the pages of history. The world is now anxiously waiting for him to seize it.

NORMAN CRUMP.

Manchuria rights the effect of which was to restrict the exercise of sovereignty by China in a manner and to a degree quite exceptional. . . . Such a state of affairs might have continued without leading to complications and incessant disputes if it had been freely desired or accepted by both parties, and if it had been the expression and manifestation of a well-understood policy of close economic and political co-operation. But, in the absence of such conditions, it was bound to lead to mutual misunderstandings and conflicts. The inter-connection of respective rights, the uncertainty at times of the legal situation, the increasing opposition between the conception held by the Japanese of their 'special position' in Manchuria and the claims of Chinese nationalism were a further source of numerous incidents and disputes.

This is a true diagnosis. China is a weak, semi-colonial State seeking independence. It is too little realised, in the West, how the Chinese resent, above all the other 'Unequal Treaties,' the Twenty-one Demands imposed by Japan in 1915. They were accompanied by an ultimatum when the countries were both numbered with the Allies. China has never ratified them, and has consistently protested against them. The entire treaty position of Japan in Manchuria, save the extra-territoriality of her nationals, rests upon the Twenty-one Demands, for all the older treaties and leases were time-expired years ago. It was inevitable that, with nationalism growing in China, the Manchurian authorities should practise, against these exacting claims, the evasion, procrastination, and obstruction in which their race is skilled. For a treaty signed under duress has even less hold upon the conscience of a nation than a contract signed under duress has upon an individual. It is true that the treaty is legally binding and the contract is not—a striking example of the time-lag between public and private law. Yet, though non-fulfilment of forced treaties is bad law—and bad policy too—it is one of the great realities of international life.

Japan's motive equally was nationalism, or, to be exact, the uncontrolled army which began the invasion was impelled by that passion. The wiser leaders in Japan, at that stage, were not so possessed; but some have fallen by assassination, others are mute under threat of death, and many have lost their judgment, as men do in war-time. Of course, the Japanese produce a long string of arguments to justify their policy, but none of them bears analysis, skilfully cooked as they are with the sauce of the country to which they are served. The main slogan used in Japan to stimulate war fever is endlessly repeated abroad: 'Japan must have room for expansion for her over-crowded population.' But not in Manchuria, where the Japanese die of cold in out-of-door employment; even Mr. Sato once admitted to the League that they did not want the country for colonisation. The claims of security and of the sanctity of treaties have re-echoed from the Paris

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAR EASTERN DISPUTE

For eighteen months, ever since September 1931, Japan has pursued the conquest of north-east China. During the whole period the Governments of the world have tried vainly to restore peace. A week after the capture of Mukden, a week before the bombardment of Chinchow, Japan pledged her word to her fellow-members of the League of Nations to withdraw her troops. On February 24, 1933, while her planes were destroying Chaoyang and Kailu, her delegates at Geneva listened to forty-two nations voting a report which declared her a violator of the Covenant. Wars of aggression are as old as history ; but a war accompanied by a continuous debate between attacker and victim conducted in the presence of the assembled world is a new thing. The grey Secretariat committee-room has been the stage whereon men spoke of horrors happening outside in the world ; their argument, with the dream-like quality of Greek tragedy, has had also its effect of revealing the fate which drives the peoples to ruin. An act is ended now. Whether the Japanese take Peiping or not, their victory is complete. It remains to be seen if they can hold what they have taken. The League, too, has reached a turning-point in giving judgment. Only the future can show if its award will be carried out. It seems as good a moment as any to look back at this dispute and to attempt to assess some of its many implications.

The first, and one obvious enough, is the danger inherent in the juxtaposition of two nationalisms—one informing a weak State, the other a strong army. The League Assembly Report of February 24 is quite clear on the point :

> During the quarter of a century ending in September 1931, the political and economic ties uniting Manchuria with the rest of China grew stronger, while at the same time the interests of Japan in Manchuria did not cease to develop.

Chinese immigration has made Manchuria

> a simple extension of China North of the Great Wall. In a population of about 30 millions, it is estimated that the Chinese or assimilated Manchus number 28 millions. On the other hand Japan had acquired or claimed in

arms Press. Statistics, however, prove that in 1931 foreign life was more secure in Manchuria than in Japanese Korea; while in the matter of treaties a State engaged in breaking the Covenant, Kellogg Pact, and Nine-Power Treaty is delicately placed to complain of infractions of the Twenty-one Demands. The United States have been flooded with appeals to dollar mysticism; Japan has an indefeasible right to Manchuria because she has great trading interests and investments there. But Japan had as great a share of Manchurian trade as she needed—nearly half of it. In any case, the total trade with Manchuria is only worth a fraction of the Chinese market within the Wall which Japan has thrown away. Great Britain is particularly asked to applaud Japan for restoring order in a lawless land. This is 'eyewash,' too. Manchuria, for China, was orderly. No anarchical country exports great and increasing quantities of peasant-grown food-stuffs. The people were over-taxed, but they were tolerably secure. The invasion produced anarchy indeed, the destruction of Chinese authority and the bombing of villages causing a vast increase of banditry and famine in the north, where the peasants dared not till their fields. As the Lytton Report says, 'The population of a large, fertile and rich country has been subjected to conditions of distress such as it has probably never experienced before.' Lastly, all the West is asked to recognise Japan as the barrier against Communism in the East. Yet if Japan felt such moral reprobation of Communism, it seems an odd way of expressing it to attack the National Government, which in 1931 was engaged in a critical struggle against the Communists of China.

The only Japanese motive which stands the test of facts is plain aggressive nationalism. The army, with some of its troops actually stationed on Manchurian soil, was modern, mechanised, equipped with aeroplanes, tanks, and all the new weapons many soldiers long to use. There was no possibility of resistance from the Chinese armies. The Japanese are trained from the cradle to believe that Manchuria is not only strategically necessary to them, but that they have a right to it because they fought the Russo-Japanese War there; as though Waterloo gave Britain the right to own Belgium. Most important of all, the resisting power of China was sensibly growing. Chang Tso-lin evaded the treaties and came to terms with the Nationalists. He was destroyed. But his son Chang Hsueh-liang went further; he acknowledged Nanking and adopted some of its methods. He and his Government must go too. The blow must be struck before China could organise sufficiently to gain general revision of the Unequal Treaties—before the solid mass of the Chinese population could turn its weight against Japan's privileges. Japan was determined to get Manchuria completely into her control, and, if possible, to

ruin the anti-foreign Government of China into the bargain. She has fully attained the first object, and may yet gain the second.

For Japan is acutely conscious that if China is a weak State, the Chinese are a strong nation. Even at its weakest, the nation can produce manifestations of solidarity like the boycott, which was practised far outside the bounds of Chinese rule. Once organised even into a loose federation with a common foreign policy, China would become a formidable force, and one whose rooted dislike Japan would have good reason to dread. So Japan argues that the Chinese Government is no Government, and she cannot arbitrate with chaos; but she insists in the same breath that she must negotiate directly with Nanking to finish this dispute. Her object is partly to avoid the equity which third parties would introduce into negotiations, but mainly to humiliate the National Government beyond recovery. And, from a short-sighted point of view, this would pay Japan.

On a long view it is all fantastically silly. The military success of Japan changes nothing, fundamentally, in Manchuria. On the contrary, it is certain to defeat its own ends. The barbarous severity which bombs towns and wipes out villages in which insurgents are reported to have stayed will cow the people. But, except in cases like the Fushun massacre of last September, where the total population of three villages was assembled and machine-gunned, it can only embitter the relations of the races. Japan has seized the machinery of government, but she cannot extirpate the population on which she depends for labour. Reforms of currency, even lighter taxation, will not reconcile it. The Chinese are called implacable in enmity; and there can be few of them in Manchuria now who have not cause to hate the Japanese. The only hope of peace, the only hope of securing Japan's legitimate commercial interests, lies in friendship between the peoples. But incendiary bombs and the thinly-veiled annexation of 'Manchukuo' are hardly the way to make friends.

It is this consideration which lies behind the verdict of the League Assembly—a belief that in the long run the strongest forces, in fact as well as in law, are on the Chinese side. This is why the Assembly has offered the solution of an autonomous Manchuria under Chinese sovereignty, with League advisers to reorganise its administration and guarantee Japanese rights. China has accepted the scheme, which is perfectly feasible, regarded absolutely. The only obstacle is the total refusal of Japan to consider it. The present party in power, flown with easy victory, is busy considering the conquest of Inner Mongolia, and treats advice to evacuate Manchuria with natural contempt. Japan, indeed, has aligned against her the moral judgment of the whole world; but she has reason to think that she can smash

her way through the world's condemnation as easily as she has through the Chinese armies. Is this belief well-founded? Has the League failed utterly in the first case of aggression by a Great Power? The problem is worth weighing; many issues hang upon it, including the continued existence of the League itself. For, after all, the League is not a device for controlling drug traffic or facilitating conversations between foreign Ministers, convenient as it is for those activities. It is a contract between Governments to keep peace and a machinery to enable them to make peace; and it must abide the test of its own purposes.

It must first be realised that the Far Eastern war is precisely the sort of crisis for which the League was designed. It consisted of a complex dispute—and all international disputes are complex—followed by an attack by the stronger disputant, as normally happens. The framers of the Covenant foresaw exactly such a contingency; they realised that an armed State would run amok from time to time. So they pledged all League members to restore the peace—by conciliation if possible, by boycott if need be; and they provided a variety of means for impartial settlement of the case on its merits. In this instance there were two factors which impeded League action: the naval hegemony of Japan in the China Seas, and the fact that the Japanese army and navy took no orders from their Government, whose pledges were thereupon worthless. To counterbalance this it had two great advantages: the co-operation of the United States, which removed the old fears of American interference with a boycott, and the extreme commercial vulnerability of Japan, dependent as she is upon export to China, the United States, and India.

It is clearer on this point to make a distinction in the working of the League between its functions as (1) machinery for settlement and (2) a pledge to keep the peace, and to assess each in relation to the invasion itself and to the conflict of interests underlying it. There has been no sign of breakdown in the League procedure, though it has been slowly and sometimes clumsily handled. When China appealed to the Council and afterwards to the Assembly Japan appeared to argue her case. Thus even the aggressor admitted that its action was 'a matter of concern to the whole League,' as Article XI. says. In the later stages, indeed, Japan insisted that she did not admit the competence of the Assembly to consider her action in Manchuria. But she contradicted her own assertion by offering to the Assembly, in speeches and documents, volumes of argument about her Manchurian policy. This necessity for submitting the case to the League was imposed by publicity, far the strongest element in League procedure. No party to a dispute which is going to be publicly debated by other Governments dares to stay

away and let its case go by default. Moreover, all discussion at Geneva is conducted under the presumption that the disputants, to justify their policy, must prove that it is in harmony with the Covenant. This solvent has an extraordinary precipitating effect, instantly crystallising out the victim and the aggressor. China's attitude has been absolutely in accord with the Covenant throughout, and every League discussion has added to the strength of her moral position. Her initial appeal to the Covenant, her immediate request for an impartial inquiry, her non-resistance in Manchuria in the early months, her offers of arbitration on all disputed questions, and her steady acceptance of suggestions made by the League were all in her favour. They were aided by the moderation of her representatives and the careful accuracy of their accounts of the occupation. The League Assembly sealed its impression of the Chinese policy when it wrote in its report:

> While at the origin of the state of tension that existed before September 18th, 1931, certain responsibilities would appear to lie on one side and the other, no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for the development of events since September 18th, 1931.

The unfortunate delegates of Japan had to try to translate into terms of the Covenant the simple ideas: 'We wanted Manchuria, we have taken it, and we mean to keep it.' They were not prepared to admit that they had broken their word, in spite of periodic lapses into pleading that the Covenant did not apply to a disorganised State, or that it must be treated as 'flexible.' So they were forced into a maze of mutually contradictory arguments and palpable falsehoods about events in the East, creating a very damaging effect of hypocrisy. The story that the September occupation was necessitated by self-defence deceived few people; the later myth of the spontaneous generation of Manchukuo was even less credible. When Japan wrote to Geneva in November 1931 that the customs and salt tax had been seized by local authorities, 'with whom Japan has nothing whatever to do,' she merely added insult to the intelligence of the Governments to injury of the Covenant. In January 1932, when the Japanese were daily massacring the workpeople of Shanghai, their Government wrote: 'It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to assure the tranquillity of the Far East.' And the onlooker could not help thinking of the *Walrus and the Carpenter*. It is perhaps unjust that the irritation set up in the minds of most Governments by hypocrisy should have been increased by the robust cynicism of General Araki when he came into power. But so it was. Japan was violating her pledges, voluntarily incurred, to keep the peace and, under the Nine-Power Treaty, to keep her hands off China.

Every League meeting served only to expose her dishonour and to make it clearer that the conflict lay between Japan and China indeed, but even more between Japan and the whole system of the Covenant. League experts have always derided the darkeners of counsel who say that it is impossible to 'define the aggressor.' The aggressor, they say, invariably defines himself by continuing to fight and by refusing reasonable settlement. In this respect the Far Eastern dispute has proved a gilt-edged League case.

A new development of procedure which has worked well, on the whole, is the co-operation of the United States in a political League case. They were, indeed, one of the Governments with first-class interests in China; and without them little could be done. The beginning was unpropitious. America refused to join in the inquiry China demanded, and must bear the major responsibility for preventing the quick action which would probably have arrested the occupation. But later the United States' policy was far more a League policy than that of any of the European Great Powers, and certainly heartened the smaller League States to stand by the principles of the Covenant. Japan, it is true, tried latterly to make the invitation to the United States and Russia a pretext for repudiating conciliation; but M. Motta, of Switzerland, called this legalistic bluff in February, when he inspired the Assembly to offer conciliation without the non-members and Japan refused it. The Assembly doctrine of non-recognition of a situation created in violation of the Covenant applied to 'Manchukuo' by the February 1933 Report was first adopted in March 1931 and taken from Mr. Stimson's public statements of policy.

The Council, acting under Article XI., found its first proposals for a settlement blocked by Japan's vote; for decisions under Article XI. must be unanimous. It may be argued, however, that the weakness lay, not in Article XI.—under which the Council States threatened Greece with a naval blockade in 1925—but in the timidity of the Great Powers which control the Council in dealing with one of themselves. The only effective contribution of the Council to this dispute was the setting up of the Lytton Commission of Inquiry in December 1931. This part of League action was astonishingly successful. It was slow; Japan blocked the nomination of the Commission's members and the Council Powers helped her to block the publication and acceptance of its Report. But nobody, except the Japanese, has found fault with the Report itself. There were partisans of the do-nothing policy who were hopefully prophesying last September that it would be an indecisive balancing of the sides. Balanced it is, but far from indecisive. It is absolutely clear on the unprovoked aggression of Japan and the artificial nature and ill results of the

'Manchukuo' *régime*. After its publication no League State could deny its Covenant responsibility to preserve China's integrity. Far more important, the solution suggested by the Report was workable, and envisaged the necessary reforms in the *status quo* of 1931 by means of an autonomous League-advised Manchuria. Japan, whose official demands had always been confined to her commercial rights, could have accepted the scheme without loss of face, and would have gained by it immensely. Her rights would have been guaranteed, and she would have avoided the odium and expense of holding down a recalcitrant Manchuria. The statesmanship to grasp this, however, was lacking in the fanatical militarists who had gained control of Japan by last October.

Meanwhile, the invasion of Shanghai had caused China to appeal to Article X. of the Covenant (the guarantee against aggression) and to Article XV., which enables the League to recommend a settlement without counting the votes of the disputants. China also transferred the dispute from the Council to the Assembly. This period marked the one decisive success of the League in the dispute. For the Great Powers, alarmed for their interests at Shanghai, remonstrated with Japan in a body with real vigour; and the Assembly took a far more decisive line than the Council had ever done, defining a condemnation of the results of violence, and intervening actively in the negotiations for settlement which took place at Shanghai under the auspices of the neutral representatives there. Japan, after a fruitless victory, realised that Shanghai was what her Prime Minister, Mr. Inukai, called a 'gigantic blunder' and withdrew unconditionally.

The last step in League procedure was the attempted conciliation by the Assembly on the basis of the Lytton Report, and after its failure the February Report. That Report is the gravest indictment of aggression ever written, seeing that it expresses the considered view of forty-three non-disputant States, the United States having endorsed the Assembly vote. It contains also, on its suggested Lytton Report scheme for Manchuria, the alternative to chaos in the Far East. For it is certain that some such settlement must be accepted, or war between Japan and a combination of China and Russia is certain, though it may be delayed for a decade. The machinery of the League, therefore, has enabled the world to judge a difficult suit and make a reasonable and constructive award. Why, then, has civilisation failed to impose its judgment? Why has Japan continued her campaigns undeterred? The answer is that the League as a contract to keep the peace has been betrayed. Its most important members, the European Great Powers, have refused to fulfil their Covenant obligations. That is a serious charge, and must be substantiated by evidence. This lies partly in the mere existence of the present situation.

League members are bound to preserve each other's territorial integrity against external aggression. China has had territory twice as great as Germany torn from her by external aggression, and the League States have not preserved her. They are all in default under Article X., except China herself. Nor have they made any attempt to fulfil their obligation to boycott an aggressor under Article XVI., though Japan certainly resorted to war in defiance of her obligations to keep the peace.

Politically speaking, other States—which in practice means Britain, Russia, and the United States—were not strong enough to defend China against Japan. But League members are not absolved from doing what they can, and the European Powers have sedulously refrained from doing even that. Action in the early stages would have been easy, safe, and most probably effective; for Japan sprang, paused to see what the League would do, assured herself that it would do nothing, and sprang again. Withdrawal of ambassadors might have sufficed; an embargo on export of arms and on credit facilities for Japan would almost certainly have succeeded, because they would have warned Japan that the Powers meant business. This hypothesis, as well as the double-dealing of the Powers, is proved by the following facts. At the suggestion of the Council, Britain, France, Germany, and the United States had official 'observers' in Manchuria almost from the first. These informed their Governments of events, but the Governments did not pass on the information to the League. They gave themselves away in November 1931, when the Council was sitting in Paris, and the Japanese advanced on Chinchow, declaring that they were threatened by a Chinese concentration. Britain and France suddenly started sending their observers' telegrams to the League. They were published, and revealed that the Chinese were totally unprepared even for defence. Mr. Stimson spoke up too, and Japan, startled by this simultaneous move by the Powers, withdrew her troops to Mukden —for three weeks.

Now it is manifest that if the observers' reports had been honestly supplied to the League throughout there could have been no doubt that Japan was the aggressor. For they must have contained the true story of the faked railway incident of September 1931. The Powers would then have been bound by the Covenant to take action. Instead, for long months their Ministers made frequent speeches saying that they could not act because they must not prejudge the issues. These statements were false. They did not need to prejudge the questions in dispute, although the Far East departments of the Foreign Offices knew them intimately. An impartial inquiry was necessary, and the despatch of the Lytton Commission was the proper course.

But the Powers knew the facts of the war all along; and the lesser States knew that they knew. The small States were debarred by diplomatic etiquette from telling the Great Powers that they were double-crossing, but they were not debarred from despising them for it. When the dispute passed to the Assembly it was interesting to note how the smaller States, who all agreed that Japan was the aggressor, appealed to the Great Powers to keep the Covenant. 'We are looking for wise leadership to the Great Powers, and above all for strong leadership,' said Mr. te Water, of South Africa, his eyes fixed on Britain and France. But the smaller States knew well that they would look in vain; and it was in face of steady obstruction by the Powers, and especially by Britain, that they forced through a resolution defining Covenant principles of settlement.

It is a common gibe in this connexion that it is all very well for Sweden and Czechoslovakia, who have no interests in the Far East, to constitute themselves the advocates of the League action. Not quite justified, for by League action Czechoslovakia would cut off her very profitable export of arms to Japan. But the smaller States are vitally interested; they depend absolutely for their security upon the good faith of the League members. Each of them separately is weak—a potential victim of attack. Their alliances, as they know well, are worth little. They sincerely believe in the Covenant as the one hope of peace for the world, and, as the existence of a Spaniard or a Belgian is as valuable to him as that of an Englishman to himself, they attach importance to the guarantee of that existence. It is perhaps incidental—though in this dispute it has been of tragic importance—that the statesmen of the world to-day all come from the smaller States. The men who have experience, brains, character, and courage are powers in the Assembly. But the Great Powers who dominate the Council have used nobody who combines any two of these attributes to represent them in this dispute—except Lord Cecil, who gave the first Council meetings a proper lead, but who was unsupported by his Government and his colleagues. It is absurd to say, as some do, that the West was impotent because of the financial crisis. Crisis is the opportunity of leadership, in which the Council Powers have shown themselves completely lacking. Their influence has declined proportionately. France's prestige has not been so low since the invasion of the Ruhr; Great Britain's has reached its nadir in this century.

Perhaps the best excuse for Japan in her violation of the Covenant is the tacit encouragement she has received from all the other Powers except the United States. Part of that encouragement may be due to fear; part is certainly due to the sympathy felt by the Conservative Governments at present in power with

reactionary imperialism. Hence the passive attitude of Italy and Germany, who have missed an opportunity to set themselves at the head of all the lesser League States in vindication of the Covenant. France, with Paul-Boncour as Council President, was partial to Japan; she straightened up under Herriot. The British representatives have been frankly and publicly pro-Japanese. Last December Sir John Simon contrived to turn what he described as an account of the Lytton Report into an attack upon China and a refusal by omission of the Report's suggestions. It was done by quotations torn from their contexts; but the effect was so partisan that Mr. Matsuoka congratulated him on having said in forty minutes what he himself had been trying to say for ten days. After that speech the Japanese were justified in believing that they could bomb Shanhaikwan and conquer Jehol without the slightest protest from Great Britain. This belief has certainly been strengthened by our latest antic. The British Government pledged itself in the Report of February 24 to take no unilateral action regarding the situation in Manchuria. Four days later it declared a unilateral embargo on arms export to China and Japan alike. The embargo did not cover aeroplanes, nor touch existing contracts. It obviously penalised China, who depends entirely upon imported arms, while Japan manufactures the bulk of her requirements. This remarkable plan to damage the victim and aid the aggressor was proposed at Geneva for general acceptance, where it met with merited scorn. After a fortnight Britain called it off.

The British policy seems to have been dictated by the feeling that, as long as some of the Powers remain favourable to Japan, the League will be unable to establish co-operation in fulfilling the Covenant. Thus Sir John Simon the other day refused to propose working out the details of the Assembly plan for Manchuria because it would be useless without 'the co-operation of the parties.' China, of course, accepted the Assembly Report; if Britain is going to wait for Japan's consent, she will never act at all.

It is impossible to foretell the future of this conflict, which is still barely begun. So far it represents a deplorable setback in the organisation of international relations. It is true that civilisation, through its political constitution of the League, has declared Japan a violator of the Covenant and proposed a possible settlement. But Japan has refused it. She has destroyed her repute as an honourable nation. She will be feared because of this adventure, but not trusted for a long time to come. Moreover, she has involved herself in holding down a conquered people, which in the psychology of modern nationalism means risings, suppressions, and ever-growing hatred. And strategically she is

immensely weakened by the acquisition of a long frontier with Russia and by creating a *Russia irredenta* in seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway. The best fate that can be hoped for Japan is internal financial ruin, which would force her to withdraw.

China, the one State which for the last eighteen months has been fulfilling the League obligations, has seen that fidelity rewarded by dismemberment. Many Chinese believe that her only possible future is militarisation and alliance with Russia. More ominous still, the Great Powers in the first real test of their fidelity to the League have evaded their obligations. This is a wound indeed. It has almost completely destroyed the confidence of the League members in their laboriously constructed system of mutual guarantee. It has rendered any substantial measure of disarmament impossible. It has thrown every State back on doing its useless best to provide for its own security. It has set every nationalist party in the world to planning its favourite war under the firm belief that when it attacks nobody will interfere, and has brought the next world war many years nearer.

The Lytton Report says:

> The interests of peace are the same the world over. Any loss of confidence in the application of the principles of the Covenant and the Pact of Paris in any part of the world diminishes the value and efficiency of these principles everywhere.

The Far Eastern dispute has proved this true. The League represents the modern, interlocked world, and its procedure is adequate to settle that world's disputes; but it rests, like any other treaty, on good faith, and the ill-faith of its members has opened the door to the forces of anarchy. There is yet a desperate hope to save the Covenant, but one so faint that it is likely that war may overwhelm the world while the Governments drift and bicker. Never was there a greater call for statesmanship than in this critical dispute; and never, surely, less sign of its appearance.

FREDA WHITE.

PRICE CONTROL IN AGRICULTURE

THE collapse of the international monetary system has led to an agitation everyhere for a planned economy. The variations are wide enough : witness the systems associated with the names of Lenin and Mussolini, the German agrarian policy, the activities of the American Federal Farm Board, our own Addison and Elliot Marketing Bills, and international organisations such as the Chadbourne Sugar Scheme. All of them, however different in scope, seek to substitute ' planning ' for the ordinary regulation of supply and demand by price. They all, with the exception of the Russian system, aim at the maintenance of a price to the producer above what would otherwise be the world price, by restriction of supply or by other means. Restriction of supply is itself a counsel of despair in a world where 30,000,000 unemployed persons and their families cannot purchase normal quantities of food, and where vast populations in China and India are living below any reasonable subsistence level.

What events have led up to our English proposals for agricultural planning ? The war, with its short rations and fear of starvation ; the post-war boom and its succeeding depression ; the necessity of restoring our balance of trade by restricting imports (of which foodstuffs form such an important part) ; the abandonment of Free Trade and the just demand of the farmer that the same measure of protection should be accorded to his as to other industries ; a recognition of the undeniable importance of re-establishing a flourishing countryside ; the ruin on the one hand of many property owners by death duties, and on the other the loss of liquid capital through the purchase of their farms by tenants in the post-war boom period. Add to these factors the fear of members of the House of Commons of the food tax cry associated with tariff duties, the world slump of commodity prices, the world over-production of foods compared to effective demand, and you get an explanation of the adoption of quotas. It must be noted that quotas have not been adopted on merit ; they have consistently and repeatedly been condemned by every economic conference, and by the British representatives at those conferences. But in the jargon of politics quotas did not

symbolise a food tax. The public had not learnt that they are far more costly than tariff duties, or that the quota subsidises the importer and foreign producer at the expense of the home consumer, and without any compensating advantage to the Revenue. In an era of glut quotas seemed to provide Ministers with an easy expedient for reducing supplies and thereby raising prices. The normal policy of effective protection by tariffs and by Empire Preference was ruled out because of politicians' fears. Since Ottawa freedom of action has been still more severely hampered.

Yet the difficulty and complexity of our agricultural situation demands action. The farmer must be protected if production is to continue. My present intention is to examine briefly whether the policy sponsored by the Government is likely to meet the case, whether the provisions of the new Agricultural Marketing Bill are in the permanent interests of British farming, and whether these provisions can be carried into effect without creating a reaction against control which must prove most dangerous to the future.

There has been a world-wide move for grading and standardising produce. If British produce is to compete successfully with carefully graded butter, cheese, eggs, apples, pears, and vegetables from the Dominions and foreign countries it must be equally graded and packed. The fact that it is fresher is not alone sufficient, especially as transport from neighbouring Continental countries has been revolutionised. The policy of the Ministry of Agriculture in the encouragement and insistence on better grading and packing for the market deserves every support. The benefits already conferred by the National Mark Scheme and by the operation of most of the clauses of the Addison Marketing Act are substantial; they have already enhanced the values of British as compared with imported foodstuffs. The Elliot Marketing Bill, in so far as it continues and expands this process and increases the producers' bargaining power, will help the British agricultural industry still further by consolidating and extending the work already accomplished. But unfortunately the attempt is also made to combine the technical improvement of marketing with price control. The most successful schemes for the grading and standardisation of produce in other countries have not been complicated by any attempt artificially to control prices regardless of world market conditions.

The Elliot Bill is not in the main a Bill to standardise quality, but to control prices. It proposes to give to Development Boards—mainly representative of producers, which will be established for various branches of the industry—powers to regulate and to limit sales of their products. It gives these boards powers to fix producers' prices at such a figure as will guarantee profits to farmers

and to secondary producers. The boards already have powers under the original Act to acquire premises for 'secondary production' (*e.g.*, bacon factories, creameries, sugar refineries, canning factories, etc.) and to require the registration of producers of a primary product such as milk, or a secondary product such as cheese and bacon. The limitation of imported supplies necessary to implement any marketing scheme in operation or in process of formation is provided for in the new Bill, by co-operation between the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Board of Trade, and the new Marketing Supply Committee. However, the prices are not to be maximum prices, like those fixed by the war-time Food Ministry, which were fixed for the benefit of consumers, but they are to be minimum prices—*i.e.*, fixed by and for the benefit of producers. They are no longer to be determined by competition, but arbitrarily on the basis of monopoly. Prices are no longer to be low because of plenty; they are to be raised by the creation of an artificial scarcity. Producers contravening the rules are to be liable to fine and imprisonment.

According to the Press, the 'interests concerned' have welcomed the Bill; agricultural M.P.'s are said to be satisfied. Is this surprising? Do not dockyard members rejoice when public money is to be expended in their constituencies? Would they not rejoice still more if they could fix the contract terms? But are not consumers equally 'interested'? Have they not been forgotten? The Labour Opposition were placed in a corner at first. The measure embodies to some extent their theories of control—the control of prices and supplies, of primary and secondary production, and of the first stage of marketing. It is an extension of the Addison Act. But the duty of an Opposition is to oppose, and they remembered that their programme is not only one of control but also of nationalisation. So they put forward a reasoned amendment based on the fact that a measure which guarantees an assured profit to those who produce food out of the land also guarantees a rent to the owners of that land; and that if the ownership of that land is vested in private hands no one can compel these landlords to spend the increased return from rents in capital improvements and equipment. Indeed, it may well be argued that the necessary corollary of large national expenditure on agriculture is the nationalisation of the land, to ensure that the proceeds of that expenditure shall permanently aid the industry itself and not the mortgagees or the landlords.

The landowner and the farmer may well be satisfied with their immediate prospects under the Bill, even if the restrictions imposed are in some cases irksome. But what of the consumer? He is in the end the person on whom the farmer depends. The political inertia of the main body of consumers is one of the

features of the last two years in politics. But though the consumer is as yet for the most part inarticulate, he makes himself felt. In deference to his supposed prejudices the Government have avoided for the time the food tax cry by adopting a quota *plus* a policy of domestic regulation as against direct new customs duties on foods. It remains to be seen what the reaction of the consumer will be if the development schemes ever come into full operation and achieve their purpose.

The rational method of raising agricultural prices and of ensuring a satisfactory permanent demand for all the products of the farm, especially of those luxury products such as the best beef and certain types of fruit and vegetables which offer good returns, would seem to be to secure a general rise in all wholesale commodity prices, with the concomitant increase of employment and consequently of demand. A large policy aiming at a fundamental improvement in the purchasing power of the people has recently been put forward by Mr. J. M. Keynes in the columns of *The Times*. Whether Mr. Keynes's proposals for national combined with international action, or whether some other plan is the best way of securing all-round prosperity to the world at large, including the farmers, is a question beyond the scope of this article. But it is desirable to make clear the point that the farmers' prosperity depends far more on the restoration of normal consumption in the thousands of families now existing on bread, margarine, and potatoes than on any marketing scheme. Even if the Government be right in supposing that farm prices must first be artificially raised in this country, because the condition of agriculture brooks no delay, the method chosen seems to embody many avoidable disadvantages. As neither the public nor Parliament have as yet adequately discussed their policy in all its implications, I shall try to see where the new marketing schemes may lead us.

I was for a time in the Ministry of Food; I have helped to control prices. I have seen some of the unexpected results of control—how a small beginning leads from one step to another, and how futile it may prove to control one or some of the stages of production and distribution without going to the end of the chain in the retail shop. I know how easy it is for producers to outwit controllers, and how unanswerably a case can be made out with books and figures for an official price which is actually higher than it need be. I have seen Lord Rhondda blessed for imposing control during abnormal times and his successors cursed for continuing it when times became normal. Parliament is entering light-heartedly on a system of food control, forgetting that restriction and control, even under the sanction of war scarcity conditions, opened the door to much obstruction and chicanery.

In what way, then, is the present Bill likely to work out? The live-stock problem is still under consideration, and the only branches of that industry for which we have full information are bacon and ham production and milk. The future organisation of the pig industry is outlined in the Report of the Lane-Fox Commission. That scheme sets up complicated machinery the efficiency of which time alone will show. The sow is a refractory animal as regards restrictive policy on account of her fertility. Moreover, in the opinion of many competent observers, the omission to control pork and the intervention of the non-registered producer—the small man—may upset all calculations. For cattle and sheep we have only the results so far obtained under the quota system. Fat cattle prices have moved very little. The price of Argentine beef at Smithfield increased at first, to the great advantage of the importing meat trusts, and without any compensating gain to our Treasury and taxpayers. It is not at all certain that a workable meat scheme for controlling the home beef and mutton supplies can be evolved. If it cannot, live-stock breeders and graziers will find themselves left in the lurch.

Further, if the intentions of the Department with regard to the marketing of live cattle are rightly interpreted and English meat is killed at central abattoirs and put in cold storage, the British producer may lose one of the few advantages he now enjoys in providing fresh-killed meat commanding a higher price. A scheme for centralised slaughtering is already outlined. It provides for better regulation of slaughter and for adequate means of inspection impossible with a large number of private slaughter-houses. These are great advantages. Care must be taken, however, to see that the system is not turned into one which limits the supply of meat.

The question of milk is an extremely complicated one. Since the war milk production has been relatively profitable. Farm prices of milk have been consistently higher than those of other products, and farmers have therefore turned increasingly to dairying; but the public are not increasing consumption, and so we have a glut which threatens to break the high price of milk, which at present stands about 77 per cent. above the pre-war level, while the general level of retail food prices has only advanced by 23 per cent. Impoverished consumers have been buying cheap imported tinned skimmed milk. It is true that it lacks butter fats which make babies thrive, but, being sweetened, children like it, and it is cheaper than liquid milk for tea or puddings. Obviously the consumption of fresh milk will not increase if people buy more tinned milk. There will be a smaller market for the fresh milk, which has a naturally protected market,

and the farmer must sell a larger proportion of his output at the less remunerative price afforded for milk for manufacturing purposes. Already M.P.'s for agricultural constituencies are demanding the prohibition of the imports of manufactured milk or their severe limitation through a quota. Suppose the appropriate board employs its powers, and supposing that the Ottawa agreements stipulating for the free import of Dominion dairy produce for three years are circumvented by 'gentlemen's agreements'—a large assumption—it does not necessarily follow that the impecunious will patronise our cows. Is it not equally likely that they may give their families more tea and fewer milk puddings?

The milk scheme is to be welcomed in so far as it secures a safer supply. With stricter regulation of the supply of milk the medical profession will be encouraged to advocate increased consumption. But the main object of the scheme is the maintenance or the improvement of prices. The vital issue is really the surplus milk employed in manufacture. Under the proposals of Sir Edward Grigg's Commission part of the higher price obtained on the liquid milk market is to be paid into a pool, the proceeds of which are to be used to bribe the surplus milk producer to keep off the liquid market. Let us take for example Wiltshire, which produces mostly milk for liquid consumption, and Cornwall, far distant from a liquid market, which produces mostly manufacturing milk in summer. A levy is to be made on milk producers in Wiltshire and distributed to summer milk producers in Cornwall and to any there may be in Wiltshire. In Cornwall a levy is to be made on producers selling milk for direct consumption, the proceeds of which will go to the summer manufacturing milk producers there. Will not such a scheme defeat itself by increasing summer milk production? No compensation is suggested for milk producers making butter on the farm; will this not prove an incentive to sell milk off the farm and so increase the glut of 'manufacturing' milk? The next step must surely be control and restriction of production if prices are to be maintained. Voluntary reductions have proved unsuccessful in most countries; there must be compulsory powers in any scheme, and we may even see the day when no new man will be permitted to become a dairy farmer.

It is clear, also, that eventually control must be extended to all farm products. For, unless there is a proper parity of price between the various crops and live-stock products, there must inevitably be a tendency on the part of the farmer to produce the commodities with guaranteed prices, and so to cause further gluts in those commodities, and on the part of the consumer to buy increased quantities of the uncontrolled, cheaper products. Any

scheme brought into operation for one branch only must defeat its own end, in so far as price-raising is achieved. Why have the sales of bacon increased in the last year? Largely because the over-taxed middle classes and the unemployed could not afford mutton and beef. But the Bill is intended to raise the price of bacon. No board can, in fact, force the impoverished consumer to purchase dear bacon. He will turn to uncontrolled, cheaper products, such as potatoes, or fish or eggs. But potatoes are not to be allowed to drop. Should there be any danger of cheap potatoes because of a bountiful crop, the board, we are informed, will prohibit the sale of small potatoes. They may do so in theory, but the 42,000,000 consumers of Great Britain may be as ready to break regulations which infringe unreasonably their liberty of choice and standard of living as American citizens have been to ignore the Eighteenth Amendment. And there will be plenty of farmers and distributors able and willing to evade these regulations in order to get customers. If farmers have to choose between official prices for surplus produce and disposing of this surplus illegally at a profit, they may break the law and risk the odium of conviction for the crime of selling cheap milk or small potatoes. The sale of unintoxicating foodstuffs is not likely to saddle us with the evils of gangdom, but we may easily witness a growing disrespect for and disregard of law and the undermining of public morality.

Let me turn to another aspect. During the past sixty years there has been a revolution in British agriculture. World discoveries, mechanical and other inventions, and changes in public taste have brought about a complete alteration in the types of food produced in this country and in the particular localities where they are produced. This change-over upset many farmers and landowners. It brought distress, just as the invention of the spinning-jenny or of railroads did. But in the long run these revolutions brought increased prosperity to the country. I see a distinct danger in British agriculture becoming stereotyped under the new policy. The effect of all control schemes during the war was to bolster up the marginal producer. Prices were necessarily fixed in a time of scarcity at a level which would enable the uneconomic producer to make his contribution to the general need. Producers favourably situated made large profits; those unfavourably situated made a livelihood. It is politically impossible to eliminate the uneconomic producer by State action. Now, in the past, the flexibility of English agriculture has been one of its greatest assets. But under the present schemes the man producing under uneconomic conditions will have no overwhelming incentive to change his method of production or to change over to another type of farming. Had there been Develop-

ment Boards at the end of the nineteenth century they would undoubtedly have used their powers to bolster up cereal farming in the Midlands. Hertfordshire being considered the best wheat county of England, every effort would have been made to enable this crop to be grown remuneratively in that district. If ten years ago we had been blessed with as water-tight a Milk Scheme as the Hops Scheme under the Marketing Act, Mr. Hosier would have had no urgent reason to invent revolutionary methods of milk production. Possibly he might even have been prevented from embarking upon them, for under the Hops Scheme no new man can easily invade the monopoly preserves of existing fortunate hop-growers. The nation would have been poorer without the Hosier system.

Control even of an industry consisting of a relatively small number—between 2000 and 3000—of fairly large units is difficult enough, as the Coal Marketing Scheme has shown. Parliament is being invited to enter light-heartedly on a much more complicated task, the detailed control of a varied industry in the hands of 500,000 small and relatively unorganised producers. The task requires a superman. Moreover, agriculture is a long-range industry in which plans must be laid years in advance. Changes once made cannot be lightly reversed, or reversed at all at short notice. For these reasons a thorough examination of the present proposals for the reorganisation of agriculture seems essential. Every student of economic, social, or political history knows how impossible it is for mere man to forecast events. World trends and tendencies have a way of upsetting our most intelligent anticipations and forecasts, as the food controllers will discover.

Agriculture has suffered in the past because our townsmen were not prepared to tax food even in times of prosperity. These same townsmen (who still form a substantial majority at the polls) are not likely to be more willing to-day in times of poverty to endure food taxes so much more severe that they will in fact be super-taxes. They have not yet realised the full implications of the Marketing Bill combined with quota restrictions. It is true that retail prices have not yet risen. After a certain interval, however, the consumers' price must rise if producers' prices are raised to the desired height. A revolt at the polling-booth against high food prices and the annoyances of control would have disastrous results to agriculture. The farmer, encouraged to increase his liabilities by increasing production for a protected market in certain lines, would find himself in a worse position than ever. Memories are short. The Corn Production Act induced farmers to plough up land for wheat. Its repeal left him helpless. Farmers are encouraged to accept the restrictions imposed on them by the new schemes because foreign

supplies are restricted. But in a predominantly industrial country a reversal at the polls may compel the removal of those restrictions. No Parliament lasts for ever.

It appears to me that the outbreak of a revolt against the new system might result in either of two things—(1) agitation by the towns on the lines of the Corn Law agitation against any consideration of the farmers' interests; (2) the advent of a Socialist Government, the introduction of a complete system of Import Boards, with complete control of home production, so that all supplies could be pooled and the consumer benefited by a price averaged on cheap imports at world prices plus a dearer home production.

My apprehensions may be unreasonable. I may be out of date in drawing conclusions from past history. I may be unfair to our super-men in doubting their genius in anticipating the future, or their political courage sternly to refuse help to grossly uneconomic vested interests when they inadvertently create them. I may misjudge the ordinary man's resentment when faced with price control, excessive restrictions, and artificial scarcity. Times are new, and strange and chaotic. Is Walter Elliot among the prophets? At all events, he is showing imagination and courage in giving the House of Commons what it wanted—namely, action.

ASTOR.

TO-MORROW AND THE PROPHETS

Le Glorieux, who seemed to take great pleasure in the discussion, had by this time bustled himself close up to the two heralds. 'I will help thee, good fellow,' said he to Rouge Sanglier, as he looked helplessly upon the scroll. 'This, my lords and masters, represents the cat looking out at the dairy window.'—SCOTT, *Quentin Durward.*

THE amazing catastrophe in America has revealed in one final lurid flash a fact which has been becoming more and more clearly evident since the war broke out. Almost from the end of the Napoleonic Wars—certainly since 1848—it was possible to believe that we knew, however roughly and vaguely, the general meaning of the kaleidoscope men call 'history.' Now and again some little piece in the kaleidoscope—Algeciras or Fashoda or the Jameson Raid—might take an aberrant course. But these were accidents. The pattern was there, and we knew it. What was really happening during this long quiet period was that the kaleidoscope was shaken very slowly and with a certain regularity. Now suddenly the movement has become violent and quite monstrously irregular, with the result that the most expert, unless they be fanatics or monomaniacs, no longer profess to know the pattern and the plain man is beginning to say sullenly that there is no pattern at all. This, of course, is a heresy; there must be causes, and if we could know them all and evaluate accurately their interactions we could prophesy their effects. The difficulty lies in their selection. The prophet picks out the wrong cause: he overestimates the effects of this factor and underestimates the result of that, and ignores others altogether which are none the less there, and possibly potent.

Lunching, just before the collapse of the American boom, with one of the most illustrious of English prophets, we fell to talking of the state of the Lancashire cotton industry and the peril to it of Japanese and Indian competition. He listened, smiling gravely. Then he took down an atlas. 'I will show you,' he said, 'the real doom of the Lancashire cotton industry,' and, opening a map of America, he put his finger on the American South, with its abundance of cheap labour, its raw material at its very doors, its splendid up-to-date equipment and its vigorous and alert direction. It cannot have been much more than six

months afterwards that there called upon me an intelligent American who had just returned from a visit to Lancashire. He admitted that the condition of the Lancashire industry was deplorable, but the condition of the American industry was, he said, far worse. 'You mean, of course,' I said 'the New England mills.' 'Oh, no,' he said. 'They are in a very bad way, but the state of things in the South is far worse. There is nothing in Lancashire to compare with the conditions in the South. They are simply incredible.'

There has never been a time when men, for obvious reasons, were more passionately eager to read the future, and perhaps never a time when the difficulty of the task was so glaring. The number of the prophets and the diversity of their prophecies are striking illustrations of both these facts. There are at least five schools of prophets nowadays—all different. There may be more. There is the Catastrophist, who envisages the imminent ruin and collapse of the whole structure of our industrial civilisation. There are the prophets of the Decline and Fall, who foresee substantially the same ruin accomplished by slower and less dramatic methods. There are the seers of the popular gospel which for convenience may be called, with due apologies to Mr. Priestley, Slipping Round the Corner—who assure a relieved public that the present depression is just an ordinary depression, only worse, and that the worst is now over. There are the grim Communist diviners who see in our present miseries, with stern satisfaction, the birth throes of a new and happier order. And there are the apocalyptic revivalists who proclaim in the very midst of the Great Slump the glad tidings of the Great Boom coming the day after to-morrow.

Catastrophism is based on the undoubted fact that for the past four years at least the structure of modern industrialism has been subjected to an unheard-of strain, and on the assumption that sooner or later the breaking point must be reached. The weaker communities will then collapse in financial bankruptcy, famine, rioting, revolution, anarchy and ruin. The process may not be universal for all the States at the same time. Almost self-sufficient communities, like the French, will hold out a little longer than peoples like our own, entirely dependent on overseas trade and food supplied from abroad. Very highly organised nations, like the Germans, will weather the storm rather longer than States, like America, with practically no social organisation at all. But the respite for the strongest will be very temporary; the weaker will drag the stronger after them into the same pit of irretrievable ruin.

The philosophy of the Decline and Fall is a variant of Catastrophism. The fact which it emphasises is the rapid and terrifying

impoverishment of all the great Western civilised nations in recent years. It is assumed that this process will continue, though more slowly; that the strength and vitality of these nations will be gradually sapped, till they sink one after another into the final decay and ruin which the Catastrophist prophesies. There is nothing impossible in the destruction of industrial civilisation. If it seems inconceivable to the man in the street, so doubtless did the collapse of imperial Rome to a Roman citizen of the age of the Antonines. Yet imperial Rome collapsed. The main argument against all the Catastrophist theories is that people dislike the prospect offered them. There is, in fact, a hard core of reasonableness in the popular belief that what millions of people do not desire to happen will not happen. But it is dangerous to lean too heavily on this instinct (it is scarcely more). Who, after all, wanted the Great War, in the form which it took? Heard far more gladly are the relatively cheerful seers who proclaim that Europe, distressful as her present position may be, is slipping round the corner. The monstrous fly in these prophets' ointment is America. So long as America sits still on her financial ashpit, pouring dust upon her head and proclaiming herself, in the midst of the wealth of half the world, irretrievably ruined, there can be no real trade revival. But what weakens the whole Slipping Round the Corner doctrine is the puerility of the theory by which some of its professors attempt to maintain it. This theory is a clearly supra-rational belief in a mystic rhythm or tide in industrial and commercial economics. Bad times always, we are taught to believe, tend to succeed good times, and good times bad. It is the story of Pharaoh's fat and lean kine, repeated, exasperatingly, to infinity. Now, it is true that before the war there was such an apparent succession of booms and slumps. This phenomenon was never perfectly explained. But the present slump has nothing whatever to do with these pre-war slumps and booms, and the prophet who says it has is deceiving himself and others. What is the good of recording the fact that there was a financial panic in America in the 'nineties? There were not 20,000,000 unemployed in America in the 'nineties; there was nothing remotely resembling the present situation.

It is darkening counsel wantonly not to recognise that what is now happening in the world is quite without parallel and has no precedent. The wiser Slippers Round the Corner do not attempt to challenge this fact. They say merely that civilisation has been in a bad way before and has recovered, and that the thing which has been is likely to be the thing which shall be, with whatever modification in scale and emphasis. If it is true, it is cold comfort; and the belief is at best an act of faith, and not a very intelligent one. The physician who tells his patient that he should

take courage, for he has been ill of one disease before and recovered, and therefore will probably recover now from a disease manifestly quite different, will, if his patient retain the faculty of reason at all, be shown the door without delay. But all these analogies are deceitful and dangerous. They ignore, without exception, material differences. If our condition to-day were far closer than it is to the position of England after the Napoleonic Wars, the similarity would still be a quite unsafe basis of prophecy; for, to take one difference only, the scale of the two is quite different, and a quantitative difference may, and very often does, involve a qualitative difference also. An experiment in a 3-inch test-tube may evolve exactly the same relative quantity of the same poisonous gas as a similar experiment in a test-tube 30 feet high. But in one case the very presence of the gas at all may be imperceptible to the investigator, and in the other it may poison half a town. A spoke of a bicycle wheel and a spoke of the engine wheel of an express train may be broken in precisely the same manner, and precisely the same mechanical results may follow; but the effects will be different, and if any prophet doubts it he should be made to ride on the engine.

The grave difficulty with the sages of Communism or Red Socialism is their lordly refusal to pay any attention to the facts of the present wretched capitalist world. What, for instance, do Mr. Lansbury and the American 'New Republic' mean when they say that Russia is 'the one bright spot' in Europe to-day? They cannot mean that life in Russia to-day—the life of the ordinary peasant or working man—is to be preferred to the ordinary worker's life in France or Germany or England. That is not a prophecy—it is an untruth; and British Socialist working men who have visited Russia have come running back, holding hands of horror above their heads, to testify that it is an untruth, and that Russian conditions, even if improved in certain respects by the Soviets, are still far below the level of working-class life in Western Europe. Do they mean, then, that Russia alone among European countries has felt no ill effects from the world slump? This cannot be true. The chief need of Russia at the present time is capital—capital at almost any price; and one chief effect of the slump is to make it difficult for any but the strongest concerns to obtain capital. To say, therefore, that Russia is unaffected by the slump is to assert the incredible. It may be suggested that what is meant is that the Soviets have found a 'cure for unemployment.' But have they? Any Government which is strong enough and ruthless enough can no doubt 'cure unemployment' by forcing an entire population to work continuously for next to nothing a day. But can converting a squalidly miserable unemployed man into a miserably squalid

employed man be fairly called 'curing' unemployment? It is only restating the problem in another form—perhaps, in these days of over-production, a more difficult form. What the prophets really have in their minds, apparently, is that the Russian example offers the sole hope of solution of our present difficulties. But does it do anything of the sort, and how? If a Communist America and a Communist France corner gold, exactly the same results to the world will follow as if both were still in the bond of capitalism. If foreigners distrust the finance of a Socialist England, the fact that the Government is Socialist will not have the slightest effect on the resulting flight from the pound. If a Red France insists on trying to extract from a Red Germany 'reparations' which the one cannot afford to pay and the other cannot afford to receive without disastrous results to the whole structure of their commerce and finance, the situation which will arise will be just the same as if they were both Blue to the backbone. This key, that is to say, will not fit this lock. The prophets who proclaim that it will are the victims of monomania. They are merely tiresome.

One of the prophet's difficulties is that it is required of him to reveal, like Nebuchadnezzar's magicians, not merely the dream but the interpretation of it as well. He must tell us not merely of the forthcoming cataclysm but what the human reaction to it will be, and in what temper and spirit the man of the day will meet it. If he does not know this, he knows nothing; for the human reaction is the very life and blood of history—the events are but its dry bones. This demand made upon him is quite precise and definite, for every age has its own quite distinct peculiar *zeitgeist*, the hall-mark of its own individuality. We may say, reading Catullus's *Odi et amo*, 'How modern!'; but we do not mean—at least, if we are intelligent we do not mean—that a Latin poet of the first century B.C. habitually thought and wrote and talked in the language of Swinburne and Verlaine. We mean that, thinking and writing so very differently, he did yet by an uncanny chance strike on one or two occasions this particular note. Some of Chaucer's characters walk our streets to-day: some are as remote from our experience and as obscure to our understanding as Habakkuk himself. But Chaucer's contemporaries were of course quite blind to any such distinction; to them the Summoner was as real and matter of fact as the Miller or the Wife of Bath. Their *zeitgeist* included both indifferently.

To recover the atmosphere and temper of a past age is the aim (though he may not necessarily avow or even recognise it himself) of everyone who has any truck at all with history, whether it be the late Dr. Theodore Mommsen or Miss Marjorie Bowen. Mr. Leonard Woolf has recently made a direct frontal attack

upon the problem. He has set himself deliberately in a big book to revive and review the psychological atmosphere of the early years of this century. With all his acumen and industry and sensitive sympathy, the enterprise remains only a half-success. It wears the air of a gallant but forlorn adventure. The thing, in fact, is almost impossible. Our private experience illustrates the difficulty. A sudden sight, a sound, a smell may recall to us vividly for a moment of time some past phase of our existence; and improvisers of genius—Mr. Noel Coward, Sir James Barrie, or the late Arnold Bennett—may adroitly use this quality of memory to play the same trick upon us. But the applause justly given to *Cavalcade*, to *Quality Street*, and to *Milestones* is applause of a trick. We applaud them, as Dr. Johnson applauded preaching women and dancing dogs, not because they did it very well, but because they could do it at all. But if the recovery of the spirit of a past age is thus difficult, what are the chances of anticipating adequately and correctly a spirit not yet called into being by hypothetical events which have not yet occurred? It was of children, and not of prophets, that Aristotle was speaking when he said they were to be congratulated 'on account of their hope.'

As accurate forecasts of the real future the vaticinations of the gravest historian or economist deserve, in fact, little more credit than those of the humbler prophets whom the Marylebone and other magistrates are always fining so cruelly. In another respect, however, they are both interesting and extremely important. The prophet starts of necessity with the assumption that the reactions of the succeeding generation will be substantially the same as those of his own. They will not, and the error vitiates the whole experiment as an actual forecast of coming events. But what it really does is to give the experiment a new turn. It causes the prophet to cast, gigantic upon the screen of time, not the future as it really will be, but the future as the prophet's generation (assuming him to be a capable and articulate representative of it) hopes or fears or thinks or believes it will be. It may not tell us much about the mood of the future: it is first-hand historical evidence of the mood of the present—very valuable because it is generally very honest and unselfconscious. Some prophets, to be sure, merely use prophecy as a vehicle for propaganda. They are not really prophesying at all—they are preaching; and perhaps most prophets are liable to yield to this temptation at times. But to spy upon the future is such an interesting and fascinating occupation in itself that they usually overcome the temptation. They present in the result what they honestly believe to be a revelation of the probable future course of events, and what is in reality a real revelation of their own and their contemporaries' minds.

It is so regarded that the slightly absurd figure of the revivalist prophet becomes so interesting. His doctrine is not quite the nonsense which at first blush it seems. It is founded, like the others, on a solid fact. This is that half our present miseries are due to lack of confidence; if the world could be persuaded that its fears were shadows, the main problem would be solved. If the investing public could suddenly be convinced that a steady stream of golden dividends was assured to any man who boldly 'plunged' on industrials—that, to parody Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's famous formula, 'cotton was rising, wool was rising, silk would rise'—then there would certainly be a prompt and surprising trade 'revival': perhaps even the Great Boom of the revivalist's excited imagination, with results by no means entirely desirable. It is no criticism of this expectation to say that it assumes a miracle. The difficulty with the revivalist's miracle is that, to be effective, it must be on so vast a scale. If it is partial only, the miracle will not come off: the last state may indeed be worse than the first. If Germany, for instance, under the influence of this Couéism were suddenly to become a hive of throbbing industry, her investing public being suddenly convinced that every day in every way they were becoming richer and richer, the result might be the final blow to our unfortunate shipping and export industries.

To be effective the miracle must take place synchronously over the entire civilised world; and, with all mankind's well-established capacity to believe things which it knows to be untrue, that seems demanding much. None the less, the revivalist presents an interesting and even faintly encouraging picture. In an age which presents superficially the appearance of an army dissolving in complete rout, the mere presence of this little figure, running so eagerly to the front of the procession to sound the heady drums of victory while everything crashes around him, is perplexing but stimulating. It is difficult to believe that the society which produces figures like that is utterly decadent or irrevocably doomed. If it is, it will at least go down fighting.

STUART HODGSON.

FRITZ VON HOLSTEIN: A PORTRAIT

SOME ninety volumes, confidential talks with leading men of the Holstein era, and unpublished letters are cited as the 'sources' of Joachim von Kürenberg's work on the famous *Eminence grise* [1] of the German Foreign Office. One hundred and ninety pages tell what the author calls 'the life-romance of Privy Councillor Fritz von Holstein.' Many thick tomes, he says, could hardly record more than a fragment of German and international history as it was moulded by Holstein's hands. Therefore he has sought to sketch, in outline, seventy pictures to illustrate the life and work of this outstanding yet obscure servant of the German Empire who, time and again, governed it more truly than Bismarck, the Kaiser, Caprivi, Hohenlohe, or Bülow.

If the method of 'picturing' be open to question, its efficacy is beyond dispute. Holstein's figure stands out with a clearness which he might have been the first to deplore, for he lived and wrought in a penumbra, and was never more powerful or more dangerous than when wholly hidden from view. Has this clearness been attained at the cost of accuracy? Is the picture of Imperial Germany, which von Kürenberg—perhaps unwittingly—presents, true in substance? Are the 'sources,' unspecified in detail though they be, trustworthy enough to warrant the conclusions he draws from them? Has he written history or merely a historical romance? For sundry episodes in his story no conscientious critic will go bail. They may be true, but they are 'not proven.' Nor is it easy to verify all the alleged facts. Holstein dead is nearly as elusive as was Holstein living. I never met him, though I heard much of him from Sir Valentine Chirol and others who had known him. German diplomatists who worked under and feared him were apt to speak of him with bated breath. Maximilian Harden, who possessed his confidence and was used by him, could hardly be brought to mention him outside the pages of the redoubtable *Zukunft*. But, having read *Die graue Eminenz* with some care, I have sought corroboration for its assertions and suggestions in such of the 'sources' as are within my reach.

[1] *Die graue Eminenz*, by Joachim von Kürenberg. (Verlag für Kulturpolitik, Berlin.)

These researches incline me to look upon von Kürenberg's 'pictures' as truer to life than I expected to find them, and even to give him credit for truthfulness where proof or corroboration is lacking.

Here, in outline of an outline, is the Holstein story. A minor Prussian noble, born in an ancestral home in the Brandenburg Mark, Baron Friedrich von Holstein had, as a boy, seen his father trampled to death by sheep stampeding from a blazing barn. Later some mishap seems to have made him misanthropic and to have given his nature a 'womanish trend.' Though not incapacitated for virile pursuits or lacking physical vigour, he never joined a students' corps or held an officer's commission. He was unmarried, and amorous adventures, if any, are unknown. Bismarck seems to have noticed him as a young, shy, awkward and secretive secretary of the St. Petersburg Embassy, and to have judged that he would be useful. Transferred to Paris, where Bismarck's opponent and potential rival, Count Harry von Arnim, was German Ambassador in the early 'seventies, Holstein was chosen by Bismarck to compass Arnim's ruin. Telling Holstein that Arnim was subsidising an anti-Bismarckian journal in Berlin out of the secret service funds allotted to the Paris Embassy, Bismarck demanded that Holstein should get material proofs of Arnim's misfeasance. In fact, Bismarck ordered a subordinate to spy upon his immediate chief. In Bismarck's indictment there were four chief counts: (1) Arnim's intrigues against Thiers and the French Republic; (2) his anti-Bismarckian view of the Old Catholic question; (3) his use of official information for financial speculation; and (4) his misappropriation of State funds to foster a newspaper campaign against Bismarck. Positive evidence in support of these counts was needed, and Holstein was told to get it by fair means or foul.

Holstein bowed and obeyed. According to von Kürenberg he was half-convinced that Arnim must be a rascal whom it would be a patriotic deed to show up, and wholly convinced that Bismarck and the old Kaiser stood for the German fatherland. In Paris he spied on Arnim, took surreptitiously, on carbon paper, a copy of the Ambassador's signature for the misuse of secret funds, and, having furnished Bismarck with this proof, warned Arnim of approaching dismissal, declined to give him satisfaction 'on the field of honour,' and advised him not to go back to Germany lest a police warrant await him at the frontier. Arnim fought hard. He went to Berlin, was received by the Empress Augusta, sought partisans against Bismarck in the Berlin clubs, and put himself at the head of Bismarck's opponents. Even the old Emperor appeared to be wavering—until Arnim published an

anonymous pamphlet against Bismarck on the strength of secret State documents.

Swift to strike, Bismarck set the public prosecutor in motion. Arnim was arrested, tried—with Holstein as king's evidence—and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment. Indignation against Bismarck and his 'tool' waxed hot among the Prussian nobility; and, as a safety-valve, Bismarck allowed Arnim to escape to Switzerland, thinking that Arnim free in exile would be less dangerous than Arnim in a Berlin gaol. But Arnim, in his rage, published another pamphlet, utilising State documents once again, and refusing to give them up on demand. Hence, in 1875, another trial, *in contumaciam*, five years' hard labour, and the juridical epithet of 'dishonourable.' Four years later, in 1879, the influence of the Empress Augusta and of the Crown Princess Victoria secured for Arnim a safe-conduct so that his trial might be revised before the Imperial court of justice and the perfidy of Bismarck be openly established. Appalled at this prospect and fearing lest Bismarck make of him a scapegoat, Holstein wrote to implore Arnim to stay abroad. Holstein's partisans let Arnim know that a cell in the Brandenburg penitentiary was ready for him. None the less, Arnim stood firm, packed his trunks, and was about to start from Nice when a stroke laid him low. In an hour or two he died, with his gaze on the box that held the anti-Bismarckian papers. On receipt of the news Holstein started for Nice without even a handbag, straight from the Imperial Chancellor's palace. He seized Arnim's trunks, opened them, and burned the incriminating papers, one by one, with his own hands. The awful nightmare was lifted.

Yet something remained—for Bismarck and for Holstein. Year by year the Prussian nobility seemed to hate Bismarck more and more. The old Empress and the Crown Princess shared their feelings. But Bismarck weathered the storm and 'took it out of' the Crown Princess in 1888, during her hundred days on the Imperial throne. Holstein, 'Arnim's hangman,' fared worse. In the club on the Pariser Platz, Count Bredow warned him that his presence might be misunderstood, and led him to the door which, Prussian baron though he was, he would never pass again. Nor would any host or hostess in Berlin society receive him. The boycott was absolute. Bismarck alone protected him. He who distrusted all men felt he held Holstein in the hollow of his hand and could rely on him through thick and thin. No official of the German Foreign Office could vie with Holstein in ability or in capacity for hard work. From 8 a.m. till late at night, year in, year out, he was to be found in his room, next to that of the Foreign Secretary, polishing off masses of reports without ever forgetting a detail, corresponding on his own authority with

Ministers and Ambassadors (this privilege Bismarck gave him), entering unannounced the adjoining room of Herbert Bismarck, who was Foreign Secretary, at any hour, and noting carefully the personal weaknesses, talents or shortcomings of every member of the Diplomatic Service from the youngest Secretary to the most experienced Ambassador. Bismarck's answer to the social boycott had been to appoint him ' First Councillor of the Political Department of the Foreign Office.'

To the Bismarcks, father and son, Holstein became indispensable. Amid their duties and responsibilities they could feel that his sleepless eye was watching over affairs and that nothing would escape him. Little by little the social boycott was mitigated, or would have been had not Holstein boycotted society in his turn. Whenever invitations reached him, even from high quarters, his invariable answer was that he possessed no ' gala suit ' and could not come. The only forms of social life in which he took pleasure were little suppers or luncheons in a ' wine restaurant '—Holstein was a *gourmet* and loved good claret—or parties in the *salon* of Frau von Lebbin, wife of a high official in the Prussian Home Office. But, as appears from the Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe, the third Imperial Chancellor, and from those of Bülow and others, Holstein's little suppers and luncheons were by no means boycotted by Ambassadors, Ministers and officials who wished to be in his good graces or whom he wished to use ; and from his early days in Berlin he kept in touch with promising or ambitious men like Count Philip Eulenburg and, later, Bernard von Bülow.

Holstein seems to have made a point of standing well with ' Phili ' Eulenburg, long before that gifted, effeminate, and somewhat perverse nobleman had become the intimate friend and unofficial adviser of William II. Holstein's influence presently made Eulenburg Prussian Minister to a South German Court and thereafter German Ambassador in Vienna. He had a hold over Eulenburg and, according to Kürenberg, over Bülow also. What it was and how Holstein used it Kürenberg explains in several passages which are as explicit as, in the circumstances, they need be. It has often been suggested that Holstein's power over Bülow was derived from the possession of a bundle of love letters which Frau von (afterwards Princess) Bülow had written to one of her music masters, and that the casket containing these letters had been acquired by Holstein from an individual who stole it. Kürenberg gives a version of this incident that is more creditable to Holstein. The casket, he says, was stolen during a party which the Bülows gave in a Berlin hotel, and Bülow suspected Holstein of the larceny. He went so far as to charge him with it, and was promptly challenged to a duel. But that same

morning an impecunious officer, who had attended the Bülows' party, brought the casket to Holstein and proposed to sell it to him. Holstein took the casket, made the officer seal it, dismissed him summarily, had him expelled from his regiment, and then handed the casket to Bülow without more ado.

This story might account in part for Bülow's subservience to Holstein. Kürenberg assigns, however, another reason for it. He relates that one night, when Holstein took refuge from a downpour in a fifth-rate Berlin beer-house frequented by sailors, he was astonished to hear, in what was obviously a homosexual rendezvous, two 'gentlemanly' voices among those of a number of men dressed as, and painted and 'made up' to look like, sailors. The two 'gentlemen' answered to the names of 'Krause' and 'Hoffmann' respectively. In the smoke and murk of the beer-house Holstein could not distinguish their faces, but he recognised the voice of 'Krause' as that of Philip Eulenburg. 'Hoffmann's' voice he could not identify until, some years later, he met Bernhard von Bülow. At critical moments, when Eulenburg or Bülow showed reluctance to do his bidding, Holstein had but to call them 'Krause' or 'Hoffmann.' It was enough to bring them to heel.

With a finger in every Berlin pie, and informers (willing or unwilling) in every embassy and legation abroad, Holstein was able to guess how the wind was blowing long before a straw stirred. After the death of the old Emperor William, the short reign of the Emperor Frederick, and the advent of William II. in 1888, he knew that Bismarck's end was approaching and resolved not to be crushed in the Iron Chancellor's fall. Subtly, imperceptibly, he passed from the camp of Bismarck into that of the young Emperor, using Eulenburg and other tools as his sponsors. In June 1887 Bismarck had concluded, for three years, a secret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, behind the back of Germany's chief ally, Austria-Hungary. This treaty was Bismarck's masterpiece. It was designed to prevent the growth of intimacy between Russia and France, and at the same time to forestall the danger of excessive German dependence upon Austria-Hungary. The treaty fell due for renewal in March 1890, when the young Emperor had been less than two years on the throne. Holstein knew that William II. meant to be his own Chancellor. He knew also that Bismarck often withheld important papers from his Imperial master, marking them either 'Not to be put before the Kaiser,' or 'Not for the Kaiser,' or 'Revise for the Kaiser.' In March 1890, when Bismarck's relations with the young Emperor were strained for other reasons, and when Count Shuvaloff was already in Berlin on a secret mission from Tsar Alexander III. to negotiate a renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty with Bismarck

and Herbert Bismarck alone, Holstein caused the original treaty to be placed before the Emperor (who was unaware of its existence) and thus brought about the Iron Chancellor's dismissal. The secret treaty was not renewed, and Russia turned towards France. While Herbert Bismarck was still impetuously defending Holstein against suggestions that ' the man with the hyena's eyes ' was betraying him and his father, Holstein was preparing to plant his dagger between the ribs of Bismarck himself and thus, at one stroke, to take revenge for the indignities he had suffered after the Arnim affair and to ensure for himself a longer lease of power by gaining the favour of William II.

So Bismarck and Herbert his son departed, never to return. When they took leave of the officials in the Foreign Office Holstein was not there. As they drove away Herbert exclaimed, ' All were there save the Demon ' ; and Bismarck answered slowly, ' If fear of the good is demonic, Holstein is a true Demon.' How Holstein intrigued and manœuvred in the post-Bismarck era—dominating and presently procuring the dismissal of Bismarck's successor, General von Caprivi ; securing the appointment of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein as Foreign Secretary, only to discard him at the opportune moment ; eliminating from the Kaiser's circle men like General Count Waldersee (who knew too much of Holstein's betrayal of Bismarck), and favouring the advent of Bernhard von Bülow, first as Foreign Secretary and thereafter as Imperial Chancellor—von Kürenberg's ' pictures ' show in something more than outline. One man only might have been too much for Holstein—Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe, who, on Holstein's advice, had given up the lord lieutenancy of Alsace-Lorraine in November 1894 to replace Caprivi as Chancellor. Hohenlohe was a Bavarian grand seigneur, distinguished, upright, experienced and keen of mind. He knew Holstein of old, knew him for what he was, dangerous and irreplacable, holding him an evil counsellor yet an indispensable wheel in the German diplomatic machine. While Ambassador in Paris—as Hohenlohe's own Memoirs show—Hohenlohe never visited Berlin without paying his respects to Holstein or supping with him. To his nephew, Count Clemens Schönborn, Hohenlohe said, upon his appointment to the Imperial Chancellorship : ' If you hear anything about Holstein in Berlin society—and you will hear much, and much that is unjust—be so good as to take no part in such talk. I have known Holstein for thirty years. I knew him in Paris, I know precisely what he is—but I need him.'

Holstein understood that Hohenlohe needed him, though he never felt that he could dominate the third Imperial Chancellor. Secret intrigues and Press attacks left Prince Hohenlohe unruffled. Once, when Holstein made a report to him and asked

the Chancellor to sign forthwith a document he had prepared, Hohenlohe observed quietly: 'I am Imperial Chancellor, not a councillor of the chancery'; and Holstein knew he had met his match. From time to time he played his trump card and sent in his resignation, which was invariably declined. Rumours of an impending reconciliation between the Emperor and Bismarck frightened him out of his wits. So he offered to resign lest his 'retention of office be one of the obstacles that might impede the fulfilment of His Majesty's wish for a trustful relationship with Prince Bismarck.' In reply Hohenlohe reminded Holstein that it was upon his advice that he (Hohenlohe) had accepted the Imperial Chancellorship, a condition being that Holstein would help him. Were Holstein now to withdraw it would be a breach of contract. The visit which Hohenlohe had paid to Bismarck on taking over the Chancellorship was a visit of courtesy—nothing more. There was nothing in it to awaken Holstein's distrust. Holstein was glad to stay. Yet he tendered his resignation again, for the seventh time, when the Kaiser and Hohenlohe went to Friedrichsruh for Bismarck's eightieth birthday. Once again it was declined. The gulf between Berlin and Friedrichsruh was too deep.

Bismarck was not the only cloud on Holstein's horizon. The influence of Count 'Phili' Eulenburg upon the Kaiser had increased beyond measure. Day after day Eulenburg was the Kaiser's guest, having immediate access to him while responsible Ministers had to wait and could scarcely get Imperial attention to their reports and proposals. Holstein grew envious—more than envious. As a hard-working official, wrath filled him at the idea that Eulenburg, whom he had sent as Ambassador to Vienna, should be neglecting his duties there in order to play and sing his own songs to the Kaiser and to surround the All-Highest with an unhealthy atmosphere of semi-mystical Byzantinism. What sort of a course would these two unstable and erratic dreamers launch Germany upon! Worse still, Eulenburg's influence might imperil Holstein himself—Holstein, to whom Eulenburg owed his career.

By chance or design Count Dohna, Eulenburg's deadly foe, called upon Holstein in those days. Dohna and Eulenburg, East Prussian Junkers both, had been 'friends in youth.' In 1886 Dohna had taken Eulenburg to Court, where Eulenburg's personal charm and artistic gifts had made him a favourite, almost to the exclusion of Dohna. Hence, in his hatred, Dohna informed Holstein that Eulenburg had once been blackmailed to the tune of £3000 by an attendant in a bathing establishment, ostensibly for proclivities similar to those which Holstein had detected among the 'sailors' in the beer-house.

On the morrow, against his wont, Holstein accepted an invitation from Prince Hohenlohe to a 'beer evening' in the Chancellor's palace so as to meet Eulenburg among witnesses. Getting Hohenlohe and Eulenburg into a corner, Holstein began to talk of blackmail, political and other; and Eulenburg, who had drunk too freely, promptly told the story of the bathing attendant. Holstein speedily committed every word to paper, and took his document next morning to the prefect of police, citing as witnesses Count Dohna, Prince Hohenlohe, and himself. Thus accredited, the story was lodged in the police archives, an official receipt for it being demanded by Holstein. Receipt in hand, Holstein persuaded Hohenlohe that a copy of the story must be placed among the 'personal records' of the Foreign Office since 'the case' was 'well known to the police.'

With this rod in pickle, Holstein let Eulenburg feel his power by many a letter and telegram to Vienna. In March 1897 Eulenburg lost patience to the point of 'letting himself go' against Holstein in a private note to the Imperial Chancellor. A prudent and conciliatory answer from Hohenlohe explained that Holstein had been trained in the Bismarckian school and could not accustom himself to an era in which decisions were taken and policy determined elsewhere than in the Imperial Chancellor's palace. 'Besides,' added Hohenlohe, 'Holstein does not know His Majesty and has never come under the softening influence of personal attachment which the kindliness of the High Gentleman inspires.'

As an immediate result—a result indicative of Eulenburg's intimacy with the Emperor—His Majesty 'announced himself' to luncheon with the Imperial Chancellor and expressed the wish that Holstein might be invited. Holstein declined, saying that he was unwell, and mentioning the nature of his indisposition; whereupon the Kaiser prescribed for Holstein, through Hohenlohe, an old Hohenzollern family remedy. Not until much later, in the Bülow era, did Holstein meet the Emperor. It was on the eve of the Emperor's meeting with Tsar Nicholas of Russia at Björkö in June 1905, when, after the fall of Delcassé in the Morocco affair—a small masterpiece of Holstein's tactics—the Emperor was determined to conclude an alliance with Russia. Though Holstein had long been anti-Russian, he agreed with the Emperor's ideas on condition that Bülow should accompany the High Gentleman. But, as Bülow was evasive and Holstein was eager to know what was really afoot, he deigned to accept an invitation to luncheon with the Emperor at Bülow's table. Dressed in a shabby frock-coat, Holstein, with Prince and Princess Bülow, awaited the Emperor, who thus met the real director of foreign policy for the first time after a reign of seventeen years.

Holstein's appearance impressed him unfavourably. During luncheon the Kaiser spoke of a cordial telegram he had just received from the Tsar, fixing Björkö, in Finnish waters, as their meeting-place, and announced, to Holstein's astonishment, that he would meet the Tsar unaccompanied by the Imperial Chancellor and would take with him only Herr von Tschirschky, a somewhat subordinate representative of the German Foreign Office.

Nevertheless, Holstein hoped, when the Kaiser should speak to him after luncheon, to dissuade his sovereign from the unusual course of leaving the Imperial Chancellor behind. But the Emperor was not minded to accept Holstein as a mentor, and put him off by talking volubly of some excellent duck shooting he had enjoyed in Holstein's part of the Brandenburg Mark. Then, without more ado, the Kaiser took leave of his hosts and departed. From this moment Holstein turned against the Emperor. To talk to him, of all people, of duck shooting! The fiasco of the Björkö Treaty is well known. Bülow, under Holstein's influence, reduced it to insignificance; and Tschirschky came in for many a bitter reproach. This very Tschirschky was, however, appointed German Foreign Secretary in January 1906, against Holstein's will. Over him Holstein had no hold; and when, as had been his custom with all Foreign Secretaries, he entered Tschirschky's room, unannounced, with a bundle of papers, Tschirschky exclaimed: 'Leave the papers here. I will send for you when I want you.' The door between Holstein's and Tschirschky's rooms, which had never before been locked, was closed and bolted, and Holstein was told to come round by the passage when he wished to see the Foreign Secretary.

This was the beginning of Holstein's end at the German Foreign Office, though chance rather than design finally brought it on. In April 1906 the Algeciras Treaty, which closed the Morocco crisis of 1905–06, was signed by the Great Powers. By many Germans this treaty was looked upon as a humiliation; but Bülow was obliged to defend it in the Reichstag. The veteran Socialist leader Bebel attacked Bülow violently. While he was speaking, Bülow fainted and fell from his chair. He was taken home and was out of action for some weeks. Holstein also had protested against the Algeciras Treaty, mainly because the suggestions of Herr von Radowitz, the German Ambassador in Madrid, had been followed in preference to his own. Six days before the treaty was signed Holstein had tendered, for the eleventh time, his resignation to the Imperial Chancellor. He knew that Bülow would not and could not accept it, and meant to make the punishment of Radowitz a condition of withdrawing it. It lay among the papers on the Imperial Chancellor's table

at the time of Bülow's fainting fit. While Bülow was being brought round in the Reichstag and taken home, Holstein rushed to the Imperial Chancellor's palace in order to remove the letter of resignation. In vain he, with the help of servants and office-keepers, searched for it. Princess Bülow had given orders that all official papers on her husband's table should be handed at once to Tschirschky. Without delay Tschirschky sent Holstein's letter of resignation to the Emperor with a recommendation that it be accepted. For once in a way Holstein's luck was out. On being informed that His Majesty had graciously deigned to accept his resignation and had bestowed upon him the brilliants to the Order of the Red Eagle in recognition of his services, giving at the same time the higher distinction of the Black Eagle to Eulenburg, Holstein was convinced that his dismissal was Eulenburg's work. Though bereft of office, he felt himself by no means powerless. On April 29, 1906, the German historian Professor Schiemann, sometimes known as 'the Kaiser's pocket spy,' told him that, during a visit to Eulenburg's library at Liebenberg Castle, he had found official documents of such importance and in such numbers as he had never before seen outside Government archives, and with them papers that were probably unknown even to the Imperial Chancellor. A dangerous fellow, this Eulenburg!

Therefore on May 1, 1906, Holstein wrote to Eulenburg: 'My Phili,—This form of address is no sign of esteem, for nowadays "Phili" means nothing good to his contemporaries. Your aim—my removal—pursued through many years, is now at last attained. Besides, the low-down Press attacks upon me respond doubtless to your wishes.' The letter went on to cite notes, not lacking in precision, from Holstein's private records upon Eulenburg's character and habits. Eulenburg felt bound to challenge Holstein to a duel. The conditions were serious. The duellists were first to fire at each other with pistols from a distance of only ten paces; then, if neither was hit, to step forward and continue firing until one or the other fell. Seconds negotiated for days in the hope of effecting a reconciliation. At last Eulenburg declared in writing that he had never worked to bring about Holstein's fall or inspired Press attacks upon him, and Holstein withdrew his insulting letter. Bülow gave his blessing to the reconciliation, and an official minute of the proceedings was placed in the Foreign Office archives. But when the archivist wished to put it on the register it was nowhere to be found. A friendly hand had removed it and placed it in Holstein's keeping for future use.

Before the year was out attacks upon Eulenburg began to appear in Maximilian Harden's *Zukunft*. Some of Harden's

phrases were characteristic of Holstein's style. One of them said that he (Harden) 'would reflect thrice before asserting that any man stood on a footing of intimacy with Prince Eulenburg.' Other attacks followed against Eulenburg and his friend General Count Kuno Moltke, commander of the Berlin garrison. Kuno Moltke belonged to the 'Round Table' group, whose members, the Kaiser among them, Eulenburg was wont to entertain at Liebenberg Castle. Harden's transparent allusions to their spiritualism, mysticism, and other less desirable tendencies gained point from his comment that these things might matter little if the Imperial Head of the German people were not mixed up in them.

Walter Rathenau and various intermediaries sought to muzzle Harden. But a Court clique, loving Eulenburg little and Kuno Moltke less, was not disposed to let things slide. It compelled Kuno Moltke to take action for libel against Harden. Bülow understood what this meant. He saw that the attacks upon Moltke and Eulenburg were only a beginning, that Harden's blows were really aimed by Holstein at the Kaiser, and that in this business Bülow himself might be between hammer and anvil. Indeed, Harden's campaign against the Kaiser's 'camarilla' found imitators. A journalist named Brand attacked Bülow and linked him with the Moltke–Eulenburg school. Whether Brand was inspired by Holstein does not appear. In any event, the Imperial Chancellor sued Brand for defamation. Before the trial Holstein, who continued to visit Bülow secretly through the garden gate of the Chancellor's palace, found Bülow engaged, with two officials of the Foreign Office, in a rehearsal of his speech at the trial. Bülow asked Holstein to be present at it. Holstein prayed to be excused. Brand was condemned to eighteen months' imprisonment.

There remained the Kuno Moltke trial. In the course of it Prince Philip Eulenburg, called to give evidence, was asked to swear that he had never been guilty of sexual perversity. He swore, and Harden promptly took action against him for perjury, producing a Bavarian fisherman as witness besides damning documents from Holstein's archives. The Kaiser and the Crown Prince cast Eulenburg off, as Bülow had long since done. Eulenburg was ruined, and died broken-hearted.

The Kaiser felt his throne tremble beneath him, all the more during the storm that broke after the famous *Daily Telegraph* interview of October 28, 1908, which moved Bülow—who had negligently passed the interview for publication—to disavow his Imperial master before the Reichstag. The Prussian and East Prussian Conservatives were at their wits' end. Albert Ballin, the Kaiser's 'Ocean Jew,' telegraphed from Hamburg to urge his

Imperial friend not to come there lest anti-monarchical demonstrations take place. Bülow begged the Emperor to stay quietly in Berlin. Bearing Bülow a grudge for having 'let him down' in the Reichstag, the Emperor could stand the racket no longer. He announced himself as a visitor to Prince Max Egon Fürstenberg's castle at Donaueschingen, in the Black Forest, where the Austro-Hungarian heir-apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, was staying, and repaired thither with a brilliant suite. Lavish entertainments were prepared for his amusement. On November 14, 1908, a cabaret was arranged after dinner, the last and chief 'number' being the *pas seul* of a ballet-dancer. The dancer was none other than General Dietrich von Hülsen, who, with naked torso and stubby legs, performed amid great applause. At the end he threw a flower to the feet of his Imperial master, tripped backwards, and fell dead near the door. The sky of Germany and of the Court, already clouded by the Kuno Moltke–Eulenburg–*Daily Telegraph* episodes, became heavily overcast.

Holstein did not live to enjoy the fall of the Kaiser whom he hated. He died on May 8, 1909, in his seventy-third year. Before his death and during his last illness he rendered one more disservice to Germany. By communicating the Bismarckian secret Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty to the Kaiser in March 1890 he had helped to overthrow Bismarck and to prevent a renewal of the treaty. The Franco-Russian Alliance of the early 'nineties was the natural consequence, as was its sequel—the growing dependence of Germany upon her only trustworthy ally, Austria-Hungary. Of this dependence the Viennese military party had already begun to take advantage after the German Emperor had, by his 'brilliant second' telegram at the end of the Algeciras Conference, brought about the removal of the prudent Count Goluchowski from the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office. The adventurous anti-Serbian policy of his successor, Baron von Aehrenthal, and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908 were based on the reckoning that Germany could not afford to leave Austria-Hungary in the lurch. Aehrenthal reckoned shrewdly. Though Bülow, whom Aehrenthal had scarcely consulted, sulked and was inclined to let Austria-Hungary stew in the juice of her own Bosnian adventure, Holstein so frightened him, by insistence upon the dangers of German isolation, that Bülow came tardily into line with Vienna, Maximilian Harden being sent to the Austrian capital to deliver a great harangue on 'allied loyalty' which the whole German Embassy in Vienna was ordered to hear and to applaud. Throughout the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908–09 Bülow stood behind Aehrenthal, awaiting a chance to 'get level' with his Austrian colleague and rival. The chance came in March 1909, when Bülow, knowing

that Russia had decided not to go to war with Austria-Hungary on behalf of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented an ultimatum to Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister. Thus Bülow, at one stroke, humiliated Russia by obliging her to capitulate to the dictates of Berlin, filched from Aehrenthal's eager brow the wreath of laurel it was fain to wear, and created a position in which no Russian Tsar could afford again to bow to a German or to an Austro-Hungarian threat.

This policy Holstein supported and probably advised. It was his last dying achievement, and it rendered a great European war inevitable whenever serious conflict should arise, or a quarrel be picked, between Vienna and Belgrade. The conflict arose and the quarrel was picked after the assassinations at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

If there be one man in modern German history whose memory millions have especial reason to curse, it is surely that of His Excellency Baron Friedrich von Holstein, Privy Councillor and *Eminence grise* of the German Foreign Office, whose life romance Joachim von Kürenberg's seventy 'pictures' caustically yet not untruthfully portray.

WICKHAM STEED.

WHAT SHOULD WE TEACH?

A GREAT deal of discussion goes on ceaselessly in the world of education as to what subjects it is most important to teach to the rising generation, and what are the best ways to teach them. Conferences and summer schools are held at which teachers harangue one another, pamphlets are issued by educational officials and specialists, inspectors impress their opinions on individual teachers; even parents in these sympathetic days are invited by enlightened headmasters to express their views. The only convincing view which I have ever heard on this enormous and tumultuous subject was expressed by an experienced and successful headmaster who said, 'Nobody has the least idea what one ought to teach, or how one ought to teach it.' The spirit of this remark so hits the truth that it is worth expanding as regards curricula. Let us clear our minds of tradition, prejudice, theories and custom, and ask ourselves an acid question. After a child has been taught reading, writing, and arithmetic—and these accomplishments are genuinely necessary—what reason is there to teach him anything else? Or rather, what use are any of the other subjects which he learns in school going to be to him in after life?

Two dicta of Mr. Bernard Shaw are worth recalling: 'Schools are places where the immature are kept from worrying the mature.' 'Nobody is fit to be educated before he is thirty.' These remarks, like most of Mr. Shaw's high explosives, do not cause us in this stubborn world, made by the Creator and not by Mr. Shaw, to alter our practice, but they shed a penetrating light on what is happening. All of us with literary tastes would enjoy immensely studying, at thirty, masterpieces like the Fourth Book of the *Æneid*, or the *Ajax*, or *Phèdre*, or *Faust*, or Grey's *Elegy in a Country Churchyard*, which, when we had to study them in boyhood, quite naturally bored us. (What normal healthy boy of fifteen is equipped emotionally to appreciate the amours of Dido and Æneas in *Æneid* iv.?) Yet at thirty, when we should like to be enjoying these works of art, and have developed sufficiently to be able to appreciate them, we have to depart after breakfast, not to the form-room, but to the office, or wherever

else we spend the day earning enough to pay for the rent, the gas, and the daily upkeep of ourselves and our family. When we do manage to snatch a leisure hour for reading some literature we find happy relaxation in doing exactly that which at the school age was tedious labour.

As, however, at the school age we are too young and undeveloped and unreliable to earn our living or anybody else's, and at the same time (as Mr. Shaw perceives) we have more than enough energy and spirit to make ourselves felt, something has to be done with us, so we are collected into schools where, on the principle that as we shan't have time to read books when we're old enough to understand them we'd better read them before, and anyway something must be done to keep us quiet indoors, we are taught the classics. In order to keep us in this way from worrying the mature, a few specimens of the mature, *i.e.*, schoolmasters, are paid their living by the rest of the mature to endure all the worrying, so secondary education resolves itself into no more than this elemental problem: how to shut up twenty to thirty boys in a room with one elderly gentleman for so many hours a day for so many years of their lives without either side doing the other any physical injury. When this fact is fully realised together with the truth that, apart from reading, writing, and arithmetic, nothing that one learns in the class-room is of any practical use in after life (indeed, one forgets almost all of it, as *1066 and All That* demonstrates), then and only then is one capable of recognising how artificial are the disputes as to what should be taught in schools and the relative claims of the various subjects. A. insists that all boys must learn Latin and Greek; B. wants all boys taught Latin, but not Greek; C. wants English literature taught, but no English grammar; D. wants English grammar taught, but no English literature; E. would have all boys taught Scripture; F. would have no Scripture at all; G. wants innumerable sciences; H. is an enthusiast for shorthand and typing; I. has a mania for teaching graphs; J. wants everyone taught first-aid and ju-jitsu; while K. is not content for any boy to face life without a thorough grounding in Esperanto and folk-dancing.

Subjects, therefore, force their way into syllabuses according to the enthusiasm felt for them by individual teachers—they are taught, that is to say, not because anybody really thinks the pupils ought to learn them, but because somebody is burning to teach them. As Mr. Lytton Strachey remarked of Dr. Arnold's *penchant* for classical education, 'If Greek and Latin had not been "given" in that convenient manner, Dr. Arnold, who had spent his life in acquiring those languages, might have discovered that he had acquired them in vain.' And what is true of the

enthusiasm of the individual teacher extends to the collective enthusiasm of the nation. English public school boys for generations were nourished exclusively upon Latin and Greek because those languages were to the taste of the mediæval era and to the dignified clarity and composure of the eighteenth century. Amidst the electric progress, democratic licence, and American gusto of twentieth-century England compulsory Greek is suddenly abolished at Oxford (by the Professor of Greek—a species of matricide), the existence of Latin, no longer quoted in the House of Commons, is threatened in schools, and a tremendous enthusiasm for teaching English literature, especially English drama, and especially Shakespeare, springs up, not only in the new secondary schools, but permeates the oldest public schools, where hitherto the teaching of English, regarded with scorn and derision, had been completely neglected. Austere classicists regard the latest turn of events—the substitution of Shaw for Sophocles, or Gilbert Murray's translations of Euripides for Euripides himself—as the death-knell of real education and culture. They should, however, realise that it is only the operation of the law by which every generation teaches whatever interests it to the rising generation, who soon sicken of the subject and teach the next generation something else. About fifty years hence it will be time for a reaction in which our grandchildren will set about giving our great-grandchildren courses in Greek with special insistence on the minutest details of Greek philology.

It is probably far best that things should work along these lines—that is, that teachers should teach what they want to teach, for no man can teach with any success what does not interest him. But there is one great and apparent danger on the horizon. In past days educationists confined their enthusiasm to one subject: Greek and Latin may have provided a narrow education for the eighteenth- and earlier nineteenth-century schoolboy, but if you worked almost exclusively at these subjects by the end of your school days you had a sufficient knowledge of them for you to be able to read the classics in their original tongues without discomfort in later life. Now, however, that our interests have become wider, so many teachers have enthusiasm for so many different subjects that the chance of any boy being able to give sufficient time to any one of them to learn it properly is becoming more and more remote. If English literature had been substituted for classical literature, all might have been well, but for the classical curriculum of the pre-Arnold days have been substituted English, French, German, physics, chemistry, history, geography, mathematics, divinity, music, gymnastics, economics, etc. Moreover, each new subject is taught by a formidable

specialist. Is it any wonder that, though a boy learns just sufficient to pass his paper in matriculation, he does not really master any one of the subjects at all? How many matriculants know enough French or German to make them at home in France or Germany, or enough chemistry to make them chemists, or enough music to enable them to earn their living as musicians? Education, it has been said, should teach one something of everything and everything of something: at present we may be doing the first, but we are certainly not doing the second.

At present up to the matriculation or school certificate age we give the young a general education, which means, roughly speaking, that beyond the primary arts of reading, writing, and simple arithmetic they have learnt nothing. They have studied a number of subjects, yes; but they have not learnt them. What successful matriculation candidate really knows French, or Latin, or even English? He has merely passed an examination of a standard which qualifies him to begin learning these subjects. That is the idea, we are told. He can then settle down to specialise in his best subject and really learn it. But how many boys in England can, in point of fact, do that? A minute fraction of them only have the chance, or can afford, or have the ability (if they could afford it) to proceed to a university to read a subject in an advanced course. The vast majority of them have to set about earning their livings, having spent the twelve or fourteen years devoted to their education in mastering nothing. This is not an exaggerated or paradoxical statement. I do not mean that the successful matriculant has not in most cases achieved many estimable qualities. To begin with, he has passed a difficult and teasing examination, particularly exacting in view of the number of subjects which have to be carried in the head at the same time. Indeed, it is remarkable, and a tribute to both pupils and teachers, that so many candidates pass as do. Secondly, the matriculants cannot fail to have imbibed a certain desirable atmosphere from their mental studies—they have, in fact, achieved some measure of culture; and it has been proved, as they have passed muster on a number of hard examination papers, that they must either possess, or have developed, some efficiency and nimbleness of wit which make them useful to themselves and their employers in doing their life's work. All this is readily granted; but what remains is the fact that a candidate cannot help himself towards earning a living through knowledge of any one of the subjects which he has for years studied.

In the olden days of English education, when the Latin and Greek classics reigned supreme, the curriculum may have been narrow, the custom may have been somewhat ridiculous—Æneas would certainly have been surprised that he must tear

himself from Dido and found the Roman race that the young squirearchy of England might learn a tongue to segregate them from the inferior classes; but, at any rate, the classically trained schoolboy did really know the classics at the end of his course. Why, instead of substituting six subjects for one, should we not substitute for a classical education a French education, a scientific education, a mathematical education, or an English education? The idea of a stunted, stifled child able to do nothing but sums, and ignorant of the name of Moses, or Julius Cæsar, or Napoleon, is conjured up. There is no need for such a nightmare vision. At the elementary stage reading (an exceedingly difficult subject), writing, and simple arithmetic are mastered, so the general foundation which really matters is laid in every case. We come then to the secondary stage (from eleven, roughly, to sixteen and eighteen); and here what a difference there might be. One of the roots of the present trouble is our present examination system.

This system, from the most elementary common entrance examination to the most advanced post-graduate Civil Service examinations, puts a fanatical premium on mere memory. The candidate who can remember this fact and that fact from a book will pass, is given a scholarship, is made a don, or is set to govern India. Whether the candidate can think, the examination does not determine; so heavy, indeed, is the burden of facts laid on the memory of candidates—and which they have to discharge in a few hours in the examination-room, like drippings from an overcharged sponge—that the ordeal might have been specially devised in order to make it as difficult as possible for an examinee to show, or an examiner to discover, real ability—that is, the power to think, originality, imagination, style; in fact all those qualities which will really make a man of use in after life. Having passed the examination stage, most of us forget the horror or farce and set about real life in a very different way. We put on our office table every kind of book of reference which will save us having to remember facts. But if we were consistent we should never employ a clerk or appoint a director unless he could memorise a large portion of Bradshaw, the Telephone Directory, and knew the current year's almanac by heart.

As examinations consist of this paralysing memory inquisition, subjects have to be taught accordingly. The result is that it takes five years to teach a subject up to the necessary standard when, if it were taught sensibly, not more than six months would be needed. *1066 and All That* was a joyously amusing book of nonsense, but it raised an intensely serious problem. The idea behind it, which is true—namely, that this vague jumble of muddled facts and two dates are all that the average Englishman remembers of all the history that he learnt for years at school—

is satire which bites home. Do away with memorising facts; let every boy have a comprehensive printed history note-book open before him in every history paper, and then leave his brain and imagination unweighted so that he will have a chance to show to what extent, for instance, he thinks Charles I. deserved execution, to what extent Henry VIII. was a great king or a villain, General Gordon a hero or a lunatic. In fact, give him time to think.

Further than that, if history, or any other subject, were taught on those lines—that is, with concentration on the stories and ideas, and with no insistence on the memorising of the facts—in an hour a week pupils would learn far more than at present they do in five or six hours. In the teaching of Latin the absurd notion that 'cribs' are immoral should be cast into the limbo of forgotten rubbish: every boy should be given a 'crib,' or, in sensible language, a translation. Thus equipped, he is enabled to prepare fifty or a hundred lines of Livy or Herodotus or Vergil at a stretch, and to become interested in the story, instead of being browbeaten by an exasperated, nerve-shattered master through ten or fifteen lines a day, in which all the beauty and romance of the literature is blasted in an hysterical torrent of abuse because some trembling urchin has translated an active for passive, or failed to recognise an ethic dative, or an enclitic δέ. Exactly the same could, and should, apply to mathematics: candidates (out of the bountiful mercy of examiners) are provided with 'log.' tables; they should also be able to refer to every theory of Euclid and put the mental energy required to memorise them into solving 'riders.' If subjects were taught thus, so much time could be saved that ample would remain for giving the general outline of knowledge, which it is really necessary for every educated Englishman to possess, but without forcing that knowledge up to the matriculation memory standard. There would also be time for each pupil to study one subject thoroughly.

The general outline of knowledge should include the Bible, some English literature, English history, geography, and some popular science. The class-room hours in public and secondary schools total about twenty-three hours a week. If an hour a week is allowed for each of the above subjects, and three hours added to provide an hour each for the study of music, training in the speaking, reciting, and reading aloud of English, and for instruction in such subjects as health, first-aid, keeping accounts, and above all the primary facts of sex, fifteen hours still remain a week for each pupil to make himself as really proficient in the subject which is most to his taste and best suited to his ability, whether it be ancient or modern, scientific or artistic, as the classically trained boy became in Latin or Greek. If the special

subject is taught on enlightened lines, the pupil stands to become even more proficient than his classical predecessor, for in his special, as in his general education he should be taught to use his brain and not merely to exercise his memory. He must be taught to do rather than to know things, or rather to get to know by doing. This is a striking fact in education which many educationists must have noticed, but the significance of which it is hard to believe has been adequately recognised.

Let us take instances: half a dozen boys, aged about twelve, are taken from one of the lowest forms in the school, where they are driving their form master mad by their apparent idiocy when called on to do French or Latin exercises, or to remember the elementary facts of English history, and they are handed over to the music master to sing treble in the school choir. These same boys, who have an ear for music, proceed to read and sustain their parts in complicated part-songs and madrigals, and after a few practices give an exceedingly efficient performance at the school concert, doing with apparent ease and evident pleasure something very much more difficult than those simple French and Latin sentences. A middle school form containing a number of apparently stupid boys read a piece of English literature, such as Sheridan's *Rivals*. When questioned about it at the end they make a large number of mistakes; their essays show an almost complete ignorance of any of the facts of English drama, outside this particular play, and, if a master with linguistic zeal asks them to analyse sentences or answer grammatical conundrums in connexion with the text, they display a profound and comprehensive incompetence. Their interest in the story has nevertheless been aroused by a reading of the play which has been at least energetic, and each boy is asked to draw a picture in preparation to illustrate any scene which has appealed to him. The class is not one which is supposed to be able to draw—indeed, no steps are taken to ascertain whether any member of it can draw at all. They come back, however, next day, each with a highly spirited drawing. Out of this class, which numbers about twenty-five, about five of the pictures are elementary, ten are very good, five are very good indeed, and about five take one's breath away by their excellence—their freshness, originality, humour, and point. It is especially to be noted that the best pictures are more often than not the work of the boys who in other respects are supposed at English to be 'duds.' I have made this experiment again and again with exactly the type of boy I have described, and if anyone doubts what I say, I wish I could show him the album in which I preserve the best pictures which are shown up. This album constitutes a spirited and vivid testimony to the vitality of the English classics and the English schoolboy.

The school acts a play of Shakespeare. The cast is drawn from all over the school (as Shakespeare would have wished); boys regarded as useless in ordinary class work memorise long and difficult parts, and (under a competent producer) give a performance of an entire play which could scarcely be surpassed by professionals for beauty and sensitiveness, and, except at the Old Vic, probably would not be. I again speak from experience. The school organises an exhibition of work: this boy, who had such a bad report last term, produces a plaster head of Dante, which he has modelled, of striking power; another classroom 'dud' exhibits a model engine he has constructed, which is amazingly complicated; another exhibits an extraordinarily neat and informative map of the world; another exhibits a monumental graph, stretching round the walls of the room, and which shows the comparative dates of the important events throughout world history.

What is to be deduced from these achievements? One deduction is that every boy is probably good at something, if that something can be found and the boy be allowed to follow his bent. This is probably true, but it is not practical politics, for in a school of even a hundred boys one cannot provide a hundred masters to follow up and foster a hundred different talents. The achievements, however, have something in common even more important, and which can and should be taken account of in a practical way. In every case the boy has been asked not merely to know but to do something. Nothing like enough notice has been taken of this fact—namely, that if you ask pupils to do something you will get startlingly better results, do far more benefit to the pupils, and effect far more of educational value, than if you only ask them to know, which in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred means only to remember.

Am I advocating a purely technical education? Am I saying that a boy of twelve had better start learning at once how to make tables, or instal electricity, or mend motor cars, because it is more useful and in some ways easier to earn a livelihood by being a carpenter, an electrician, or a mechanic than it is by having only a cultural education behind one as one's stock in trade? I am not. I am as persuaded as the most ardent 'culturists' that so long as a civilised country requires to be governed and administered, and its finance and commerce organised, administrative posts can only be appropriately and properly filled by men who have been culturally educated. Further than that, I think a man will be a better carpenter, electrician, or engineer the more cultural education he can have behind him. This does not mean that he will hit a nail straighter for having read *The Tale of Two Cities*, but it means that if he

can appreciate Dickens he will be a more useful and imaginative carpenter, which will show in his relation with his customers and his employers and eventually with those men whom he employs. In fact, the best way to train a good carpenter is to train a good man to become a carpenter.

I am as far as possible, therefore, from advocating technical in place of cultural training. But I do advocate—and here I strenuously join issue with the present system—that cultural training should be given on far more practical lines. Pupils, whether they are studying English or French, or even Latin, should be taught to do something, just as much as apprentices who learn to make tables. Sanderson of Oundle (enthusiastically approved by Mr. H. G. Wells, who has a genius for thinking to-day what England will think to-morrow) was right. Sanderson abolished all marks, all competition with its hideous and invidious treadmill of personal judgments; he put all boys through the engineering workshops, and he organised and stimulated the academic forms into making Latin proses and Greek verses and French translations and English essays in just the same enthusiastic spirit as the boys in workshops were making machines. In fact he swept away the deadening competitive routine of conventional education and stimulated in its place the vital, individual, creative spirit: the instinct and desire to create, which is the most profound and happiest instinct of mankind, and which exists with especially fresh enthusiasm in the young, should be utilised as the very sparking-plug of education.

The etymology of the word poet (the Greek ποιεῖν, to make) proves how little difference there need be between the spirit in which work is done in the carpenter's shop or the classical classroom. The pity and shortcoming of Sanderson's career was that he founded no lasting tradition. His ideas were right, but they died with him. His individuality was so strong that he could admit no colleague near enough to the throne to succeed him. He is already known only as a meteor that illuminated briefly the obscurity of our education, and, when it had expired, left our schools to continue in much the same darkness as before. The measure of Sanderson's success, while it lasted, is the last notice he sent round the school before he fell dead after making a speech in London: 'In future no more punishments will be given.' There is no reason why Sanderson's ideas should not be codified and put into general practice, so that they depend no longer for life on the vitality of one man; then Education will at last be advancing, not, as at present, in all directions, but towards a logical and spiritual goal, and school work throughout the country will have a chance of approaching that consummation where 'in future no more punishments will be given.'

Let us codify a subject by way of example. No marks or places will be given, and if a prize is awarded it will be given to a boy not because he is the best boy in the class—an absurd notion, because this is impossible to assess—but because he has made the best thing.

English History.—Twenty-five boys and a master—not a master and twenty-five boys—are detailed for a term to study the reign of Queen Elizabeth. A good text-book of the period will be read and discussed, but the boys will be asked no questions on it. The master will talk of the reign, read extracts from first-class books, and perhaps dictate some notes. The class during the course of the term will be asked to make (literally) a study of the reign. A., with full use of books, and perhaps in collaboration with B. and C., will be asked to compose a study of the character of the Queen; D. and E. will compose a narrative of the defeat of the Armada; F. will illustrate it in black and white or paints; G. will draw the appropriate map, and other maps to illustrate Drake's voyage round the world, the Spanish Main, and so forth; H. will compose an essay on the social life of the time; I. will build from cardboard an Elizabethan theatre with puppet actors and audience; J. will make and clothe dolls to illustrate varieties of Elizabethan dress; K. will make a graph showing the comparative dates of the period; L. will compose an essay showing what was happening all the while over the water in Spain; M. will draw a genealogical table to show the Queen's claim to the throne. All these works can be made within the class-room. Outside there will be opportunities for further study. Town pupils can visit museums and picture galleries, seek out portraits and relics of the period and purchase picture postcards of those they have seen for inclusion in the class 'Elizabethan album.' Almost every part of the country has some historic house where Queen Elizabeth is said to have slept; keen amateur photographers can obtain snapshots of these or other buildings of Tudor interest for inclusion in the same album. The musical members of the class will seek out and learn Elizabethan music, madrigals and songs; the literary members should select favourite sonnets to be transcribed in a manner worthy of the class's pride in its album; novels dealing with Elizabethan life should be read out of school—*Westward Ho!*, *John Temple*, *With Drake to the Spanish Main*. In fact, the class for that term will be Elizabethan in spirit and in practice. Everybody's work will be shown to and discussed by everybody else, the master directing, helping, encouraging, appreciating. At the end of term the results will be laid out for the inspection of the headmaster, and exchange visits will be paid with a class-room in which the period, perhaps, of the Napoleonic Wars has been studied on the same

lines. Nobody has been marked, nobody has been examined, nobody has been punished; the word 'lessons' has never been mentioned, and everybody, especially the master, has enjoyed himself.

Can any educationist in the country deny that by the end of the term the boys taught thus will have learnt immeasurably more history than they will have done under the usual present method? If anyone thinks that some boys, even given the right lead from the master, would not enter into the enterprise in the right spirit, I can say that I have taught in one of the largest of our public schools and one of our largest secondary schools for ten years, and I have not found that boy yet. There is no reason whatever why public examinations should not be adjusted to welcome and apprise this type of work. I can picture the cynics, the ritualists, the conservatives, who will ridicule and pick holes in the conception. I do not mind, for I know, not only that this is the best method of education, but I think that it will come. It is only a question of 'How long, O Lord, how long?'

GUY BOAS.

CAUSE, EFFECT, AND PROFESSOR EDDINGTON

There is an under-world of which ordinary people know little or nothing. I am not speaking of the under-world of crime, of Chicago gangsters, of the Réné Clair films. There is another and a very different under-world: the remote, mysterious region where philosophers and physicists meet, and, in an *argot* of their own, discuss relativity and the quantum theory and wave-mechanics—a dim world of learned institutes and scientific societies. Ordinary citizens go about their peaceful avocations, aware, indeed, that there is such a region and that there are such strata of society, but otherwise indifferent, feeling that these activities are too far removed from normal life to cause them much concern. But suddenly they may be stirred out of their complacency by reading accounts of a sensational raid by intellectual bandits who, after stupefying their victims with mathematical formulæ, try to rob them of their most valuable beliefs. There has, in fact, lately been such a raid, led by that very distinguished scientist Sir Arthur Eddington. It is high time that he and his accomplices were arrested! Fortunately the forces of law and order—Cosmic Law and the Order of Nature—have been reinforced by well-disposed members of the same under-world, who have voluntarily come forward and have given information to the public authorities which is amply sufficient to make conviction certain.

Sir Arthur Eddington has set out to take from us our faith that all events are the result of causes. He declares that they may possibly be determined by prior causes, or they may not, but that to say that they are is no more than 'a frivolous conjecture.'[1] And he asserts that this is not merely his own opinion, and the opinion of certain individual scientists, but is the authentic pronouncement of modern science. From this it would follow that the foundations on which the mind of man has for centuries been building the edifice of knowledge are only of sand. If the new principle be accepted, it will effect, as Eddington himself says, at least as great a revolution in our thinking as the principle of relativity; and 1927, the year of its alleged estab-

[1] *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Vol. x., 1931, p. 173.

lishment, 'will certainly rank as one of the greatest epochs in the development of scientific philosophy.'[2] Further, Eddington asserts that since physical events may be uncaused, much more are the actions of human beings likely to be uncaused; and the conduct of individuals may rightly be regarded, therefore, as independent of prior events and arbitrary.

Lest it should be thought that I am not conveying accurately the substance of the new theory, I will take leave to quote Sir Arthur Eddington's own words in some recent addresses:

> In the present century there have been a number of revolutionary changes of scientific thought, but I suppose that none has given a greater shock to the philosophically-minded public than the abandonment of Determinism in physics.[3]

> Determinism has faded out of theoretical physics.[4]

> I must make it clear that the scientific doctrine of indeterminism is not that there exist occasional exceptions to deterministic law, but that every phenomenon is to a greater or lesser extent indeterminate.[5]

> The result of our analysis of physical phenomena up to the present is that we have nowhere found any evidence of deterministic law.[6]

Sir Arthur Eddington does me the honour to refer to an address which I delivered to the British Institute of Philosophy last year, and in which I quoted the authority of eminent physicists in opposition to his doctrine. He proceeds:

> Having stated his dissatisfaction with the older philosophy, Sir Herbert says: 'But from this standpoint I set out more hopefully, and it seemed to me clear that the first principle which philosophy might receive, as established by science, was the Law of Causality.' Instead of 'as established by science,' we must now write, 'as a principle which science has found no trace of, but which may be true for all that.' Is the change so very unimportant? Suppose that I had not noticed the change, and that I were to encourage Sir Herbert to go forward with his scheme relying on the support of physics. His philosophy will doubtless have to fight its way. Presently one critical philosopher will be rash enough to say that deterministic law does not exist. Sir Herbert turns to me: 'My enemy hath delivered himself into my hand. Just hand me over one of those deterministic laws you promised, and I will finish him off.' I look in one cupboard and another. I become puzzled. 'I am sure there were several knocking around here last time I looked.' I cannot find any. 'Oh, now I remember. We cleared them all away last spring-cleaning.'[7]

Now the Law of Causality may be stated as follows: Every

[2] Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 350.

[3] Eddington, address to the British Institute of Philosophy on 'Physics and Philosophy,' published in *Philosophy*, January 1933, p. 38.

[4] Eddington, presidential address to the Mathematical Association, 1932, published in the *Mathematical Gazette*, May 1932, p. 66.

[5] Eddington, 'Indeterminacy and Indeterminism,' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *loc. cit.*, p. 163.

[6] *Philosophy*, *loc. cit.*, p. 38.

[7] *Philosophy*, *loc. cit.*, p. 40.

event is preceded by earlier events; if the earlier events had been absent, the later event would not have occurred; if the earlier events had been different, the later event would have been correspondingly different; the earlier stand to the later in the relation of causes to effect. This has always been regarded as obvious. Sir Arthur Eddington now says that there is no more reason to believe such a statement as this than to believe that the moon is made of green cheese.[8] Having declared this to be the conclusion of modern physics, Sir Arthur applies it to the sphere of philosophy and says that it confirms the freedom of the human will. 'If the atom,' he says, 'has indeterminacy, surely the human mind will have an equal indeterminacy; for we can scarcely accept a theory which makes out the mind to be more mechanistic than the atom.'[9] And in his well-known book *The Nature of the Physical World*, Eddington says that science, having accepted the principle of indeterminacy, 'thereby withdraws its moral opposition to free-will.'[10]

The books of Sir Arthur Eddington have deservedly attained a vast circulation. So also have those of Sir James Jeans, who, in the main, though more guardedly, adopts the same standpoint in these matters. To the general public in the English-speaking world what is said by Eddington and Jeans is the pronouncement of science. These ideas, then, percolate rapidly among thoughtful people. Unless they are challenged, and by men of equal or greater scientific eminence, they will be accepted as established. If they are established, they cannot fail to have a profound effect upon the development of philosophy, and particularly upon the school, now active and growing, which bases philosophy largely upon science, metaphysics upon physics. Already there is a vague notion, emanating from these discussions and spreading among the public at large, that science does not know where she stands; that, the principles of Newton having been overthrown by relativity, the very sequence of cause and effect has now been overthrown by indeterminacy. And the perverted conclusion is sometimes drawn that it has become legitimate to believe or not to believe anything you please; any ancient superstition or the most irrational myths of a discarded theology may now be re-established in credit with the acquiescence of science. This, then, is no remote or unimportant discussion. It touches the very springs of thought and action in contemporary life.

The matter, clearly, is one which must be settled by means of

[8] *Mathematical Gazette*, May 1932, p. 76.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[10] Page 295.

the researches and on the authority of the scientists themselves. We who are laymen are not qualified to judge. But we have the right to watch the discussion and to draw the attention of our fellow-laymen to views on the other side. The case need not go by default at the tribunal of instructed opinion. Let the evidence, therefore, be cited on which those who attack the Law of Causation may be arraigned.

If anyone were asked to name the three men now living who were to be counted as the leaders among the physical scientists, he would probably say Einstein, Max Planck, and Rutherford: Einstein, the most adventurous of pioneers and most fruitful of thinkers; Max Planck, the originator of the Quantum Theory and the doyen of the great German school of physical science; Rutherford, the acknowledged chief of British experimentalists, who has done more than any man to reveal the structure of the atom and so to lay the foundations on which the physics of to-day is building its new edifice. Not one of those three accepts the view which Eddington so confidently asserts is the established conclusion of modern science.

A volume has lately been published which is of great value in this discussion. It is entitled *Where is Science Going?*[11] and consists of a series of short papers by Professor Max Planck, preceded by an introduction by Professor Einstein, and followed by a report of conversations between those two scientists and the editor of the book, Mr. James Murphy. The volume furnishes a complete negation of the Eddington position on Indeterminism.

Let us first call Max Planck into the witness-box. He poses to himself this question:

> What is the practical attitude adopted by the special sciences in regard to the universal and invariable validity of the law of causation? Does science in its everyday investigations accept the principle of causation as an indispensable postulate? Does it act upon the assumption that there are no loopholes in the causally governed order of nature? Or, while using the principle as a working hypothesis, does scientific practice intimate that there are certain happenings in nature where the law of causation does not function, and that there are regions in the mental sphere where the causal writ does not run?[12]

After surveying the problem, Planck gives to the question this clear and categorical answer:

> Therefore it may be said here that physical science, together with astronomy and chemistry and mineralogy, are all based on the strict and universal validity of the principle of causality. In a word, this is the answer which physical science has to give to the question asked at the beginning of the present chapter.[13]

[11] Published by George Allen & Unwin, 1933.
[12] Planck, *Where is Science Going?*, p. 141.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

With respect to the contention of the indeterminists that what have been regarded as laws of causation are merely mathematical generalisations based upon probabilities, and that research into the behaviour of molecules, atoms and electrons establishes this, Planck gives the following reply:

> In point of fact, statistical laws are dependent upon the assumption of the strict law of causality functioning in each particular case. And the non-fulfilment of the statistical rule in particular cases is not therefore due to the fact that the law of causality is not fulfilled, but rather to the fact that our observations are not sufficiently delicate and accurate to put the law of causality to a direct test in each case. If it were possible for us to follow the movement of each individual molecule in this very intricate labyrinth of processes, then we should find in each case an exact fulfilment of the dynamical laws.[14]

As to the assertion that the Quantum Theory itself demands indeterminacy,[15] Planck, as author of that theory, may speak the decisive word. He says that the quantum hypothesis has, indeed, introduced a certain disturbance into the relativist ideas that had previously prevailed, and he proceeds:

> One cannot yet definitely say what influence the subsequent development of the hypothesis may have on the formulation of fundamental physical laws. Some essential modification seems to be inevitable; but I firmly believe, in company with most physicists, that the quantum hypothesis will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which will be a more exact formulation of the law of causality.[16]

Not, be it observed, an abandonment of the law of causality, but, on the contrary, its more exact formulation.

With regard to the connexion so strangely sought to be drawn between the appearance of arbitrariness within the atom and the freedom of the human will, Planck makes these observations:

> The freedom of the human will has been put forward as offering logical grounds for the acceptance of only a statistical causality operative in the physical universe. As I have already stated on other occasions, I do not at all agree with this attitude. If we should accept it, then the logical result would be to reduce the human will to an organ which would be subject to the sway of mere blind chance. In my opinion the question of the human will has nothing whatsoever to do with the opposition between causal and statistical physics. Its importance is of a much more profound character and is entirely independent of any physical or biological hypothesis.[17]

[14] Planck, *Where is Science Going?*, p. 145.
[15] See Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe*, p. 19.
[16] *Where is Science Going?*, p. 143.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

He says again:

We have the fact that natural phenomena invariably occur according to the rigid sequence of cause and effect. This is an indispensable postulate of all scientific research, not merely in the case of those sciences that deal with the physical aspects of nature, but also in the case of the mental sciences, such as psychology.[18]

The part which force plays in nature, as the cause of motion, has its counterpart in the mental sphere in motive as the cause of conduct. Just as at each and every moment the motion of a material body results necessarily from the combined action of many forces, so human conduct results with the same necessity from the interplay of mutually reinforced or contradicting motives, which partly in the conscious and partially also in the unconscious sphere work their way forward towards the result. . . . And so, even though the motive of a certain line of human conduct may often lie utterly hidden, conduct entirely without motive is scientifically just as incompatible with the principles on which mental science is carried on as the assumption of absolute chance in inorganic nature is incompatible with the working principle of physical science. . . . The dependence of each event upon preceding fact and preparatory factors gradually begins to appear under the strong light of scientific investigation, so much so as to warrant the statement that present-day scientific procedure in psychology is founded practically exclusively on the principle of causal interrelations and the assumption of an active law of causality which permits no exceptions. This means that the postulate of complete determinism is accepted as a necessary condition for the progress of psychological research.[19]

Planck's conclusion on the whole matter is stated in these uncompromising terms:

I have not been able to find the slightest reason, up to now, which would force us to give up the assumption of a strictly law-governed universe, whether it is a matter of trying to discover the nature of the physical, or the spiritual, forces around us.[20]

With regard to Professor Einstein's testimony, it might be sufficient only to quote the statement of Sir Arthur Eddington himself that 'Einstein is still a convinced determinist.'[21] But there will be much interest in these fresh expressions of his views reported in the conversations with Mr. Murphy included in the book to which I have been referring.

MURPHY: It is now the fashion in physical science to attribute something like free will even to the routine processes of inorganic nature.

EINSTEIN: That nonsense is not merely nonsense. It is objectionable nonsense.

MURPHY: Well, of course, the scientists give it the name of indeterminism.

[18] *Where is Science Going?*, p. 107.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 153, 154, 155.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 100.
[21] Aristotelian Society, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

EINSTEIN : Look here. Indeterminism is quite an illogical concept. What do they mean by indeterminism ? Now if I say that the average life-span of a radioactive atom is such and such, that is a statement which expresses a certain order, *Gesetzlichkeit*. But this idea does not of itself involve the idea of causation. We call it the law of averages ; but not every such law need have a causal significance. At the same time if I say that the average life-span of such an atom is indetermined in the sense of being not caused, then I am talking nonsense.

And again :

EINSTEIN : When you mention people who speak of such a thing as free will in nature it is difficult for me to find a suitable reply. The idea is of course preposterous.

MURPHY : You would agree then, I imagine, that physics gives no ground whatsoever for this extraordinary application of what we may for convenience' sake call Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy.

EINSTEIN : Of course I agree.

MURPHY : But then you know that certain English physicists of very high standing indeed and at the same time very popular have promulgated with emphasis what you and Planck call, and many others with you, unwarranted conclusions.

EINSTEIN : You must distinguish between the physicist and the *littérateur* when both professions are combined into one. In England you have a great English literature and a great discipline of style. . . . What I mean is that there are scientific writers in England who are illogical and romantic in their popular books, but in their scientific work they are acute logical reasoners.[22]

Our third witness is Lord Rutherford, who was good enough to write me a letter, which he has given me leave to quote. He says :

While the principle of indeterminacy is of great theoretical interest as showing the limitations of the present wave-theory of matter, its importance in Physics seems to me to have been much exaggerated by many writers. It seems to me unscientific and also dangerous to draw far-flung deductions from a theoretical conception which is incapable of experimental verification, either directly or indirectly.

In presence of this evidence from these authoritative witnesses —and there are others—can the court hold that Sir Arthur Eddington is justified in saying, not that certain scientists, but that science itself, has abandoned determinism, that 'physical science has withdrawn from an attitude it has adopted consistently for more than two hundred years' ? [23]

If anyone were to place some of the substance called gunpowder in a receptacle called a barrel and applied to it what is termed a light, he would cause the phenomenon called an explosion, with

[22] *Where is Science Going ?*, pp. 201–2, 210–11. A letter giving an earlier expression of Einstein's opinion is quoted in the present writer's *Philosophy and the Ordinary Man : The Presidential Address to the British Institute of Philosophy*, 1932, p. 15.

[23] *Mathematical Gazette*, *loc. cit.*, p. 66.

certain consequences to himself. But we might imagine, though with difficulty, one of Professor Eddington's students, who had learnt from him that it was merely 'a frivolous suggestion' that events always follow from causes, on a par with saying that the moon is made of green cheese; who has grasped that 'every phenomenon is to a greater or lesser extent indeterminate,' and that, although there might be a high degree of probability that an explosion would follow if he set light to a barrel of gunpowder, Modern Physics assured him that there was no certainty—we might imagine this loyal student deciding to put the matter to the test. His relatives would have the right to complain of the teaching he had received.

Every experiment made by the chemist in his laboratory, every piece of constructive work carried out by the engineer or the builder, depends upon the faith that like causes will invariably produce like effects. Every movement made, every action taken by each one of us in the daily affairs of life, depends upon the same faith. Within human experience, no exception has ever been established to the rule of the uniformity of Nature. That is why we are entitled to hold, so long as there is no direct proof to the contrary—and Professor Eddington makes no claim to submit such proof, or that such proof is possible—that the rule holds also in the physical realms that lie beyond our experience.

With regard to the freedom of the human will, different people hold, of course, different views. For my own part, I find myself in full agreement with Professor Planck's position. I do not think that a boundary can be set to the Law of Causality. You cannot say that it applies everywhere except in relation to the actions of human beings. That a person does choose between this and that, every day and every hour, is known to all of us as a fact, and is not to be gainsaid. But the person who chooses is himself the product of prior causes. The past history of the human race and of his own family, the influences of physical environment, and of the home, the school, the church—these and many more causes have combined to make the individual what he is, to create in him the character that he possesses. The choice which he makes in any given circumstances, the action he takes on any particular occasion, are the outcome of that character. They are secondary effects, therefore, of the causes which have formed the character. We often cannot predict, and he himself often cannot predict, what the choice and the action will be, for the reason that all the vast complex of causes that come into play is not known; it is seldom possible, also, to calculate what will be the resultant of an immense number of separate but interacting forces. But we may accept, I think, the summary of the matter as Spinoza states it: 'This freedom of man's will

consists only in this, that men are aware of their own desires and ignorant of the causes by which those desires are determined.' Or as Schopenhauer puts it: 'Man can do what he wills, but he cannot determine what he shall will.'

To adopt this position is not to admit any doctrine of fatalism or moral irresponsibility. The individual personality must be accepted, in the affairs of practical life, for what it is—the product of prior causes, it is true, but an entity in itself and the cause of later effects. The individual is responsible to himself and to society for what he does. He is not the mere puppet of outside circumstance; the motives that decide his choice between this and that are mainly within himself. The fact that he regards himself, and is regarded by society, as responsible for what he does is one of the most important of the factors that determine his choice. But whether this conclusion be accepted or not, and whether the contention is accepted or not, that the movements of the electron may be a matter of pure chance, I submit that the one subject has no connexion whatever with the other. Few admit nowadays the doctrine that life and mind and human action are 'mechanistic.' To hold that the Law of Causation applies in the spiritual and mental sphere as well as in the material is not to hold that the two are identical, and a deduction drawn from the one, even if it were sound, need not necessarily affect our ideas about the other.

If it should be asked why anyone whose interests are mainly in political matters should show concern about a question that seems so far away, I would give this answer:

There are great numbers of people in all countries who are trying, according to their lights, to make a world that is largely bad a little better. They are labouring to improve the social environment, to get rid of evil housing conditions, to improve the sanitation of the towns and villages, to encourage eugenics—in a score of ways to give more favourable opportunities to individuals to develop healthy bodies. They are trying to promote a full and sound education, to suppress drunkenness, to obviate crime. They are trying to inculcate ideas of co-operation, within the nations and between nations, and to get rid of social strife and of war. They are trying to persuade the peoples to do what is sensible; to persuade them that if they sow folly they will surely reap disaster. The task is very hard. The progress is painfully slow. They are met by the defeatists who say: 'When have men ever consented to be governed by reason? Look at the world to-day.' But they are not discouraged or deterred.

Into a world so struggling, and in an age which is already one

of intellectual confusion, there is projected a new doctrine. It is heralded as the latest conclusion of modern science and is announced on the authority of one of the most eminent of scientists. (And our present-day world is largely under the influence of science; it listens with special attention to the voice of this particular exponent.) The doctrine is found to be this—that there is no reason at bottom to think that the things that happen are the outcome of what has been done before; hazard rules at the heart of Nature; the implication is drawn that human conduct is wayward, arbitrary and quite unpredictable. If that is true, then why trouble with our vast organisations for child welfare, education, sanitation, penal reform, anti-war propaganda, and all the rest? You can have no ground for thinking that, at the end, things will be any different from what they would have been without them.

Experience proves that that is not so. Ameliorative forces have, in fact, brought an increase in human welfare. There have been constant mistakes and failures no doubt, but if the right causes have been made operative the right results have followed. We may therefore hold that they will do so again, if the conditions are the same. But immense effort is needed; the inertia of indifference is vast and hard to move. Whether the effort will be forthcoming depends upon the willingness of millions of individuals; it depends upon their determination, their enthusiasm, their faith. If the faith that good results will always follow from right action, bad results from wrong, is undermined, immense harm will follow. That is why this discussion has actuality. To no one can it be a matter of indifference.

HERBERT SAMUEL.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE SPICE TRADE ON WORLD HISTORY

In this article I propose to deal briefly with the spice trade from early times and to show how during the Middle Ages it became a monopoly of the Moslem Powers, who mainly for this reason defeated Christendom in the Crusades and bled Europe white. This unfortunate situation was entirely changed by the Portuguese under Vasco da Gama and his successors, who, by dominating the Indian Ocean, cut the arteries of commerce which ran up the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to Egypt and Syria respectively. At a later period the European Powers—first the Dutch and later the English—broke through the monopolies of Portugal and Spain and then fought for the spice trade. I hope to be able to prove that the quest of the spices and condiments of India and the Malay Archipelago greatly influenced world history.

Among the most interesting chapters of Ezekiel is one in which the Prophet, writing early in the sixth century B.C., gives a valuable account of the commercial geography of the Near East, with special reference to Tyre. In it he mentions the merchants of the Yemen and of the Hadramaut—to give these countries their modern names—who dealt in various spices. At this period the trade was conducted by sea to the Hadramaut and thence by camel caravan to Mecca. The merchants of this city bought the spices and forwarded them by caravan across Central Arabia to the Mediterranean, where they were distributed by the Phœnicians of Tyre and Sidon. Later, the spices were carried in ships to Aden (the Eden of Ezekiel). Owing to the dangerous reefs in which the Red Sea abounded, the cargoes were changed at this port to vessels of lighter draught, in which the voyage was resumed up the Red Sea to Aydhab. From this port the desert was crossed by camel transport to Kous, on the Nile, and so by boats to Alexandria, which had succeeded Tyre as the great trade emporium.

In the reign of Augustus the Eastern trade flourished, thanks partly to the patrolling of the Red Sea by Roman galleys. Writing towards the end of the first century A.D., Pliny represents silk and highly-prized iron as coming from China, while India supplied

spices, of which cinnamon and pepper were of great importance. Among the Roman exports were glass, textiles, coral, and amber. It is interesting to note that Pliny declares that the adverse balance of trade was over the equivalent of £1,000,000 annually—'so dearly do we pay for our luxuries and our women.' This constituted a serious state of affairs, as the money was hoarded in India, where enormous quantities of Roman coins have been found, while Rome had no mines from which this currency could be adequately replenished. For two centuries the Eastern trade flourished, but it came to an end owing to the decline of Roman power and prestige, the result of which was that the Arabs and Abyssinians practically closed the Red Sea to Roman ships. Indeed, from that period, until the appearance of Vasco da Gama in Eastern waters, there was no direct commercial intercourse between Europe and India or the Spice Islands—a period of more than 1000 years. The foundation of Constantinople may be taken to denote the end of the classical period and the beginning of the Middle Ages. The spice trade was now handled by the Abyssinian merchants of Axum, who made large profits from it. During the fifth and sixth centuries the loss of the western provinces of the Roman Empire to German conquerors resulted in the new rulers demanding spices, silk, and all the luxuries of the East. An instance of this is seen in the demand of Alaric in 408, that the ransom for Rome should include not only gold and silver, but 4000 tunics of silk and 3000 lb. of pepper. The rise of Islam was the most important event of the Middle Ages. Inspired by fanatical devotion to the monotheistic religion preached by the Prophet Mohamed, and also by the lure of rich spoils and fair women, the Arabs swarmed out of their deserts into the fertile lands of the Persian and Byzantine Empires. Within a generation, not only had the Persian Empire been conquered, but Syria and Egypt had been wrenched from the Byzantine Empire. As a result, the spice trade with Europe was dominated by the Moslems. But before describing the result of the new order I propose to turn for a while to the spice trade in England.

In the Middle Ages the demand for pepper and other spices was very great among the rich. Considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping live-stock during the winter, before root crops were grown, and the custom was to kill the cattle and salt the winter supply of meat in the autumn. The unwholesome and unsavoury nature of this food was mitigated by the use of spices. There was also a constant demand for drugs and perfumes, while incense was largely used in religious services. All the above came from the East. In Anglo-Saxon times spices reached London through the Norsemen and the Germans. The colossal quantities of Anglo-Saxon money that have been unearthed in Sweden, and

especially in the island of Gottland, prove the existence of an active trade in which the advantage lay with the Norsemen. The most ancient document proving the presence of German merchants in England is a statute of London of the period of King Ethelred (978–1016), which, with reference to the tolls charged at Billingsgate, laid down : ' For the men of the Emperor . . . it was not lawful for the portreeves to put upon them any trading fine ; and they had to pay their own toll, and also at Christmas, two white loaves, and one brown, and 10 lb. of pepper.' Under Edward the Confessor the foreigner could only sell wholesale—for example, not less than 12 lb. of pepper or spices. The above reference to the Germans is important as establishing the fact that they dealt in pepper and other spices.

In proof of the great importance of the spice trade, I would point to the fact that one of the earliest of the City guilds was the Pepperers, which was first heard of in 1180. This guild, with the Ropers and Apothecaries, nominated the officer in charge of the King's beam. In 1345 the Guild of Pepperers was succeeded by a fraternity which in 1373 became the Grocers' Company. The word ' grocer,' to quote from an old work, ' was a term distinguishing merchants of this society, in opposition to inferior retailers, for that they usually sold in gross quantities, by great weights.' Since spices constituted the commodities in which they dealt, the word gradually acquired its present meaning of an ' inferior retailer ' in spices. The weigh-house and public weighing were vested in the Grocers' Company, a right which they retained until the eighteenth century. The privilege of garbling or cleaning spices was also bestowed on the company, whose representatives were empowered to enter any shop or warehouse to view spices and drugs and to garble them. They were also empowered to confiscate any spices that were being sold without being first cleaned by a garbeller ' chosen, accepted and sworn for that purpose.' The patron of the company was St. Anthony, in whose honour the fraternity attended a high Mass annually. The arms of the company granted by Henry VIII. included ' Six cloves in chief, and three in base . . . a loaded camel trippant proper . . . and two griffins.' To quote from a ' metrical oration ' spoken by Pallas at a ' Triumphant Pageant ' of 1673 :

> The King bless'd Loyal Grocers Company ;
> Whose Traffique into India and the Straits,
> Does feast you with delicious Delicates ;
> Which on this laden Camel they present ye,
> As a small symptom of their greater Plenty.

After the rise of Islam the most important campaigns of the Middle Ages were the attempts made by Christendom to recover the sacred city of Jerusalem from the Moslems. The first Crusade,

led by Duke Robert of Normandy, captured Jerusalem in 1099, and four Latin States were established in Palestine and Syria. Less than a century later the great Saladin, who was the ruler of Syria and Egypt, defeated the Crusaders decisively at the battle of Hattin in 1187, Jerusalem falling into his hands a few months later. In vain did Cœur de Lion win deathless fame throughout Christendom and the Moslem world. He had to fight dissensions and jealousies, whereas Saladin had at his back Syria and Egypt, with their immense revenues gained from customs duties levied on the spice trade, and to this the defeat of Christendom was mainly due. A remarkably clear-sighted Venetian, Marin Sanuto Torcello, who wrote at the end of the thirteenth century, refers indignantly to the defeat of the Crusaders owing to this cause.

The rise of Venice was one of the most remarkable events of the Middle Ages. Her wealth and power rested mainly on the trade with India and the Malay Archipelago, and when Charlemagne invaded Italy at the beginning of the ninth century Venetian merchants sold to the Franks the luxuries of the East. As the years passed, the wealth of Venice increased, until one of her Doges in 1423 boasted that 'to the citizens of Venice belonged the carriage of all riches; they were the providers of the entire world.' In 1317 Venice opened up direct commercial intercourse with Flanders and England by sea. However, one of the Venetian galleons was lost on the Goodwin Sands, with the result that the English merchants were warned that, in future, they must fetch their own spices from Venice. The sea States of Italy benefited enormously from the Crusades, not only from the hire of transport by pilgrims and Crusaders, and from the supply of funds, but, indirectly, from the increased demand for spices, drugs, perfumes and incense.

I now pass to the customs duties imposed on this flourishing spice trade by the Moslem rulers. Just before the Portuguese appeared in the Indian Ocean we learn that the Sultan of Egypt took one-third of the value of every cargo that entered Egypt. In addition, customs were charged, and the duties paid by the Venetians and Genoese at Alexandria alone were estimated annually at £300,000—a huge sum at that period. Fortunately we possess reliable lists of the prices prevailing in India and at Alexandria respectively at this period, and I will illustrate my theme in the case of four of the chief spices:

	India.		Alexandria.	
	s.	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*
Cloves, per lb.	0	7·2	1	11
Pepper "	0	2·9	1	5
Ginger "	0	0·5	2	0
Nutmegs "	0	0·3	1	7

Other imports from the East included drugs, musk, cardamums, cinnamon, galangale, camphor, coconuts, aloes-wood, ebony, Brazil wood, ivory, and mother-of-pearl. There were also pearls, diamonds, rubies and other precious stones, incense and perfumes. The exports of Europe were timber for shipbuilding, iron and pitch. To this list may be added ships, arms, jewels, furs, amber, gold and silver. The exports of Europe did not equal the imports in value, and, as in the days of the Roman Empire, there was a heavy debit balance against Europe. When we add the enormous customs charges made by the Moslem Powers we may say without exaggeration that Europe was bled white.

The marvellous development in Portugal of ocean navigation and sea power was due entirely to Prince Henry the Navigator, a grandson of John of Gaunt. He spent his life in training the hardy fishermen of Portugal to become skilled navigators, and in building ships suitable for ocean voyages. Armament, too, was not neglected. Year after year he despatched expeditions down the coast of Africa, which, in time, reached Negroland and started a lucrative traffic in slaves, while rich gold mines were worked on the Gold Coast at Elmina. When Prince Henry died, in 1460, the Portuguese had penetrated beyond the mouth of the River Gambia and had become the best-trained navigators in Europe. Explorer after explorer pushed on to the south until Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope and landed at Mossel Bay in February 1488. The way was thus prepared for Vasco da Gama, who sailed from Lisbon in 1497. After rounding the Cape of Good Hope and passing the point reached by Diaz, he had nearly 1000 miles of unknown coast to explore before reaching ports under the control of Arab chiefs, who conducted a regular commercial intercourse with India. At Mozambique, the first port at which he touched, Gama found four Arab vessels 'laden with gold, silver, cloves, pepper, ginger, and silver rings, as also with quantities of pearls, jewels and rubies.' Although his reception was hostile, as soon as it was known that the strangers were Christians, Da Gama was well received at Malindi, whose ruler provided him with a Hindu pilot, to the entire satisfaction of the Portuguese, who at first believed that the Hindus were Christians. Da Gama left Malindi on April 24, 1498, and on May 20 his squadron anchored off Calicut, and thus the great feat was accomplished.

The Portuguese were able by their superior ships, artillery, and skill in navigation to defeat a combined Hindu and Moslem fleet in 1509. Under Albuquerque, Malacca, the key to the Spice Islands, was secured, and in 1515 he constructed a great fort at Hormuz, the key to the Persian Gulf. Albuquerque failed completely before Aden in 1513. Four years later the

Turks annexed Egypt, and in 1538 a powerful Turkish fleet appeared in Indian waters and besieged Diu. The Portuguese, however, defended the fort tenaciously, and the Turkish fleet disappeared as suddenly as it had arrived. This ended all serious opposition to the Portuguese, who rapidly established a monopoly both in the spice trade and in the carrying trade of the Indian Ocean. They thereby severed the arteries of commerce which ran up the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

A Venetian envoy at Lisbon, just after the arrival of the first big cargo of spices at Lisbon in 1501, describes how the Portuguese had loaded their ships at a price which he feared to mention.

They had presumably purchased in India at the low rates given above and were out for huge profits, as the Lisbon prices at this period prove :

	s.	*d.*		*s.*	*d.*
Cloves, per lb. .	3	6	Ginger, per lb. .	2	1
Pepper ,, .	1	5	Nutmegs ,, .	1	9

Priuli, the writer of the celebrated *Diaries*, comments as follows :

> Upon the arrival of this news at Venice, all the city was deeply moved and remained stupified, and the wisest held it for the worst news that could reach them. . . . For that now, by this new voyage, the spices would be brought from the Indies to Lisbon, where Hungarians, Germans, Flemings and French would be able to procure them cheaply ; and that because the spices that came to Venice passed through the whole of Syria and the countries of the Soldan, paying in every place exorbitant duties . . . that what at first cost one ducat, was raised in the end to sixty and even one hundred ducats.

And what was the result on world history of these epoch-making events ? To begin with, the Moslem menace, which threatened to overwhelm Eastern Europe, was ended, so far as naval domination was concerned, at the battle of Lepanto in 1571, while the Turks were driven back from the walls of Vienna in 1683. Had the Turkish Empire continued to drain the wealth of Europe, the result might well have been very different. From the larger point of view commerce, wealth, and power left the States bordering on the Mediterranean Sea and passed to Portugal, Spain, France, England, and the Netherlands, which States possessed Atlantic seaboards.

I now turn to Columbus, Amerigo and Magellan, the leading figures in Spanish exploration. Columbus, a Genoese by birth, took part in trading voyages to Chios, at that time a possession of Genoa, and later to Lisbon, England and Scotland. In 1477 he settled at Lisbon and visited Porto Santo, where his wife's father had owned property. He also took part in a Portuguese voyage to Elmina, on the Gold Coast. His scientific views were those of

the Middle Ages, and on Ptolemy's map he saw the enormous and inaccurate prolongation eastwards of the continent of Asia. He also read, and annotated, the book of Marco Polo, who had erroneously stated that Cipangu, or Japan, lay 1500 miles east of China. Relying on his studies and his discussions with seafarers, Columbus became imbued with the idea that he had a divine mission to discover new lands, whose inhabitants should be converted to Christianity, and he finally persuaded Queen Isabella of Castille to patronise the scheme. Columbus sailed from Spain on his famous voyage in 1492. His objectives were Asia in general and Cipangu in particular. He also vaguely hoped to discover other 'islands and mainlands in the ocean.' He intended to reach the Spice Islands by sailing to the west.

His success was amazing, as he crossed the Atlantic from the Canary Islands in thirty-three days, and struck land at one of the Bahamas. He continued his voyage, and of Cuba he wrote: 'I found it be so extensive that I thought it must be the mainland, the province of Catayo' (Cathay). From Cuba he shaped his course for Espanola, where, to quote again: 'There was a large town well adapted for all kinds of commerce either with the mainland on this side,[1] or with that beyond, which is the land of the Great Khan.' Columbus apparently died in the belief that he had reached Asia, although I can hardly accept that such an intelligent man could have really believed that Cipangu, with its civilised people and its ships, was to be identified with islands inhabited by naked savages. Rather am I inclined to think that he was bewildered, but unwilling to confess the fact. Shortly after the return of Columbus from his first voyage, the Treaty of Tordesillas was negotiated by Spain and Portugal in 1494. By its terms the entire world outside Europe was divided between these two Powers by a line drawn 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands, and severe penalties were threatened to all intruders. Columbus was succeeded by Amerigo Vespucci, the explorer of the eastern coast of South America, who sailed south to latitude 50° and discovered Brazil. Unfortunately we have few details about this important voyage, which was mainly undertaken with a view to finding a route to the Spice Islands. Again, in 1513, Vasco Nunez de Balboa crossed the isthmus of Panama and discovered the South Sea, as he named it, and thus proved that a great ocean lay to the west of America.

The monstrous Treaty of Tordesillas, which made *maria clausa* of the oceans, was received with indignation by the other States of Europe. Henry VII. was not unwilling to infringe it, so far as lands which lay in the same latitude as England were concerned. Consequently he patronised the voyage of John

[1] Presumably Cuba is referred to.

Cabot, who in 1497 set sail to discover 'heathen islands or countries hitherto unknown to Christians.' As a result Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were discovered on the first voyage. Cabot firmly believed that he had struck the mainland of Asia, and in his second voyage he intended to follow the coast down to the spice regions. With this purpose in his mind he surveyed the coast of North America, probably as far south as the Delaware River, but as he found no spices, nor brought home anything of commercial value, the project was abandoned.

Among the greatest navigators of all time was Magellan, who in 1519 sailed from Spain with the express object of discovering a strait to the south of America which should lead to the Spice Islands. In October 1520 the straits called after the explorer were discovered, not far south of the point where Vespucci had turned back. Magellan crossed the Pacific Ocean, as he named it, in spite of terrible sufferings from hunger and thirst. For ninety-eight days he sailed over this vast ocean, and at last sighted the Ladrones Island. Later he reached the Philippine Islands, and thus the great object of his voyage had been accomplished. Magellan did not live to enjoy his success, but the survivors of the expedition reached Seville after having circumnavigated the world for the first time.

During the sixteenth century the Spaniards and Portuguese dominated the ocean routes to the Spice Islands, albeit in 1578 Drake had appeared in the Pacific Ocean, and had loaded up his ship with a rich cargo in the Spice Islands. Unable to use these known routes, the English and later the Dutch navigators decided to try for a passage through the Arctic to these islands by the north-east or by the north-west, hoping thereby to escape capture by the Spaniards or the Portuguese, and to tap the spice trade. As in the case of their precursors, the English navigators were led astray by 'Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers.' To quote Sir Humphrey Gilbert:

> Learned men and painfull travellers have confirmed with one consent and voice, that America was an island; and that there lyeth a great sea between it, Cathaia and Grondland, by the which any man of our country may with small danger passe to Cathaia, the Moluccas and India.

This view summed up the best opinion of the period, and nothing could well have been more misleading. In the first instance a search was made for the North-East Passage. Sebastian Cabot drew up the instructions for the first voyage which ran 'you use all wayes and meanes possible to learne how men may passe from Russia by land or by sea to Cathaia.' The Muscovy Company, which despatched these expeditions, rediscovered the White Sea, which was known to Alfred the Great through the voyages of the

Norseman Othere, and opened up a profitable trade with Russia. In spite of several attempts, by the end of the sixteenth century the heroic explorers had only traversed perhaps one-quarter of the northern coast of the immense continent of Asia that separated them from the Pacific Ocean. The names of Willoughby, Chancellor, Burrough, and Barents are illustrious, but the search for a north-east passage had failed. Then followed the search for the North-West Passage that was especially favoured by Sir Humphrey Gilbert. Frobisher, Davis, Hudson, and Baffin—all names that excite our admiration—pushed their way northwards and made discoveries of considerable importance, but they failed to find in the Arctic the wished-for portal of the Spice Islands.

We now come to the seventeenth century, with Spain and Portugal entrenched behind the Treaty of Tordesillas. They had built up great empires and lucrative commerce, but in so doing had exhausted their man power, and furnished an ideal example of the French proverb, '*Qui trop embrasse mal étreint.*' The decisive battle which ended the world hegemony of Spain and Portugal was the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The Dutch were the first to take advantage of the altered situation. In 1595 they despatched a pioneer expedition, the leader of which brought back a treaty with the King of Bantam, in Java. This important success, as it was considered, was followed up by fleets sailing annually and the formation of the United Company, to which sovereign powers were delegated. The Dutch attacked the Portuguese wherever they met them. In the Spice Islands, their principal objective, they ultimately succeeded in driving them out, and firmly established themselves in the Malay Archipelago, which from that time became the seat of their power.

This brings us to the appearance of the English in Eastern waters. At this period one or two pioneer voyages to the East had been undertaken, but had not been successful. Curiously enough, our somewhat sluggish ancestors were goaded into activity in 1599 by the action of the Dutch, who raised the price of pepper from 3*s.* per lb. to 6*s.* and even 8*s.* This was too much for the merchants of London to tolerate. They petitioned Queen Elizabeth, who in 1600 granted a charter to the East India Company, as it was ultimately called. In 1601, James Lancaster, under the auspices of the new company, made the first English voyage to the Spice Islands since Drake's memorable expedition. Lancaster secured a rich cargo, which included 1,000,000 lb. of pepper. In the second voyage the hostility of the Dutch, who had defeated the Portuguese near Bantam in 1602, and who had captured their forts at Tidor and at Amboina, created serious difficulties. The Dutch wished to monopolise the spice trade as the Portuguese had done.

The Portuguese, on their part, resented the appearance of the English, who established themselves near Surat, in a harbour known as 'Swally Hole.' In 1612 the *Dragon*, 'assisted onely,' to quote Purchas, 'with the *Osiander*, scarcely a ship,' defeated a Portuguese fleet comprising four galleons and twenty-five frigates. To continue the quotation, 'the great Mogoll, which before thought none comparable to the Portugall at sea, much wondered at the English resolution.' In 1620 the Portuguese again attacked the English off Jask, where they were opening up trade relations with Persia, but only to suffer a second defeat. Finally in 1622, in alliance with Persia, our fighting ancestors captured Hormuz, the strongest fortress of the East, and this feat of arms not only raised English prestige to a considerable extent, but Portugal never recovered from the staggering blow dealt her at Hormuz.

To return to India, in 1639 the first fort was erected at Madras, named after the patron saint of England; in 1661 Bombay was acquired as forming part of the dowry of Catharine of Braganza; and in 1690 Calcutta was founded by masterful Job Charnock. In 1708 rival companies which had fought one another were combined into the company which won India. The Dutch were bitterly jealous of the English, and so far did this sentiment prevail, that in 1623 ten members of the English factory at Amboina were seized, tortured and killed. For many years merchants of the two Powers were unfriendly rivals, but yet united in 1625 to fight a Portuguese fleet, which made an unsuccessful attempt to retake Hormuz. Established at Bandar Abbas, the Dutch, not without success, undermined the English position in the Persian Gulf, while they resorted to any action that would exclude the English from Java, Sumatra, and China. In 1638 Mandelso wrote: 'The Dutch are the better situated of the two [in the Persian Gulf], and do furnish in a manner all Persia with Pepper, Nutmegs, Cloves and other Spicery.' Hunter aptly summarises the situation:

> In the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the strength of England was not less than that of Holland. But the English nation was not as yet prepared to risk a little for the Indian trade; the English sovereigns would risk nothing. The Dutch people and the Dutch Government were ready to risk much. Holland brought to the struggle a slowly acquired knowledge of the Eastern trade, a vast patriotic subscription from the United Provinces, and a resolve alike of her people and her Government that the Spice Islands should pass to no other hands but their own.

The French appeared on the scene in India somewhat late, La Compagnie des Indes having been founded in 1664. At first their merchant-adventurers were unable to resist the Dutch, who seized their settlement of Pondicherry and held it for six years, until the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 compelled its restoration.

Under Dupleix, who assumed charge in 1742, they won some successes, Madras being captured in 1746, while a British naval attack on Pondicherry was repulsed. Clive now stepped on the stage and, thanks mainly to his genius, the situation changed, and Dupleix was recalled in 1753, having completely failed to expel the British from India. In 1756 the Seven Years' War again involved the two Powers in hostilities, which resulted in the capture of Pondicherry, and with it the French power in the Carnatic came to an end. During the same year they lost their settlements on the coast of Africa, half their West Indian islands, and Canada. The sea power of Great Britain gave her the advantage for which no successes on land could compensate. It had long been a maxim of French policy that England could only be brought to her knees by the capture of her possessions in the East. Napoleon Bonaparte, who apparently failed to grasp the full significance of sea power, led an expedition to Egypt with this intention, which ended in complete failure, owing to the destruction of the French fleet by Nelson in Aboukir Bay. Nothing daunted, Napoleon in 1807 negotiated a treaty with Persia by the terms of which the Shah declared that 'if the French have an intention of invading Khorasan, he will appoint an army to go down by the road of Kabul and Kandahar.' At this period a French mission under General Gardanne appeared in Persia to train Persian troops, while Lucien Bonaparte was appointed French representative at Teheran. Napoleon, moreover, at Tilsit in 1807 induced Tsar Alexander to despatch an army to Persia which would join a French army marching across Asia Minor. The three allied forces would unite in Persia and sweep the British out of India.

This impracticable scheme never materialised. The Shah, who had been promised the restoration of Georgia, taken by Russia, was deeply chagrined by the Convention of Tilsit, in which no mention of his lost province appeared. Finally, British diplomacy won the day and General Gardanne was given his passports. Napoleon's scheme for the conquest of India fell to pieces like a pack of cards. The final outcome of the Napoleonic wars was the colonial ascendency of Great Britain. That Power had seized the whole of the possessions of Holland in the East, but restored them in their entirety with the exception of Cape Colony and Mauritius, which were kept for strategical reasons. Again, in dealing with France, the conquered islands in the West Indies were restored, with the exception of Trinidad.

A century passes and we see Germany in her ambitious scheme for world dominion evolving the policy of the *Drang nach Osten*, which, through the instrumentality of the Baghdad Railway, threatened the British position in Iraq, in the Persian Gulf, and

in India. When the World War broke out she adopted Napoleon's scheme of attacking Egypt, 'the neck of the British Empire.' Furthermore, again copying Napoleon, she attempted to utilise the Turkish army as an instrument for an invasion of India across Persia. She appointed Von der Goltz to the supreme command in Iraq and Persia, and, after the fall of Kut in 1916, Turkish troops occupied Hamadan and pushed forward to the vicinity of Isfahan. It is my definite opinion—and I was in a position to know—that, had a Turkish division reached Kabul, the Afghans, ever athirst for fighting and spoils, would have joined their fellow Sunnis in an invasion of India, which would have constituted a terrible menace to the British. *Dis aliter visum.*

In conclusion, I will quote the weighty words of the great Albuquerque:

> There are three places in India, which serve as marts of all the commerce of merchantable wares in that part of the world, and the principal keys of it. The first is Malacca, at the exit of the Straits of Singapore. The second is Aden, in the entry and exit of the Straits of the Red Sea. The third is Hormuz, at the entry and exit of the Straits of the Persian Sea. And if the King of Portugal held sway over these three Straits, he might well have been called the lord of all the world.

PERCY SYKES.

A SIDELIGHT ON JAMES JOYCE

THE recorded writings of James Joyce begin with a pamphlet on Parnell, written when the author was nine years old. Ten years later, at the beginning of this century, he produced a tiny brochure on the Irish Literary Theatre, entitled *The Day of the Rabblement*. The censor of the Dublin University rejected it from the University magazine, whereupon it was printed in a pamphlet along with an essay by Sheehy-Skeffington. But these writings clearly do not belong to the James Joyce canon. No copy of the first is known to exist; not even the defunct Anglo-Parisian review *transition* considered it would serve any useful purpose, in the elucidation of the art of Joyce, to revive the second. The James Joyce canon officially begins with the publication in 1907 of a collection of thirty-six poems entitled *Chamber Music*. It ends, or is in a process of ending, with a work entitled *Work in Progress*, of which a number of sections, beginning in April 1927, have appeared in *transition*, and a few have appeared, either as expensive *de luxe* editions or shilling brochures—*Anna Livia Plurabelle, Tales Told of Shem and Shaun, Haveth Childres Everywhere.*

I state that the canon *officially* begins with *Chamber Music*, not merely because it was the first work published by Joyce through the ordinary channels, not merely because the most solemn consideration of Joyce as major artist usually includes a respectful or even enthusiastic criticism of *Chamber Music*, but because Joyce himself has made no effort to disavow it. On the contrary, he avows it very explicitly. In the page that faces the title-page of his most famous work, *Ulysses*, it stands up in bold type heading the brief list of works 'by the same writer.' Moreover, so late as 1927, in the year when the first section of the cryptic *Work in Progress* appeared, *Chamber Music* appeared again. It is true it had another name. It was called *Pomes Penyeach* this time. (This was the volume sold to Miss Rebecca West 'as if it had been a saint's medal on the porch of Westminster Cathedral.') From the title of the minute volume, from the fact that *Ulysses* had been finished in 1921, from the fact that *Work in Progress* was in progress, the reader would have been justified in expecting a terrifying distillation of that variety of

Rive-Gauche-Greenwich-Village poetry which, consisting to an appreciable extent of figures and signs of punctuation, seems to the uninitiate as coherent as a blind man's lackadaisical tappings upon a typewriter.

But it was not that variety of poetry which met the eye. You read in a poem entitled *Flower Given to My Daughter* and written in Trieste in 1913 :

Frail the white rose and frail are
Her hands that gave
Whose soul is sere and paler
Than time's wan wave.

In *Alone*, a poem written in Zürich in 1916, a year when the same author was engaged upon a prose masterpiece which exalts him among the most important artists of our day, you read :

The sly reeds whisper to the night
A name—her name—
And all my soul is a delight,
A swoon of shame.

There are better poems, far better, in this volume. Indeed, the best is the earliest, and was written in Dublin in 1904, the very year in which the celebrated June 16 occurred in which is comprehended the whole action of *Ulysses*. The best is the first, so that in his lyric verse undeliberately, as in *Work in Progress* deliberately, Joyce confutes the categories of time. But the point is not that there are better poems than *Alone* and *A Flower Given to My Daughter* in *Pomes Penyeach*. The point is that there are poems so bad as those ; the point is that Joyce is writing *Chamber Music*, however exiguously, all his life long ; the point is, not that he turns out infrequently a fairly beautiful poem, but that he is perpetuating and re-rendering poems so thin, so mawkish, usually so derivative, as those I have quoted—from stage to stage across a career in which, as a prose artist, he exercises so masculine, so subtle, so versatile, so courageous an intellect, in which, as a prose artist, he not merely handles his medium with incomparable skill, but creates it in a fashion associated with very few artists besides himself.

Joyce is not the first great writer who has begun his career with a volume of inferior verse. But the others do not seek to perpetuate it. George Moore, for instance, re-wrote much, but he did not wrestle with *Poems of Passion ;* if the bibliophilists had permitted it, how fervently he would have allowed it to disappear quite quietly ! Yet it would not be impossible to trace some tenuous thread of development between *Poems of Passion* and *Aphrodite in Aulis*, George Moore's last and loveliest novel.

How much more enigmatic do the two enigmas of *Chamber Music* and *Work in Progress* become when we try—as we must, for Joyce allows no alternative—to explain them in the terms of a single creative personality! We cannot ignore *Chamber Music* because Joyce does not. And Joyce does not, I believe, because the key to Joyce, or to Stephen Dedalus (the name he gives himself in his *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*), is locked in it, more truly than the key to Shakespeare is locked up in the Sonnets. Shakespeare the man, the lover, is expounded in them; but the subject-matter of Shakespeare the artist was something infinitely richer than the private storms of his heart, though these, doubtless, gave his wings the initial impulses which lifted them into the universal heavens. But Stephen Dedalus is the theme of James Joyce from the beginning to the end. In *Chamber Music* he sings his pitiful little songs. In *Dubliners* we tread his streets and rub shoulders with his familiars. The light moves from the circumference into the centre in *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*. In *Exiles* his heart is shown divided between two bodies. In *Ulysses* he is incorporated into myth and attains immortality. His grin, disembodied, extends across the dislocated firmament of *Work in Progress*.

What, then, is the secret hidden away in *Chamber Music* and the much tinier volume *Pomes Penyeach*, which, though twenty years elapse between the writing of its first and last poem, laboriously tots up to fifteen pages? Miss Rebecca West, in her brilliant cataract of an essay, *The Strange Necessity*, obscurely suspects the existence of the secret. She is troubled. She pretends she is delighted, but it is clear she is troubled. She quotes the poem where Joyce swoons for shame. She knows that his prose works prove him beyond argument 'a writer of majestic genius.' How came Joyce to swoon for shame? How? And then it dawns upon her. And she almost succeeds in convincing herself that she is enchanted with her discovery. 'For really, I reflected, as I went on my way down the Street of the Seine, this makes it quite plain that Mr. James Joyce is a great man who is entirely without taste.' Taste? But what is taste? How tasteless a word! To invoke taste, of all gods in the machine, how reprehensible an abrogation of that function of criticism which is to prove that, so far as the word 'taste' has any validity at all, each new work of art only makes it a little more invalid than before. Her complaint is that the author of *Ulysses* wrote these poems, not that the poems themselves are tasteless. Indeed, they are not. They taste mildly of Swinburne and Symons and Yeats and the Celtic fog from which Stephen Dedalus was, at that very period, holding so arrogantly aloof. But the duty of the critic is not to complain or marvel, but to elucidate, and her elucidation

supremely begs the question. How came the genius, so 'majestic' in prose, to twitter in verse so gently ?

It is well known that James Joyce was a singer at one time, as a younger and more lucid contemporary of his, Francis Brett Young, was a composer of songs. I have heard admirers of both sigh somewhat wistfully at the thought that each abandoned so completely the more lyric muse for an austerer one. Certain of the poems in *Chamber Music* (and doubtless, by now, in *Pomes Penyeach*) have been set to music, for they are sufficiently devoid of the subtler specific rhythms of poetry to lend themselves admirably to that operation. Some of the music is good, and it can take care of itself. I am not aware whether the poem, *Goldenhair*, has been set to music. But not the harpstrings of Israfel himself could condone

Lean out of the window
    Goldenhair,
I heard you singing
    A merry air.

My book was closed ;
    I read no more.
Watching the fire dance
    On the floor. . . .

There are moments of despair in which a poem like this inclines one to the suspicion that Joyce is indulging himself in a saturnine joke. He has always known that his work must attract two types of readers : first, that small company which in every generation is alive to whatsoever art is new and vital and has splendour, whether it is fashionable because, superficially, it flouts all the traditions, or whether it is unfashionable because, superficially, it respects them.

He was to have, and has had, a second type of reader, who, for some such irrelevant reason as because he was obscure in places, or obscene in places, and because to espouse him was the high-water mark of sophistication, gathered round his banner, sweating and crying shrilly. To such readers the transcript of a chemical formula, a Listerine advertisement, or an Ella Wheeler Wilcox poem would, with the signature of their hero attached, be as dizzy with meanings as the Pythian priestess swaying over her tripod. It was to test such fools as these (one said in moments of despair) that Joyce composed and published such a poem as *Goldenhair*. And then one remembered *Work in Progress*, with which one had wrestled for long days, and had reeled back at length defeated. ' Another joke ! ' one said. ' He's testing them again ! They'll write books to explain it—its language, its form, its philosophy. And it's just a palimpsest of puns. It's a joke ! '

And one staggered back still once more to *Work in Progress* and read:

> Grouscious me! What a bagateller it is! Pou! What a Zeit for the goths! vented the Ondt, who not being a sommerfool, was making chilly spaces at hisphen affront of the icinglass of his windhome, which was cold antitopically ixnixundnix!

'A joke!' one said, and turned to the bookshelves to take down a volume of Aristophanes or W. W. Jacobs, where the humour is a little easier to get at. And even at that moment of reaching the hand forward one realised the futility and insolence of it. One realised that it would be much more preposterous to accept such an explanation than to believe (as some have believed) that Rabelais' epic is an allegory in which the processes in the manufacture of wine are elaborated. For the creator of such characters as Leopold Bloom, Buck Mulligan, and Simon Dedalus in the *Portrait* and *Ulysses* has far too sappy a sense of humour to permit himself so arid a joke. He spent seven years writing *Ulysses*; he has been working longer than that on *Work in Progress*, and it is not finished yet. No. There is not a syllable he has penned, in a career of incomparably arduous devotion to his art, which is not utterly, even flagrantly, sincere—even the jejune quavers of *Goldenhair*, even the multilingual portmanteau puzzles of *Work in Progress*.

No. *Goldenhair* is not a joke. It is not a song too sweet for losing. It is not a breach of taste. It is the worst of these poems; yet in the scale of great poetry, such poetry as we might have hoped the author of *Ulysses* capable of producing, it is not far removed from the best. But worst or best poem is Stephen Dedalus escaping from the hell with which he was threatened for his adolescent sins, as he tells us in the *Portrait*—escaping from 'the fire of hell which gives no light, from the stench, the sulphurous brimstone which does not consume itself,' from the spiritual pains of hell which are more subtle than these. It is the subconscious mind of Stephen Dedalus hoping to find in the lambent atmosphere of poetry a relief from those woes which, in its intensely sensitive youth, the rector of Belvedere College had branded upon its marrow. But the sorrow is that Joyce is no poet; or it may be that what is the sorrow of Stephen Dedalus is the gain of ourselves. It would be idle to speculate how much of a poet Dedalus might have been if the rector of Belvedere had not terrified the poet in him into paralysis. We can only conclude from the brief spurts of lyric which have escaped him that, as a poet, he would have been no great thing, whilst we know that, as a prose writer, he has established himself among the most illustrious of our age.

Among great works of prose we find none that compares in kind with *Ulysses*. When we seek works which compare with it in scope, we cannot stop short this side of the *Inferno*, *Hamlet* and the *Odyssey*, each of which, in point of fact, has the closest bearing on the developing history of Stephen Dedalus and Leopold Bloom during the eternal eighteen hours of the day on which the action of *Ulysses* occurs. But those others are poetry; their compass is between heaven and hell. *Ulysses* is prose. It does not leave the gross stuff of this earth; its journeys are along the grey corridors of mind, among the red chambers of the flesh.

I say of poetry that it is the exercise of the subconscious mind, because, whatever the source of it, the element of irresponsibility is stronger in poetry than in the other forms of æsthetic composition in words, even though the conscious mind may quite scientifically, throughout the whole process, organise the technique of its expression. That Stephen Dedalus did not give up all hope that he might some day exercise in poetry the subconscious mind is proved by the pathetic retention of the scraps of verse which constitute *Pomes Penyeach*. It is as if he hoped that by muttering them over to himself he might some day suddenly, in the fortunate coincidence of kabbalistic syllables, find that the iron doors opposed to him had drawn apart. In the meanwhile, the conscious, the prose, mind exercised itself in the production of *Dubliners*, the *Portrait*, *Exiles*, and, supremely, in *Ulysses*. And now at length, as it seems to me, having given up all hope of release through poetry and the subconscious mind, having exorcised his demon so far as prose and the conscious mind permit (producing during that process the greatest prose work in our time), he is endeavouring to exercise in *Work in Progress* a type of cognition which can be described only as a 'superconscious mind.' That is to say, he himself is conscious, and expects his readers to be conscious, on a number of planes and in a number of dimensions at the same time. In space, the river Liffey is simultaneously Ganges and Indus and all earth's rivers; Waterloo is the Garden of Eden. In time, Gladstone and Noah are simultaneously his protagonists. In speech, a given word may be compounded out of elements introduced from three or four languages. In philosophy, the tongue of the Frenchman Bergson projects from the mask of the Neapolitan Giambattista Vico. In approach, the reader must listen intensely with his ears to the spoken achievement, apprehend on the page the composition and disposition of the printed word, rise to the attack with all he possesses of erudition, lie passive to the reception of overtones, undertones, crude jokes, suave innuendo.

It is extremely difficult. But it is not so difficult, I assure you, as the thirty-first poem in *Chamber Music*:

Along with us the summer wind
    Went murmuring—o, happily !—
But softer than the breath of summer
    Was the kiss she gave to me.

There is a sense in which the most tortuous poem of Robert Browning is a nursery rhyme compared with that !

LOUIS GOLDING.

MATTHEW ARNOLD

THE 'UNKNOWN YEARS'

IT is a familiar cause of complaint among students of Matthew Arnold that so little, apart from a few external facts, is known of his life before his twenty-ninth year, when he became a school inspector and married. It has been possible to piece together some sort of picture of his youth from the memoirs and published correspondence of his contemporaries—notably his brother Tom, his niece Mrs. Humphry Ward, and his life-long friend Lord Coleridge; but the part played by divination and conjecture in all such attempts at reconstruction has necessarily been large. A few early letters of his—still the earliest published—were printed in the *Life and Correspondence of Lord Coleridge*; but of the great friendship of his youth, though we have the immortalising elegy, we have so far had no real record. Arnold's published correspondence contained no letter to Clough and Clough's only one, and that much 'edited,' to Arnold. Now, however, an American professor has at last done something to fill the gap by publishing fifty-seven letters from Arnold to Clough, ranging from 1845 to Clough's death in 1861.[1] Though the collection contains none from Clough to Arnold, except the full text of the one already published, the editor has been able, with the help of various Clough papers, to reconstruct Clough's side of the relation to a considerable extent. Even with these letters, the picture of Arnold as a young man is still very incomplete; probably it will always remain so, but there are in existence various other materials, many of them unpublished,[2] and with the help of all in combination it is possible to fill in a good deal more detail than has yet been done.

It has always been clear—and these letters make it clearer still—that Arnold and Clough were in many ways a not too well-assorted pair. Even so, it comes as something of a shock, after *Thyrsis*, to read the following excessively judicial summing-up of

[1] *The Letters of Matthew Arnold to Arthur Hugh Clough*, edited with an introductory study by Howard Foster Lowry. (Oxford University Press.)

[2] I am extremely grateful to the numerous owners of unpublished documents who have at various times in the past kindly allowed me to examine them.

their friendship by Arnold: 'I do not think we did each other harm at Oxford. I look back to that time with pleasure. . . . If you had never met me, I do not think you would have been the happier or the wiser on that account: though I do not think I have increased your stock of happiness. You have, however, on the whole, added to mine.' But this passage, as the context clearly shows, was written in answer to a rather tiresome letter from Clough, and elsewhere in the correspondence there are plenty of indications of really warm feeling on Arnold's part. The fact remains that their friendship did survive all the strains imposed by their temperamental differences. It began, as it were, semi-officially: Clough Dr. Arnold's 'star' boy and Matthew his eldest son. They were never actually at Rugby together, as Clough went up to Balliol the term that Matthew entered the school; but their acquaintance had begun long before, for Clough, having come at the age of ten, without a home of his own in England, had been more or less adopted into the Arnold family. But it cannot have been till 1841, when Matthew Arnold went up to Balliol, that they got to know one another really well. Even then, the three-odd years between them was, at that stage of their lives, a big difference; and half-way through Arnold's first year Clough became a Fellow of Oriel. So that they were still in the relation of 'inspirer' and 'hearer,' in so far as Arnold was ever capable of the latter part. 'The period of my developement (God forgive me the d——d expression!),' he wrote to Clough years later, 'coincides with that of my friendship with you so exactly that I am for ever linked with you by intellectual bonds—the strongest of all: more so than you are with me: for your developement was really over before you knew me. . . .'

During Clough's first years at Oriel his three special intimates were Matthew Arnold, his brother Tom, and another old Rugbeian, Walrond. But for these letters, one would be tempted to think, on grounds of natural suitability, that Clough's great friend, now that they were all together, must have been Tom, not Matthew, Arnold. Like Clough, Tom seems to have lacked that saving somewhat—flippancy, worldly wisdom, or whatever it was—which protected Matthew from exacerbation of the moral sense in his young days. (It is significant that Tom is said to have been the Doctor's favourite.) Clough and Tom were both conscience-ridden, both overcome by their 'difficulties,' in a way that Matthew never was. According to Tom's own testimony, from the time he took his degree (unlike his elder brother, he worked hard and got a First) he was beset with difficulties, largely connected with Strauss's *Leben Jesu;* whereas Matthew was already so completely above the battle that the appearance of that work in English left him perfectly uninterested. He seems,

indeed, to have shed his orthodox beliefs with few of the usual struggles. In one of his very early poems he dismisses immortality in a parenthesis—'Nay and since death, which wipes out man, . . . '; and as an undergraduate he could recommend his father's sermons to a High Church friend, while he himself went off to St. Mary's to hear Newman purely for the sensation.

Another strong bond between Clough and Tom Arnold was their sansculottism. Social conscience was also part of the Arnold tradition (the Christian Socialist movement owed a good deal to Dr. Arnold), nor was Matthew without it; but he never let it get the better of him, whereas it drove Tom to throw up a safe career and seek a juster world in New Zealand. Clough, though he sympathised, did not go so far, but developed an anti-gentleman complex and wrote his pamphlet on Retrenchment at Oxford. Matthew, nourishing no illusions about the heaven-sent nature of the existing order, and by no means indifferent to its abuses, nevertheless managed very well to come to terms with it, at least to the extent of enjoying such of its good things as came his way.

That it was nevertheless Matthew's friendship that mattered most to Clough is now clear, if only from his touchiness. The period when relations between them came nearest to being strained was, it appears from the letters, between about 1848 and 1852 or 1853. By that time the position had in a great measure been reversed. Arnold had grown up and was very consciously clearing his own path for himself, while his former mentor had made such a muddle of his own life that it was Arnold who was now providing good advice, and even practical offers of help. Nor was the advice confined to practical matters; a good deal of it was aimed at the good of Clough's soul. Arnold's first volume of poetry contained three sonnets addressed to Clough in the guise of 'a republican friend.' To call the two on the Revolution of 1848 a lecture would perhaps be a trifle strong, but it is the only word for *Religious Isolation*, with its exhortation to control 'wishes unworthy of a man full-grown.' It appears from a letter which he sent, with a copy of the poem, to his elder sister 'K' (Jane), his great ally in the family, that the fault in Clough that he was castigating was his inability to act on his own convictions without troubling himself with 'unanswerable questions' as to their general validity, an inability which, he says, produces fanaticism (he calls Clough 'a great social fanatic'), since people try to force their opinions on others in order to convince themselves. This advocacy of a contented subjectivism is rather curious; it runs through almost everything Arnold wrote about religion and bears witness to his inability to enter into the minds of people to whom the objective truth of this or that doctrine is the main concern. In this particular context it is, I think, to be

linked up with his criticism of Clough as a 'mere d——d depth-hunter in poetry' and, in a slightly different sense, in life too. 'You ask me,' he wrote in 1853, 'in what I think or have thought you going wrong: in this: that you would never take your assiette as something determined final and unchangeable for you and proceed to work away on the basis of that: but were always poking and patching and cobbling at the assiette itself—could never finally, as it seemed—"resolve to be thyself." . . .' (He is fond of quoting his own poems at Clough.) Altogether, the letters give one the impression that even intellectually Arnold has somehow become the predominating partner in the concern: it is Clough who now talks of throwing off his influence. Arnold has become more necessary to Clough (in spite of Clough's heroic efforts to assert his independence) than Clough is to him. Hence Clough's readiness to feel slighted. It is now Arnold *qui tend la joue*, and the indefinable ascendency which that position confers is never clearer than when he is being magnanimous and taking the blame for their tiffs on himself.

But when Matthew Arnold was an undergraduate Clough was still the great man; and it is pretty clear that he disapproved a good deal of his young friend's proceedings. For Matthew early showed that he had no mind to be another perfect Rugbeian. He took his place in the 'high Arnold set,' as Clough once called it, as a matter of course, but he did not let that hamper him unduly. His brother Tom, who came up a year later, records of him that he 'read a little with the reading men, hunted a little with the fast men, and dressed a little with the dressy men.' For the last-named proclivity he was evidently well 'ragged' by his family. The January 1842 number of the home-made *Fox How Magazine* contains a ribald ballad, written by his sister 'K,' about a 'fine young Oxford gentleman' who 'wears an eye-glass round his neck hung by a silken string' and is too much occupied with his clothes and scents and hair-wash to do any reading:

> Eau de Mille Fleurs, Eau de Cologne and twenty eaux beside
> Rowland's Odonto, scented soaps, jostle his books aside . . .

Arnold's appreciation of good living and of the society in which it was taken for granted contrasts strongly with the almost inhuman asceticism of Clough, who hated the least suggestion of luxury and was always anxious to keep his friend out of its reach. One can imagine how annoyed he must have been at opening Arnold's letter from the Baths of Leuk in Switzerland and reading: 'A wood fire is burning in the grate and I have been forced to drink champagne to guard against the cold [it was September 29] and the café noir is about to arrive, to enable me to write a little.'

The Newdigate was Arnold's only academic success as an

undergraduate. As Schools drew near it became obvious that desperate measures were necessary, and Clough, as his natural mentor, took him on a reading-party in his last long vacation, but even then found it hard to keep his nose to the grindstone. Clough's efforts and those of his tutor, Lingen, who coached him intensively for the last three weeks, secured him a Second. The examiners—to their great annoyance, it is recorded—found his ignorance of his set books too glaring, in spite of his obvious first-class quality. Clough, of course, thought it very good for him to go back to Rugby to take the Lower Fifth as a stop-gap, and when he escaped after two months by getting elected at Oriel, Clough's pleasure at having him back at Oxford was tempered by regret that it meant his leaving Rugby. 'I am only sorry,' he writes in a slightly governessy tone, 'that he will be obliged to leave his present duties at Rugby . . . which he appears to have been performing very satisfactorily and with great benefit to himself for the last few weeks.' The headmaster, Tait, may have been satisfied, but Arnold was obviously a fish out of water, and cut a somewhat incongruous figure. In *The Three Friends: a Story of Rugby in the Forties*, written by A. G. Butler, the first headmaster of Haileybury, who was in the school at the time, and described by him as 'hovering between fact and fiction,' Matthew Arnold appears as a master. 'There's not a bit of the dominie about him,' a boy is made to say, 'he's much too great a swell,' which is no doubt an authentic impression; and the story of his audibly exclaiming 'Thank God!' before his form when an extra half-holiday was announced may also belong to the realm of fact. How he regarded this schoolmastering interlude may be inferred, even more distinctly than from his letter from Rugby printed by Professor Lowry, from certain passages in his works—notably *A French Eton* and his essay on Maurice de Guérin, in which he speaks with an emotion that he rarely displays of 'that common but most perfidious refuge of men of letters—the profession of teaching.'

To Matthew Arnold, who never seems to have contemplated an academic career, the great thing about a Fellowship was that it relieved him from the need to get into some sort of harness at once and enabled him to read and travel. For the next two years, apart from the not very onerous obligations of residence as a probationary Fellow, he was a free man. Outwardly at least his life at Oriel does not seem to have been strenuous, as appears from Clough's somewhat mordant description, evidently written after his return from Paris at the beginning of 1847, which Professor Lowry quotes in his Introduction:

> Matt is full of Parisianism; Theatres in general and Rachel in special: he enters the room with a chanson of Béranger's on his lips—for the sake

of French words almost conscious of tune: his carriage shows him in fancy parading the Rue de Rivoli; and his hair is guiltless of English scissors: he breakfasts at 12, and never dines in Hall, and in the week or 8 days rather (for 2 Sundays must be included) he has been to Chapel *once*.

Yet he was not wasting his time. The main business of his life was one that notoriously prospers best in idleness, or at any rate freedom from routine—namely, writing poetry. How seriously he took it comes out very clearly in these letters to Clough—indeed, it is the most powerful single impression they leave; nor did the mountains bring forth a mouse in this case, for a considerable part of the 1849 volume goes back to his Oxford days. The sonnet on Shakespeare, for example, belongs to 1844; *Resignation* and the *Gipsy Child* cannot, at least in their inception, be much later than 1843 and 1842 respectively. Even in this his most 'æsthetic' period, being a poet meant for him struggling hard to get clear on the great questions, and for this two things were especially necessary—intellectual companionship, which was just what Clough could give him, and profound and comprehensive reading. Of his reading during these years 1845–47 some idea may be gained from the book-lists in his pocket diaries, one of which contains on the fly-leaf the following quatrain, (?) of his composition:

> They had not suffered yet they said we love
> Said—we are happy—yet could show no tears
> Were hopeful, having never yet despaired
> Had broke no vows yet now they plighted one.

To judge by his later practice in his 'Note-books'[3]—large-size diaries in which, along with engagements, accounts and good resolutions, he copied out passages from the books he was reading—these lists probably represent the programme of serious study that he set himself (this is confirmed by the repetition of certain titles in successive years). Perhaps the most noticeable thing about them is the prominence of philosophy, in view of the somewhat contemptuous attitude of his later years and the frequent charges of ignorance in this field made against him. In addition to Plato and Aristotle, the lists include Bacon, Descartes, Schelling, Kant, Herder, Plotinus and the *Bhagavad Gita*, in which he tried unsuccessfully to interest Clough, who was no doubt only getting his own back when he referred in his review of Arnold's poems to the 'dismal cycle of his re-habilitated Hindoo-Greek philosophy'; and there is other evidence that he also began to study Spinoza at this time, and not much later he was reading Locke. The more 'literary' names on the lists, varying

[3] A selection from these, made by Arnold's daughter, now Viscountess Sandhurst, has been published—*Matthew Arnold's Note-books*, with a preface by the Hon. Mrs. Wodehouse (Smith Elder, 1902).

from Lucretius and Tacitus to Montesquieu and Béranger, show how carefully he was tilling the soil which was eventually to produce the gospel of Culture. It is interesting, incidentally, to find Glanvill's *Vanity of Dogmatizing* (a congenial title), which is the source of the *Scholar Gipsy*, put down for 1845. The book-lists in his diary for 1851 tell a similar story. Perhaps there is rather less of philosophy, which is represented by Spinoza's *Ethics*, Epictetus, Plato and Diogenes Laertius, and more of 'literature,' especially modern French; while the appearance of Thomas à Kempis prepares one for certain rather surprising future developments. Now, as always, Arnold's reading was wide rather than curious. For the most part he stuck to the main lines; if he had a tendency to stray from them anywhere it was among the French Romantics. Musset, George Sand, Chateaubriand may not need any explanation, but his enthusiasm for Béranger, Obermann and Maurice de Guérin, while so many of his English contemporaries, like Tennyson and Charlotte Brontë, only moved him to varying degrees of impatience, argues some special soft spot: perhaps the fact that he came to Obermann and Guérin through George Sand accounts for something.

In the summer of 1846 his enthusiasm for George Sand led him to make a pilgrimage to the county of her pastoral novels, and on his way back he sent her from the nearest town an admiring letter, to which she replied with an invitation to call. He has told the story himself very fully in his essay on her, written some thirty years later, in which he makes one interesting slip of memory. He says there that he was on his way to Switzerland, whereas his diary shows that he was on his way home and had not been further afield than France—which disposes of a recent conjecture that he got to know Marguerite in that year.

On his return another thrill awaited him. Rachel, the great tragédienne of the Comédie Française, who had conquered English Society from the young Queen downwards a few years before and had repeated her success regularly since, was just then appearing in London, and during the four days he spent there on his way home to Westmorland he went to see her twice, once in her great part of Phèdre. If his own statement in *The French Play in London*, that he saw her first at the Edinburgh Theatre as Hermione, is correct, then this was not the first time; but there are difficulties about it. It was also made some thirty years later, and, as we have seen, his memory was not infallible. Rachel was in Edinburgh in August 1845, and apparently not in 1846. It seems from the diary that Arnold was either in the Isle of Man or in Ireland then. He may, of course, have gone over to Scotland without noting it, or the fact that he saw her, in his diary, but that is not likely, considering the impression she made on him.

Moreover, his further statement in *The French Play in London* that he 'followed her to Paris and for two months never missed one of her representations' is much more natural if he saw her first on this occasion in July 1846 than if it was in 1845, which would imply an interval of sixteen months between the seeing and the following. For one thing is proved conclusively by the diary—namely, that the 'two months' were at the beginning of 1847. He arrived in Paris on December 29, 1846 (and went to see her in *Polyeucte* that very night), and left on February 11, 1847. During that time he went to the theatre nearly every night: when it was not the Théâtre Français and Rachel, it was the Varietés or the Vaudeville or the Gymnase and other attractions—Déjazet, Mme. Doche, or Rose Chéri. He also seems to have found time for some social duties: he paid his respects to Lady Elgin and went to the Embassy ball and the Opera ball. The trip cost him 1567 francs (£62 odd), 108 of which were spent on French lessons. Though he does not seem ever to have learnt to pronounce French in the least like a native or to write it quite without mistakes, he learnt enough to converse and correspond freely with Frenchmen, and this seems to have been the one accomplishment of his that his official superiors in the Education Department really appreciated.

He returned, equally convinced of the merits of Rachel and the demerits of French classical poetry and the Alexandrine metre, to the problem of his future. It was now that being Dr. Arnold's son as well as a Fellow of Oriel proved useful. Like so many of his countrymen, Lord Lansdowne, one of the last of the Whig grandees, who was then Lord President of the Council in Lord John Russell's Government, and therefore had Education under his charge (shades of the prison-house!), had a deep admiration for Dr. Arnold, and on the strength of this offered his son Matthew the post of private secretary, which he accepted, while his brother Tom and Clough shook their sanscullotist heads at the thought of his being taken up by Society. For a young man of Matthew Arnold's tastes it was, as jobs go, ideal. The work cannot have been tedious and there was not too much of it; the holidays were long and the social opportunities limitless. Arnold seems to have made quite an efficient secretary; at any rate, as he gratefully recorded in a letter of condolence to Lord Lansdowne's son after his death, if it was otherwise, 'my man,' as he called him to Clough, never let him know it by any sign of impatience.

Arnold's social success in London and the doubts and fears for his salvation which it roused in his family, his and Clough's reactions to the events of 1848 and to each other over them—all these things are well enough known to need no further com-

mentary. It was not revolutions but something more personal that made 1848 an important year in Arnold's life. Marguerite has often been explained away as an imaginary figure, but Arnold's general character as a poet (he prided himself on the 'literalness and sincerity' of his poems and praised Goethe for his 'thorough sincerity—writing about nothing he had not experienced') and the *Switzerland* poems themselves have always seemed to me a sufficient refutation of that theory. Not only is her personal appearance described in considerable detail, but the scene of their meetings has been correctly identified, on the strength of the poems alone, as Thun. And now, in these letters to Clough, comes the decisive evidence: 'To-morrow I repass the Gemmi and get to Thun: linger one day at the Hotel Bellevue for the sake of the blue eyes of one of its inmates: and then proceed,' etc. That was written in September 1848. In September 1849 he writes from Thun: 'I am here in a curious and not altogether comfortable state: however tomorrow I carry my aching head to the mountains and to my cousin the Blümlis Alp.' He then gives an early draft of a stanza from *Parting*, one of the *Switzerland* poems, ending:

> I come, O ye mountains—
> Ye torrents, I come—

to which he adds: 'Yes, I come, but in three or four days I shall be back here, and then I must try how soon I can ferociously turn towards England.' All this exactly accords with the internal evidence of the poems themselves, from which it is clear that he saw Marguerite in two consecutive years, and that in the interval he tried, in obedience to the promptings of his 'better' judgment ('I hear a God's tremendous voice, Be counsell'd and retire!'), to root her out of his heart, but unsuccessfully; that they met again, and finally broke with each other. Very likely, as *Parting* suggests, their ideas on these matters were too different. Sex was one of the few subjects on which Arnold seems to have been in sympathy with the official ideals of the Victorian age, and the fact that he was evidently not Marguerite's first lover may really have loomed tremendous in his sight. There is a passage in the second letter from Thun which I cannot but think refers to his internal struggles over Marguerite:

> I have never yet succeeded in any one great occasion in consciously mastering myself: I can go thro: the imaginary process of mastering myself and see the whole affair as it would then stand, but at the critical point I am too apt to hoist up the mainsail to the wind and let her drive. . . . I find that with me a clear almost palpable intuition (damn the logical senses of the word) is necessary before I get into prayer: unlike many people who set to work at their duty self-denial etc. like furies in the dark hoping to be gradually illuminated as they persist in this course.

His "one natural craving is not for profound thoughts, mighty spiritual workings etc. etc. but a distinct seeing of my way as far as my own nature is concerned.' The end of this reads almost like a commentary on his poem *Absence*, in which he, a little unattractively, treats Marguerite as at best a stage in his development which he is rapidly outgrowing, though the effect is softened by the extreme pathos of the end :

> I struggle towards the light ; and ye,
> Once-long'd-for storms of love !
> If with the light ye cannot be,
> I bear that ye remove.
>
> I struggle towards the light ; but oh,
> While yet the night is chill,
> Upon Time's barren, stormy flow,
> Stay with me, Marguerite, still !

This strain of ruthlessness in personal relations which history seems to suggest is almost essential to the artist (Goethe is an instance) runs through a good many of the letters to Clough too.

Nothing is known of Marguerite except what may be gathered from the poems. From these it appears that she was a French girl living at Thun and that she had at least some literature—else she would hardly have lent Arnold the *Letters of Ortis*, a semi-political, semi-Wertherian composition by the Italian poet Foscoli. Her importance lies wholly in the effect she, or rather the break with her, had on him. After the first conflicting emotions, his chief feeling was one of loneliness, of being a soul disqualified by nature from finding a mate, which he generalised into a kind of philosophy of separateness in his two poems on *Isolation*. It can hardly be doubted that Marguerite casts her shadow over a good deal of the 1852 volume besides the *Switzerland* lyrics. Professor Garrod has called the 1852 volume 'Marguerite's book,' and there are certainly many things in *Destiny*, *Youth's Agitations*, *Self-Deception*, and *A Summer Night*, for instance, which gain immensely in point if they can be related to some great emotional crisis ; and *Tristram and Iseult* also points in the same direction.

Now, he has himself recorded that he came upon the story of Tristram and Iseult in a French review at Thun and that it 'fastened upon' him so strongly that he roughed-out the poem at once. It is, of course, a story that might well fasten upon anybody at any time, but the fact that he was in a highly emotional state might be expected to influence the way he handled it. Out of the whole story he chooses as his main theme, not the great romantic moment, not the central catastrophe, but the final

reunion of the lovers and the *Liebestod* which immediately follows it. I will stay with you, says Iseult—

> Tell thee tales of true long parted lovers
> Join'd at evening of their days again.

No, says the dying Tristram, no words—

> Sit—sit by me: I will think we've liv'd so
> In the greenwood all our lives alone.

The similarity of feeling between this and the latter part of *A Farewell*, given the facts about the genesis of *Tristram* above mentioned, can hardly be an accident.

So much for the *Switzerland* poems. But there is another group of love poems, also published in 1852 and finally grouped together under the title *Faded Leaves*, for which reason it seems natural to attribute the same unity to them as to *Switzerland*. Some, on the insufficient ground that both sets are love poems, have assumed that *Faded Leaves* also belong to Marguerite; others have rightly objected on the ground that, with a poet so physically exact as Arnold, the same person cannot have blue eyes and ash-blond hair in one place and grey eyes—or 'eyes too expressive to be blue, too lovely to be grey'—and brown hair in another. The most natural view is that *Faded Leaves* belong to his wife. The description fits her well enough; then it is very tempting to connect *Calais Sands* with them owing to its conclusion about the 'storied Rhine,' and *Calais Sands* was certainly about her. But the matter is really settled by Tom's statement that one of them, *On the Rhine*, records a 'counterblast' in his relations with Miss Wightman which 'drove him out of England and towards the Alps.'

Arnold was fortunate in that the dreariest portion of a young man's life, the dead period between the break-up of one love affair and the beginning of the next, was in his case comparatively short. By the summer of next year Clough was reporting him 'deep in a flirtation' with Fanny Lucy Wightman, and adducing as proof of the depth that he was actually prepared to go to church for the pleasure of meeting her. Things did not at first go smoothly over Miss Wightman either, but the main difficulties were of a different nature—they were external and material, not spiritual. This difference seems to me to be clearly reflected in the difference of atmosphere between *Switzerland* and *Faded Leaves*. In the former the lover is torn by conflicting feelings, in the latter he is thwarted principally by outward circumstances —'an iron knot ties straightly up from mine thy lot.' In other words, his job with Lord Lansdowne, being subject to the vicissitudes of party politics, in addition to the fact that his lordship

was then seventy years of age, was anything but secure, and he would, of course, forfeit his Fellowship on marriage: hence he was far from being a desirable suitor—so far that he was reduced to following Miss Wightman about without her knowledge in the manner commemorated in *Calais Sands*. And even when he was permitted, or permitted himself, to approach her more openly, it was by no means smooth going.

By the beginning of 1851, as his diary for that year shows, he was in a terrible state. It begins with him reading Spinoza's *Ethics* and trying hard to pull himself together by self-criticism: he is idle, gets up late, cannot concentrate, etc. 'Flu' (Fanny Lucy) Wightman and he had already made up their own minds: at the beginning of the year he is already writing to her every day, by the end of January it is sometimes twice, by the middle of February sometimes three times a day. But her father, Mr. Justice Wightman, whom Lord Coleridge described as a 'real character,' 'dignified without ostentation,' but 'a little short-tempered under stress of judicial anxiety in difficult cases,' seems to have held out for security. In this quandary the part of fairy godmother was played by Lord Lansdowne. His first suggestion appears to have been the statistical clerk's post, which Arnold turned down, whereupon he arranged to have him made an inspector of schools. It was not the sort of job Arnold would have chosen, but he was glad to marry at any price. The judge, now satisfied, came down handsome with an allowance of £100 a year, numerous friends and relations lent or gave him money, and they were married on June 11 at Hampton, where the judge's country house was. His Oxford friends were represented at the wedding by Walrond, John Blackett, Wyndham Slade and Clough, who described him in a letter to Tom, who was by then in the Antipodes, as 'admirably drest and perfectly at his ease.' In another way, too, he had been true to form. At the time when he was noting in his diary that he had walked to Eaton Place after dinner just to see Flu at the window, he seems nevertheless to have kept up the light touch with the outer world. 'All my sweetness and none of my airs,' 'entirely free from the taint of letters,' 'a charming companion' was how he commended her to his friends. And Clough, who, as old friends do, rather resented her existence at first, came to the conclusion that she would 'suit well enough.'

After a preliminary honeymoon of four or five days they returned to London. The honeymoon proper started on September 1 and was spent in France, Switzerland, and Italy. On October 11 he began inspecting, and with that the 'unknown years' are at an end.

Alan Harris.

CORRESPONDENCE

PRINCE OR PRETENDER?

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—On the subject of the Montenegrin dynasty Miss M. E. Durham and Mr. Henry Baerlein have each, metaphorically speaking, trodden on a particularly slippery banana skin. We Montenegrins have had our laugh at their expense. May I, as the hereditary standard-bearer of the kingdom of Montenegro, and for fifteen years commandant of the Royal Guard at the Court of King Nikolas, have the honour of picking them up and dusting them down?

The members of the Petrovich-Niegosch family, other than the one occupying the throne, have been always regarded by the Montenegrin people as enjoying equal rights to the succession. This is due to the inherent, and sane, objection of the Montenegrin race to be ruled by any incompetent who happens to have been his father's son; and this procedure has been studiously observed for 225 years, from the days of Danilo I. down to those of Nikolas I. Throughout all those years the succession has gone from uncle to nephew, or other male relative who may have been closely or distantly connected with the monarch. The great essential has been that the nephew should be of such character and ability as to further the happiness and the prosperity of the nation. This being so, every Montenegrin who is not a serf holds that, legally and morally, Prince Milo's right to the throne is incontestable and that he cannot waive it. He is the direct descendant of Danilo I., founder of the Montenegrin dynasty; and instead of his being only able to claim relationship to our late King through a 'common ancestor,' as Miss Durham observes, it would have been correct for our late King to claim relationship through a common ancestor with Prince Milo!

Again, King Nikolas never had a first cousin, as Miss Durham asserts. And are fundamental truths and historical facts to be swept aside by any statement that may adorn the pages of the *Almanach de Gotha?* I ask, because that work soberly records as princes sons and grandsons of the late King those who have forfeited the love and the confidence of the Montenegrin race by subjecting themselves to Alexander Karageorgeovich of Yugoslavia and accepting the rewards he has cared to bestow on them. The Montenegrins do not deem these people to be princes; they have another name for them. Prince Milo could have joined them had he chosen, but, to his renown, he has gone into exile to preserve untarnished the glorious traditions of his line and of his people. He has proved himself a true prince, and honest Montenegrins all over the world recognise him as their leader.

Now to succour Mr. Baerlein. Danilo I. had an elder brother, Rade, from whom the right to the Montenegrin throne actually descends, as it was Rade I.'s son, Vasilije, who became Prince-Bishop of Montenegro. Vasilije reigned from 1750 to 1766, and Prince Milo is the nearest direct living male relative of Vasilije. Mr. Baerlein contends that the title of prince was first introduced into my country in 1852. I wonder if he knows that George Czerny, otherwise Karageorge, who was born as far back as 1766, besought the Montenegrin Buonaparte, Prince-Bishop Peter I., to recognise him as a prince! This supplicant was the great-grandfather of

the present dictator of Yugoslavia. Incidentally, research into the genealogy of George Czerny might prove interesting to Mr. Baerlein on wet evenings.

Yours faithfully,
MARKO Z. POPOVICH.
(Major.)

73, Holland Park, W.11.

SIR,—Major Popovich states that he was for fifteen years commandant of the Royal Guard at the Court of King Nikolas. He must therefore be well aware that during his period of office no Prince Milo was known at the Montenegrin court. His knowledge of Montenegrin history is inaccurate. Montenegro had as its head a bishop. The Turks in Europe recognised the local bishop in various districts as head of the Christian population. Till recent years the greater part of Montenegro was under Turkish rule. After the election of Danilo I. as bishop, Russia subsidised the Petroviches and enabled them as Russia's agents to keep the bishopric in the family. The bishops were celibate and chose their successors, not always a nephew. Montenegro was divided into tribes, each ruled by its Council of Elders. The bishop's power was mainly spiritual: *e.g.*, Sava I. spent most of his time in his monastery and the country was ruled by a pretender—Stefan the Little, who passed himself off as a Russian tsar; and at the end of the eighteenth century a Plamenatz—not a Petrovich—was bishop, and the country was ruled mainly by a *gubernator*, till Russian agents arrived and a Petrovich was again bishop.

Till Danilo II. in 1852 refused to take holy orders there was no royal or princely title. With Russian consent and support he was appointed Prince of Montenegro, and the title was made hereditary. Till then each Petrovich, bishop or prince, had been selected by his predecessor. We have no evidence that Milo Petrovich has been so selected. In his article in *The Nineteenth Century* he states that for twenty years he has taken an active military and political part in the affairs of Montenegro. From my own knowledge I can say that up to the end of 1913 no Prince Milo was known in Montenegro.

As for his military experience, most of the military movements of the war he quotes from the Austrian archives. Others do not correspond with accounts given me by persons who were on the spot. One great military exploit of his own he does tell us. In December 1918—just a month after the Armistice and *before* the fate of Montenegro was sealed—he took part in an attack on a Serbian camp near Cetinje, and after that escaped on board an Italian ship and has lived safely in foreign parts ever since. So much for his twenty active years. Would *any* of the old Petroviches have chosen him as a worthy successor?

In my previous letter I should have stated that the Voyvodas—Marko, Bozo, Djuro, and Shako—were King Nikolas' second cousins. Such of them and their descendants who survive, and who have chosen to face poverty and hardship in Montenegro rather than fly to safety and comfort, have not only a stronger legal claim to be leaders of their country, but a stronger moral one. I have every sympathy for their wrongs and sufferings. Nor—as in pre-war days Milo Petrovich held neither a high position nor owned an estate in Montenegro, and his political and military activities were confined, it would appear, to the years 1915–18—is it easy to understand why Major Popovich should imply that, had Milo Petrovich chosen,

he would have been compensated by the Yugoslav Government, as the royal princes have been (quite rightly), for their confiscated rights and properties.

Inquiry in other Montenegrin quarters shows that the choice of Milo for the Montenegrin throne is, to say the least of it, *not* unanimous. Meanwhile, the *Almanach de Gotha* must remain as the authority for legal rights.

Yours faithfully,

M. E. Durham.

Sir,—We are assured by Major Popovich that the gentleman who describes himself as Prince Milo of Montenegro has every right to do so. The *Almanach de Gotha*, which ignores him, is to be ignored. Let me add that the *Royal Almanach of Montenegro*, published until the war at Cetinje and in 1920 in Rome, does not once see fit to name this gentleman. We find that Milo's father never claimed to be a prince; such a claim would have been received with roars of laughter in Montenegro. By what right, then, does he assume this title?

The Montenegrins used to be under a spiritual ruler, a bishop (Vladika), who also exercised temporal power. But Peter II. arranged with Russia that his successor Danilo (1851–1860) should be exclusively a temporal sovereign, and it is from that period that the system of primogeniture dates in the country. Before then, an Orthodox bishop being unmarried, each ruler was succeeded by a nephew or other male relative, the ablest young man being chosen, while his brothers remained mere peasants. On the death of the late King Nikolas his throne, or claim to the throne, was inherited by his eldest son, Prince Danilo. When Danilo resigned, these rights, if any, passed to Michael, the elder son of his late brother Prince Mirko. It is Michael who would be King of Montenegro to-day if the inhabitants of that Serbian country had not, after the war, voted by an overwhelming majority to become united to their brothers of Serbia, from whom they had been tragically separated for 500 years. The united kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—all of them Yugoslavs (Southern Slavs)—is now known as Jugoslavia.

I believe that a handful of Montenegrins maintain that they are adherents of Michael. What of the adherents of the gentleman who calls himself Prince Milo? According to Major Popovich they consist of all good Montenegrins. I say deliberately that they are negligible in numbers—the bulk of them probably live at Holland Park; and among the Montenegrin people this Milo, a very obscure member of the Petrovich clan, who has lived for years in America, is almost completely unknown. Major Popovich contends on his behalf that he is the ablest member of the very large Petrovich clan and the most likely to give happiness to Montenegro. This is a pure assumption on the Major's part. But if we are going to permit the scanty devotees of Milo to revert from the system of primogeniture to the more ancient system of the selection of the fittest, then the fittest really must be selected and not self-chosen.

Yours faithfully,

Henry Baerlein.

The Bath Club,
34, Dover Street, W.1.

[This correspondence is now closed.—Editor, *Nineteenth Century and After*.]

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

CONTENTS FOR MAY

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A.

THE

NINETEENTH

CENTURY

AND AFTER

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REFLECTIONS ON THE GERMAN REVOLUTION

The fate of the would-be chronicler or critic of revolutionary Germany is an unhappy one; long before his words can reach the public they will probably have become obsolete and uninteresting. The moment at which I am embarking upon this article seems one suitable to an unhurried analysis of the existing situation in Germany, but by May 1, when the first festival of pure German Labour is to be held, the Nazi floods may have risen again. I propose to examine, first of all, what has been achieved, how the achievement was technically performed, and why it was possible. Secondly, I should like to search—diffidently enough—for the place of this revolution in modern history.

Between August 1919 and March 1930, when Hermann Müller's Socialist Cabinet resigned, there existed in Germany a *régime* which, while essentially capitalistic, was extraordinarily Liberal. Its Ministers belonged usually to the Socialist Party, the Centre, or the People's Party; its expansiveness in the direction of social insurance and municipal welfare combined the

Bismarckian tradition with the ideals of a young Joseph Chamberlain or David Lloyd George. The men who ruled Germany in the 'twenties—that period of 'ignoble' Weimarism which has now been branded with every insulting adjective—believed in a liberty which has since been denounced as licence. In time, they thought, their enemies at home and abroad would either come to terms with them, or make themselves so ridiculous as to lose their strength. This theory was applied alike to Chauvinists and to Communists, within Germany and without. On the whole it may be said to have succeeded abroad and to have failed at home. The patient persistence of Stresemann, and later of Brüning, culminated in the victory of the Left in the French elections of May 1932; since then the attitude of France towards the Peace Treaties has completely changed, although the political transformation of Germany has now obscured the change in France.

This concealed success of the Weimarists in foreign policy was aided by the general economic collapse, but the slump itself led, at the very same time, to the breakdown of the Liberal system at home. It is increasingly felt that Liberalism thrives only in prosperity; it has yet to be shown that any other system can flourish for long in economic adversity. Haphazard and unlimited borrowing, together with the exceedingly rash policy of the German banks, had invited disaster, but it must be remembered that the Hague experts, no less than the German Government, seemed unaware of the danger early in 1930. The German elections in September of that year transformed Adolf Hitler's National Socialist Party from something merely ludicrous to something formidable as well; that it has ever wholly ceased to be ludicrous many people might be unwilling to admit. The slump had in fact embittered all the political animosities which the Weimar Ministers had hoped to soothe, and their tolerance of the violently aggressive tactics of the parties on the Right became anachronistic. The elections of September 1930 had, as a matter of fact, been due to Dr. Brüning, who had become Chancellor in the preceding March; the results of the elections led him to modify the Weimar Constitution into what the Nazis scornfully christened *Das System*. For he proceeded to legislate by Presidential decrees based upon the posthumous consent of the Reichstag. This thoroughly sensible compromise between parliamentarism and dictatorship probably provided the best possible method of tiding Germany over the slump, but its efficacy depended, in the last case, upon President von Hindenburg's loyal co-operation. Now the President became increasingly susceptible to the discontent of the Junker circles to which his family belonged. This caused the fall of Dr. Brüning in the spring of 1932, but after a few months' interval the Brüning

system was re-erected by General von Schleicher in December 1932. Reactionary intrigue, however, having destroyed Brüning after two years, destroyed Schleicher in a mere two months, and with that the Nazis sprang to power.

I do not wish here to revert to a closer examination of the reactionaries who refused to allow the Brüning–Schleicher system to function; it is difficult throughout to feel certain how far their supposed patriotism was coloured with hatred for the trade unions, which admittedly formed the backbone of the Weimar *régime*. For these reactionaries consisted of the old ruling classes of the Hohenzollern Empire, the big landowners who had largely officered the army, together with many of the big industrialists who had supplied the sinews of war. Their political leader, Hugenberg, and his Nationalist Party, thus represented the bellicose Germany of 1914, and something very real which we in England have usually, rather unreflectingly, designated as Prussian militarism. Far from accepting the extraordinary clemency of the Government, they exploited its mercy to mobilise every one of its enemies. But their hold upon the Germans as a whole was only financial; psychologically they could not recapture the old pre-war ascendency. When Papen's attempt—June to November 1932—to govern without the Nazis ended in fiasco, he decided with Hugenberg to accept the Nazi terms and exploit the popularity of the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor. With the formation of the National Government on January 30, 1933, three Nazi Ministers appeared to enter a Nationalist Cabinet; the Nationalists agreed, with a cynical smile, to the celebration of the foundation of the Nazi *Dritte Reich*, but they, not the Nazis, had been deceived.

In the course of the next six weeks a complete revolution in the political life of Germany was effected by an adroit combination of trickery, thoroughness, and terrorism; by March 12 Germany had been Hitlerised. The trickery was necessitated, not merely by the desirability of observing the more obvious moral precepts of humanity in order to be popular at home and abroad, but also by the conscientiousness of *Der alte Herr*. For Hindenburg revealed a mentality akin to that of George III. in the matter of his oath to remain true to the Weimar Constitution. Only, where Pitt resigned, the Nazi Ministers, on the contrary, took office, with the intention of impelling the President into unconstitutionalism, provided this could be skilfully enough disguised. If the letter of a Liberal Constitution was still to be observed, a parliamentary majority must be obtained for the Government parties. A series of elections in 1932 had made it clear that the Nazis and Nationalists together could not hope to outnumber their opponents without some phenomenal occurrence; the Nazis had lost

2,000,000 votes between July and November, and not all the enthusiasm that could be evoked by torchlight processions and State funerals for storm troopers, not all the suppression of their meetings and newspapers, seemed to shake the hostility of the Catholic or working-class parties. A Swiss sergeant[1] has just been sentenced at Stuttgart to a month's imprisonment because he is said to have remarked that 'in Switzerland and Italy it is thought that the Nazis themselves fired the Reichstag.' It is worth pointing out that, apart from any of the evidence with regard to that well-timed event, in Berlin last month there were Nazis who were saying 'Well, and what if we did ?'; while many Nationalists referred smilingly to Zinovieff letters. The Reichstag fire, at any rate, did its work in the General Election held on March 5; about 4,000,000 new voters voted for Hitler; for the first time the Nazis came out top in Bavaria. The suppression of the Communist Party had in any case been expected; it could now be effected by the indefinite imprisonment of the Communist deputies without trial.

Meanwhile the Nazi Ministers had been justifying their appointment by a demonstration in thoroughness which Strafford might have envied. Dr. Frick had become Reich Minister for the Interior, and Captain Göring the commissarial chief of the Prussian Home Office. Both proceeded to 'purge' those branches of the Civil Service which they now controlled by the expulsion of all adherents of the Weimar Republic. The one embarked zealously upon the work of intimidating the non-Prussian States; the other upon that of converting the police into the dependable ally of the Nazis, who after the Reichstag fire were actually enrolled in large numbers as auxiliary police. The Nazi success in the General Election was the signal for the Nazi seizure of the non-Prussian States. Prussia had been in Göring's hands since January 30 with excellent results, but the Socialist losses in Prussia on March 5 had been outdistanced by their gains in the other States. Between March 5 and 12 storm troops expelled the legal Governments of the States from Hamburg to Munich and installed Nazi police commissioners with full powers. How the activities of this week were reconciled with the President's oath to the federal Constitution of 1919 has never been explained. But this, the decisive, week in the Revolution went so quickly that its enemies, and even its friends, were bewildered; General von Epp, for instance, set out upon a leisurely journey to Bavaria, but received a telegram *en route* ordering him to take over in Munich at once, and was compelled to install himself with no plan of action prepared. Between March 12 and April 7 this Hitlerisation of Germany was systematised and the legal cover for the

[1] See *The Times*, April 11.

frankly revolutionary action of the previous week was rapidly, if posthumously, supplied. On March 23 the newly assembled Reichstag voted, by the two-thirds majority necessary for so fundamental a change, an Enabling Act giving to Herr Hitler as Chancellor complete dictatorial powers until April 1, 1937. (The two-thirds majority was obtained chiefly by threatening the Centre into submission while some twenty Social Democrats were already safely in prison.) On March 5 the Prussian Diet had also been re-elected, and on March 12, after a week of sensation and terror, all the smaller local bodies of Prussia were similarly re-elected with conspicuous effect; this indirectly affected the composition of the Reichsrat in a fashion agreeable to the Nazi leaders. With these tickets of recommendation from 'public opinion' in their pockets and the *carte blanche* of March 23, they proceeded to the Unification Acts of March 31 and April 7. By the law of March 31 they remodelled all the local bodies of the States outside Prussia according to the votes cast for Reichstag deputies on March 5; this is also to hold good for four years. On April 7 the Cabinet agreed to the publication of a law by which Herr Hitler as Chancellor is to nominate *Statthalter*, or governors, to the seventeen, once federal, States of Germany: these officials, superseding the *ad hoc* commissioners, will be local dictators with the power to appoint the State Governments; they will be responsible to the Chancellor alone.

Two remarkable facts should be emphasised with regard to this new and immensely thorough unification of Germany; they can best be weighed by comparing Hitler's position with that of Bismarck. Whereas in Prussia, where Hitler is *Statthalter*, he is necessarily delegating the Premier's power which Bismarck so carefully retained for himself, his authority over the rest of Germany is scarcely to be distinguished from his authority in Prussia, while Bismarck possessed no real administrative power in Munich, Hamburg and Dresden. In view of this, the old historic nomenclature by which Bismarck's work was termed unification becomes almost absurd; in his day, as it now seems to us, Prussia simply supplied the Empire with its foreign policy. Now the particularism of mediæval Germany has been overridden more completely than any Tudor or Bourbon could accomplish in England or France; only the Jacobins can compare with the Nazis. It will be interesting to see how fundamentally particularist the Germans are; within the National Socialist framework regional voices have already been raised, for the Würtemberg Nazis disliked the superimposing of a commissioner from Berlin. It is also worth observing that, while Germany has in a manner been ruled by Presidential decree from 1930 to 1933, the new system virtually leaves the President with nothing but his

command of the army; Bismarck could be dismissed at any moment by the Emperor, but it is scarcely thinkable that Hindenburg—or his successor—could dismiss Hitler during the next four years.

The technique of the Nazi victory, the thoroughness which distinguished it, involved a very dexterous use of terrorism in combination with paper legality, with an occasional interpolation of undisguised *force majeure*. Around the terrorism employed such controversy has arisen that it becomes essential to examine, as best one can, the chief factors in the situation. On the one hand, official German circles and endless letters to the English Press have insisted that ordinary life was miraculously undisturbed throughout the two most important months of 'National Resurgence'; on the other, anyone who was at all in touch with Liberal, Socialist, Communist or merely intellectual circles in Germany during February and March 1933, and who was able to express an opinion, expressed an implicit or explicit dislike for the terrorism to which those circles were being subjected. The fact that this dislike was mostly voiced by responsible foreign, and especially by English and American, correspondents merely proves the completeness of the Terror; hostile criticism from a German was, roughly speaking, suicide—more often economic, sometimes physical.

There is little doubt that the sections of German society which offered criticism of the National Government dwindled noticeably during these two months from being a small majority of the nation to becoming a large minority. It was evident that pageantry and an excellently 'produced' new spirit combined with more obvious propaganda and the lack of any opposition Press to capture new adherents. The Berlin trams, for instance, were douched with pamphlets about Socialist corruption before the communal elections of March 12; converts to the view that the Jews came to Germany in a post-1914 invasion were evident. But the economic pressure was, and is, the thing that counts the most. A slump on the scale of the present one gives opportunities for a type of oppression of which none of the tyrants of history could hitherto be guilty. The Nazi movement has been largely built from the swelling crowds of people (especially among those ruined by the inflation) who envied the intelligence of successful professional men. These jealous *Parteigenossen* now seize upon every trace of heterodoxy to expel their abler rivals, who will mostly lose pension as well as job; the Nazi personnel of the new bureaucracy will, moreover, administer the dole with political discrimination.

Yet the indictment of franker terrorism rests upon a series of violent acts of whose occurrence there can be no doubt. To hear

people in England saying 'Oh, the newspapers always exaggerate so much' is, for an English observer of the German Revolution, to feel a twinge of exasperation. 'Regard the Press with incredulity on every other occasion,' one wants to cry out, 'but try to understand the extraordinary difficulty of penetrating the secrecy and threats of the more active storm troopers, with a veil of official propaganda ready to shroud their baser activities; remember that one could seldom use the material one possessed because of the unhappy consequences which would overtake one's informant; remember that most journalists would only hear of a fraction of the 'beating up' in Berlin alone—they would know that the ferocity of Breslau would be greater.' I remember several arguments with my nationalistic German friends during March. 'But the traffic is undisturbed and the streets quiet,' they would say; 'you could scarcely guess that a great political change had taken place—no other revolution has been so peaceful yet so profound.' To which I might answer, 'But I have read in my *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, from the patriotic pen of Fritz Klein, that deplorable *Terrorakten* are taking place which should, he says, be stopped.' 'Oh, well, yes; you can't wonder if the Nazi boys have a go at a few Communists; they deserve anything they get.' 'Communists are human beings,' I murmur, thinking of some rather beautifully-minded pacifists, who in England would be Quakers, but call themselves Communists in Germany. 'Good heavens, no; they're not human beings,' is the answer; the conception of a common humanity is not popular in Germany to-day. 'Well, what about the treatment of Schäffer and Stützl?' I find myself saying: 'they were the leaders of the Bavarian People's Party, I believe. Besides (this is before any question of the boycott), I have several Jewish friends whom I happen to admire here.' At this my hosts look a little graver. 'Yes, that Jew talk is nonsense, but you must give things time to settle down. The Jews will soon be all right.'

Perhaps this was lunch-time, and I went on to take tea with my artist friend, writer, musician, architect, or whatever he may have been. He is a Jew by descent, whose family has lived for generations in Germany. As an artist of sincerity, he has expressed himself in twentieth-century, in fact in post-war, terms. All that he had to say and the way in which he said it have suddenly been rejected as *Kulturbolschevismus*, though he learnt more, perhaps, in Paris than in Moscow. He has become personally ostracised because the Revolution has declared him to be a social nuisance and a public danger, in that he implicitly denied the primitive notions of German nationalists. For this he is now not only to be insulted wherever he goes, but also to starve, and to live with the constant anxiety that he may at any moment be

brutally maltreated without the ability to claim any protection. Later that same day I dined, perhaps, with a Centre deputy who had received threatening but anonymous notes because during the election campaign he had made a stand for constitutional rights; we spent an interesting hour or so, waiting for the storm troopers to break in with the passive acquiescence of the police. On my way home I met a Socialist friend who usually works for a trade union organisation. His offices had been confiscated, his job was gone; he dared not go home for the night lest they came to beat him up, and was wondering which friend could put him up this time with reasonable security for them both. Several of his Communist friends had completely vanished; one was in hospital unlikely to recover from the treatment he had received.

This state of affairs was probably at its worst during the first fortnight in March, but there are clear indications that it is still not over, although there will be no more elections and the Jewish boycott was called off. It does not seem unjust to compare it with the Jacobin Reign of Terror, though public executions are yet to come. This Terror lacks the excuse of needing to defend the country against foreign attack; it is engaged in bullying helpless scapegoats, not in struggling with a dangerous enemy. The most responsible English and American journalists in Berlin, in spite of very severe obstacles, were able to communicate to their readers a few of the facts and a good deal of their own disgust. This complicated the situation prodigiously, for Hitler and some of his colleagues—but especially Hitler—were hungry for 'Anglo-Saxon' approval and friendship, yet they could not admit any deference to foreign criticism. It seems probable that the journalists helped to mitigate the Terror. I heard of several persons in high places, who on seeing *The Times*, for instance, hastened to exert what influence they had for the restraint of the storm troopers. But the consequent retreat had to be made good by a counter-offensive. So far Communists, pacifists, and the *Künstlerkolonie* had been the most convenient victims. Now Dr. Goebbels, the former disciple of Gundolf and Stefan George, who just after the General Election had joined the Cabinet as Nazi Minister for National Enlightenment, devised perhaps his most brilliant stroke in propaganda; by declaring, on the strength of one or two inevitable misstatements, that international Jewry was getting up an atrocity campaign with which to defame Young Germany, he discovered a new scapegoat and a new activity—the boycott of the German Jews—to keep the young men busy. Those of us who were fairly familiar with Dr. Goebbels' technique shuddered a little for his latest victim, but were perhaps too weary to attach importance to the choice he

had this time made. But these transfrontier contests are fertile. The English public has joined hands, from Locker-Lampson to Lansbury, to protest against the persecution of the Jews by a nation which whimpers for the rights of its own minorities abroad. It looks a little as if Dr. Goebbels belongs to the group of the too-clever, who sooner or later fall into their own trap; it depends upon how long England's memory proves to be.

Before examining the immediate and historical significance of the German Revolution, I want to try to answer the question one hears so often—how, apart from the actual technique of the two months' performance, could the Nazis achieve their lightning success?—why was so little opposition offered? The answer of almost any German amounts to an indictment of the Treaty of Versailles as politically unjust and economically foolish. The Treaty and the slump—most Germans attribute the second wholly to the first—conspicuously created a nationalistic spirit of revolt; this is too obvious to deserve further repetition. But there remains the question why the Weimar Republic died quite so inglorious a death, why, for example, the *Reichsbanner* organisation, founded to defend it, never struck a blow? I think there are three answers to be made. First, the Liberalism of the Weimar people was too easy-going and matter-of-fact; it went some way to justify the hostile taunt that these were elderly armchair committeemen, not statesmen. In the more moderate circles on the Left up to the very last moment one heard, if not the silly optimism of the Communists, a rather miserable grumble that their enemies would never quite dare to do—precisely what they did. The Socialists, particularly, had shown a culpable lack of imagination in not hastily borrowing from nascent Hitlerism some of the ritualistic pageantry which has drawn so many converts and held their allegiance. The 'bloodless' nature of the Revolution when it came has become a Nazi boast, but it was primarily due, especially in Prussia, to the Socialist non-resistance attitude, and perhaps to the deplorable ill-health of Otto Braun and his wife. The Socialists' desire to avoid bloodshed was, I believe, genuine, yet however much one sympathises with this desire, one feels that it was disastrous. The Weimar Republic was revealed as something for which no one was willing to die, at a moment when the Nazis were advertising the revival of primitive heroics: herosim, said Hitler in the Reichstag, was again to become the theme of art. Mr. Edgar Mowrer, the American president of the Foreign Press Association in Berlin, has succeeded in defying the new Government on behalf of the principles of Weimar, and Herr Furtwängler has just made a courageous protest; but what is to be hoped for a *régime* which finds only a foreign correspondent and a great musician, how-

ever brilliant both may be, to make a posthumous stand in its defence ?

'But,' says the persistent inquirer, 'one has heard that the highly organised working class of the highly industrialised German towns was opposed to the Nazi movement. The Socialist leaders were weak ; but was there no strength in the rank and file ? ' One answer to this question is that the working class was divided against itself, and for this Moscow was primarily to blame. The German Communist Party devoted its strength to undermining social democracy, seducing its younger members, sowing dissension between leader and led. Repeatedly, when a Communist leader showed a larger grasp of the situation in Germany, Stalin replaced him by some more strictly orthodox Leninite. A childish credulity convinced the German Communists that leaders would spontaneously arise on the eve of their victory which was imminent. This point brings one back to Mr. Mowrer, who in his book *Germany Puts the Clock Back* maintained that Prussianism, far from being a hollow bogey left over from 1914, has bred as sad a sheepishness in the workers of Germany as the arrogance it instilled into the old ruling caste and its satellites. This arrogance, too, has played a big part in destroying the political structure which the Nazis have overridden. The rigid hostility of the East Prussian Junkers to the praiseworthy settlement policy of Brüning and Schleicher spelt the final destruction of the Brüning 'System.'

And now what is the new Germany, which, whether we like it or not, has so successfully arisen ? It is clear that many Germans, from whom it has been easy to hide the discreditable facts attending the National Resurgence, are glorying in the official repudiation of materialism in favour of an emotional and disinterested idealism. It is also clear that Young Germany possesses the centripetal drive of the Jacobins without any of that thoughtful humanitarianism which gave the Revolution of 1789 its early inspiration—unless we are to equate the Weimar with the Mirabeau period. The French in 1789 threw away their titles, privileges, and land monopoly, but the German Jacobins have made their *début* as the allies of 'diehard' landowning. They have just restored all the titles of the pre-war period, and it is amusing to hear that the Nazis, not to be outdone by the Junkers, are suggesting that the new *Statthalter*, who will probably all be Nazis, shall *ex officio* receive the title of *Herzog*, revived expressly tc relate the Germany of Hitler with that of Barbarossa.

It must, however, be admitted that it became evident, even in the first week or so of *Das Dritte Reich*, that the Nazis regarded the Nationalists chiefly as the brocaded footmen who should fling open before them the doors of the Presidential palace. Hitler's appointment on April 11 of his most vigorous lieutenant, Captain

Göring, to be Premier of Prussia marks the defeat of the whole Nationalist-Stahlhelm group—the *Kampfront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot* of the recent elections—which had desired Papen's commissarial premiership now to be regularised. The Nationalist group consists of the President and his personal circle (in which his son Oskar and Herr von Papen are most conspicuous), the army chiefs, Dr. Hugenberg's Nationalist Party, the Stahlhelm old soldiers' organisation (whose chief, Herr Seldte, is Minister for Labour), and all those who desire a scarcely qualified return to pre-war conditions. They have seemed lately to play almost a liberal *rôle* in attempting to moderate Nazi extremism. Their defeat could be foretold from the time of the Reichstag fire, when Göring took care to keep the army at a distance, and, instead of declaring a state of siege, as was done for a time in the summer of 1932, chose to defend Germany from the alleged Communist peril entirely through the police, whose regular members he had cowed, and to whom he added Nazis as auxiliaries. At that time the Nationalists were still sufficiently considerable to require that he should enrol a small number of stahlhelmers as policemen too. The Nazi leaders in this way flouted the Reichswehr generals who despised them, and were able to rebuke those who condemned them as military usurpers of civil authority.

This divorce of Hitlerism from the army, together with conciliatory declarations from the 'Leader' and the old association of anti-materialism with youth movements in corduroy and sandals, has inclined some spectators to shut their eyes to the military hierarchy, uniforms, weapons, and spirit of the Nazi movement. It is very important to remember that the Brown Army was organised within the shadow framework of the old Imperial Army, while its leaders were able to exploit an alliance with the Nationalists because both parties in the 'Harzburg front' shared the old fanatical jingoism of the Prussian Junkers. Before all things the pacifist, be he Communist, Catholic, or Jew, is the enemy who is to be 'cleansed,' to have the pacifism thrashed or drilled out of him. There are countless incidents of the Frau Jankowski [2] type which make this clear. The new concentration camps exist for this purpose, and labour service is not unrelated. Socialism is no crime if it be national; Bolshevism provides a model to be closely imitated in technique. The Nazis have made articulate the old Prussian hatred for a conciliatory, analytical state of mind; the objective, liberally minded intellectual, who is probably something of a cosmopolitan in his general outlook, is a *Minusmensch;* 'true Germans think with their blood,' and Captain Göring boasts that he is a subjective man. On March 21, when the glory of *das unsterbliche Preussentum* (as Goebbels then

[2] See *The Times*, April 1, 1933.

named it) was celebrated at Potsdam, the President of Nazi Germany placed a wreath on the tomb of Frederick William I.; but how did he come to do equal honour to his intellectualist son, who despised the Prussians and praised Voltaire?

Beyond this it is difficult to define the new tendencies with much certainty. Chancellor Hitler made a long speech before the Reichstag on March 23 in which he outlined the policy of his Government with a brilliant but not very informative eloquence. The task of the interpreter is complicated by the double voice of the Nazi movement. This duality—one is tempted to say duplicity—is useful in keeping together a heterogeneous following, but, since the Nazi success has been assured, it appears something like weakness. Hitler himself shows an inclination to consider the interests represented by Papen and Hugenberg; he declared for property and private initiative on March 23, while both he and Dr. Schacht, the Nazi president of the Reichsbank, have come out emphatically against any currency experiments. Further, on April 7 Dr. Schacht poured scorn upon the policy of stimulating employment with the aid of expanded credit, a policy which had gained many sensible supporters as an alternative to the deflationary budgets of Dr. Brüning's time. But it should be noticed that on April 10 Captain Göring, who in his own view is the true spokesman of Hitlerism, re-emphasised the socialistic aspect of the Nazi programme.

On May 1, at the Festival of Labour in Berlin, Herr Hitler is to outline his intentions for the first year of his four-year plan, which has hitherto remained astonishingly obscure. While looking forward to the definition then to be expected, it should be noted that the Chancellor has always laid the greatest emphasis, both on March 23 and at other times, upon the 'rescue of the German peasant.' This is important, not because any very adequate method of effecting it is indicated, but because it is probably accurate to regard the Nazi movement as a revolt of the country against the town, the peasant against the urban worker. All along the industrial workers of the towns have, as a whole, been hostile to Hitlerism, which, however, supplied many unemployed youths with a shirt and soup and a bed in the Nazi barracks. The peasantry have slowly but surely come into the Nazi battalions; this process culminated in the secession of the Bavarian peasants from the Catholic Bavarian People's Party as the result of the Reichstag fire scare to which Eisner's Communist *régime* at Munich had probably made Bavarians susceptible. On March 23 the Chancellor admitted the hostility of the town workers when he declared the highest task of the National Government to be to win the German worker to the national State. In the great week of revolution between March 5

and March 12 the storm troopers took care to occupy the trade union headquarters as well as the Government offices of the State capitals. Trade union life is being broken up; its most active members, if not serving in concentration camps, are terrorised into inaction. By such methods, but more particularly by compulsory labour service (mostly out in the country) for the urban unemployed, it is hoped that the close, independent organisation of the artisans will be disintegrated; State-run unions are to be substituted. The peasants are only too ready to applaud the attack upon the 'materialism' of the factory hands; they were jealous of the wage safeguards and arbitration rights supplied by the Weimar *régime* for the members of the trade unions. The peasants resent their conviction that the Weimar Governments offered them no equivalent defence against the evils of depression; as a matter of fact, agriculture was probably over-protected, and therefore tended to produce too much. It is held by most authorities, as I indicated above, that the Junker resistance to the settlement policy of Brüning and Schleicher precipitated the Nazi revolution. An unusually intelligent German political critic remarked to me the other day that this was more profoundly true than most of us realised, for it was the primeval spirit of the land, which, in the persons of the Junkers, had resisted the inroads of the town. He regarded the triumph of the Nazis as the triumph of a more simple, rough, unsophisticated spirit over the spirit of modern industry. Industry has over-developed into decay, and he looks forward to a successful 'Back to the land' drive and the dispersion of the stereotyped ideals of the town. It would be merely another of history's ironies if the Nazis themselves forced the Junkers, rather in this primitive spirit, at last to accept the expropriation of the big estates of the east. This town and country interpretation of the struggle in Germany coincides with the revival of the spirit of Prussian militarism, whose organisation has always been closely associated with land tenure. The town has produced the intellectuals who questioned the military emotions of the Junker and the peasant; town life has impaired the physique—*i.e.*, the military value—of town-dwellers.

While Italy and Russia supply the more obvious parallels for recent happenings in Germany, French analogies are, in a way, more suggestive. The tone in which Stendhal's politically orthodox in *Le Rouge et le Noir* refer to *les libéraux* has something of the suggestion of the unclean animal which the Nazi makes when he speaks of a 'Marxist.' But most of all when Hitler cries '*Das deutsche Volk will mit der Welt in Frieden leben*' do the words '*L'Empire, c'est la paix*' seem to ring in one's ears. For Napoleon III., too, was swept into absolute power by the yearning admira-

tion of a people for a military glory which had somehow also ended in defeat. He, too, was an emotional, vacillating mystic, standing for an ill-defined Socialism and a plebiscitary dictatorship based on the destruction of parliamentary parties. He, too, was the expression of peasant rage against the unhappy attempts of the Second Republic to ameliorate the town-worker's lot. There was not the same jealous fury against intellectualism—perhaps because France even then had a less broken tradition of civilisation behind her; but there was a comparable confusion of conflicting interests behind Napoleon III., and the onlooker then was equally sceptical. I believe that Napoleon was at least as sincere as Hitler in his desire for peace, but it was impossible for him to avoid war, and the Second Empire perished in war. What, then, will be the fate of *Das Dritte Reich?*

[*NOTE*

This is the first time an unsigned article has appeared in THE NINETEENTH CENTURY *since the publication of its first number in March 1877.*

The reason for this departure from our hitherto invariable rule, which must not be regarded as a precedent, should be obvious to all those who have studied the behaviour of the present régime *in Germany, and we are perfectly satisfied with the reasons given by the author against signing.*

THE EDITOR.]

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL

THE year 1933 in America is the year of the New Deal. It is a time of profound perplexity mingled with anticipation. The public mind has at least realised that the optimism of nineteenth-century expansion must give place to a reasoned examination of the ills of the body politic and economic, and that all business, big and small, must undergo reform. An unprecedented depression has been necessary to reveal the truth of that early conclusion of Henry Adams that America had outlived her institutions, both economic and political, and that in the sphere of government no less than in banking and manufacture a new and more stable plan must be devised. Whether the lesson has been severe enough and long enough to awake a real determination to remedy the situation thus revealed is uncertain; for, as Mr. Philip Guedalla has recently said,[1] 'the fierce alacrity with which American citizens denounce their institutions without the slightest effort to improve them is a perennial surprise.' The truth of the matter in past times has been that in the bountiful prosperity of her expanding home market, which could hardly cease growing while America was exploiting and filling the vast expanse of her continent from ocean to ocean, she ignored, and could afford to ignore, the waste of her corrupt cities, her unstable banks, and her unsolved problems of democratic government in State and Federal regions alike. To-day this accumulated mortgage on her national life must be liquidated.

Even before the depression set in the process of expansion was slowing down. Not only were the empty spaces no longer empty, but the post-war restriction of immigration had imposed a sudden check on the growth of the population and thus automatically eliminated a powerful factor of expansion. Within five years of the completion of this restrictive policy the depression itself disclosed the vices of American economic life, and these vices in their turn aggravated the depression. Its extent and magnitude are well known, and its statistical record could be

[1] *The Times*, April 8, 1933.

read daily in the railway traffics, the prices of stocks and bonds, the bankruptcies and the bank failures of the past two years. It is revealed in every national, State, and city budget; and nowhere is its effect on American credit more strikingly shown than in the steep increase in the Federal debt of the United States Government since 1930. In round figures the national debt in 1917 was £200,000,000. By the end of 1919 the war had raised it to £5,000,000,000; but such was the fiscal ease of America in the boom that by the end of 1930 it had been reduced to just over £3,000,000,000. Three years of depression have raised it once more by over £1,000,000,000, so that to-day it stands at well over £4,000,000,000—*i.e.*, at $20,660,000,000! This increase of debt is directly due to the failure to balance the budget for three years in succession, the accumulated deficits of 1930–1933 being $4,700,000,000. Every State in the Union tells a similar tale, and the great cities are all in deep water, New York and Chicago being practically bankrupt.

The individual citizen watched the first stages of this process with complacent equanimity, for he still believed not only that America was the land of opportunity, but that American inventiveness had forged the key to permanent well-being. The tide would turn, he said; and if it was longer in turning than he expected, the fault lay in disorderly Europe, not in progressive America. But as month followed month and year succeeded year without improvement uneasy doubts assailed him, so that by the time the full impact of the depression struck him last year complacency gave way to bewilderment, and bewilderment to anger, till his pent-up feelings exploded in the Presidential Election which swept Mr. Hoover out of sight and sent Mr. Roosevelt to the White House.

The scene in which the drama was enacted showed the America of 1932 as a land transformed. The pace of life had slackened; trains were running empty; at every railway centre the sidings were lined with engines rusting in idleness; and hundreds of once-busy factories were closed and silent. Detroit in the decline of the motor industry was reported to have lost one-third of its population; the school teachers and municipal workers of Chicago had not been paid for months; the prairie was experimenting in barter and burning its crops to warm its insolvent farmers. One owner of a small newspaper in Kansas accepted weekly crates of chicken and baskets of eggs to pay the subscriptions to his paper from the farmers around him because they could pay in no other way. On January 29 I received a long-distance call from Cedar Rapids, Iowa, to say that all the banks in the town were closed and that my lecture engagement must be cancelled; and when I reached Pittsburgh I found there the most

impressive picture of depression that America has to show. In the fork of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers stand the Homestead Works of the Carnegie Steel Company. In normal times they fill the sky with their heavy pall of smoke and light up the steep valley with the red glare of their furnaces, flaming and glowing in the lurid colours of an apocalyptic scene. To-day they are cold and silent as the grave, like the giant ruins of some strange fortress, an epitome of distress. I recall these evidences, not in order to stab the reader's mind with sensations of disaster, but to reveal the reality of America's plight. For, in spite of all the statistical proofs of depression, we are apt to retain our former impressions of American prosperity and to picture Uncle Sam as the one rich man in a poverty-stricken world, whose pockets are bulging with wealth untold, and incidentally with our gold. Nor shall I pause to apportion the blame for this reversal of fortune, but I deliberately repeat evident facts so that their significance shall not escape our notice. In view of the important decisions about to be made by the British and American Governments, in co-operation with others, it is well for us to bear in mind the actual conditions in America, for they are the material on which the President must work in accepting any new international obligation. Moreover, a knowledge of these conditions is the necessary point of departure for any endeavour to understand the effects which they have wrought on the American mind. To these effects we can now turn.

The era of American post-war prosperity came to an end in the winter of 1929–30, and in the four years that have elapsed American opinion on nearly all the major subjects of policy has undergone considerable change under the pressure of a new economic experience. Prohibition shows the most spectacular change, leading to a complete reversal of policy ; but since of all the questions involved it is probably less influenced by the depression than any other, it may be laid aside. The other subjects on which opinion now takes new, if still undefined, attitudes are : the obligation of Government, State and Federal, to relieve distress, carrying with it a genuine interest in the British system of unemployment insurance, which is no longer dismissed contemptuously as the 'dole' ; the problem of the tariff ; the social as distinct from the purely industrial effects of machine production on a large scale, in which the sudden 'boom' in 'technocracy' was an almost ludicrous proof of a new approach to the problem of big business ; the system of banking in all its aspects ; the reorganisation of the railways on lines resembling rationalisation ; the effect of agricultural depression on the well-being of the whole community ; and the relation of the United States to the rest of the world, in which the proclamation of the

'Stimson Doctrine' in the political field and the deadlock over War Debts in the economic field are the most significant factors. To this formidable list we ought perhaps to add a mood of doubt about the efficiency of the whole American system of government and a sense of dismay at the chaos of municipal administration in the great cities. In a word, America is asking heart-searching questions of herself. Doubtless the answers will not produce a reform of her national life as radical as her present temper suggests, for when the depression lifts, life will tend to resume its former course. But the signs of the times justify the expectation that big changes are about to take place, and Mr. Roosevelt's promise of a 'New Deal' is clearly more than an election bait.

Little of this was foreseen in 1932 while Mr. Hoover was still in the White House. Nor did Mr. Roosevelt's campaign in the election seem to herald any sweeping revolution either in American thought or American policy. 'Wild radicalism has made few converts,' he himself said, 'and the greatest tribute I can pay my countrymen is that in these days of crushing want there persists an orderly and hopeful spirit in the millions of people who have suffered so much. To fail to offer them a new chance is not only to betray their hopes but to misunderstand their patience.' This new chance, so unlike Woodrow Wilson's more grandiose 'New Freedom,' is to be offered in a general policy of renovation in which, 'not class control, but a concert of interests,' is the key-note. Throughout the book from which these words are taken [2] the whole purpose of the new Administration is presented with such restraint, and at times hedged with so many reserves, that its quality of understatement only serves to set in bolder relief the decisive acts of its author when he came into power. The President is an old campaigner and knew the risks of presenting the vulnerable front of an ambitious programme in advance. But, as such, he also knew that America, in the new temper of the people, sought above all things leadership. And the response which greeted President Roosevelt's courageous handling of the banking crisis in March was due in part no doubt to the almost universal recognition that his action was right and necessary, but it owed its convincing zest to the more important conviction that the man who could thus act swiftly was the fitting leader for a nation thirsting to be led.

Let us look a little closer at the evidence of this new temper. And since the Prime Minister's visit to Washington will be taking place while these pages are passing through the press, we may usefully concentrate our attention on the signs of change in respect of those problems which figure in the programme of the

[2] *Looking Forward*, by Franklin Roosevelt. (New York: John Day, 1933.

World Economic Conference. But as a preface to that there is one decisive factor in the immediate domestic situation which is too important to be passed in silence. Ordinarily, Congress protects and insists upon its constitutional rights in all its traffic with the President. The Fathers of the Republic set the legislative and executive powers of America apart from one another, so that the independent authority of the former might check any incipient autocracy in the latter. The tyranny of the Crown in Europe must never reign in the White House. Thus the President, whose power can sometimes be almost unlimited, is at once the protector and the prisoner of the American Constitution; and most Presidents have in fact found that the White House was a prison with the Senate as turnkey. But since President and Congress alike derive their different mandates from the same source in the sovereignty of the American people, times will arise when the sovereign, being weary of talk and desiring action, will support the President as the man of deeds against the Congress as the men of words. Such a time is the present. Among the many novel phenomena produced by the crisis in America none is more remarkable than the alacrity with which Congress has surrendered some of its most cherished prerogatives into the hands of the new President. In so departing from their traditional jealousy of the executive power legislators have obeyed the will of the American people, who sought leadership bold enough to cut the Gordian knot of depression. Moreover, President Roosevelt's power over Congress is strengthened by his control of patronage, and until the process of dispensing Federal patronage is complete he has the whip-hand. Thus equipped with the whip of patronage and the spurs of an impatient public opinion he can guide the coach where he will—for a time. How long? No man can say; but, in the conditions of 1933 and with a leader as skilful in handling men as Franklin Roosevelt, the favourable period may prove longer than some of his critics now imagine. In any event, to-day is the moment of action, for what can be done with ease at Easter may be impossible by Christmas.

It is certain that he must alienate groups and interests in his policy. *Gouverner c'est mécontenter*, and American politics have ever been the happy hunting-ground of malcontents. But probably President Roosevelt knows better than most of his Congressional colleagues in Washington how far the American of 1933 has moved in the past three years and is thus better able to attune policy and action to the new mood than they are. Here again is another source of strength. In examining it we shall approach the scene with a view to discover the changes of American opinion which bear upon international rather than upon

purely domestic problems. The distinction is doubtless false, for there are few questions which do not belong to both fields—or rather the whole field is one and indivisible—and the dawning discovery of this fundamental truth is the prime mover in the present reorientation of American thought. The phrase 'American opinion' is, however, only a convenient expression which covers a composite entity containing many different elements. It is divided not only by the lines of Republican and Democratic partisanship but also by regional cleavage of great depth and significance. The Republican of Maine is one person, his fellow-Republican of Kansas quite another; while the Democrats of Boston and New York are urban radicals and the Democrats of Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans belong for the most part to the opposite end of the social scale. Thus the region of the voter is more important than his political label in any endeavour to estimate the balance of forces in a given political or economic battle; and the knowledge which one region has of the others is often too limited to make genuine co-operation possible. There is a contradiction to be noted, none the less. In times of stress, as in the swing to belligerency in 1917, or against Prohibition last year, a wave of feeling may pass over the country with surprising force, swiftness and unanimity, apparently obliterating these differences. To-day a wave like this is breaking all over the country; but since it is part of a broad tide of feeling, and not an uprising for or against a specific policy, it must be described as a general and prevailing condition of mind rather than a normal swing from Hoover to Roosevelt, or from 'dry' to 'wet.' It is not a change of policy so much as a change in the popular way of looking at all policies.

Thus some of the fundamental assumptions of American life are being challenged. The old certainty has been shaken, accepted policies are being questioned, and among them the relation of the United States to world problems is being studied anew. The evidence shows that American sentiment is by no means so isolationist as the Hearst campaign for 'Buy American' would make it appear, and that it is veering to support the President in his endeavour to extend the New Deal from the domestic to the foreign field, especially in tariff reform and in War Debts. Take the latter as a symptom of new opinion. In 1926 Mr. Newton D. Baker, a Democratic leader of national authority who was War Secretary in the Wilson Administration, published a closely reasoned manifesto declaring that the War Debt settlement with England ignored the fact that the debt could only be paid in goods, that the discrimination between the European debtors on the basis of capacity to pay was fundamentally unsound, and that neither 'in morals nor in a long view of its own best industrial

and commercial interests' was the United States justified in maintaining its existing policy on War Debts. In the same year forty-two members of the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University pleaded for the revision of the settlements. In both cases these pleas were ignored or derided. Mr. Baker was dismissed as one who 'specialised in lost causes,' and the professors were told that their document was a 'publicity effort' which could only do 'harm to those whom they say they would help.' In commenting on the new situation which has arisen, Mr. Walter Lippmann, to whose book [3] I am indebted for some of the facts here recorded, says that 'the change in American sentiment between 1926 and 1932 was unmistakable: advocates of revision were no longer members of a wholly insignificant minority, powerless to obtain serious consideration of their opinions. A vigorous debate was now [1932] in progress between large numbers of Americans who favoured revision and probably still larger numbers who opposed it.' During 1932 the debate grew apace, and while Mr. Lippmann was composing his judgment of its significance the balance of advantage was shifting in favour of the revisionists. On April 13 Mr. Alfred E. Smith, the 'Al. Smith' of national fame and ex-Governor of New York State, spoke as follows to his fellow-Democrats:

> Let us say to the nations of Europe which owe us money that we will forget all about it for twenty years, and not only will we do that, but we will write off as paid each year 25 per cent. of the gross value of American products which they buy from us. . . . This will help the farmer; it will help the mill-owner; it will help the manufacturer; it will help the railroads and the transportation industries and in turn help all the various lines of activities that are dependent upon the railroads. I assert that this is a far better way to restore trade than the present method of sitting idly by, clamouring for the payment of debts we know cannot be paid, and thereby losing for the farmers and manufacturers and working-men of the United States more billions of dollars than the whole European debt.

On May 13 the seven leading railway trade unions presented to President Hoover a memorial supporting Mr. Smith's proposal and published it in their own magazine accompanied by a graphic cartoon to illustrate the urgency of cancellation. Seven days later the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks called for the readjustment of the debts due to the United States 'on the basis of active co-operation on the part of the debtor Governments in the stimulation of international trade between them and

[3] *The United States in World Affairs*, 1932, prepared by Walter Lippmann for the American Council on Foreign Relations. (Harpers: New York and London, 1933.)

the United States.' Before the month was out the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church and the Master of the National Grange (one of the great farming organisations) had endorsed the same plea. And in July 1932 Senator Borah, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and hitherto noted for his isolationist creed, confessed his belief that 'the cancellation of the debts in connection with, and as part of a program including the settlement of other war problems, would . . . bring to the people of the United States an equal or a greater benefit than the amount which they may collect from the debts,' because, in his judgment, it would 'open foreign markets for the products of the farm and the factory, cause the price level to rise, put an end to unemployment, and thaw out the frozen credit of the banks.' Like all converts—and the Idaho senator is a prize among converts on this issue—Mr. Borah here claims too much. But it is not his precise words that matter—it is the thought behind them; and when Senator Borah begins to think such thoughts they must be in the air!

Before we attempt to gauge the possible effect on the action of the American Government of this changing sentiment, and remembering that it is a change in process, not a change completed, let us turn to the influence of depression on the American attitude to the Tariff. And here we have more definite indications of official policy, though as yet no authoritative declarations. During the Presidential Election there was no more than a difference of emphasis between the Tariff arguments of Mr. Hoover and Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. Hoover did indeed commit himself to the Tariff, the whole Tariff, and nothing but the Tariff; but when he said that the grass would grow in the streets if the Tariff were lowered, America merely laughed, and Mr. Al. Smith put the fools-cap on this extravagance of Hooverian rhetoric by saying that it was high time there were grass tennis courts in some of the slum streets of New York. Mr. Roosevelt, though moderate and cautious, gave little support to the old view that the Democrats were a low-Tariff party, and he entered the White House unencumbered by any definite commitment either way. But after March 4 the American public was forewarned by clear hints from the White House that if the United States hoped to reap any benefit from the World Economic Conference, the American Tariff could not be regarded as sacrosanct. And on April 8 Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, speaking obviously with the consent of and authority of President Roosevelt, told a meeting of journalists in Washington (as reported in *The Times*, April 10) that as America had been one of the leaders in economic nationalism, and as now every nation as a

result finds itself flat on its back economically, it was high time to recognise that American responsibility involved leadership in the opposite direction. Enlightened self-interest demanded the removal of obstacles to trade, among which the Tariff was certainly to be reckoned. He refused to commit himself further, and reminded his hearers that the nature and extent of the powers with which Congress might be willing to endow the President were still uncertain. Two days later the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Roper, broadcast the following statement from Washington :

> I do not suggest that we should permit our tariff rates to be fixed by any World Conference. Nobody suggests that. I do suggest, however, that our representatives will be listened to with far greater respect, and that their influence in the general effort toward constructive accomplishment will be much increased if they can come into the court of world negotiation with clean hands and admitted recognition of the self-evident condition resulting from our impossible tariff situation.

Here are warm winds indeed loosening the frozen block of isolationism ; but the block itself remains, and the question which is not easy to answer is whether it still presents so tough an obstacle to reform as to prevent the Roosevelt Administration from fulfilling the promise held out in these two utterances. As suggested above, the change of opinion here expressed is a change in process, not a change completed ; and as long as so incompetent a reader of public sentiment as Mr. Hoover sat in the White House it could proceed far without being observed. Mr. Roosevelt's election, however, did two things. It revealed the desire for change and it sent to Washington a leader capable of interpreting the desire. The new President is not only a better tactician than his predecessor but he also sees the whole problem with a more realistic eye, and he knows that failing a definite lead from him the desire for reform will dissipate itself in disjointed and extravagant policies which can only make things worse. His leadership is therefore the key of the situation ; and his action during the past eight weeks shows that he accepts the opportunity with alacrity. He may be too bold, but he is not daunted by the dilemma of War Debts, for instance, of which one horn is the apparent determination of America (or rather of Congress) to insist on payment, and the other is the impossibility of collecting them ; for he sees, what Mr. Hoover either would not or could not acknowledge, that the solving approach to them is to treat them for what they are, an indivisible part of a greater economic whole. If no World Economic Conference were in prospect, and if the War Debt problem had to be treated by itself, we should not be entitled to expect from Mr. Roosevelt all that Senator Borah prescribed last year, and the solution might have to be

found in repudiation by Europe. But since Mr. Roosevelt presumably does not desire that result nor Great Britain relish it, and since War Debts will be merged in the general programme of the Conference, he believes he has found a way of approach which will enable him to present a new economic programme to America in which the palatable and the unpalatable can be judiciously blended in an acceptable whole. In that programme what the Washington correspondent of the *Spectator* called 'a major adjustment' of War Debts will find a place.

The immediate problem ahead is to pass June 15 without another crisis over the War Debts; not because War Debts are the crucial factor in the depression, nor because their cancellation would bring abundance, but because the time-table gives them a special urgency. In order to do so there is little doubt that Mr. Roosevelt will accept, if he does not himself propose, a renewal of the moratorium, probably under another name. A stand-still agreement will be the form in which the debt controversy will be laid on one side while the Conference is engaged on its appointed task; but though that controversy will not formally appear on the agenda, the preparatory conversations in Washington will be used to fit its solution into the general scheme. The programme of the Conference is wide, and offers a field of negotiation which, if promising on its merits, none the less bristles with difficulties. We ourselves know how thorny was the similar if narrower path in Ottawa, and the new Conference will be Ottawa magnified one hundredfold, both in possibilities of good and in risks of misunderstanding. The Governments, surveying it beforehand, will have to realise that if there is to be any advantage for the world they must approach their self-aggravating problems in a spirit of give and take. The reservoir of general prosperity can only be refilled from the common pool of mutual concessions. In a word, for each and all concerned, the only hope of getting something out is to put something in. You cannot work a dry pump until you have poured in a bucket of water to give it a start.

Now we in Europe are prone to believe that, in relieving Germany of the burden of reparations in all but name at Lausanne last year, we have already created a substantial pool of concessions to which we await the American contribution. As pointed out above, the American contribution might have been slow in coming if the matter were restricted to the scope of war obligations—Reparations on the one side and Debts on the other. But Mr. Roosevelt is enabled by the wider scope of the Conference to offer his contribution in a different way; and though this way appears safer than a frontal attack on War Debts, it also has its own dangers, not great now, but increasing as time

goes on. Again the need for speed is to be stressed. Meanwhile Mr. Roosevelt's general purpose and tactics are becoming clear and will probably soon be even clearer. Knowing that America is changing her mind, he will do nothing to check the process; and, in order to appreciate his handling of the situation, we should realise that he is taking a course which will disturb American susceptibilities as little as possible. He has already shown timely courage and realism in authorising Mr. Cordell Hull's remarkable forecast of America's Tariff policy, and therein has offered a pledge of effective international co-operation. Even a moderate reform of the American Tariff would be a fertile contribution to the policy of give and take; and, though Mr. Hull himself has warned us that Congress must of necessity endorse any such concession, the President's present control of that body seems to justify the hope that if the new policy is executed quickly it will not fail for want of Congressional support. But, be it remembered, every month that passes increases the element of doubt by adding recruits to the now disheartened forces of the Republican Party; and not in the Republican opposition alone, but also within his own party, Mr. Roosevelt must inevitably alienate some of his enthusiastic friends. To save precious time is Mr. Roosevelt's main reason for opening the Washington conversations with the major Governments concerned this spring, and we can only congratulate him on his promptitude, without sharing all the optimism of his official entourage.

But if America thus consents to lead the world down the steep hill of tariffs she cannot continue alone. Other countries have tariffs which, if not so prohibitive as the American, are barriers which must be lowered. Since the Ottawa Conference our hands are not so free in this vital matter as could be wished; and though the British tariff is moderate compared with many others, some concession in its present schedules may prove to be a necessary part of England's contribution to the common pool. America would doubtless welcome, if indeed she is not endeavouring to extort from us by her desertion of the gold standard, a change of policy on the sterling exchange; but although the gold standard will be a major subject at the Economic Conference, there does not seem to be even now much prospect of our immediate return to it, nor, in view of the uncertainty concerning the effects of American monetary policy, is it possible to predict at what parity our return, if it were decided, would be made; for the facts of to-day—and even of a fairly distant to-morrow—may compel us to stay where we are. There is also the Disarmament question, which American opinion is inclined to link with any economic concessions which the United States

may make; but it must be assumed that in Washington Mr. MacDonald has set Disarmament in its true relation to the problems of the Economic Conference; and that relation is remote. Disarmament would relieve every European budget of a serious burden, no doubt; but in Europe it is neither an economic nor a financial problem. It is political, and therefore cannot be treated as a by-product of economic discussions. Much Transatlantic misunderstanding will be avoided if this is clearly understood on the other side, though candid talks between Mr. Roosevelt and his foreign visitors may do something to revive the languishing Disarmament Conference itself.

These talks are mainly concerned with the economic situation; and, unfortunately, the financial and commercial outlook in America when the Prime Minister landed on April 21 was still shrouded in obscurity. Signs of improvement were to be found in railway traffics, in steel production, and in motor manufacture, but real confidence was slow in growing. Two days before he sailed there was a sharp fall in the exchange value of the dollar, and the foreign exchange market remained in a markedly nervous condition throughout the latter half of April on account of the uncertainty regarding the real purpose of the Roosevelt Government. There was some fear for the fate of the dollar, for it was impossible to say whether deflation, reflation, or inflation was to be the accepted policy. Inflationary sentiment was and is strong in Congress: the Cabinet was known to be divided on the subject; and Mr. Roosevelt's ambiguous phrase in his inaugural Address—'an adequate but sound currency'—was widely quoted to show that he himself was at least a reflationary advocate. He had taken action of a deflating character in his heroic endeavour to balance the budget, and more than once in April checked the advocates of inflation in both Houses; but his programme of public works, which seemed to foreshadow a grandiose plan of expansion designed to stimulate employment, pointed significantly to an intention to raise prices by direct Government action on a scale hitherto unknown in American history except during the war. On the whole, therefore, and in spite of the known conservative attitude of the Secretary to the Treasury, the expansionist forces are in the ascendant in Washington, and it will tax all Mr. Roosevelt's power of political management to prevent them from running to excess. It may yet prove that his principal contribution to economic recovery is intended to be made by a deliberate resort to inflation; and if so, the world will watch with interest, if also with some anxiety, to see whether he can keep it within reasonable bounds. Indeed, America has already justified the fear hinted at above by deserting the gold standard. She has done it voluntarily, for domestic political

reasons, and not under the compulsion of forces beyond her national control. Inflation is under way; and a new situation has been created at home and abroad. But the general scene described above is still the background of policy.

A. F. Whyte.

INDIA—THE LONGER VIEW

SINCE the earlier contribution under the above title appeared in the pages of the *Nineteenth Century and After*,[1] a period of more than sixteen months has passed. It has been a period full of interesting developments, striking incidents, and unquestionable progress. The second Round Table Conference held its last session on December 1, 1931. Mr. Gandhi and his Congress henchmen had attended the meetings, but had done nothing to help in clearing the position; indeed, their intervention had only further confused the issue by emphasising the divergence between the Hindu majority on one side and the whole group of minorities on the other. Their unconciliatory attitude and their blindness, whether real or pretended, to practical issues had effectively (though, let us hope, not permanently) frustrated Lord Irwin's hopes of associating in the settlement the party which they represented. But naturally the Government of India were ready for this conclusion of the matter; for the lukewarmness of the Congress in regard to the despatch of their representatives to London and Mr. Gandhi's hesitation up to the eleventh hour, before actually setting his face towards England, were obvious indications that their hearts were not in it. Mr. Gandhi accordingly, on his return to India, found that the Government had decided to take a firm grip of the helm, making it clear at the same time that there was to be no deviation from the prescribed course. They had, in fact, decided that the Congress must be treated as an unlawful body of revolutionaries, and had already issued certain special ordinances giving themselves power to deal frankly and vigorously with sedition and civil disobedience. Mr. Gandhi, finding his plans for a further campaign in these directions thus checkmated, appealed for an interview with the Viceroy, but coupled it with terms and conditions to which no self-respecting Government that meant to govern could accede, and before long Mr. Gandhi and great numbers of his lieutenants throughout the country found themselves arrested and lodged in gaol. The Government of India, when once they had decided that the gloves were off, carried through their plans with the

[1] December 1931.

utmost swiftness and precision. It was a bold and necessary stroke for the recovery of a free and unfettered hand, and it was exactly the kind of stroke that captivates the imagination of the ordinary Indian. This is undoubtedly in part the reason why it was not followed by the commotion which many expected. But there were other contributory causes. India is a large country and a very heterogeneous one. There is at all times a substantial majority against any one section of the population, a majority of which is apt to grow when, as in this case, the talking machines of the section are silenced. And, further, there had been for some time before 1932 a growing dissatisfaction among many professed adherents of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress Party at the dislocation of trade, the dangerous riots, and the disruption of classes for which the doctrines of civil disobedience and boycott were obviously responsible. Whatever the reasons may have been, the fact remains that with the reassertion of authority by the Government the power and influence of the Congress Party began to wane, so that in the news telegram of January 2, 1933, we read that at Bombay, their former stronghold, the attempt of the Congress to celebrate their 'Independence Day' aroused no public interest and ended in a complete fiasco.

The Government of India made it clear that this repressive action did not connote any policy of reaction; but that, on the contrary, it was necessary in order to clear the field for greater activity in the pursuit of constitutional reform. The three so-called 'fact-finding' Committees appointed after the Round Table Conference of 1931 to analyse and report on some of the less conspicuous issues of Franchise, Finance, and Federation were despatched to India without delay, and a General Committee was assembled to represent in India the Conference itself, under the presidency of the Viceroy. Their reports were received between May and July 1932. The proposal which perhaps struck the imagination most forcibly was that of the Franchise Committee advising the increase of the women voters from 316,000 to 6,500,000 [2] for the Provincial Legislature, and from 55,000 to 1,500,000 for the Federal Assembly, but that which elicited the widest criticism was their further recommendation that the electorate should be extended so as to include 27·6 per cent. of the British India population against a previous percentage of 5·4. This proposal for the enfranchisement at one stroke of over 22 per cent. of the people—say, roughly, between 50,000,000 and 60,000,000 individuals—was certainly a bold step in advance. Yet it is patently absurd that the Government of any country should, as is the case at present in India, reflect the opinion of only about one-twentieth of the people. Clearly, a large increase in

[2] This figure was revised after the Conference to about 4,200,000.

the electorate was much to be desired. The question which really matters is whether the increase proposed will have the effect of reflecting the opinion of the right people—that is, the enormous mass of the agricultural population. The danger of a limited individual vote in a country where constituencies cover large areas occupied by small collections of inhabitants dotted about in thousands of villages, unconnected by road or rail—where, too, the recording of opinions is handicapped by illiteracy and by easy avenues for fraud and bribery—is that the urban population will gain an undue weight in the elections at the expense of the rural community. And the latter, be it remembered, form the backbone of India. On the face of it, the proposal that was once made for the application of a group system to the rural areas seems to have much to recommend it; and it is to be hoped that possibly this method of indirect election, so suitable to the circumstances of India, may yet come to the front again, when the villages some day come into their own, difficult and unnatural as the transition must be, once individual voting on a large scale has become the rule.

To return to the Committees, all these were to some extent hampered by the failure of the Conference of 1931 to arrive at solutions of the two central problems they had to deal with—namely, the distribution of power between Hindu and Muslim, and the combination in the organs of government of a democratic system in one part of India with an autocratic system in the other. The first of these problems proved as insoluble as ever when the Viceroy's Committee in India attempted to tackle it in the spring of last year. The various parties concerned finally decided to abandon the effort and to trust to the hope that the Prime Minister's promised solution might, if luck were on their side, bring them a quota of seats in the legislative bodies more favourable than any they seemed likely to wring out of their opponents. Accordingly, in August, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald announced the British Government's decision on the point; and, judging by the universal protest which this award aroused in India, it seems probable that it was a remarkably good one. If any of the larger sections had accepted the judgment in silence, it would have been a fair presumption that in that particular case it had erred on the side of generosity; but, happily, nowhere was there any symptom of the silence of consent. There was clear internal evidence that the conclusions published had only been reached after the most careful survey of the claims of each and every party; and to anyone standing completely outside the turmoil and jealousies of party politics in India it appeared to carry the hall-mark of genuine regard for the interest of each section and of a desire for full justice and impartiality to all. While there

may be two opinions about the wisdom of thus attempting to cut the Gordian knot, nothing could have furnished a more decisive proof of England's sincerity and good-will.

In announcing the award the Prime Minister coupled with it a warning and a promise. He declared that, as between parties, the proposed distribution of electoral seats was final and irrevocable, except in the case where one and all agreed to some alternative solution; and he promised that, within party limits, proposals for the modification of the award would be carefully listened to and considered.

The only modification agreed to so far was due to a strange exploit by Mr. Gandhi. Though he had thrown in his lot with Brahmins of the highest caste when attending the Second Conference, he has always protested against the position accorded to the Untouchables under Brahmin influence. Although the award granted to the Depressed Classes the ordinary rights of Hindu voters, it also granted them, in addition, separate electoral rights for the protection of their own representation. Mr. Gandhi declared that this was equivalent to treating them as a class apart from Hindus, and that his objections to this were so vital that he intended to fast until death, unless the award in this respect were altered. The Government, not unacquainted with the practice of 'sitting *dharna*,' were unresponsive. The fast was duly begun and threatened to end in tragedy. But the contest turned to a struggle between Mr. Gandhi and orthodox Hinduism rather than to a fight to the death with the Government. He was saved by his Hindu brethren, who dreaded the effect of his death in such circumstances on their whole system. Hindu orthodoxy gave way and made terms which, if observed, will cost it heavy sacrifices both in the religious and in the political sphere. If the 'Poona Pact' is implemented in full, the Depressed Classes will in future have free entry into temples and they will have reserved for them in the Provincial Legislatures no less than 148 seats against the 71 proposed for them in the award. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Gandhi's bold venture will succeed, and in any case it seems certain that it may herald the beginning of a fresh series of troubles in India. Brahmanism is a strong power in India still, and it is not lightly going to loosen one of the pillars on which its domination rests. Socially, the Pact is still far from being implemented; admission of the Untouchables into temples is still widely resisted in many quarters. Politically, the gain to the Hindu body as a whole is problematical. They lose 77 seats in the Provincial Legislatures in the hope of securing a backing of 148 representatives of the Depressed Classes. But the latter, under the award, were to vote in the general list in any case, so that the gain to the Hindu party will only come from those who,

without the Pact, would have voted against them and now decide to vote for them. It is easy, on the other hand, to see the practical advantage of keeping under the Hindu wing a section that came of Hindu origin and is probably not less than 40,000,000 strong. But there is a distinct aversion from the terms amongst great numbers of the caste Hindus, and this feeling is likely to be reinforced. Murmurs of an approaching storm are already audible, and, indeed, the victory of the terms of the Poona Pact over those of the award seems to depend very much on the vitality and permanence of Mr. Gandhi's influence. In any case, he can fairly claim that what he has already accomplished in this matter amounts to a miracle.

As regards the combination of an autocratic with a democratic system, the most noteworthy incident in 1932 was the unanimous decision of the Chamber of Princes in favour of forming an All-India Federation, subject to the Crown accepting responsibility for securing guarantees on three points of importance, which will be mentioned later. This decision and the publication of the reports of the three fact-finding Committees paved the way for the meeting of the Third Conference which was summoned to assemble in London in November last. On this occasion there were again captains present; but no kings—only the kings' plenipotentiaries. The Conference, however, went far to disappoint the expectations of the pessimists, for it was marked by a spirit of good-will, conciliation, and practical commonsense on the part of the Indian delegates as a whole, a spirit which, if it could only be extended to all Indian sections, would furnish a far happier prospect for the peaceful and orderly evolution of self-government than in fact can be said to exist at the moment. The final session of this Conference was held on Christmas Eve, and the Secretary of State reviewed the progress made, and later announced that the conclusions reached would be drafted into precise form in the shape of a White Paper, which would then be placed before a strong committee representative of the main bodies of opinion in Parliament. It was not easy to gather exactly what decisions had been reached in the Conference; but the point which struck the expert in the kaleidoscope of Indian administration was the multiplicity of gaps which, judging only by the speech of the Secretary of State himself, remained to be filled in the pattern, compared with the time which appeared to be left for that purpose. The size of the Central Legislature; the manner of election of the British Indian section of the Upper House; the grouping of the smaller States and the fair representation of the whole 552 States, jagirs, etc., in the Upper Federal Chamber; the weightage, if any, to be given to the States as a body in the Central Legislature; the power of the Indian Legislature to

modify the franchise or the composition of the legislative bodies; a variety of difficult questions concerning Federal finance—these and other matters of minor importance, such as the educational qualifications, if any, for voters to different legislative bodies, seemed to be still left 'in the air.'

In due course, on March 17, the promised White Paper was made public. Before we turn to its discussion it should in justice first be said that the Government has every right to claim that the period under review, in spite of the fact that it opened with a definite cleavage with the Congress Party, has been one of remarkable progress. The Government have fully redeemed their promise that the building of the Constitution should not be hindered by the stern measures they had to adopt against Congress and their claim that their action would, on the contrary, enable them to accelerate the pace.

And yet! Why is there in many minds, Indian as well as British, a certain feeling of misgiving, the shadow of a suspicion of a doubt? It is apparent in the speeches of Mr. Baldwin, Sir John Simon, and even of Sir Samuel Hoare himself in the debate of March 27 and 29. Why have some of us, the present writer amongst the number, found ourselves wondering whether no other solution of the Indian problem was possible; whether democracy, which is not making a very brilliant show even in Western countries in these modern days, is really a very suitable growth for experimental planting purposes in the soil and surroundings of Hindustan; and whether it is too late to look round for some more congenial background for the lay-out of this Oriental garden-design. For outside the 'intelligentsia' democracy is not really understood in India; from the average Indian's point of view it is an exotic, and we are contemplating introducing it into India, not only as an exotic, but as a hybrid at that. This latter quality springs from the Federation plan; that development has involved us in the necessity of finding a means of combining in one scheme a democratic and an autocratic system. The greatest difficulties in England's task in India have their origins in two sources—namely, the religious antagonism between Hindu and Muslim, and the bringing under one yoke States that have been under monarchical rule for centuries and Provinces that have been trained for a hundred years in the school of 'government by the people.' Except for these hundred years, India since the dawn of history has been accustomed to personal rule; it is the form of government which the masses understand best and which the common people like, whatever the more advanced politicians may say. The antagonism between Hindu and Muslim we should have had to face always; to create a feeling of brotherly love and national union between

these two is likely to be a matter of a century's duration, even if everything were made easy for such a change of spirit. The other trouble is largely of our own making; if we had approached the problem a century ago from another angle, if we had pursued a policy of indirect rather than direct rule, if we had, as Elphinstone said, 'cherished whatever was good in the Indian system' (*e.g.*, the organisation of the *punchayet* or village communities), if we had always been led by men after the stamp of Warren Hastings and Sir Thomas Munro instead of by men like Lord Dalhousie, the present difficulty of combining two systems of government would not have arisen. All India, except perhaps small areas here and there, would have been State territory; there simply would have been no dual system to contend with. And if within these States the democratic spirit had in time become clamant, they would have developed, as Mysore and Travancore appear to be doing, through the stage of autocracy towards a modified system of popular representation and the eventual establishment of a system of pure constitutional monarchy in each area, the central control which Great Britain has engineered being maintained at the same time throughout the period of transition in the whole collection of States.

Incidentally, this course would have rendered the Hindu-Muslim problem far easier of solution. For the democratic system that is now being planned for British India will involve elections in some part of that territory probably not less than two or three times a year on an average, and the excitement of elections provides unrivalled material for fanning the flame of racial animosities. It is significant that since the Reforms racial feeling between the two sects has become more embittered, and has led not only to violent outburts of crime in British India, but to serious and wide disturbances in at least two Indian States, where previously such trouble had been quiescent for a century. With a system of States only, there would have been no elections until each area was considered to be ready for them and able to bear them without turmoil or upheaval.

Too late, probably by some sixty years; that, it is to be feared, is the only echo to these reflections. And up to 1930, when the Simon Commission was engaged on its Report, it certainly seemed too late. Then a new and unexpected development occurred. The Indian Princes expressed their desire to be associated in a scheme for All India. A Federation for the whole sub-continent had till that moment been a dream; suddenly it became a reality. There was rejoicing and enthusiasm over the grand vista opened up by this announcement. But the far-reaching implications of the development were not grasped till long afterwards. The Simon Commission had regarded it as a

remote possibility and had no authority to study and report on it. Consequently the public who chose to read and digest the Simon Report were able to learn almost everything there was to be learned about British India, but next to nothing about the bearing on the whole Indian problem of the entry of the Indian States. In fact, this change introduced into the original scheme an element which altered its entire character and which might well have involved another Simon Commission all to itself, and possibly a reconstruction of the whole plan from the beginning. Sir Samuel Hoare has expressed his belief that historians would regard this decision as a turning-point in the history of the British Empire, and that is doubtless true. But it might also have been regarded at the time as more of a turning-point for the Indian Empire. Its innumerable repercussions on the earlier problem do not seem to have been understood till quite recently, and even now are still seen only, as through a glass, darkly. But the States occupy a very large portion of India; the claims and interests and idiosyncrasies of the Princes are distinct and individual, and their number is legion. Hence the troubles that still attend the problem of Federation for All India. Would it not have been possible in 1930, had the full proportion of the Princes' action been grasped, to make an effort to find out, by means of a *plébiscite* of existing electors and of town and village groups, whether the Indian people as a whole, including not only the intelligentsia, but also the inhabitants of the States as well as of British India, were really in favour of guiding India along a steeply democratic path or more gently by a route leading through the ancient custom of personal rule to a system of limited constitutional monarchy in each area under the ægis of the Crown? A large majority vote in favour of the more gradual ascent would have shown to the public where India stood and would have overridden any promise or pledges given by England to the small section by whom three-quarters of the population, or, to be more accurate, one-twentieth of that three-quarters, are under existing arrangements represented. This seemed to some of us a possible line of advance at that moment; it is not perhaps possible now. In any case, it would have been well at that moment to warn British India that the new situation created by the Chiefs' action, while it opened up a new and glorious vista, was certain to introduce a certain retardation in the fashioning of the new Constitution, especially if Federation, as the majority of Indian delegates at the Conference of 1932 desired, was to precede the start of autonomy in any form in any Province of British India.

For there are reasons for thinking that a considerable time must pass before the Federation of India becomes an established

fact. A period of some eighteen months after the announcement of the Chiefs' decision in 1930 elapsed before the Chamber of Princes passed its unanimous vote as to the conditions on which they were prepared to enter into an All-India Federation. These conditions were of a general character and reflected the conservatism which governs a great number of the Order. They were as follows: (1) that necessary safeguards should be embodie in the Constitution; (2) that their rights under treaties, *sanads*, or engagements should remain inviolable and inviolate; and (3) that their sovereignty and internal independence should remain intact, the obligations of the Crown to the States remaining unaltered. Finally, the Chiefs requested that the Crown should accept responsibility for securing guarantees on the above three points. In the debates on the White Paper no speaker seems to have referred to this Resolution. The White Paper, in the second section, says that, by a formal Instrument of Accession, any Ruler desiring to accede to the Federation will transfer to the Crown for the purposes of the Federation his powers of jurisdiction in respect of those matters which he is willing to recognise as federal matters; and the powers and jurisdiction so transferred will thereafter be exercised by the Governor-General and the Federal authorities. From this it would seem that the choice of matters which shall be regarded as Federal will be with the acceding Chief. All-India means of communication, such as post, telegraphs and railways, are generally under the control of the Government of India at present, and these are likely to be included in the powers and jurisdictions ceded, but beyond that there is a whole range of Federal subjects about which different Chiefs are likely to take different views, and all are likely to think twice. In the Kathiawar States, Customs are certain to supply a fruitful source of discussion, and the Chiefs concerned will not freely accept the recommendations made in this matter by the 'fact-finding' Committee. It seems clear that the Instruments of Accession cannot be framed on any uniform type. Each one will have to be dealt with individually, and when one considers that there are 235 States, apart from 327 estates and *jagirs* outside British India, it is obvious that the discussion of these Instruments, their preparation, final approval and eventual signature, will be an affair of no short duration.

The White Paper states that Federation will not be proclaimed until the Rulers of States representing not less than half the aggregate population of the Indian States and entitled to not less than half the seats allotted to all the States in the Upper Federal Chamber have signified their desire to accede. Half the population of the States could be provided by the ten largest units, but it would scarcely be possible to give the 100 seats reserved for

States' representatives in the Council of State and the 125 in the Assembly to so small a contingent; hence the second condition. But the White Paper does not define the distribution among the States of the seats in the Upper Federal Chamber, nor does any definition on this point seem to have been made public as yet. Moreover, a few Princes, holding only half the seats allotted to their Order in the Federal Chamber, would clearly be at a great disadvantage as against the representatives of British India in the same bodies, since the latter are certain to be up to their full strength from the beginning. These numerous and complicated questions are not at all likely to be settled easily; yet decisions must be reached and the results published before the subject of Federation can even be approached.

There is another point, referred to in the previous article—namely, the desire of many of the Chiefs to form a confederation among themselves in order to acquire the strength of combination and a measure of uniformity in relation to matters of Federal interest. The recent appointment of H.H. the Maharaj Rana of Dholpur, who is one of the most enthusiastic supporters of this policy, as Vice-Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes seems to indicate that the principle of a confederation of Princes in constant touch with political developments is gaining adherents. But if this measure is pursued there must again be long negotiations and correspondence with each and every Chief before a confederation can take shape. Lord Sankey, at the final session of the 1932 Conference, made an eloquent appeal to the Chiefs to advance the scheme of the Government by notifying their readiness to enter the Federation when the Select Committee began its task, probably in the early summer of this year; but in spite of this, and in view of the difficulties and causes of delay above described, it seems extremely probable that States to the requisite number will need a much longer period to register their final decision. Even after their consent, the final steps—*i.e.*, the drafting and approval of the individual Instruments of Accession—may well raise new points of doubt or difficulty and involve long and laborious negotiation. And not a single negotiation in regard to any one of these Instruments of Accession can even be begun until the Princes know the terms of the proposed Federation—that is, until the new Act has been approved by Parliament. These are grave reasons for anticipating a slow advance on the part of the States.

A few words may be said about the gaps that were mentioned in a previous paragraph. The White Paper has filled up a number of these by making proposals where agreement in Conference was not reached; a tentative decision has been offered, and is left for discussion in the Select Committee in Parliament. For

instance, the size of the Federal Chambers, brought into the melting-pot again owing to the larger extension proposed in the franchise, is tentatively fixed as follows: for the Council of State, 260 members, of whom 150 will be from British India and 100 appointed by the Rulers of States; for the House of Assembly, 375 members, 250 from British India and 125 from the States. A definite procedure is formulated in regard to the Federal financial proposals; out of the 150 seats allotted to British India in the Council of State, 135 are proposed to be filled by election by the members of the Provincial Legislatures, by means of the single transferable vote, though Muslims at the Third Conference desired to reserve their judgment on this point, until they knew what the result would be on the communal proportions of the whole. And there are numerous other items, for which a solution is offered in the White Paper, obviously as a *modus vivendi* rather than as an *ex cathedrâ* finding, since they cover points regarding which it was admitted that, agreement not having been reached, further discussion would be needed. It is remarkable, however, that the majority of these items concern the Central Legislature of the Federation, while those which concern British India, except where a communal issue is involved, are few and insignificant; and these latter are for the most part left to be regulated by Orders in Council—*e.g.*, the qualifications of electors and the delimitation of constituencies. It will be observed that the White Paper gives great detail as to the methods of election and representation in the British India side of the new Constitution; out of thirty-nine pages of appendices, two only deal with Federal matters. This perhaps is but a natural result of the existing situation, but at the same time there was obvious room for more detail on the Federal side. Up to the end of 1932, at least, the progress made in regard to the representation of the States in the Central Legislature was known to be inconsiderable; and the telegrams from India since then do not give the impression that in this matter events have moved with any startling rapidity. This seems to reinforce the conclusion that Federation is not to be expected in the near future.

Nevertheless, the Federation of All India is and must remain the best solution of the Indian problem. Everyone recognises this—the Chiefs themselves as a body, as well as the leaders of British India. The Chiefs are entitled to have a voice in the policy of India; British India can be seriously hampered and injured in her future development if the States remain outside as disinterested, if not actually hostile, spectators. For India's future peace and happiness and the smoothness of its administration, co-operation between these two great units is essential. The Federation idea must at all costs be preserved. But in order

to preserve it either British India may have to wait for a length of time which may try its patience sorely, or there must be a review of the decision, reached in the Second Conference, that provincial autonomy must not precede Federation. On the horns of this dilemma, the leaders of the movement in British India may well prefer the second alternative. And, indeed, this course has very much to recommend it. To introduce Federation and provincial autonomy together at one and the same moment would really amount to a leap in the dark. It was a matter of amazement to many observers that this proposal was accepted by the Government and only the further proposal for the giving of a date for the transfer of power *en bloc* rejected. The grant of power at the centre was conditional on the establishment of an All-India Federation; and it seemed unwise to agree to keep British India waiting for this consummation, and to lose the opportunity of allowing self-government to be tried in the Provinces at an earlier date. The British Government have always laid stress on the fact that the process of the transfer should be gradual; ever since the first announcement of 1917 that has been the theory, if not the practice. The promise of that year was the progressive realisation of responsible government by successive stages—not by one blind leap on some fortuitous date. The grant of provincial autonomy throughout India would in itself be an immense step forward in the promised direction, a step which some might say is entirely lacking in the quality of gradualness.

The White Paper reflects the excellent work done in the Third Conference in regard to safeguards. Now that these have taken their place in the picture, they seem to fill a larger space than was anticipated, and the Congress extremists and others nearer home are bandying cheap witticisms about the quills of a porcupine, stones for bread, mountains and mice, 'Home Rule for the Viceroy,' and so on. But the more moderate men in India—and it is pleasing to see amongst them a substantial majority in the Legislatures—have the sense to prefer the old tag, 'Better not look a gift horse in the mouth.' Although alterations were asked for in both Chambers, and though in the Assembly an unanimous vote was passed calling for substantial amendments, the spirit of acceptance and co-operation was clear and unmistakable. It was a refreshing change from the old atmosphere of unthinking opposition. The safeguards impose a very heavy, almost personal, responsibility on the Viceroy and Governors, the former in particular, as Lord Zetland has pointed out. It seems likely that previous experience of India will be a *sine quâ non* in the case of the Viceroy of the future, and that the new precedent set by Lord Willingdon's appointment will in future become, not the exception, but the rule. It is to be hoped that the safeguards will

never have to be used, for this would be a return to autocracy indeed, and that amongst an alien and possibly alienated people. So long as the elective system produces men of good sense in the Legislatures, the mere suggestion of these safeguards being brought into use should suffice. The most serious menace of the future lies in the possible return to power of extremists, and, it is painful to add, in the present spirit of the Labour Party, which, if given free rein, would plunge India into anarchy and disintegration in the twinkling of an eye. The steps that are now in contemplation are more than ample for the moment. They not only fulfil, but exceed the fulfilment of, Great Britain's promise of the gradual introduction of self-government. Indeed, if provincial autonomy comes first, a firm control at the centre over the whole of the Indian police should be maintained pending Federation. Sir John Simon in his speech in the March debate stated that the proposed transfer of Law and Order was based on the assumption that there would be at the centre a strong Government, meaning, of course, a strong Federal Government. If provincial autonomy should come first, there may yet be a long interregnum before Federation follows. During this period he would presumably prefer the proposals of his Commission's Report to those of the White Paper in respect of Law and Order. The Commission admitted the strength of the arguments against their own conclusion, but were swayed by considerations of a political character to the other view. Important as these considerations may be, it is perhaps too soon, in the present circumstances of India, to let them hold the field. The transfer of Law and Order might well be gradual and might be made experimentally in one Province, or at the most two; certainly not in any Province where terrorist crime is still rife. A breathing space for this purpose would be useful while Federation materialises, and would enable Viceroy and Governors to test the working of the special responsibilities which are to be placed upon them. And time is needed to bring the Congress Party in. The White Paper, giving 40 per cent. of the seats in the Federal Chambers to the Princes and 33⅓ per cent. to the Muslims, leaving only 26⅔ per cent. for the Hindus and all other sections of the communities in British India, does not seem to encourage this end. It is true that the great majority of the Princes will be of the Hindu race, but the representatives of that great section in British India will require a more substantial share than the proposed arrangement allows them.

Many Indians themselves are conscious of the need for ordered progress and efficient preparation. The writer met more than one delegate to the last Conference who, while recognising the good-will and sincerity of the British members, was distinctly

apprehensive of pushing on at too rapid a pace. They felt that the conditions of India of to-day were still far from affording the elementary essentials of a self-governing unit. And, since all parties, including even the Congress, favoured an All-India Federation as the basis of the scheme, they frankly recognised that anything leading to its premature birth would entail very serious damage to its subsequent growth, if not to its subsequent existence.

Perhaps their apprehensions of prematurity are themselves premature. While there are those that think the British Government is again 'pressing,' perhaps it is merely engaged in laying out the course. Or, to change the metaphor, it is engaged in painting a picture, a very attractive picture, of the possibilities. The picture is being prepared for eventual presentation to India. It is not nearly finished. The background is at present little more than a blur; there are numerous *lacunæ* still to be filled in, and most of them can only be filled in with the help of Indians themselves; the picture has to be tried in different lights; colours here and there may have to be toned down and shades toned up. When the gaps, and more especially the background of Federation, have been duly touched in, when the whole composition has been harmonised with the help of India's leading men of sense and moderation, then and not till then will the picture be ready to be made over as England's best and last gift to India. The genius of the British race abhors a scamped and unfinished job; and it is to be trusted, especially since the essential facts of the situation have begun to be better understood, to see that their gift shall be a well-composed work of real value.

So the longer view remains unchanged, though advance during the last year has been creditably rapid. The signpost which pointed us once along a better and possibly shorter route to the goal has been left behind. There is no going back. We must move forward along a more arduous path. Let us not imagine that we are even yet within easy distance of our destination, and above all let us not encourage the Indians themselves to entertain such an idea. This view will doubtless be unpopular. The British public loathes the thought of continued repression in India. So does Lord Willingdon; so does every Indian administrator. There is a common desire to give to India's leading politicians of this generation the boon they ask for without further delay and circumvention; and with those who judge by European standards there is a natural apprehension of the dangers attending the suppression of political aspirations. India, however, is not comparable with a homogeneous European country; its population is as mixed as those of all the countries in Europe; civil disobedience has waned, not waxed, under a strong grasp of the

rudder. The issue of Federation and the birth of a genuine national spirit, on which success depends, will be still-born if the scheme is launched, and control abandoned in undue haste. In that case all the ambitions and aspirations of popular leaders and of Princes will vanish into dust. The reasons which forbid acceleration of the pace lie in the facts themselves; they are not occasioned by extraneous causes for which Great Britain is responsible. She has already demonstrated her good-will. In India there is greater danger in ignoring or slurring over these reasons than in facing courageously the need for careful and deliberate advance, coupled with the due seizure of every opportunity for a step forward, when it comes. This course is more likely to bring the extreme sections to our side than the alternative one of giving them a free hand to preach their doctrines of subversion and disunion. Many Indians recognise the difficulties of rapid progress; and it would be well if measures could be organised, regardless of expense, to bring these difficulties home to the millions of the rural population, who have been riddled by the propaganda of the ill-disposed. The one thing these millions desire is a firm and stable Government, and they should learn that nothing is more certain to defeat the fulfilment of this desire than the triumph of those who to-day advocate separation.

Pending the conversion of the Independence Party and the completion in full detail of a Federal Constitution, surely Great Britain would be wise to keep the guidance firmly in her own hand. '*Festina*' is for India. Let her hasten and let England keep step with her, by all and every means. But at the same time let England not forget that, in this connexion and at the present stage, the pith of the motto lies in the last word, '*lente*.' Perhaps the truest and the sanest word spoken in the parliamentary debates was uttered by Lord Lytton when he said that the Indians had too long lived under the fallacy that a self-governing and workable Constitution for India was a thing which it was in our power to give them at one stroke, and not what it really is, a thing which it was in their power to achieve.

ELLIOT G. COLVIN.

THE MOSCOW TRIALS AND THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

IT is not altogether unnatural that during the last few months the attention of all those interested in international affairs should have been very largely concentrated on the developments in Germany and the United States. The outbreak of terrorism and violence in the one and the vehemence of the economic crisis in the other offered a novelty and, as such, possessed the greatest possible news value. Soviet Russia, on the other hand, had lately somehow or other lost part of her attraction; she was definitely under an eclipse so far as the British public is concerned, and both politicians and the intelligentsia had turned to other things. That was one of the main reasons why the sudden arbitrary arrest by the Soviet authorities of some British engineers working in Soviet Russia came as a complete surprise. The shock was unexpected and therefore all the more violent. The Soviets have just re-entered the stage with a bang, and once again they are in the limelight. But perhaps it may be said that to the student of Russian conditions there is nothing surprising in all this, and that no great prophet was necessary to foretell that sooner or later the Soviets would once again indulge in what the Prime Minister once described as 'monkey tricks.' After all, they have been doing it regularly for the last fifteen years, and if the rest of the world were not so thick-skinned it would not have to wait for the occasional more blatant outbreaks to sit up and take notice of the Bolshevist methods of government.

It is not even a question of ignorance, as might have been the case during the early stages of Bolshevism. Foreign Governments and foreign public opinion should know full well by now what is happening in Soviet Russia, and could have known it for years if they had only chosen to do so. But they deliberately ignore it or misconstrue it—politicians and business men, because Soviet Russia is an important trump card in their own game; the intelligentsia, because to them, too, the Soviet system offers untold possibilities for fighting their own little battles. It is not a paradox to say that to the foreigner (*i.e.*, non-Russian)

Soviet Russia is but an instrument, a weapon, or else an object of idle curiosity, but that Russia *in se* has ceased to exist. The more radical elements in most countries, disgusted as they are by the imperfections or failure of capitalism, of parliamentarism and of democracy, see a kind of panacea against the world's evils in Communism (occasionally also in Fascism), and particularly in the Five-Year Plan. Having made up their mind that the Bolsheviks are conducting an 'interesting experiment'—the choice of the adjective is either meaningless or insulting—most people settle down in their preconceived ideas and then go out on a quest for information to substantiate their own point of view. Some of them even visit the Soviet Republic to collect on the spot what they take to be evidence justifying their pro-Bolshevist, or now and again (very seldom) anti-Bolshevist, theories. And then they lavish it on a placid and ignorant public that swallows everything. It is an insult to intelligence that these trippers to Soviet Russia should be given the opportunity of publishing their ineptitudes when the sole qualification of such authors is their ignorance of Russia and the impertinence with which they talk of that country. 'The Russian book market,' says Mr. Kingsley Martin in the introduction to his own recent book on Russia, 'is spoilt by sloppy, prejudiced, dogmatic, myopic slush.' I quite agree with him. Yet the means of finding out about conditions in the Soviet Republic is a simple one indeed, and is easily accessible to anybody who has any knowledge of the Russian language. All that is necessary is a systematic, careful, and regular study of the Soviet Press. And there the reader will find infinitely more real information than the foreign visitor who pays a flying visit with 'Intourist' or, as he thinks, occasionally on his own. If you read and analyse the Soviet papers you have in your possession a fund of material enabling you to draw a picture of Soviet Russia that cannot be challenged.

Now, the Soviet Press is a very peculiar institution. There are no independent papers in the Soviet Republic: they are all either under the direct control of the central Government, the Communist Party and the local Soviets, or else they are controlled by the innumerable offshoots of these organisations. Yet both in its articles and in its *faits divers* the whole of the Soviet Press is continuously pouring out a torrent of anti-Soviet facts and revelations. Sometimes this gets weaker and sometimes it is allowed to get stronger, but it never ceases completely: the much-talked-of 'self-criticism' is always there. How is it possible, it may be asked, that the Soviet Press—devoid as it is of any freedom—should be able to publish so much that is against the Soviets and that is so damaging to them? How is it possible that you should find in *Pravda*, or *Isvestia*, or *Economitcheskaya*

Zhisn, or *Za Industrialliszatsiou*, for instance, facts and figures which by far surpass anything a 'Riga correspondent' or a professional anti-Bolshevik might concoct in his wildest moments? It is pathetic how almost every time some foreign friend or admirer of the Soviet *régime* gets up and says something his statements are completely contradicted by things that appear in the Soviet Press. The explanation of this phenomenon, which might at first appear illogical and incredible, is in fact very simple. There is nothing Machiavellian in it, as some people might be led to think. The Soviet Press is in the first instance a vehicle of propaganda in the hands of the Government—in fact the most potent instrument of propaganda they have got. In a country of Russia's size, with a population of 160,000,000, it is in many ways the only means by which the Government and its affiliated institutions can get at the people at all. Therefore the Soviets cannot avoid addressing their admonitions, exhortations, appeals and threats to the population otherwise than through the Press. And in doing so they are compelled to reveal everything which is wrong or which has failed. Even their praise of what they consider achievements is invariably followed by the greatest emphasis on failures and imperfections, with the inevitable appeal at the end to put these things right. As a result of this the Soviet Press offers a peculiar contradiction—on the one hand, verbose, bombastic and extremely vague bragging about what has been done, and how everything has been 'achieved,' 'fulfilled,' or even 'exceeded'; on the other hand, an ever-growing chorus of lamentations that nothing works, that inefficiency, corruption, incompetence, and the lack of 'proletarian enthusiasm' are the root of all evil and are threatening to destroy the country. Only it so happens that the facts and figures to be found in Soviet publications fully corroborate the lamentations and make one wonder on what precisely the assertions of success and achievement are based! Of course, the Press never draws the only logical inference from these admissions of failure, because that would reveal the true cause of it all—the Soviet system itself. It is obvious that from the point of view of the Soviet authorities other reasons or excuses have to be sought, and this has a very direct bearing on the series of Moscow trials culminating in the recent case of the six British engineers. We will revert to that later. But the admission of failure is definitely there—failure which is by no means limited only to the economic functions of the Soviet system.

The principal object of the Five-Year Plan is to create Socialism in the Soviet Republic in the shortest possible period. Its main task is, therefore, increased industrialisation, a forced industrial expansion which aimed at 'overtaking and surpassing'

Europe and America in every branch of production. First of all the basic industries are to be developed, those creating the means of production, whereas the lighter industries are to follow suit in a slower *tempo*. Almost equally important is the object of making the U.S.S.R. absolutely independent of the capitalistic world both in respect of production and raw materials: Russia must be completely self-sufficient. As to the enormous capital investments required by this vast programme of industrialisation, the bulk is to come from the peasantry. The Five-Year Plan rejects the 'capitalist method' of the appropriation of the worker's surplus production and counts only to a small degree on imported capital, whether in the shape of money or of goods. Agriculture is to be the real source of the supply of capital, and therefore its transformation from private ownership to collective farming is only to be a gradual one. For the same reason the Plan implies only a gradual liberation from the laws of a money economy, and relies on the continued existence for some time of private property in small industrial and commercial undertakings side by side with those belonging to the State. Finally, it includes an extensive programme for raising the material and the cultural standard of the population, by providing more and better food and industrial goods, higher wages, better working conditions, better houses and greater social hygiene, as well as many other reforms in the realm of social policy, culture and education. 'The Five-Year Plan,' according to its authors, 'will bring the country to an unheard-of high level of material and cultural development.'

Now we are told that the Five-Year Plan has been triumphantly fulfilled in four years, and that a second Five-Year Plan embracing the years 1933–1937 is to be put into operation. It might be asked why, if the Plan were really fulfilled, it should be necessary to go any further and do anything else. Surely its 'triumph' would imply the establishment of Socialism in Russia, her complete economic self-sufficiency, and the achievement of all the other wonderful objects envisaged in the Five-Year Plan. The very fact of the introduction of a successor to it should prove that there must be something wrong with the alleged 'triumph.' Let us look at the 'achievements' and base our observations solely and entirely on what can be found in the Soviet papers. Forced industrialisation, it must be remembered, has nothing to do either with Communism or with the Five-Year Plan; it can only be considered as one of the instruments for achieving the fundamental objects of the Plan. In Tsarist Russia under Count Witte, and in many other countries (*e.g.*, in recent years, Japan), a very great deal has been achieved in the way of forced industrialisation. The Soviets cannot therefore claim the monopoly of

that invention, and the success of their 'general line' must be judged by other standards than the erection of factories. Even in that respect they are extremely vulnerable, although the building of plant, which is not the same as its economic utilisation, has certainly reached huge proportions. But there are other and more significant tests.

First of all, as to the 'unheard-of high level of material wellbeing.' According to the *Pravda* of January 1, 1933, wages in Soviet Russia have risen during the period 1928–1932 by 67 per cent., the 1932 average being 120 Chervonetz roubles a month, or 49 more than in 1928, 'while in England they have fallen by 15 per cent., in the United States by 35 per cent., and in Germany even by 50 per cent.' That sounds marvellous, only there is a little snag about it: no mention is made in this context of the depreciation of the Chervonetz rouble and of the value of 'real wages.' But elsewhere in the Soviet papers we find the following details about the proportions inflation has gained in the Soviet Republic. The utmost limit to which the Plan would allow Russia's note issue to rise was 3,220,000,000 Chervonetz roubles in 1933, as compared with 1,970,000,000 in 1928. But, according to their own official reports, in July 1932 the Soviet had 6,138,000,000 in circulation, which is twice the amount budgeted for as the very extreme total for this year. Since then no precise figures have been published, in order to conceal the further progress of inflation, but it can be judged by the following movement in the price of foodstuffs. At the principal co-operative shops of Moscow, Leningrad, and the main industrial centres—and these shops are supposed to be the cheapest and most severely controlled in the Soviet Union—the price of cabbages increased over the period July 1931–July 1932 by 125 per cent. During the same period the price of potatoes moved from 22 kopeks per kilo in June 1931 to 90 kopeks in July 1932, and only one month later to 1 rouble 70 kopeks, or 2328 per cent. more than in 1928! These figures are taken from *Pravda* and *Isvestia*; moreover, cabbages and potatoes are two of the main sources of nourishment in Soviet Russia. In terms of potatoes the Russian wage-earner, with his average of 120 roubles a month, would be therefore able to buy 133 kilos if you take the July price of 90 kopeks a kilo, or about 70 kilos at the August price. In other words, infinitely less than even the British unemployed, who with his 15*s*. 3*d*. per week can buy 440 kilos a month. And lest I should be asked why I have picked on the potato, of all things, let it be remembered that Karl Marx singled out that vegetable as a true measure of 'real wages' because it is the cheapest and most universal foodstuff in Europe. Compare, then, the rise in wages of 67 per cent., of which the Soviets are so proud, to the rise in the price of

potatoes, which is 2328 per cent., and the 'triumphant achievement' will become only too obvious.

But the co-operative shops are notoriously empty, and people who want anything to eat have to buy it through different channels. The latest and, in the words of the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted in January, 'highest' form of commercial intercourse which has taken the place of private capitalistic transactions is the 'Collective Farm Bazaar.' It is proclaimed to be a further proof of the 'predominance of socialistic elements in the national economy,' and it means the selling of agricultural products by the collectivised peasants to the population of the socialistic cities. In Moscow in January 1933 you could buy a kilo of butter at the 'Collective Farm Bazaar' for 60 roubles; in the autumn of 1932 it cost 24 to 28 roubles, in 1928 2 roubles, and in 1913 1 rouble. In January 1933 you had to pay 16 roubles for ten eggs; in the autumn of 1932 these were 7 to 8 roubles, in 1928 50 kopeks, and in 1913 12 kopeks. In January 1933 a kilo of meat cost 25 roubles; in the autumn of 1932 8 to 9 roubles, in 1928 90 kopeks, and in 1913 18 kopeks. The price of milk was 2 roubles 50 kopeks per litre in January 1933, 1 rouble 50 kopeks in the autumn of 1932, 20 kopeks in 1928, and 10 kopeks in 1913. The Five-Year Plan claims to have raised wages by 67 per cent., and it intended to raise the purchasing capacity of the rouble by 20 per cent. Only it so happens that, in spite of the alleged triumph, the figures I have quoted show that the purchasing capacity of the rouble in terms of agricultural produce has fallen from 25 to 150 times, and that the value of the Chernovetz rouble is no more than 4 pre-war kopeks at the very utmost.

How the Soviet wage-earner manages to live at all under these conditions it is almost impossible to conceive. Were it not for the fact that he gets a little cheap bread, which the Government takes away from the peasants by means of terror and violence, he simply could not exist. The Soviets describe this expropriation of the peasants as the 'carrying out by the peasants of their duties towards the State.' In point of fact, what it means is that the workman if he does not want to die is driven to participate in the process of robbing the peasant: a grim picture, the full measure of which cannot yet even be guessed at. That and similarly ruthless measures just manage to keep the workman from dying of starvation. If he wants to live he must fight for every ounce of bread, and both quantity and quality of what he gets are most unsatisfactory. Thus, to talk of an improvement in social conditions and of the realisation of an 'unheard-of high level of material well-being' is the sheerest nonsense.

An interesting confirmation of the havoc and devastation

caused by the Five-Year Plan to the people of Russia comes from a most unexpected quarter. Mr. Maurice Hindus, whose absorbing but extremely misleading books on Russia have made such a profound impression on British and American readers, is nothing if not an admirer of the Soviets. Yet in a recent article written upon his return from the Soviet paradise he says that 'the Five-Year Plan ends with the cultural standard of the Russian masses higher than it has ever been in Russian history, but with their standard of living lower than it has been in a decade, and in food appreciably lower than at the beginning of the Plan. Cruel indeed has been the price Russia has paid for the First Five-Year Plan.'

I will not argue here about the sweeping and irresponsible generalisation about cultural achievement. Suffice it to mention that the Soviets themselves by no means share Mr. Hindus' opinion, and as recently as February 1933 decided to overhaul completely their educational system, because of the lack of culture among the younger generation. Much more could be said on the subject. But what an admission for a man like Mr. Hindus about the other aspects of the Plan! 'Starving Russia' is a phrase that has lost its human appeal, but the fact remains that there is a ghastly shortage of food in Russia, and that this is due entirely to the insane agricultural policy of the Soviet Government. The resistance of the peasants to the so-called 'general line' of the Five-Year Plan, mainly passive though it has been, is assuming a threatening character. According to the *Pravda*, it was only with the help of the Government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party that 'it was possible to break the ribs' of the peasants in the Caucasus. No details of what actually happened are given, but it seems that the peasants' resistance there was recently anything but passive. Those very same collective peasants of the North Caucasian region were for over two years the object of unanimous praise in the Soviet papers. In Government resolutions and at party meetings and congresses they were described as 'the main support of the Soviet Government in the villages.' But recently they seem to have caused an extremely violent and dangerous riot. The cause of all this is that all over Russia—the Caucasus is merely a striking example—each peasant and each worker is nowadays individually faced with 'the bread problem,' which is very far from being 'fundamentally solved,' as Molotov proclaimed over a year ago. In fact, the situation in the collective and in the State farms is such that the Government has introduced a whole series of extraordinary measures, including the death penalty, for 'stealing socialistic property'—*i.e.*, for collectivised peasants stealing from their own collective farms in order to keep themselves alive. But

no measures seem sufficiently powerful to force the peasants to carry out the 'compulsory supplying of the State with corn by the collective farms and individual peasants,' as prescribed in the decree of January 19, 1933. Under the present system they simply will not do it, and they prefer to starve rather than obey. During the last few weeks the *Pravda* has been particularly alarmed because so little grain is being sown and because the peasants are deliberately sowing it slowly and badly. The 150,000,000 Russian peasants are breaking through and utterly ruining the Five-Year Plan, or indeed any kind of a plan, and are paralysing the further application of the 'general line.'

The breakdown of the latter is borne out by the Soviet Press in its daily communications. The further industrialisation process must be slowed down or discontinued. Of course, what is already there must be completed or maintained. The ambitious second Five-Year Plan, with which the failure of the first one was quite recently being covered up so noisily, has been dropped. A modest one-year plan, for the first year, has been adopted instead. But the Bolsheviks themselves no longer talk of 'catching up with' or 'surpassing' all the capitalistic countries of the world, and are driven to emphasising the need of mastering the expensive and intricate industrial plant which they have got and which gives little or no satisfaction. 'How can it be contended,' Stalin said at the last Communist Party Conference held in Moscow early this year, 'that our Soviet currency is worthless? Is it not a fact that with this currency we have built Magnitostroi, Dnieprostroi, Kusnetzkostroi, the Stalingrad and the Kharkov Tractor plants and hundreds of thousands of State farms?' It most certainly is not a fact, and Stalin knows that better than anybody else. The building of these industrial giants would admittedly have been impossible without foreign technical and financial help. And this help was paid for, not in Soviet currency, but in gold, in dollars and in pounds. In order to obtain these the Russian population was being starved and robbed of everything. And while foreign capitalists and engineers were always receiving a handsome remuneration for their goods and services, the Russians themselves were being paid in worthless paper roubles. The best proof, incidentally, of the worthlessness of the Soviet currency is the existence of the *torgsin*, or shops for supplying foreigners in Russia, which accept payment in foreign currency only. Thus it is a slave-driven, terrorised, and practically unpaid population, working under the supervision of foreigners who were paid in gold, which has put up the gigantic factories, some of which are not even well built and most of which it does not know how to operate. And, of course, it is a fact which is con-

stantly admitted in the Soviet Press that this plant cannot be properly utilised, not only because of inadequate technical knowledge, but because frequently the factories cannot even be supplied with the raw materials they require, owing to the fact that in many cases they are too far removed from the centres of population they are supposed to provide for. The chaotic state of transport—also admitted in the Soviet papers almost daily—helps to paralyse the would-be activities of these gigantic factories, that have to remain idle or to turn out goods of such inferior quality that they can hardly be used at all. These luxurious superfluities are not only unprofitable, but they are actually threatening to crumble away, thus involving the total loss of the huge investment they represent. 'Mastering' the plant is the great and somewhat pathetic slogan put forward by Stalin at the last party conference in Moscow—'mastering' the plant and mastering the peasants, for so far the Soviet Government has proved quite incapable of assuring the smooth working of either. The 'general line,' in other words, has broken down, and the economic breakdown of the Five-Year Plan has once again opened up the ever-latent political crisis of the Communist dictatorship. That Stalin and his satellites are fully aware of this can be seen from the various measures they are constrained to take daily, and as usual economic difficulties are being treated by political methods. The Communist dictatorship must be ruthlessly reinforced; everybody or everything that is against it must be wiped out; terrorism and violence must rule supreme; the proper quotation from Lenin's speeches or writings must be found; and, finally, there must be scapegoats and they must receive a model punishment.

During the fifteen years of Communist dictatorship these scapegoats have varied a great deal both in numbers and in character. But the principle of finding scapegoats and attributing to them the failure of the Soviet Government has remained unchanged. Somebody has always been in the way and has prevented the full realisation of the Soviets' programme. First the remnants of the old Russian *bourgeoisie*; then the foreign capitalists and imperialists; then the 'N.E.P. men' in Russia; then the 'Left' and 'Right' opposition within the Communist Party; Trotzky, the *kulaks*, the semi-*kulaks*, and the 'middle' peasants; finally, the whole of the peasantry, which was driven into collective farming against the original intentions of the Five-Year Plan. Also Poincaré, Curzon, the Socialists in all other countries (the height of ingratitude, this), the Church, God—this list could be continued indefinitely. But side by side with all these alleged obstacles to the creation of integral Communism in Russia another bogey, both Russian and foreign, was created and

very widely exploited: the 'wrecker' or 'harmdoer'—*wreditel* in Russian. From time to time mock trials of these alleged 'wreckers' or 'harmdoers' are staged in Moscow and the victims are compelled to make the most sensational self-accusations. The *modus operandi* of the O.G.P.U. in these cases was described by Professor Vladimir Tchernavin in his letter to *The Times* on Tuesday, April 18. This distinguished Russian scholar was himself a victim of these methods and knows them, unfortunately, only too well. As he says, the O.G.P.U. investigations preceding these trials consist 'solely in trying to obtain from the prisoners, by means of moral and physical torture, the confession of crimes they had not committed.' And he enumerates the terroristic methods, unprecedented in their brutality, by which the Bolsheviks try to extort from their victims the desired confession.

The arrest and trial of the Metro.-Vickers engineers, preceded as it was by the shooting without trial of thirty-five Russians, is but a variation of a well-known theme. From the moment of their arrest it was plain that these six British engineers were being used as scapegoats or 'harmdoers.' Their innocence was obvious, not because they were British (the theory that a Briton can do no wrong is too futile to deserve even passing consideration), but simply because no people ever tried on similar charges of 'harmdoing' could be guilty. These trials, like those for witchcraft in the Middle Ages, are usually cases where the initial falsehood of the accusations is too blatant to mislead anybody, whatever the nature of the 'confessions' extorted from the unfortunate victim or victims. The Soviet authorities know perfectly well that the real 'wreckers' are, not the engineers, but the workers themselves. When the editor of the Soviet paper *Za Industriallizatsiou* recently took his courage in both his hands and said so publicly he was promptly removed from his office and all the other positions of distinction which he occupied in various Soviet institutions. He was severely reprimanded, and before long he may find himself in the dock among the 'harmdoers.' The fact remains that it is the workers who neither know how nor wish to operate the Soviet factories properly, who time and again have been found deliberately breaking or dismantling expensive machinery, putting sand in the oil, throwing nails or stones into the turbines and blast furnaces, and doing all the other things with which the six Britons have just been charged.

'Sabotage' or 'economic espionage' are as difficult to substantiate or to disprove (particularly the latter) as the charge of 'wrecking' and 'harmdoing.' But bribery and espionage pure and simple are a very different matter. That accounts very largely for the fact that the crimes with which the six Britons were charged were altered while the case was actually in progress.

The usual 'harmdoing' charges were more or less dropped and every endeavour was used to represent their offence as genuine, old-fashioned military espionage—not even of an 'economic character.' Wrecking, sabotage, bribery, and economic espionage could not be completely cut out, of course, since the Soviets have their own public to consider. But they also had foreign public opinion to cater for, and that is why they laid all the stress on the ordinary espionage business. They realised that no one abroad could take the allegations of 'wrecking' seriously, but that spying was in a class all by itself. How well they estimated the reactions of foreign, and chiefly British, public opinion (a tribute to their own most efficient spying system) can be seen from the fact that their calculations were absolutely correct. Immediately a number of people everywhere said: 'Well, perhaps there is something in that. Let us wait for the trial. There always have been spies in the world, so how do we know that these fellows weren't spies?' The fact that it is not the practice of Governments in general to intervene on the part of their spies once they are caught out and to make loud protestations of their innocence did not strike anybody as odd. Since all Governments use secret agents, such affairs are usually passed over with as much silence as possible. The Foreign Office and Sir Edmond Ovey would surely have known better than to intervene had there been even a vestige of truth in the Moscow accusations. It is sufficient to read Vishinsky's speech in which he proudly announced that the Soviet courts are an organ of class war to appreciate the fact that there was no need for the Bolsheviks, and never is, to produce any charges based on realities. I happen to possess a pamphlet written by the same Vishinsky last year on the subject of *Fifteen Years of Soviet Justice*, in which he considerably elaborates this point.

It is unfortunate for the six Britons that this time, for reasons best known to themselves, the Soviets should have hit on them to make them the scapegoats of their own failure. But that was one of the risks which foreigners must take in whatever capacity they are dealing with the Soviets. It is no use being surprised or indignant about it, because the unprecedented arbitrariness of the Soviets in all their dealings should be realised before you start. Indignation ought really to be directed at other quarters—at those who for fifteen years have made all this possible. Perhaps I may be allowed to quote from my previous article on 'The Moscow Trials and the Five-Year Plan'[1]:

> The Bolsheviks have never made a secret of their intention of destroying the capitalist system and ruining the rest of the world, but, not feeling strong enough as yet to achieve this object, they have been anxious to

[1] *Nineteenth Century and After*, April 1931.

use the financial resources, help, and co-operation of other countries until the moment to strike has arrived. Did not Lenin say, 'Our enemies, international capital, must help us to build up our State and create our weapons against them'?

Thus it must be realised by foreign countries that every penny lent directly or indirectly to the Soviets, that every foreign engineer, foreman or skilled worker who gives them the benefit of his knowledge and experience, that any other help or encouragement given them—whether material or spiritual—stands to strengthen them and enables them to draw nearer to their final goal. That in the meantime these transactions can be most advantageous to private firms and individuals there can be no doubt. A great deal of money has been made abroad out of discounting Soviet bills at 30 per cent. and more, or out of selling them all kinds of rubbish at prohibitive prices,[a] or again, out of buying from them cheap dumped goods. They are an easy-going lot, much to be appreciated in these times when trade is bad.

Far from being the Soviets' enemies, foreign capitalists all over the world are competing with each other in doing business with them. In spite of Russia's wholesale default they have lent her about £150,000,000 gold. In spite of the murder and expropriation of foreigners in Russia, other foreigners have placed themselves at the disposal of the Soviets. The Bolshevik can get away with everything and anything. Liberals and Socialists all over the world, who are so rightly indignant about reaction and terrorism elsewhere, accept and condone it in Russia. What is the reason of this conspiracy of silence? Not even the Bolsheviks themselves deny that they have murdered hundreds of thousands of people. Russian atrocities have lost their news value. They have lasted too long and taken place on too big a scale. But all the supposed apostles of peace, freedom, good-will, and humanity are silent. Their mentality does not seem to differ a great deal from those who produce or read tabloid newspapers. The Bolsheviks discovered this a long time ago, and they act accordingly. The capitalistic world swallows it all and goes on helping them.

Even a break in diplomatic and commercial relations would not stop it. No firms, groups, or individuals would turn down a Soviet order out of solidarity with some colleague or friend who has been badly treated by the Bolsheviks. Even Hitler, the sworn enemy of Communism, has just extended the great trade facilities already enjoyed by the Soviets in Germany in the past by granting them 200,000,000 marks new credits. Negotiations are taking place for another 50,000,000 marks. If the Bolsheviks had failed to obtain these additional facilities in Germany they would have been unable to meet their obligations. Rather than

[a] This is not a reflection on Messrs. Metro.-Vickers and was written over two years ago.

allow Communist Russia to default or to collapse, Fascist Germany and capitalistic Europe hasten to bolster her up again. The Bolsheviks know how to use that situation. Every time they have been in difficulties one or more capitalistic country has come to their rescue. Despite everything; despite their propaganda, their default on Russia's old obligations, their fraudulent trade methods, their bluff and blackmail; and despite their terroristic outrages, to which 160,000,000 Russians and a certain number of foreigners have been subjected for over fifteen years, and of which six Britons have just had so tragic an experience.

The revolting Moscow trials of the British 'harmdoers' are but one more illustration of the Soviets' failure; there is plenty of other evidence of their difficulties, which may perhaps in the end prove fatal to the Soviet *régime.* But no prognostications are possible, because, as I said in my previous article, 'the key to the Russian problem is not in Moscow; it is in London and Berlin.' *Quousque tandem?* it may be asked. As long as it will please the foreign capitalists, is the answer.

GEORGE SOLOVEYTCHIK.

DISARMAMENT AND THE BRITISH PLAN

THE Disarmament Conference has just resumed its activities in peculiarly inauspicious circumstances. In the first fortnight in March statements were made which let it be clearly understood that a breakdown of the Conference was likely, and that this breakdown would cause some mysterious catastrophe. In the words of Mr. MacDonald on a former occasion, 'A failure, in view of its consequences, is unthinkable.' Why it should be so was not explained; that also remained part of the mystery. Yet the impression given was that something unmentionable, or something at least to which it was undesirable to give a name, might happen. Since we do not share the responsibility of statesmen, we can be franker and ask whether the awful mystery, the unspeakable catastrophe hinted at, was war, immediate or ultimate. There is much evidence to show that this is what we are expected to believe. As a result we must not, as we otherwise might, look upon the winding up of this Conference as upon the closing of a very noisy monkey-house the chatter of which is quite unintelligible, but as a thing to be at all events avoided in the interests of the welfare of the world.

To emphasise the importance of this, the orthodox view, the Prime Minister himself, accompanied by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in person, rushed to Geneva to save the Conference with yet another plan, one which they had not even had time to study thoroughly—a plan with sufficient articles to keep up the talk, it has been calculated, for at least two years more, and placed this before the Conference. That the Conference after receiving this plan should immediately have adjourned for a month was a strange anti-climax, a further sign to the world that it does not understand work and time as Geneva does, but not, we may feel sure, a step intended to be in any way rude, nor yet one rendered necessary on medical grounds, since Geneva, having received so many plans before, is now shock-proof. Nor are Mr. MacDonald's and Sir John Simon's further actions to be considered in any way as 'getting their own back' on Geneva for this. It is true that their Roman visit sent a shudder through Europe, alarmed such experienced weather

prophets as Mr. Churchill, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Mr. Attlee, as well as most of the other members of the House of Commons, and terrified the Little Entente. Nothing like this should have happened. It was all a mistake based on a misapprehension—on a lack of understanding, according to those two Ministers, but particularly, we might add, on a lack of information. Nevertheless, whether they intended it or not, they got their own back on Geneva, and they showed it that if it could not disarm nations in accordance with their plan, they at any rate could quite easily, almost unconsciously, perform the opposite function.

What is this strange religion that has grown up amongst us? Why should its abandonment be so disastrous? Does Sir John Simon's statement in the debate on Disarmament represent the Government view, or does Mr. Baldwin's? The Foreign Secretary said, 'The main purpose of disarmament is to ensure a lasting peace'; while Mr. Baldwin later in the same debate said, 'Disarmament, in my view, will not stop war.' The high priests may differ in the virtues they claim for their religion, but they agree in executing its principles in this country, as our emaciated Fighting Services show. Further unilateral disarmament, they promise, will not take place. That is obvious, because while we have disarmed beyond the safety limit with the intention of giving the world the moral leadership it lacked, the other nations have steadily armed in accordance with their own ideas. We must give them credit for powers of judgment as great as our own and for just as great a desire for peace, though their methods and ours do not coincide. As we wish their co-operation and without it we can do nothing—for peace cannot be a unilateral achievement—and as we have thrust our plan upon them, the time has come when we must pause and ask ourselves whether our ideas are sound and practical, and whether they will enable us to achieve the aim we are setting before ourselves and the world.

If disarmament does what is claimed for it, then it will give us peace and reduce expenditure. But is there any connexion between armaments and peace? Do armaments cause war, or does war cause armaments? Official opinion plumps for the former proposition, and this is very natural. Senior officials to-day held responsible posts before 1914 and watched with anxiety the race in armaments in which Germany was setting the pace. The war, in the opinion of a large number of people, broke out when it did because it was necessary to put an end to a race which was becoming intolerably expensive, and it is possibly for this reason that armaments are generally accepted as the cause of war. But if we look a little more deeply at this case, and then a little more widely at other cases, we discover that this theory

is not convincing. The armament race took place in order that a war might be fought: that is true. But no race would have been necessary had armaments been the cause of war, since the cause would have been present before the race. It was therefore for some other reason that war had become necessary or desirable, and that armaments had to be provided so that the war could be fought. Thus war was the cause and not the result of the race and of the armaments. Similarly, was it really to put an end to an intolerable burden of armaments that war was declared? It may be so, but it is most unlikely, since war can hardly have been looked upon as a method of saving money except by the most short-sighted.

Looking farther afield we fail to find any case in which arms can be said to have been the cause of war, though we see how often it has been disadvantageous to be disarmed. In the wars of conquest, which have given us the greatest empire the world has seen, can it be said that it was our armaments which drove us on? The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries found us continually entering into wars for which we had most inadequate resources in armaments. We were not prepared for the reconquest of the Sudan, which it took us ten years to organise; and who can say that we were prepared for the Crimean, the Boer War, or even the last War? The American Civil War was fought between armies which were hardly armed at all in the beginning. La Vendée, one of the fiercest wars of the French Revolution, was fought by peasants who relied on victory to obtain both powder and arms. Similarly in the civil wars in China as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century, in which 100,000,000 are said to have perished, there was always a dearth of arms. In the more recent Chinese Civil War arms were more abundant but still inadequate, and, though China is looked upon as having been, and as still being, an unarmed country, more men have probably perished there by the sword than in the whole of the rest of the world. Nor can it be said that Japan went to war with China because she was armed and China was not. If, then, we read history aright, we can safely say that it is war which causes armaments, and not the contrary. Arms are a symptom, not a disease. And so, even if the Disarmament Conference succeeded in disarming the world completely, war would be just as possible—or rather more so. Who in this country will not subscribe willingly to the statement that the fighting forces of our country are a preventive of war, and so a bulwark of peace? Is it not due to them that India has enjoyed immunity for internal and external aggression for over a century? And who to-day so blind but does not recognise that it is due to France being at once the most pacific and the most armed Power in Europe, that there is still peace? This being so,

disarmament may be a very great danger indeed, as I shall try to show.

Another belief, which the public is asked to accept by the advocates of disarmament, is that it will save us money. The common method adopted is to mouth the enormous total represented by expenditure on armaments and to hold this up as being a sum which could be saved, thereby reducing taxation and bringing many indirect blessings. Is it preferable that in place of our armed forces we should have a still larger army of unemployed ? And is it not realised that a nation's capacity to defend itself depends on its power rapidly to manufacture armaments, and that once our armament firms close down that capacity thereby ceases ? Can we to-day, or are we likely to-morrow to be able to, take this risk ? I do not think so. A country that cannot manufacture its own armaments cannot guarantee its own independence. Here again saving is illusory, and its effects might well be disastrous. It may be said that Government factories could be maintained. So they could, but they would be more expensive, since private armament firms do not manufacture arms alone. But apart from that, modern armament embraces the products of almost the whole field of human industry, from which it cannot be isolated. To quote one example only. The Report of the Special Committee on Chemical Warfare contained the following among its general conclusions :

> It is not possible to prohibit the manufacture, import, export or possession of apparatus and substances capable of employment both for peaceful and for warlike purposes. Any such prohibition imposed upon a State would either be ineffective in practice, in view of the stocks held in industrial establishments, or it would inflict irreparable damage on the chemical industry.

So far, therefore, we see that there can exist considerable doubt as to what disarmament can achieve, and that there is some reason at least to support those who have politely but firmly rejected the type of disarmament proposals which our draft Convention now repeats.

Let us now examine methods pursued, especially those suggested in the draft Convention submitted by Great Britain in the middle of March, with a view to deciding whether or not there is in them any hope of practical achievement. During the past year the various Powers have submitted their plans. Suggestions ranged from complete abolition of all armaments to the creation of yet another force—an international force to enforce the decisions of the League. Then, finally, the Conference considered quantitative and qualitative methods of reduction. Agreement could not be reached on many points, and when in July a resolution was put to the Conference embodying these few points,

though forty-one nations voted in its favour, two voted against it and eight abstained. Germany, Italy, and Russia being in the latter categories, nothing further could be done. The reasons why all plans have so far failed to recommend themselves to all nations is because they are based on what I have endeavoured to show are erroneous beliefs, and secondly because they ignore certain fundamental principles. While other nations might be prepared to disarm because they believe that peace can thereby be achieved, they are not prepared to do so without a guarantee—a complete guarantee that no national danger will be thereby incurred, or, in other words, without complete provision being made for their security. No plan has put forward a satisfactory solution to the problem. To be adequate such a plan must include sanctions so swift of application and so shattering in their effect that no nation will face them, and, of course, the machinery by which these sanctions can be put into force. The dilatory way in which the existing League machinery works and its ineffectiveness in the Sino-Japanese dispute, even when unanimity of the Assembly was achieved, will act as a warning to every nation that its defence is its own affair, and that its cry to Geneva for help would at the best produce an opinion—possibly a unanimous opinion—but nothing more helpful. Our new draft Convention fails here, just as all others have done before. For the existing slow machinery it attempts to substitute something even slower. The Covenant provides for the immediate examination by the Council of any threatening situation on appeal by one member. Our latest suggestion demands that five nations must make the appeal, and that one of them must be one of the Great Powers, Japan being specifically mentioned in this category. It would hardly seem necessary to examine the further suggestions of the plan, unless we assume that it will be so amended as adequately to provide for security.

The first glance at this plan shows clearly that we have fallen into the time-honoured Geneva custom of disarming our neighbours rather than ourselves; a second glance that we propose to scrap the Peace Treaties; a third that we still maintain our belief in both quantitative and qualitative methods (in spite of the results of a whole year's intensive investigation which have proved them impossible) with all that bull dog tenacity which so often, and so successfully too on occasions, replaces intelligence in our affairs; a fourth glance that we still expect the world to believe that chemical warfare can be prevented. A final glance shows that all these recommendations could be adopted and that the world could come out of the Conference better and more efficiently armed than it is to-day. The plan is, in fact, just as much a rearmament plan as it is a disarmament plan.

Let us examine the details. The draft Convention proposes to abolish all Continental regular armies except our own—to replace them by forces of which the strength in effectives is laid down. The numbers are 500,000 for Russia, 200,000 for each of the Great Powers Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and a lesser number for the other European States. Roumania, for instance, gets 150,000, Hungary 60,000, and Czecho-Slovakia 100,000. Powers with colonies are allowed oversea forces, France getting 200,000 and Italy 50,000. A special clause excludes from such limitation of numbers armies the main purpose of which is to provide reinforcement for oversea garrisons; and this is presumably our case, since no numbers are laid down for the United Kingdom or any part of the Empire. But will we be considered sincere? For who, looking at our Army, can believe that we maintain on the active list six field-marshals, ten generals, twenty lieutenant-generals, seventy-five major-generals, and 380 colonels merely to command five draft-finding Regular divisions? The most serious change which these apparently simple figures propose, however, is that the land forces of Germany are doubled, the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles being thus overridden at our suggestion. At the same time the French effectives are nearly halved. No decision of the Disarmament Conference can be binding on any member except with that member's consent. Do we really seriously consider that France can accept this, or that any of those States that look to France for security and protection, or that value European peace, could countenance it? Again, is it likely that Poland could agree to reduce her army to 200,000 with a frankly hostile Germany on one side and a covertly hostile Russia on the other mustering between them three and a half times as many men? Not, at any rate, until she felt that the League could afford her protection from aggression within twenty-four hours of her application. The most serious thing about these figures, however, is that they override the Peace Treaties, which, however bad they may be, are yet infinitely superior to this draft in that they do provide security; and since every country in Europe, except ourselves and those interested in their abolition, fully realises this, there seems little hope that these proposals can form the subject of serious discussion. Incidentally, since all European nations except ourselves are to have a short-service army, our professional army would become the most formidable force in Europe. But that is by the way.

The proposals for qualitative disarmament exclude heavy howitzers and guns and tanks over a certain weight—16 tons. We have only one, but France has a battalion, and she would thus be further disarmed. Nothing is laid down as yet as to tanks under this weight, but every Power which wishes to modernise

its military equipment will be able to lay claim to a very handsome number, which will constitute a very much better armament than a large number of effectives, but one in which a militia army is not likely to become efficient in the eight months' training allowed. And this is where the whole weakness of these disarmament proposals shows itself. They can cater for the last war, they can deal with known armaments, but they cannot deal with the next war, and they cannot legislate for the untried armaments which exist secretly to-day. Too little is known, even about tanks, for any set of laws to be laid down. How little can therefore be done towards the control of the application to war of the discoveries in science which are constantly going on. We are only on the edge of electricity; we know not what may yet come from the laboratory or what new forms air weapons may shortly assume, though it can be confidently predicted that they will be as numerous and as varied as are land armaments to-day. The war of the future will probably be a contest of scientists in which weapons as yet unknown will play the largest part.

Our naval proposals include the ratification by France and Italy of the Treaty of London and the stabilisation until December 1936 of naval forces as laid down in the Treaties of Washington and London. Future strengths after that date are to be decided by the Conference of 1935. No further capital ships are to be built except by Italy, who may build one. As in land armaments, Germany is freed from the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, but her building up to 1936 must be entirely for replacement purposes. There is nothing radically new in these proposals except the overriding of the Peace Treaty, no less important in this than in the previous case.

Our air proposals will, like our land proposals, be somewhat suspect; for here again it would be possible to say that we are disarming our neighbours. We propose to reduce the war aircraft of all Powers so that at the end of five years the European Great Powers will have 500 each, as will also the United States and Japan. At present we have 750 first-line aircraft, and a reduction to 500 would therefore mean a cut of one-third. But other countries have more, the United States and France having something like 1750, and for such countries as these the reduction would be something like two-thirds. Apart from that, the Dominions are not mentioned, and even if they were limited to what they should reasonably have (probably more than other nations better armed in other respects), the air fleets of the British Empire would be the strongest in the world. There is no imputation in what has been said now, or previously, that the British proposals are intended to deceive or in any way to use the Disarmament Conference to recover our lost place at sea and in

the air. We are merely looking at these proposals as others may see them and estimating their likelihood of acceptance. Air proposals do not, like the land and naval proposals, attempt to infringe the Peace Treaties. Germany, like the other ex-enemies, may not have any war aircraft. This does not seem quite consistent with the spirit of revision which animates the other clauses, and the reason for this particular exception is not at once apparent. Perhaps their proposals were drafted in a different office.

Generally speaking, we can safely predict that this draft Convention ignores the real difficulties surrounding the question, and by ignoring them does not, unfortunately, remove them. Its main weakness is its failure to make arrangements for future security, while it tampers dangerously with the existing satisfactory guarantees. While half Europe is disarmed war is impossible. But rearm that half, and war becomes possible, and probable. As regards the remaining proposals in the note, naval proposals excepted, they are directed more at the prevention of a war of the type of the last than of one which is at all likely to occur in the future. There is also the persistent tendency to restrict war to the fighting forces and to make the civil population secure, thus removing one of the main preventives of war. The forces which would result from world acceptance would vary infinitely, but they would all be more suitable for future requirements.

The achievement of peace is not to be compassed in this way and by these methods, which treat the symptom and not the disease. What, then, is to be done? The activities of the Conference must be turned to the real problems. These would seem to be: first, the location of the likely causes of war in the world to-day and their treatment to render them innocuous. These, I venture to suggest, are to be found quite easily—it is only their solution which presents difficulty; and it is for this reason only that their treatment by an international Conference is necessary. A complementary requirement is the method of enforcement of decisions reached. These problems will be found in the economic, political, financial, and geographic spheres, and will provide subjects the elucidation of which will not only make for external but also internal peace in nations. Secondly, there must be the machinery to impose peace. This must be swift, terrible, and absolutely impartial. When these requirements have been met, nations will be only too glad to be able to disarm.

J. R. Kennedy.

A PLEA FOR MORE WAGES

It would appear that at last people are beginning to realise that the present industrial depression is not of the same nature as those which we formerly experienced and from which we emerged more or less rapidly. Twelve years have been spent in discovering that it is something entirely new and that we have seriously accentuated the severity of a chronic disorder by adopting remedies which could be justified only in the case of a passing indisposition. We have assiduously treated symptoms before making any effort to diagnose the disease, and are now horrified to observe that the fever remains unabated though every spot has been obliterated with whitewash. Relief works, inflation, protection, unemployment insurance, and a dozen other quack remedies or evanescent stimulants have been administered. Yet still the terrible figures of unemployment rise to ever more terrifying heights, and even the political charlatans themselves advertise their nostrums with less and less confidence. Surely, then, it is high time to face the facts, however unpleasant they may be, to probe to the very root of the trouble, and then to take whatever course is necessary to check the disintegration of our economic life, no matter what sacrifice may be entailed for each of us.

I cannot claim, like those who monopolise the greater part of the time devoted to debates in the House of Commons on Unemployment, that I have held high office in the State, have used that position to meddle insanely with the delicate mechanism of industry, and spent my life in the dream world of politics which never touches reality at any point. On the contrary, I have been mainly occupied during the last twenty-seven years in keeping a number of skilled workers in regular employment at a satisfactory wage. Circumstances, moreover, have enabled me to go much further than most other employers can do with safety in the direction of industrial experiment and research involving unusual methods of organisation, with a view to gaining by practical experience some real knowledge of the factors which induce unemployment. The reader must accept my assurance that I have never hesitated to try any experiment, however hazardous, which gave promise of useful results. He will, however, judge for

himself whether the deductions which I have drawn from those experiments are true or false.

Every serious student of the unemployment problem must be struck at the outset of his investigations by certain obvious facts admitted by all and indicating the probable direction of fruitful research. We know, for example, that formerly from time to time unemployment became acute, but that it soon began to decrease until normal conditions were re-established. We know also that the present unemployment crisis has persisted for many years and shows no signs of abatement. Taking these two factors together, the investigator is naturally led to extend his inquiry, with a view to identifying the changed conditions to which may reasonably be attributed these diverse results. Our first task, therefore, must be to find out why in former times unemployment crises cured themselves.

Let us, then, suppose that John Smith, a bootmaker, is informed by his employer that his services are no longer required, although there is no cause for complaint in regard to his industry or skill. When such an event happens the usual, though not the invariable, cause of it is the fact that the employer finds himself unable to sell the boots which Smith produces. He cannot sell them because prospective purchasers are either unwilling or unable to pay the price demanded. If the cost of producing the boots is so high as to render a reduction of price impracticable, it is necessary to curtail the production of boots, and Smith is thrown out of employment. It is almost inevitable that Smith's fellow-workers will soon join him outside the factory, and a state of acute unemployment will prevail in the bootmaking industry.

Now, since wages constitute in most cases the greater part of the cost of production, and are often the only item in cost which can be substantially reduced, the dismissal of workers will presumably be followed by a demand for a reduction of wage rates. At this point, in the era of economic sanity which terminated in 1910, the problem became one for the officials of the bootmakers' trade union, who had to judge whether the employers were telling the truth, or were lying, when they said that a reduction of wage rates could alone restore the industry. But the decision of the officials was influenced by other factors. Those of their members who were thrown out of employment caused a heavy drain on the union funds and were generally very anxious to get back to work even at a reduced wage, because the latter would still be in excess of the exiguous out-of-work benefit which the union could afford to pay. In this way increase of unemployment in the industry spontaneously generated an increasing pressure in the direction of reduced wage rates. So that ultimately, if the employers were not manifestly lying, the trade

unions accepted the inevitable, wage rates were reduced, costs of production fell, the sale of boots increased, and Smith and his friends found themselves again in employment. The disease had been permitted to engender its own cure.

In those days employers of labour who felt themselves to be responsible for the welfare of their workmen—by which I mean all employers with a few dishonourable exceptions—were guided in their actions to a large extent by the consideration that it was their duty to give continuity of employment to their men so far as this was possible. That continuity could only be secured by a discontinuity of wage rates, for reasons which I have already set forth. Hence some of us adopted systems of profit-sharing, partly in order to preserve wage rates in a fluid and easily changeable state, and partly to show our men by practical example that wage rates are ultimately decided by the purchasers of the products of industry. But it should be noted that profit-sharing is useless for either purpose when there are no profits to share, and when, on that account, wage rates freeze at the minimum figure maintained by trade union action. Very small fluctuations in the market may then cause very large increases in unemployment. At my own works I have, for the last seven years, been paying out the whole of the profits to those whom I employ, since this is the only way to maintain wage rates above the recognised minimum, and thus to keep them liquid. In this way we have succeeded in maintaining an unusual degree of continuity of employment, in spite of the terrible state of the coal mining industry, which is our largest customer. But even this extreme development of profit-sharing would have failed to effect the object in view if I had not constantly invented new products as fast as our old designs were copied by competitors and their prices reduced to unremunerative levels.

To sum up our argument thus far: I contend that continuity of employment is in direct ratio to fluidity of wage rates, and my own experiments appear to give results which support that view. Furthermore, prior to 1910 a considerable degree of fluidity existed, but was kept within reasonable limits by trade union action. It may be added that, at the date in question, that action was controlled by experienced officials who possessed a fairly accurate knowledge of what was possible or impossible in the industry with which they were concerned. That is to say, the trade unions were becoming a useful and almost necessary part of our industrial organisation. They did not attempt to force immovable wage rates on industry, but secured the highest rate possible at any given time.

But the fatal year 1910 witnessed the inauguration of a policy which reduced the trade unions to little more than organisations

for collecting funds to keep worthless Socialist politicians in comparative luxury. One by one their beneficent functions were taken over wholly or in part by the State, in order that party politicians might buy votes by pretending to give their supporters ninepence for fourpence. Employment exchanges, health and unemployment benefits, and old age pensions provided by the State have been the chief factors in perverting the trade unions from their proper functions. And finally the politicians, wherever they could contrive to do so, deliberately set about freezing wage rates above the economic level by Act of Parliament. As was proved in the coal strike of 1926, even the most powerful trade union cannot maintain wage rates at a level high enough to destroy the industry. But the law of the land can do so, and does. Nor is the ruin of industry the only evil attributable to the policy of fixing a statutory standard of living for certain favoured classes without regard to what they are really earning. For the policy in question makes industrial disputes into revolutionary contests. The railway strike of 1919 and the coal strikes of 1921 and 1926 were not disputes between employers and their workmen. They were attempts by organised labour to terrorise the Government of the country into paying blackmail at the expense of the taxpayers. It was never suggested that the owners of the railways and the collieries could meet the demands of the unions, which necessitated State subsidies on a large scale. Formerly, employers formed a buffer between organised labour and the State. They took the shock and incurred the odium in industrial disputes, insuring that these should take the form of strikes or lock-outs and not, as now, of revolutions.

Perhaps the best example of the disastrous effects of frozen wage rates is to be found in the case of the railwaymen. It is, however, to be observed that other factors in this instance must be given due weight. We must bear in mind that the Government of our country, at the taxpayer's expense, has duplicated our system of transport and, by spending some hundreds of millions sterling in making roads, has naturally reduced the capital value of the railways by an equivalent amount. Indeed, it is interesting to note how closely the drop in the market value of railway stocks and shares approximates in the aggregate to the amount spent on road-making. Not content with thus bringing the railways near to ruin, our politicians then proceeded to throw them together into huge amalgamations with no regard to the all-important fact that there were no men capable of managing undertakings so gigantic. And, finally, wage rates on the railways were frozen solid. Those wage rates have no relation of any kind to the value of the services rendered by their recipients. It would not be untrue to say that their basis was in the main a consideration of

what the railwayman would like to have, rather than of what his work is worth.

The value of the railwayman's services is assessed by the public, who alone can decide what are to be his wages. And it should be noted that in assessing that value the public takes into consideration the fact that some uncertainty is introduced into the working of our railways by the attempts of the railwaymen's trade unions from time to time to starve the workers in other industries into submission to their demands. The services of a man who at any moment may be forced to discontinue them are naturally valued by the public at a lower rate than those of a man who is unlikely to fail it at critical times. It is notorious that, before the era of State interference, the public fixed the wage rate of certain classes of railwaymen at a figure not much in excess of that which represented the earnings of an agricultural labourer. It was perhaps felt that the latter's long and laborious day should not be remunerated with a very much lower wage than that received by a porter at a branch-line station. However, whether the valuation of the latter's services were mean or generous, the applications for employment on the railways were far in excess of the positions vacant. Thus there was a reasonable presumption that the persons chiefly concerned accepted the valuation of their services by the public. But we have changed all that. Wage rates on the railways have been frozen at a level which is manifestly far higher than the figure at which the public values the railwaymen's services. So the rich man travels about in his motor car and the poor man goes by the omnibus. Thus the railwayman is thrown out of work by the workers in other industries. In this connexion it should be observed that the Salter Commission's Report suggests that, as the railways have been rendered bankrupt by statutory burdens, we should now adjust the balance by placing equally overwhelming burdens upon road transport. If we implement the Report by legislation, the poor man will, of course, walk or stop at home.

Year by year the number of men employed on our railways decreases. Year by year the traffic receipts both from passengers and from goods diminish. Year by year those for whom in their old age provision has been made by investments in railway stocks find themselves nearer to destitution. And when we free our minds from cant, we know perfectly well what is the fundamental cause of this ruin and misery. It is the curse of frozen wage rates. If those wage rates were liquefied, if they were brought into relation to the value of the services rendered as assessed by the public, then thousands of unemployed railwaymen would again be in regular work, the amount of wages paid by the railway companies would be increased, and the almost intolerable burden of support-

ing the workless railwaymen would be taken off the backs of the workers in other industries. Let the reader imagine that the chairman of the Railway Wages Board comes to the conclusion that wage rates are at present too low—a thing which might easily happen, since his recent decision was admittedly based upon a consideration of what the railwaymen would like to have, and not upon what his services are worth. I write 'the chairman' advisedly, because the wisdom of our rulers has constituted the Board in such a way that there will always be an exactly equal number of its members for and against any serious proposal which comes to it for decision. Suppose, then, that the chairman were to raise the rate by 20 per cent., what would happen? We know quite well that the railways would cease to exist, that all railwaymen would be unemployed, and that this result would be the direct consequence of freezing wage rates at too high a level. Yet most of us refuse to perceive that the fixing of those rates at the existing level is the real cause of unemployment among railwaymen, and that the aggregate sum paid in wages would be immensely greater if the wage rate were liquefied and could quickly find its economic level, varying with the varying values of the services rendered, as assessed by the public.

As a second example, let us consider the cotton industry of Lancashire, which for generations throve on its export trade and employed an ever-increasing body of workpeople. That industry is now on the verge of extinction. Its overseas markets are disappearing and, with the exception of certain special branches, there is no reason to anticipate the survival of the industry in any but a small highly protected home market. It is true that, from time to time, half-hearted attempts have been made by mill-owners to reduce wage rates to a level at which there might be a possibility of successfully meeting foreign competition. But, for the moment at any rate, it is impossible to contemplate a reduction sufficient to enable the Lancashire operative to remain in regular employment. Japan, China, and some of the States of America are producing cotton goods by the employment of labour on so low a basis of remuneration that we are forced to admit that our cotton industry must perish unless, as in the past, we can produce something which the low-standard peoples cannot manufacture. In the meantime, we are paying to the workless operator a weekly sum in excess of the economic wage. This is a case where the wage rates are killing the industry yet cannot be reduced to a level at which the industry could survive.

Again, during the last few years there has been a very great decrease in the number of men employed in the coal-mining industry, and there would appear to be reason to anticipate still further reductions. Now, a consideration of the basis upon which

that industry is at present conducted reveals the fact that the joint policy of the Miners' Federation and the Mining Association has been one of endeavouring to maintain wage rates at, or above, a definite and fixed minimum. In order to effect this object, an attempt to limit the production of coal has been made in the hope of thus securing higher prices. The statistics of the industry for 1932 show clearly the failure of this policy—a failure which, one would have supposed, might have been anticipated by any body of rational persons. A pitifully small rise in the average price obtained has been largely neutralised by the rise in production costs inevitably following a reduced rate of output. Even that reduced output has depended upon an increased development of labour-displacing machinery, and the result of the whole scheme has been to maintain in employment a diminishing number of miners, whose wage rates do not fall below the minimum, but whose annual incomes are seriously lessened by irregular employment. It must also be borne in mind that, with a fixed money wage rate, the real wage rate has risen to a considerable extent during the last few years owing to the general fall in prices. Here, then, we have a further example of an industry in which an attempt is made to maintain a standard of living for the workers which is not justified by the economic position. Already that industry displays a terribly high ratio of unemployment, and as the real wage rate automatically rises, so also does the number of miners deprived of their occupation. The aggregate amount paid in wages each week inevitably shrinks, and an added burden is thrown upon all industries owing to the expense of maintaining the unemployed miners. This, again, raises production costs and forms the starting-point for more unemployment.

Yet who can doubt that, if wage rates in the coal-mining industry were fluid and thus capable of rapid adjustment to the needs of a varying market, the number of miners in regular employment would increase, the excessive development of labour-displacing machinery would be checked, and the aggregate amount paid in wages in each week would be much greater than it is at present. Again I would insist that the prosperity of the wage-earners as a whole is entirely conditioned by the total of wages paid week by week, and that the freezing of wage rates is the most effective means for reducing that total and that prosperity. It should be noted, also, that our coal exports have dropped to little more than half of what they used to be. This naturally reacts disastrously upon shipping and other industries. The direct cause of unemployment in the coal-mining industry is the attempt to raise prices to an uneconomic height. And the direct cause of that hopeless attempt is the endeavour to maintain wage rates at an uneconomic level.

It is impossible to make a close study of this problem without feeling amazement at the unwarranted optimism of the Chancellor of the Exchequer when he hinted recently that we might expect an improvement at the expiration of ten years. For there is nothing whatever in the situation which could give ground for such a hope if we continue the policy which at present is favoured by all political parties. The standard of living of each individual worker must ultimately be related to the value of his services as assessed by the purchaser of his product, else we can never escape from our present position. If we continue our mad policy of fixing it on an eleemosynary basis, he is certain ultimately to become unemployed. Then our system of unemployed insurance makes it inevitable that, sooner or later, he will drag another wage-earner out of employment.

In this article I have, thus far, considered only the effect of frozen wage rates upon employment, and it is only in certain industries that fluidity has entirely or almost disappeared. But there is another factor which directly affects every worker without exception, and that is those additions to the standard of living which we call Social Services. These additions are made universally and without any regard to whether they are earned or not. They constitute a fixed item in all costs of production, and tend to increase rather than to grow less. For politicians are convinced, wrongly I believe, that the electorate is hopelessly corrupt, and that votes can be obtained only in return for bribes, which latter are with tragic irony termed 'social services.' By their means we insure that everyone starts with some items of his standard of living provided and fixed before he begins to make any contribution to the wealth from which those items must come. They thus constitute, in their degree, a peculiarly efficient method for producing unemployment.

At this point we may conveniently consider the reason why heavy taxation diminishes employment. There appears to be a general impression in the minds of those who speak or write on this subject that unemployment is caused by the mere amount of taxation exacted from each year's production of wealth. For my part I cannot subscribe to this opinion, being convinced that the important point is, not the amount collected, but the use to which it is applied after collection. If, for example, income tax were reduced by a shilling in the pound and the Sinking Funds were robbed to an equivalent extent, industry would not be in any way relieved, since the discounting of the effect of smaller debt repayments would inevitably result in a contraction of credit either hidden or visible. But if a similar reduction of direct taxation were made possible by a diminution of expenditure calculated to give people a standard of living which they are not

earning—in other words, by a curtailment of social services—industry would quickly feel relief and unemployment would be lessened.

Consider for a moment the crushing burden upon industry caused by subsidised house-building. From the time of Dr. Addison onward we have been giving everyone in the building industry a standard of living vastly higher than what was being earned. We have thus accumulated a debt of hundreds of millions sterling, for which we can only show assets of very much less value. Houses which under State housing schemes cost over £1000 are now worth not more than £250. The balance of £750 represents the amount paid to the building industry in excess of what it was earning. And the burden has to be borne by all other industries in the form of taxation for the next two generations, to that extent reducing the standard of living which can be maintained without throwing men out of employment.

But I should weary the reader if I were to call to his mind one by one the legislative and administrative follies which have brought us to our present pass. In the year 1910 we decided to follow the route of the Gadarene swine, and adopted a policy which every intelligent man must have known to be ultimately fatal to our prosperity. Since that date we have rushed with increasing velocity down the steep place. And if anyone suggests, as I have done in season and out of season for the last fourteen years, that it would be well to retrace our steps, he is shouted down as an enemy of the workers and as one who proposes the impossible feat of 'putting back the clock'—whatever that may mean. It is as true now as ever it was that you cannot get a quart out of a pint pot, and those who endeavour by legislative action to do so will inevitably suffer severely from thirst. One by one we have neutralised those factors which automatically began to restore the equilibrium of industry as soon as it was in danger of losing its balance. To sum up the whole matter in a sentence, we have made unemployment a disease of the body politic incurable except by a reversal of policy. And our so-called statesmen inform us that a reversal of policy would involve red revolution.

For my part, I am convinced that it is better to risk revolution rather than expose the nation, as we are doing, to a slow but certain death. Furthermore, I believe that the dangers of a drastic cure have been much exaggerated. Nor is this opinion unbacked by evidence. In the summer of 1925 the coal-mining industry, burdened by frozen wage rates of an altogether uneconomic nature, was disappearing. To quote the words of the Samuel Commission's Report, to maintain those wage rates would have meant, 'not the disappearance of the inefficient, but the collapse

of an industry . . . we come reluctantly but unhesitatingly to the conclusion that the costs of production, with the present hours and wages, are greater than the industry can bear.' In 1926 the whole force of political trade unionism, egged on by the present Prime Minister and his colleagues, was mobilised to prevent those costs of production from being reduced. After a horrible struggle, lasting many months, we saved the mining industry from the collapse predicted by the Commission. To how many of our industries could the words quoted above be justly applied at the present time? And how vastly easier would be the salvation of those industries than the rescue of the mining industry in 1926!

I am well aware that the General Council of the Trade Union Congress will make every endeavour to foment industrial unrest so long as the present Government is in office. It is only right that it should do so, because it is the caucus of a political party, and its duty is to embarrass the other parties as far as it can and by any means within its scope, even if these involve widespread misery and destitution for the wage-earners. In carrying out its duties it must, as in 1926, refuse to be hampered by any sentimental consideration of compassion for the helpless. Its business is to get the Socialist Party into office, and not to occupy itself with matters which do not concern it. Hence any attempt to reduce unemployment among the railwaymen, for example, will be met by threats of revolutionary action, unless a Socialist Government is in office when the attempt is made. Indeed, the railway companies missed a great opportunity during the lifetime of the late Government, when they might have reduced wages to an economic level or, at the least, have squeezed a huge subsidy out of the taxpayers wherewith to maintain the existing rates. But though the readiness of the Trade Union Congress to cause revolutionary outbreaks cannot be doubted, yet its power to do so is perhaps by no means so great as is generally imagined. Its attempts in 1921 and in 1926 were not conspicuous for their success, and its extreme agility in getting out of danger by betraying the miners did not raise its reputation. Nor do its constituent members appear to be the kind of men who die on barricades or lead revolutionary armies from any position except the rear. Finally, I may add that I find it impossible to be really frightened of a body whose orders were publicly disobeyed in the autumn of 1931 by the present Prime Minister.

I have an inclination to think, therefore, that a reversal of policy sufficiently drastic to reduce unemployment to manageable proportions could be accomplished without disruption of the State. The trade unions could have their functions restored to them, and employers of labour would be called upon to perform those duties which they carried out in the past and of which the performance

is the only justification for the generous remuneration usually accruing to employers. Wage rates would be easily and quickly variable, and employment would regain a large measure of continuity, so that the aggregate of wages would be increased, probably to a very great amount. The danger which chiefly concerns me is, not the risk of fighting in the streets, but the risk of producing much misery among certain classes of the people during the period of adjustment. That the process will be a painful one is but too manifest, though it cannot be compared to the horrible poverty and chaos into which we are at present descending at an increasing pace.

It must be clearly understood that the campaign to be initiated is a fight for More Wages—that is to say, for a largely increased aggregate amount of wages to be paid each week. In some industries the success of such a campaign undoubtedly involves lower minimum wage rates. In others there is a reasonable hope of an increase of those rates. But, even if every existing wage rate suffered reduction, the campaign would be won if the aggregate were to be increased. It must further be recognised that, in adopting such a policy, we should still leave unaffected many factors conducing to trade depression and unemployment. But those factors are matters beyond our control, and it would therefore be foolish to worry about them. We have it in our power to remove the main cause of our present discontents, which is the frozen wage rate.

The first point to be gained is the checking of the excessive development of labour-displacing machinery. Under the old industrial *régime* the elasticity of wage rates did not prevent the invention and introduction of such machinery. But it certainly did avoid the unhealthy and exaggerated increase of devices intended to throw men out of work which we have witnessed lately. The sinking of capital in labour-displacing machinery is the inevitable reaction of an industry to an unjustifiably high fixed wage rate, and it hampers the development of that industry to a very serious extent. Profits are absorbed in providing the machines instead of being left available for varying the product or introducing entirely new products to the market. No employer wishes to see his profits frozen in the form of machinery so that his working capital is reduced to an insufficient amount to allow extensions of his business. He buys the labour-displacing device only when sheer necessity drives him to that course, and in nine cases out of ten dismisses his workers with the utmost reluctance.

I have endeavoured to show that the effect of frozen wage rates is cumulative, and that, if they are regarded as unalterable, every worker must logically be thrown out of employment sooner or later, so long as the unemployed are not allowed to starve but

are maintained by the gradually decreasing number of workers in employment. And I would suggest to the reader that my policy of more wages would also have a cumulative effect. For it is manifest that each man restored to employment, even at a wage little in excess of the figure of unemployment benefit, would at once begin to absorb more of the products of industry and thus to open out the possibility of employment for yet another worker. Let me repeat, at the risk of wearying the reader, that, at present, high wage rates mean less wages, and low wage rates mean more wages.

No one is more vividly aware than myself how difficult a task it will be to convince the majority of our industrial population that their only hope of prosperity lies in thawing out wage rates and restoring to their trade unions the functions which they formerly exercised. Nor do I underestimate the resistance of professional politicians of all parties to a policy which will deprive them of the privilege of pretending that they are giving ninepence for fourpence. My own experience, however, of a huge industrial constituency in the sharpest throes of unemployment convinces me that the vote-catching value of bribery masquerading as social services is vastly overestimated, and that the electorate is far less corrupt than parliamentary candidates suppose. Furthermore, the thoughtful reader will probably agree that the useful limits of political deception have now been passed, and that our people will soon be ready to welcome the truth if it is offered to them. Perhaps also he will agree that, if they are not told the truth within the next year or two, we shall find ourselves confronted with masses of men driven to fury and despair, setting aside reason and forcibly rendering unworkable an organisation of society to which they will attribute all their ills, and which no one has ever taken the trouble to explain to them. What our Socialists call the 'capitalist organisation of society' is not breaking up. It cannot break up, because it is no artificial economic system, but merely the state of affairs which exists when men and women are as they are, and at the same time demand liberty. If they will surrender liberty, they can have economic security under an autocracy even if they remain selfish. If they will surrender selfishness, they can retain liberty and can do without the capitalist organisation of society. But, in the meantime, they are using their political power to make the latter work in such a way as to produce poverty instead of wealth. And, as I have said, nobody of importance takes the trouble to explain these matters to them.

Hence a return to sound policy, in the way which I have suggested, involves risk of trouble. But no one can deny that time presses and that we cannot go much further on our present

route without disaster. So critical, indeed, is the situation that I am convinced that moral factors must be taken into account. Now, the State is not a moral being, and recent attempts to make it function as such have invariably brought disaster. The best thing, and indeed the only useful thing, that the State can do is to get out of the way. That is to say, sundry statutes must be repealed because they are destroying the economic life of the nation. Then the whole burden must be thrown upon us employers of labour, who have been paid to do the work and ought to do it. If there is any danger or any odium to be incurred, it is far better that we should incur it rather than the State. If a few of us are hanged on lamp-posts, the nation will not necessarily perish. And all of us know well that we can avoid that fate if we dare to tell the truth to the workers and to act in accord with the logical conclusion to which the truth drives us. We give orders, and those whom we employ must obey. There is only one thing which justifies any man in giving orders, and that is that he is willing to sacrifice his personal interests for the sake of insuring that the work in hand is carried through successfully.

Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. It is this: that in industry, as in all other common human activities, there can be no progress and no contentment in the absence of an aristocracy. We cannot obtain for our people a return of prosperity so long as wage rates are frozen. For till they are thawed out we cannot give them a larger aggregate wage. We cannot reduce wage rates unless the workers trust us. And they will not trust us unless we become industrial aristocrats. And aristocrats are those who act upon the principle that the well-being of the many can be secured only by the self-sacrifice of the few.

The theory works well in practice.

AUSTIN HOPKINSON.

WANTED A ROAD TRAFFIC POLICY

A SERIES of disasters, extending over the years, has produced strong feelings, often justified, on the subject of road traffic, and since a dispassionate outlook is best if we are to be constructive, the problem is here separated into two parts, much as one might divide off a discussion on literature from such a subsection as pornography. We have then Road Traffic and Road Hogging. For the purposes of this article we relegate the second to the second place, remarking only that it will have to be ruthlessly subordinated to the interests of the country and of road traffic proper.

The object of a road traffic policy, if we had one, would be to ensure that goods and people should get home without accidents, with economy and with regard for amenity. Other elements of a general kind exist, but the extent to which these three *desiderata* are simultaneously attained is some test of our road law, policy, layout, construction and control. One element without the others is of no more avail than a pen without nib or ink, or ink without a pen. Specific traffic laws have been much discussed ; the policy but rarely. Let us consider it in the most general manner, *ab initio* with a view solely to the welfare of England as a whole, in the hope of finding a standpoint from which to see further than the short-range antagonisms of motorists, pedestrians, or railways.

The State's economy depends on production. For good reasons the production of certain things becomes localised, and the consequent local superabundance calls for their distribution in exchange for other things from elsewhere, in order that the producers may live on and work on. So transport begins. But producers are consumers, and they live and work in shelters usually approached through a door from the road. So road transport is necessitated. Without road transport no State can survive, or ever has, survived. It is more than the fertiliser of industry. It is an essential part and usually also the final stage of almost all wealth production, while socially it is far more. England would be sorely tried by ten weeks of railway stoppage, but three weeks of a road boycott would break all those contacts which constitute

the organised State and would bring starvation perilously near to all classes. Moreover, a simple retrogression in transport methods to those of thirty-six years ago would create so great distress to our present economy that revolution must arise to countermand the error.

Of the immense burden of inland distribution that tends increasingly to fall upon road transport, now that petroleum has been taught to contribute its energy, a portion should, in the general interest of the State, be by-passed from the roads, to their relief, and should employ the mechanism of the railways. Just what that proportion should be, and to what classes of goods and journeys it should apply, is entirely unknown. There exist no data either in public or private hands [1] which indicate any measure of the addition to road maintenance ascribable to extra loads or to extra speed in road transport. These technical *lacunæ* should be filled at the earliest possible moment by experiment and research. It is equally remarkable that no one knows the average cost of conveying one ton one mile by rail, save that when the goods train is loaded to its complement it is demonstrably cheap, probably from a quarter to one-eighth of the cost of conveying the same ton over the same distance by road lorry. Against this the average door-to-door speed of freight by rail is far less. It involves, moreover, certain well-known inconveniences, notably of crating and the transhipment from lorry to rail and back to lorry to complete delivery. The State has need of both services, and both have need of scientific research and measurement as a basis of reform.

For the transit of persons, individual preferences and conveniences dispose the traveller now to the one, now to another mode of locomotion. Certain distances, notably when an all-night journey occurs, favour the rail, while other *desiderata*, apparently of more widespread appeal, make certain travellers (*e.g.*, a family party on holiday with luggage), for certain types of journeys and certain routes, prefer the variety afforded by the road journey. If we include for present purposes the road use by persons on foot and the road use for the movement of part-finished goods from factory to factory, from finisher to rail, from rail to wholesaler, and thence to the retailer's and consumer's door, and if we remember the collection of agricultural produce from scattered sources, the broken journeys of commercial travellers, and the wishes of the tourist and week-ender, as well as the daily attendance by bicycle of the factory worker, we need not dismiss as erroneous the claim that the larger part of the total

[1] The Salter Committee discovered the non-existence of these basic data and appears to have been considerably incommoded thereby.

overland transport of to-day is induced by causes, among which cheapness is not the greatest, to go by road.

Anyhow, there is a great and necessary activity on our 180,000 miles of roads, with the result that pedestrians, cyclists, and vehicles find themselves on the highways together, mostly fulfilling that function of distribution without which what should be wealth is dirt and what should be 'available service' is unemployment. These disparate traffic units should not, if our traffic were properly ordered, be obliged to journey along the same part of the road (the carriageway) save exceptionally. This is not only because of their very various fragility and mobility, but much more because of the difference in the manner in which their nature permits them to comply with the inescapable law of safe traffic movement, called herein 'the law of the showing of intention.' Their simultaneous presence is a difficulty, but it is not the whole of our problem. Of the 44,000,000 people in England a majority are in towns or work in towns (the London area alone holds nearly a quarter of the total); there are 2,000,000 motor vehicles, 6,500,000 pedal cycles, 800,000 horsed vehicles, quantities of tramcars, agricultural machines, barrows, cattle, dogs, etc., and, say, 28,000,000 walkers. Not all these use the roads at all hours, but on the working days substantially all who are there are so in the course of industry or trade. Unless and until we have in England that form of rationalisation or Fordism which segregates the many specialised factories which contribute to a common finished product under one localised group of roofs, the intensity of our activity on the public roads will continue to be accentuated.

The traffic movement by road with which most readers are chiefly and indeed grievously familiar is the week-end, holiday, and pleasure traffic. This is mainly the comings and goings between the town and countryside of a population largely massed in towns and not unnaturally seeking relief from that environment whenever free to do so. Lust of speed—thought by many to be a significant factor—must also create some additional traffic which we could well spare from our roads. In one way or another our dense population, our way of industry, and our way of life have called up an exceptional growth of road traffic, and we have to-day far more motor vehicles[2] per mile of road than any other country, *malgré* the deterrent of the highest scale of motor taxation of any State. If we could but combine therewith public safety and amenity—a not impossible task—our highly developed

[2] France has 3·9 motor vehicles per mile of road; Italy, 2·5; Germany, 6·3; the United States, 8·8, and England as many as 13. While in England also there is a more crowded pedestrian population, more tortuous roads, and more uncertain weather.

workday road use, albeit detestable to some, would be not only a hopeful economic sign, but commendable generally.

Our extreme activity on the road has given rise to two noteworthy consequences:

(a) A happy fertilisation of the productive capacity of the country and increased flexibility of distribution. The means for a daily or even hourly linkage between factories which subserve one another's work. The diminution of stocks by reason of *seriatim* deliveries of relatively small tonnage; a quick service for urgent or perishable goods when (*e.g.*, fish, milk, flowers, fruit) they cannot wait for the railway time schedule or for the accumulation of the 250-ton load to make payable a goods train. Country air and scene for townsfolk, and eventually some disurbanisation of the population.

(b) A disastrous sum of motor accidents (145,502 and 143,056 in 1931 and 1932; causing 5936 and 5745 deaths respectively). These represent in terms of lost time, sick benefit, nursing, etc., a loss to the country of some £30,000,000 in the year, apart from an immeasurable sum of pain and bereavement. A great loss of rural amenity, quiet and solitude.

It would only be a reader inert in kindly imagination and human sympathy for whom it would be necessary to prick his conscience by re-enumerating these crushing totals in terms of daily assassinations or to elaborate their grim resemblance to the bloody casualty lists of the war; but if he should ask, as well he might, how it is that the pedestrian, possessed of all the British qualities that distinguish a pedestrian, becomes so quickly callous on turning motorist, or why it is that we do not daily see motor vehicles in the streets besmirched with blood, there is an arithmetical answer. The average motor vehicle is involved in one of these accidents only once in each 13 years. He has a fatal accident once in 300 years! This, of course, excuses no one, nor does it diminish the intention, which is the directive of the present article, to remedy a grievous trouble that seems to be defeating us and to suggest a procedure different from those yet tried.

In order to evolve a policy which shall take full account of the risks to the State involved by the neglect of either (a) or (b), it is necessary, *inter alia*, to have what we have not to-day—namely, the facts, details, and prime causes of fatalities—and then to analyse them scientifically.

The introduction of any new traffic control, roundabout, pointsman, coloured lights, etc., or changes of road form, surface, layout, marking, unblinding, equipping with new refuges, footways, or lighting should be attended by the measurement (in some

suitable locality) of the change of accident ratio—that is, the change in the number of accidents in comparison with the amount of flow affected. The mere counting of mishaps leads us nowhere, for we would evidently have no road accidents if we had no road traffic; while the *desideratum* is to get the traffic through without accidents. There is no space here to deal with the manner of measuring a *quantum* of traffic flow; that is the proper function of the traffic research committee, which should be responsible for advising all scientific work on the whole subject. It is imperative that we get away both from the panaceas designed by the amateur public, which have been tried and proved futile, and from committees selected to represent conflicting interests which thwart one another, and come down to independent scientific measurement, observation, and extrapolation. This has been done with great success in aeronautics by a Committee formed by Lord Haldane in 1908, which has been allowed to initiate its own research work, as well as to answer the scientific inquiries of the Air Ministry. The arrangements made twenty-five years ago give full precedents for the administration, responsibility, and remuneration of such a disinterested scientific body.

When pleading for inquiry and research it would be presumptuous, and in any case futile, to claim to know what our 1700 highway authorities do not know of their own subject, but that in no way precludes our observing that they do not know their subject and are taking no steps to inform themselves. What is wanted is that authority should awaken its own curiosity, by observation and the systematic collection of data. Experiment, scientific research, and measurements will indicate causes and remedies. If some proof is required of the prevalent ignorance of the general problem of road traffic, consider the following:

In spite of the millions at stake by reason of congested flow in big towns, no one has yet troubled to find, or even to seek by research to find—(*a*) the laws of traffic flow; (*b*) the rate of flow (vehicle speed) which gives to a simple straight bridge like Waterloo Bridge the maximum useful carrying capacity per hour; (*c*) the factor which distinguishes the offence of 'cutting-in'; (*d*) the effect of speed on road wear; (*e*) the effect of heavy total loads and of heavy wheel loading on road maintenance; (*f*) their combined effect; (*g*) the relative contribution to vibration caused respectively by road surface irregularities and by the class of tyre; (*h*) the method of measuring, and therefore repressing, noises which exceed, say, forty decibels; (*i*) the physiological causes of dazzle, and its cure; (*j*) the danger of relying on coloured light controls where at least 3½ per cent.—*i.e.*, 250,000—users of vehicles in England are incapable of knowing red from green; (*k*) psychological tests for drivers.

If one should remonstrate with 'This is a hard saying!' and 'Who could know such things?,' let us pass on to more obvious instances of official ignorance with the remark that none of the above matters are at all beyond the range of the scientific method, and many are easily to be solved by elementary scientific experiment; albeit, where the material under test includes a human factor, time is required to establish the averages on which action could be based. It is not idle to show that there is a broad general significance in the occurrences which attend road traffic, and that this meaning is not sufficiently appreciated by the multitudinous authorities that govern it, pave the way for it, and provide for its control. The great wear and disintegration of British roads which was caused in four years of the carriage of war material and by the unavoidable neglect of road upkeep during the war has swollen road expenditure to a total of about £500,000,000 in the fourteen ensuing years. Foreseeable as this was, it is noteworthy that neither before starting nor during this outlay have our authorities sought answers to many elementary scientific questions which must be asked if such expenditure is to be allocated in the best way. In addition there have been grave oversights. A relatively small expenditure would have provided some footway (preferably, as the writer suggests, behind the hedgerows, whose beauty would thus be spared) to most roads. The fragile and ubiquitous traffic units that are pedestrians require for their safety a surface separated from that allotted to steel motor vehicles. In this case the generalisation is elementary. But a list of less obvious questions, each as an example only, may usefully be asked.

CASE 1.—(*a*) A driver is concerned to obey official orders, warnings, etc., and must be able to find, identify, and understand them so that as he runs he may read.

(*b*) A system agreed to internationally by eight nations was adopted at Geneva some five years ago standardising the undeniably best shapes, colour, and mode of display for these notices.

(*c*) In England official notices are square, oblong, round, blue, white, red, triangular, annular, and a mixture of triangle and circle, and different within a few miles of one another even for the same official notice! As malice must be excluded, does not this mean ignorance of the driving conditions under which notices and warnings must be found, identified and appreciated?

CASE 2.—(*a*) A driver is concerned to find his way to his destination in town, to identify buildings, to read the numbers of houses.

(*b*) In most large English towns, notably in London (except Kensington), the chief streets are not adequately and sometimes not at all name plated. Compared, say, to New York, which itself

is not perfect, we are deplorable. Shops at street corners are allowed to displace or obliterate the street name and to omit their house number (this is the deciding factor as to whether to turn right or left on entering a cross street). Odds and evens are on any side of a street.

(*c*) In dense traffic such a driver's attention is uselessly distraught in seeking out an unfindable name or number. This induces accidents, as well as stoppages to inquire, and congestion. The uneconomic procedure of wasting drivers' time and road space as an alternative to accidents is proof of ignorance in high places.

CASE 3.—(*a*) A roundabout is designed to consist of a non-stop vortex receiving contributions of traffic units from convergent streets, and throwing off the units at their chosen outlets, which they reach by a process called 'weaving.'

(*b*) Many roundabouts contain within their central island telephone-boxes, flower-sellers, lavatories and the like.

(*c*) Telephones and the other conveniences are liable to be used for highly urgent calls made by pedestrians across the non-stop vortex, wherein the drivers are engaged on the intricacies of 'weaving'! Does not the person who rushes to telephone for a doctor, or is alarmed by a fire, deserve to be protected from the risks he will take in his distress? Is it not a mark of ignorance to lure people to these frequently used conveniences and telephone within the hub of a roundabout?

CASE 4.—(*a*) A vehicle on the left of a street is about to turn left and gives in advance the correct hand signal.

(*b*) When the angle of the corner pavement is reached it proves to be of such acute form that the driver finds himself unable to turn left until he has swerved considerably to his right. Thus he moves contrarily to the notification given by his hand signal. There are many thousands of such corners in London alone. Are not the other vehicles or pedestrians near by exposed to risk of collision by this? And if so, is the faulty road layout tolerated through ignorance, or is it inertia?

CASE 5.—(*a*) Vehicles should keep on left of the carriageway.

(*b*) Pedestrians freely keep on the right of the footway.

(*c*) Is the well-known council that refused its support to the 'safety first' in its campaign against this erroneous habit of pedestrians aware that this habit endangers the walker by allowing him to progress with his back to the near line of vehicles; that the walker is not yet educated to the idea that he is a traffic unit, or aware that he cannot evade his duties and responsibilities as such? If he accordingly steps out on to the carriageway with no prior sign of intention among a horde of drivers in congested roads and so risks life and limb, is not this initially ascribable to the council's ignorance of traffic conditions?

CASE 6.—(*a*) A white line down a road centre implies an order to keep within the width delimited between the line and the near kerb.

(*b*) Local tradesmen's carts and cars, the local doctor's car, and even the urban council's vehicles are commonly left standing (sometimes unattended) within the delimited areas without remonstrance from the village authority or the local police.

(*c*) All traffic arriving at such a spot finds itself thus permanently blocked, and accordingly the white line rule is disobeyed; thus by inducing a pernicious neglect of the code we tend to annul the protective effect of an important device for safety—the white line. Do the local authorities who instruct their police realise this? Obviously not. It is just ignorance of road traffic conditions.

CASE 7.—(*a*) The appearance from a side road of a vehicle which may enter or cross a stream of traffic in a major road without warning is a danger against which there is an internationally agreed notification symbol, accepted by the League of Nations. As this is an oft-recurrent danger, a cheap and exceptionally distinctive danger signal—namely, an inverted triangle (a pyramid on its point)—was chosen. It is to be erected in the minor of two roads near a junction.

(*b*) This warning sign is not used in England. Instead, a complicated sign of our own that no foreigner could know or interpret has been invented. It is expensive and therefore rare. Few British drivers know it. Is this insularity, or ignorance?

CASE 8.—(*a*) Most road users are aware that some road surfaces are hardly ever slippery. They also see roads of the same class surfaced with such material that they become slippery at the least weather provocation.

(*b*) Do the authorities who know (since they install) these non-slip roads calculate the cost of the delays caused to traffic by slippery surfaces, or the cost of accidents, or is it ignorance of the traffic problem?

Although lists of such examples can be continued for endless pages, the above are sufficient. Taken together, they show that in many authoritative quarters the innumerable hazards that mismanagement is forcing on road traffic, pedestrian and other, are not understood. Some are mere neglects, some false economy, some official inadvertence, but all betray a misconception in the mind of the numerically dominant voter, the pedestrian (who alone can elect the councils and remedy these evils), that these troubles are the motorist's look-out. They are far more—they are the pedestrian's danger.

Each of these examples is a case of detail. What, then, are the general conditions governing these details, and what the

principles necessary for decisions as to safe traffic movement, which our authorities, in common with the public, mostly ignore? Starting from the premise that the 'rights' of anyone on a road are limited to the right of passage, the first condition for safety may be called 'orderly placing,' or orderly movement; the second may be called the 'show your intention' principle, which sailors call the rule of 'show your helm.' The first implies that for general safety every traffic unit should have a knowable locus or path from which it only departs after notifying its neighbours all round. For example, orderly movement would require that the units must be discouraged from wandering across and about the width of the carriageway (or for pedestrians, the footway). The second condition is consonant with the first, and its implications are even more far-reaching, for it is the main basis of safe movement, whether by sea, land or air. It is no more use disapproving of the duties it implies than is disapproving of the law of gravity. Neither can be ignored without incurring peril. Let us make this clear. Moving units in any limited space will eventually collide if there is nothing to restrain them from seeking to occupy the same place at the same moment. If, however, they had pre-knowledge of each other's intention, the clash could be avoided. To carry out this in practice, each should indicate in advance his next intended movement, and as a corollary each must heed the other's indications by moving in accordance with a simple code.

When 'orderly placing' is applied to British road traffic it will mean that each unit must be enabled and encouraged to keep to the left of its part of the highway. So alone can orderly streams be formed. For the highway authorities it means that a footway must be provided for walkers, and that it must be such that they will walk on it. Moreover, it means that road layout (notably acute angles) must not be such that keeping to the left is impossible; nor should the road sides be so sloped or surfaced that keeping to the left involves slipping, or cut tyres, or splashing, or potholes, or endangering pedestrians, or a blind approach to a road junction. This list, which reads like an enumeration of reasons against keeping to the left, is not so, because, unless the 'keep left' rule is rigid, unforeseeable movement of traffic will result, and unforeseeable movement spells danger. Alternatives to the 'keep left' rule have been imagined and tried; they involve costly longitudinal lines, and are not of the same universal applicability, nor equally conducive to orderly movement.

'Show your intention' does not merely mean that a driver is to put out his hand when about to swerve or stop. It means far more. To the highway or transport authorities the imperious character of this rule indicates that they must make it possible for the intention when so displayed to be seen. For example, it

calls for the unblinding of corners when possible. It means that hand signals, visible as they are only on one side of a vehicle, are inadequate, even if fully and correctly given in good time and on every occasion. The pedestrian cannot see them, though they concern him far more than he yet realises. They are ephemeral, because the hand is wanted for other duties. The constable on point duty needs to see them, the driver of a vehicle approaching from the right or left at a road junction or crossing needs to see them (whereas, if he be on the left, he cannot to-day). In fact, a complete mechanical signal is required, and should after due notice be made compulsory and be such that all without exception can read the indications by day or night, from front, back and both sides—can see whether the intention is to stop or proceed or swerve, and in which direction. When this exists it will, let us hope, become the habit of pedestrians as well as of drivers to read the driver's signals, for it is a step towards safety to know what the other unit is proposing. It must not be thought that the whole function of ' showing of intention ' is adequately covered even by this supposed perfect device on a moving vehicle. Supplementary and continuously supplied information is required, and can moreover be given, without effort, *ad hoc.*

When it is, as it should be, compulsory on every traffic unit to keep to the left of the available space, whether of carriageway or footway, the fact of moving along on the left should of itself imply the intention to continue so moving until an indication is given in due time of any forthcoming change of movement. The pedestrians cannot satisfactorily signal to drivers because conflicting intentions shown by numerous pedestrians would cancel, and no simple code of responses for the vehicle can therefore be devised. As, however, the walker's intention must somehow be knowable in his own interest, alternatives should be adopted to protect him. They will not be universally applicable, but will cover a large majority of cases. Thus the fact of walking on the footway and on the left of the available footway space when going along the highway might legitimately be treated by the approaching driver as an indication of the walker's intention to continue. Pedestrians crossing the carriageway should go at right angles to it. Thus they will be giving an indication of purpose. Where there is a constable on point duty the walker should be held to take his cue from him, as the vehicles do. Similarly he should respect the traffic-controlling lights. He must take simple precautions to be visible at night. If he keeps left on the footways, the fact of his crossing over from the left to the right of the footway prior to crossing the carriageway will give a preliminary warning of his intention to the drivers, who are on that side of the carriageway most dangerous to him, and, as before remarked,

he will without any special forethought, as a mere habit, avoid walking with his back to the nearest oncoming line of vehicles.

Should the number of fatalities to pedestrians on the roads be less than the number to motorists, the saving of the pedestrians would still present by far the greatest problem, even if it were not unconsciously intensified by the assertion that they have rights without duties in the manner popular with some public persons who have evidently more kindliness of intention than knowledge of road conditions. Both habit and natural structure are against us. First, walking is so natural a movement that at no point of time does the walker feel that he has consciously become a 'traffic unit' involved in the compulsions which are inherent in the status of 'traffic unit' (*i.e.*, these duties are not of human imposition). Secondly, he is physically so shaped (he is a vertical animal) that his intended direction is neither indicated by the direction of his head, nor fixed by the direction of his body. His rate of change of direction (pivoting, or reversing) and his rate of acceleration are greater than those of other normal traffic units; he is of fragile flesh, and he is, as yet, frequently unconscious of those inherent conditions of traffic movement which are not man-made. This last can only be remedied by propaganda.[3]

It appears from the foregoing outline that even if we exclude every shade of 'road hogging'—*i.e.*, whether careless, brutal, dangerous, inconsiderate, or drunken—there still remains the bulk of this difficult problem. Remedial action is complicated by the very great diversity of the combinations of possible road occurrences, and the whole difficulty is accentuated on the one hand by a very real ignorance, which makes the problem seem easy, and on the other by the need to avoid allowing either walkers or vehicles to impose protracted stoppages on one another. This means we must provide that continuous or discontinuous streams of either shall safely and alternately use the same surface of the carriageway at countless crossings. The infinite variety of traffic circumstances can be reduced by rigid orderliness wherever it can be shown that orderliness is not unreasonable. It is suggested that the universal adherence to a 'keep left' rule can be shown to be orderly, and not only reasonable, but to facilitate and expedite both crossings and progress along the road, while automatically imposing a continuous restraint on maximum vehicle speeds. Moreover, were it the law—which it is not—it should not be too difficult to enforce on vehicles now that we have mobile police. The root cause of accident is whatever makes unusual or sudden or unexpected demands on the driver. Sometimes, though not

[3] Pedestrian problems are further discussed in my paper of that name read before the Royal Society of Arts on November 16, 1927, to which the reader is referred.

SPEED OF VEHICLES (INCLUDING MOTOR CYCLES) IN THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DISTRICT.

	1 to 5 Miles per Hour.		5 to 10 Miles per Hour.		10 to 15 Miles per Hour.		15 to 20 Miles per Hour.		Over 20 Miles per Hour.		Unknown.	Stationary.		
	Number of Fatalities.	Per cent. of the Year's Total.	Number of Fatalities.	Per cent. of the Year's Total.	Number of Fatalities.	Per cent. of the Year's Total.	Number of Fatalities.	Per cent. of the Year's Total.	Number of Fatalities.	Per cent. of the Year's Total.	Number of Fatalities.	Number of Fatalities.	Per cent. of the Year's Total.	Total Fatalities in the Year.
1920	248	38·87	250	39·19	79	12·38	21	3·29	9	1·41	28	3	0·47	638
1921	204	35·73	231	40·45	79	13·83	27	4·73	2	0·53	22	5	0·88	571
1922	219	32·44	285	42·22	94	13·93	28	4·15	11	1·63	31	7	1·04	675
1923	185	27·69	282	42·22	119	17·81	39	5·84	13	1·95	26	4	0·60	668
1924	227	26·90	339	40·17	150	17·77	39	4·62	17	2·01	65	7	0·83	844
1925	206	24·53	364	43·33	132	15·72	50	5·96	25	2·98	57	6	0·72	840
1926	208	20·74	366	36·49	221	22·03	98	9·77	45	4·49	55	10	1·00	1003

Table IX. from the London and Home Counties Traffic Advisory Committee (Transport Ministry's) Report.

always, it is speed, sometimes the highway authorities which do this. Dense traffic frequently does it, and it can be relieved by the scientific study of traffic flow and road layout. This study may be expected to give such economy by avoiding destructions and road widenings as have not yet been dreamed of by our unscientific masters—in addition to saving life.

Among the beginnings that have been made in collecting and sorting data for the purpose of scientific analysis there are the efforts of the 200 coroners who voluntarily worked for the 'Safety First' Association in 1926–7. In addition, there is the table of official information which most closely touches the question of the dangers of difficult driving as affected by speed. It is the paper (61434–12) of 1928. It relates to the Metropolitan Police Area of Greater London, and Table IX. is reproduced on p. 600. The area includes a quarter of our population. No locality has a more complete range of contrasted wide and constricted roads with sparse and dense, fast and slow traffic. The police are probably as competent as most to form a valid opinion of the speeds which they are observing round them, and their estimates have never been accused of under-statement. The most recent available show that out of 1003 fatalities in the year over 78 per cent. are related to vehicle speeds below 15 miles per hour, whereas under 5 per cent. are in the category 'over 20 miles an hour.' On this showing the most Draconian laws against exceeding 20 miles per hour would only have given an infinitesimal increase of security. Seven years of similar records confirm this result in every detail. Both these documents seem to endorse the view that the chief trouble is found wherever driving has in some way been overloaded with difficulties, whether by the unwisdom of the authorities, or by crowds, or congestions, or by the frequent occurrence of the unforeseeable. Such places seem to be those where high speeds are absent chiefly because unattainable. These considerations are far from affording satisfaction, or simplifying the quest for a cure ; but they do lend colour to the view that there is need for scientific investigation before the hot breath of reformers, uncooled by the saner air of science, parches a valuable plant which only needs to be trained and guided by knowledge to yield increasingly valuable fruit.

The plea of this article is for one Scientific Committee on both Traffic Control and Road Layout.

MERVYN O'GORMAN.

THE ECONOMICS OF LEISURE

At the present time a good deal is said about over-production, but the more vital need for increased consumption is not so widely recognised. Until quite recently the majority of people were engaged in factories and offices for most of their waking hours and had little energy or opportunity for anything but work. Gradually the machine has increased productive capacity to an extent that was undreamed of a few years ago, and 'surplus' commodities are actually being destroyed. This unnatural and wasteful state of affairs demands, first and foremost, the removal of the many restrictions which now hamper exchange; it also calls for a better adjustment between work and leisure. The producer in his free hours becomes a consumer and helps to restore the balance.

The more far-sighted leaders of industry are recognising this factor, and it is receiving a stimulus in the hands of the public school and University men who are now engaging in business to an increasing extent. Formerly the so-called leisured classes accepted a professional career as the inevitable sequel to their education, unless perhaps a family business had claims on their services. By 1914 a change was beginning, and, whether from inclination or financial necessity, many of them were turning to commerce as a change from politics and the professions. Then the war intervened and delayed this tendency for another decade. It is important to note that all these men took leisure for granted, as being as valuable as their work. The vacation of the lawyer was not merely a reward for a strenuous term, but something to be enjoyed for its own sake. The boy who started in business at sixteen had little time to think of anything else. His youth was spent in the office or factory, and not until middle age was it possible to enjoy leisure. By that time the business had become the only occupation which he really cared for. It was, indeed, a matter of boasting that a man had not missed a day from his office in forty years. The fact that he had not improved his methods was usually forgotten, and the question whether his time was occupied efficiently did not arise. Every age quite naturally believes that 'things are not what they were,' but in this matter

of work the old days are greatly over-estimated. Then number of hours spent in an office or factory is not necessarily a measure of the work accomplished. In the days of stand-up collars there were no typewriters or telephones, and the mere labour of writing out a dozen letters and screwing them up in a copying press was necessarily a morning's work. Coffee with a game of dominoes at eleven o'clock seems to have been a regular custom in the City. In terms of energy and production, seven hours to-day are probably equal to fourteen hours in the Victorian office. Having doubled the speed and pressure, the average worker to-day requires more leisure than his predecessors and also gets more out of it. As the opportunities for using leisure have increased in a hundred directions, it is being more widely valued and is no longer regarded (like the Victorian Sunday) as a boring interval between one day's work and the next.

One result of this change is that work is now more efficient, bringing special advantages to the manual workers, who need no longer tire themselves out with jobs that are totally unnecessary. There is no virtue in licking stamps if a machine will do it instead. It is argued that people may be put out of work by the new efficiency, but that does not necessarily follow. The fashionable charge of over-production assumes that everyone's needs are satisfied, but while there is a single cottage still without a bath it is dishonest to use this excuse for retaining out-of-date methods. Sooner or later, efficiency means that even the unskilled workers will contribute a greater share to the general well-being and hence do better for themselves. The speeding-up of all work will make it possible to provide most of our needs in less time. It has been estimated that fifty years hence the work of the world will be done in about four hours daily. A good many firms have already adopted the five-day working week. In my own office this practice has prevailed since the war with the most satisfactory results. We work harder while we are at it, and have the chance to make something more of life than merely earning a living and spending the odd half-day in digging the garden! The time will come when four days' business will be sufficient, and many of the jobs now done by women will no longer be tolerated in the interests of health. As a first step, no woman should be allowed to work during pregnancy, as is still the case in some occupations. The machine is giving us, if we will only use it intelligently, the opportunity to arrange life on a higher basis for everyone—to get more out of life. I look forward to the day when work and leisure are regarded as matters of equal importance, when a man will not merely be content to be a mechanic, but will aim at being a competent athlete, artist or student as well. Self-respect and public opinion will demand a full life, and will give the same

attention to cultural and social pursuits as to industry and economics. I am interested to find that a similar view was advocated by the late Lord Melchett. In one of his last addresses, to an American audience, he urged them to realise that 'we are not slaves of the machine but its master; that the office is not for us to work in but to provide a living. When I say "a living" I mean something more than going to an office. Machinery is there to provide us with leisure and not to give more work; transportation is there to give us more time, and not less.' [1]

There is, however, no sense in making books, cars, and golf clubs available to the million unless everyone has the opportunity to use and enjoy them. At present we spend enormous skill and energy in creating new tastes, but seldom pause to ask whether we provide enough leisure to indulge them. Side by side with shorter working hours, the provision of longer holidays is therefore an ideal at which employers should aim. Leisure is, of course, appreciated in proportion to labour: no one is more miserable than the man with nothing to do. But those who say that 'man was made to work' are usually the first to point out that they are not in business for their health. While admitting that work is not enough, they seldom give the same attention to the use of leisure as to working hours. The most efficient business man is often the least satisfied when he leaves the factory. If I emphasise this rather obvious consideration, I do so because the new generation's ideas on the subject are often misrepresented. A love of leisure is not necessarily laziness, though many of the older school seem to think that this is so. The man who spends fifty weeks of the year at a desk or a bench may get immense satisfaction out of writing letters or making watches; his week's or fortnight's holiday cannot be more than a mere respite from his work, and is over almost as soon as it is begun. A month, or even six weeks, would provide the chance to develop other activities and thus to get more out of life in every sense. An alternative occupation provides the most effective rest; merely 'sitting around' (to use an Americanism) is not always the best cure for fatigue.

The proper use of leisure is a problem that will become increasingly important. Whether we like it or not, we shall have to occupy an increasing amount of free time. There will always be people whose only amusement is 'loafing,' but the majority are already making the most of the opportunities which modern life offers. The wireless programmes are criticised for being too 'high brow,' but there is no doubt that the talks on science, economics and art are widely appreciated, and they show an

[1] *Alfred Mond, First Lord Melchett*, by Hector Bolitho (Secker, 1933).

intellectual interest on the part of the masses which a few years ago would have surprised even the most ardent believer in democracy. For this reason the suggestion that commercial training should be given in the schools is short-sighted. Special instruction is obviously necessary for technical work such as chemical engineering, but nine out of ten occupations in industry can best be learnt by experience. This view is disputed by the modern advocates of 'salesmanship,' but as a boy will have to spend the greater part of his life in industry, the longer he can defer commercial subjects, the more time will he have for acquiring other interests. A love of languages or natural history acquired at school will help him to use his leisure to the best advantage later on. These subjects are also useful, indirectly, to the conduct of industry itself. An all-round man is more fitted to lead than the specialist, as I suggested in an earlier article [2] dealing with the universities and business. In the past few years the agitation for commercial training has been less active, but the criticism remains true to-day.

It will surely be a sad day for industry itself when cultural studies are given second place. Technical ability is always wanted, but what appear to be even more necessary are breadth of mind and a sense of proportion. These factors may often be acquired through other channels, but are certainly forthcoming from the period for disinterested study and reflection which the years at our English universities provide. A knowledge of business principles may usually be obtained afterwards if a methodical approach to study has been acquired in even small measure at the universities, yet if the business sense is altogether lacking no amount of special training will inculcate it.

The increase of leisure is bringing a new responsibility for the leaders of education. It will become more necessary than ever for people to think for themselves if they are to use their freedom to proper advantage. Mr. Edward Filene recognises this in his book *Successful Living in This Machine Age* when he says that the time has come for educational institutions to concentrate on

the great social task of teaching the masses, not what to think, but how to think, and thus to find out how to behave like human beings in this machine age. This teaching, of course, should begin in the home; but it can begin in the home only when parents are sufficiently educated to begin it. I do not minimize the task. Even to get it started will require every contribution that every sincere educator can make, and all the help that every . . . business leader can give them. But the task is glorious. Its accomplishment will mean not merely the completion of the machine civilization . . . but the preparation of the masses to live in it.

[2] 'Cambridge and Commerce,' the *Nineteenth Century and After*, October 1928.

Until the level of education is raised many people will continue to spend their leisure badly; but no matter how it is used, it has a direct economic value. The producer is also a consumer, and whether he rides in a motor coach or aspires to a car himself, reads books and goes to the cinema, or is content to work in his garden, all these activities mean more work for someone else and more employment. Most of the newer industries are concerned with leisure. The activity of the sports trades is almost too obvious an example to mention. The growth of the British motor industry has not been due mainly to tariffs; the greatest development is in the production of small cheap cars. The lower middle class whose ambition was once to own a house or employ a servant has turned to the car. It is remarkable how cheaply a car can now be run; I know several three-hundred-a-year men who are almost outraged at the suggestion that a car is perhaps a luxury in these hard times.

The popularity of tennis and golf is having wide economic results. Nearly every housing company lays out a golf course as an 'amenity' of the new estate. Social halls and club houses are springing up in dozens round London and in the Midlands. Thousands of pounds are spent every week-end on caddies and equipment by people who a few years ago gave up playing games as soon as they left school. Even 'hiking' as practised by the masses involves special dress and equipment, not to mention omnibus fares and excursion tickets. Higher up the social scale the expenditure on leisure has increased, and ice rinks are a feature of the new hotels. Garages cover ever bigger spaces; there is already an underground garage near Piccadilly Circus which can hold 1000 cars, and similar buildings are proposed in other parts of London. I have not mentioned wireless and gramophones—both becoming more popular every day. These newer trades are one of the few bright spots in British commerce to-day, doing much to counteract the depression in the heavy industries.

The personal element is receiving greater attention, now that leisure is becoming a recognised factor in industry. All that was implied by the soulless word 'hands' is gradually disappearing under this influence. In the economic unit of rural life, the country estate, the squire knew his labourers personally, and though they might meet only at Christmas, there was a feeling that each was a necessary part of the world which was bounded by the estate. Just the same principle is needed in industry. Some people will always resent intrusion into their affairs or will regard an interest of this sort as 'patronage.' Self-respect must, of course, be encouraged, but most workers appreciate a little personal interest on the part of their employer. This mutual trust has been preserved to a great extent in family businesses,

but there is a danger of its disappearing in the vast companies which are becoming the order of the day.

This danger was emphasised by the Prince of Wales in a recent address to the Royal Warrant Holders' Association. 'I think,' he said, 'that the feeling expressed in the boast "Boy and man, I have been with this firm forty years, and I followed my father in it," and which was also expressed in the sense of obligation on the part of the employer to look after his workers, to treat them not as machines but as friendly co-operators in a common task, was the soundest element in our national life.' His Royal Highness went on to say that in the work of restoring British trade, although much can be done by scientific improvements in manufacture, distribution and salesmanship, 'nothing can be achieved of permanent value without the existence of a real spirit of friendly co-operation in industry.' The changes since the war have not helped to restore the personal touch. 'The supplanting of the individual type of business by the era of great combinations, the increasing strain of commercial life, and the widening of the scope of operations of firms—all this has led to an ever-increasing gap between the master and the man, between the controlling heads of a business firm and those employed by it.' As a solution of the problem, the Prince of Wales suggested that those who guide the fortunes of our great industries should make greater use of men of proved success in leadership. 'Would it not serve in some degree to replace that old factor of strength which existed in the individual type of undertaking? The added efficiency accruing from an expert understanding and human handling of men would do much to close the gap caused by the growth of rationalisation and the disappearance of individual control of business.'

Whether in large or small concerns, a practical way of promoting corporate feeling is a works magazine, giving weekly or monthly news (depending on the size of the firm) about the staff's activities. Some of these publications have been issued for a good many years, and the idea received an impetus after the war; but there is room for its extension. The value of the house system at our public schools has long been recognised, and a similar feeling can be encouraged by a works journal, which gives the staff a mutual interest in every branch of the business. I think the idea should be developed by the new recruits of industry, who have enjoyed enough education to write and edit a magazine in their spare time with little extra effort. There are also openings for games as part of the business life. Many big firms already have their own sports grounds, and even provide omnibuses to take the staff there on Saturday afternoons. In future sport may become a feature of business hours on a second

afternoon in the week, and trades might be organised into leagues for competition in the major sports. The provision of canteens and libraries is gradually spreading, and some progressive firms are even providing medical clinics in the interests of their staffs. 'Something for nothing' is a dangerous principle, but it is possible to charge prices that make these services attractive and consequently appreciated as a privilege. Where firms have enough capital to make loans to employees who are buying their own houses, so much the better. If we can ensure that everyone engaged in business has a roof of his own we shall be doing a great service to the community.

The growth of leisure among all classes is reflected in the greater attention that is now being paid to art and appearance in commercial matters. It is no longer enough for an article merely to 'sell.' Public taste has been improving for twenty years, but, properly guided, it is now going forward by leaps and bounds. Ruskin used to protest against the ugly factories with which the mid-Victorians were content. At that time the industrial era was developing so rapidly that they hardly paused to consider what things looked like. They were too much occupied in getting things done in order to keep up with the new pace set by the machine. I know a commercial traveller of the 'eighties who, much ahead of the times, once urged a furniture manufacturer to simplify his designs. He appeared to be getting a sympathetic hearing and became quite eloquent, but the manufacturer brought him down to earth with one pithy comment. 'It seems to me,' he said, 'that there's too much of this damned art about nowadays!' The pendulum is now swinging the other way. Beauty, accepted as a matter of course by the few, is now found to be a commercial asset. The public does appreciate beautiful things if they are offered consistently. Witness the popularity of the Underground Railway posters, on which artists of the first rank are being employed. Advertising, to be successful, must be artistic. A great improvement is noticeable in commercial literature, and the same influence is seen in furnishing and decoration.

The new leaders of business are endeavouring to introduce the old exclusive standards and to give them to the masses. Mass production is now being adapted to turn out beautiful things in the hands of those to whom beauty has always been an accepted standard. This influence is bringing about a change in all branches of industry which is little short of a revolution, both in the methods and products of manufacturing. Its importance is being recognised by some of the biggest firms in the country.

Under the new conditions the dignity of work assumes a new significance. In times gone by it was creditable to paint a picture or design a building, but the manufacture of picture frames or

drain pipes was on an altogether different plane. The one was noble, the other was a matter for apology, so that while everyone knew that 'Jones' was an architect, 'Smith' did his best not to mention his connexion with 'trade.' Actually the one was dependent on the other, and, however much some people may regret the gradual passing of the leisured classes in the limited sense, the finer things of life are assuming a new value in becoming available to the many. Leisure is one of the keys to this important development.

JOHN BENN.

ARE THE JAPANESE COMING HOME?

THE question which constitutes the title of this article is asked in respect of two separate yet connected groups of facts, one relating to the racial, the other to the cultural history of the Japanese. Amongst the former, an outstanding fact is that historically the Japanese have Mongolian affiliations, which as a result of recent events in Manchuria have acquired practical importance in Mongolian life. In the latter group the chief fact is that below the bitter hostility which separates the Japanese and the Chinese at the present time lie many elements of sympathy and mutual understanding.

At the moment undoubtedly Sino-Japanese relations could scarcely be more inimical without resulting in declared warfare. The Japanese have allowed Manchurian troops to carry hostilities into North China, and may, for all that can be foreseen at the time of writing, intend, or be forced by Chinese resistance, to develop this incursion into a regular invasion by their own forces. It is in that light, indeed, that the Chinese regard their occupation of Manchuria, not to speak of their seizure of Jehol. Accordingly, to use the term home-coming in connexion with recent Japanese movements may seem to many far-fetched. Home-making, however, is not necessarily a peaceful process in its initial stages. Nor will it be denied that there have been previous incursions into China, marked by all the characteristics of invasion in the accepted political sense (for instance, by the Manchus) which are now seen to be much more in the nature of civil war than were, say, English invasions of France in the fifteenth century. Few, moreover, will deny that at least as strong as the hostility which the Japanese and Chinese feel towards one another is their sense of kinship in respect of matters differentiating them from the Western world. What is usually referred to in terms of colour by no means covers the whole basis of this sentiment. Fortunately there is to-day no likelihood whatever of an attempt by Western Powers to impose political domination upon China. But in the past that possibility has not been so far removed from likelihood as not to have suggested to the Chinese the doubt whether, had they to choose between

European and Japanese domination, the former would be the more tolerable.

In actuality, moreover, Japan's recent activities in Manchuria and Jehol have to some extent been influenced by pro-Japanese sentiments in China. This fact was referred to in a telegram from the Tokyo correspondent of *The Times* on October 24 last. It said:

> Speculation on the possible restoration of Mr. Henry Pu (the head of Manchoukuo) to the Dragon Throne, which hitherto seemed unsubstantial, has been quickened by the simultaneous presence in Peking of Mr. Ariyoshi, the Japanese Minister to China, Mr. Komai, Japanese member of the Manchoukuo Privy Council, and several prominent opponents of the Nanking Government, including Tuan Chi-jui, Yen Hsi-shan, Sun Chang-feng and others. . . . If the Japanese should advance towards Jehol these rumours [*i.e.*, rumours of an impending transference of allegiance of Northern Chinese leaders to Pu Yi] would acquire vivid interest.

Jehol is now under Japanese control, and so far the movement alluded to has not developed. Very possibly it will not; on the other hand, it may. In any case, Pu Yi's presence in Manchuria and the position he occupies there represent more than a clever Japanese conjuring trick of the white-rabbit-out-of-a-hat order. Pu Yi went to Manchuria very willingly, and as the outcome of a Manchu revival vigorous enough to be on the look-out for opportunities. What, or how many, Chinese are still loyal to the Ch'ing Dynasty few Englishmen if any are in a position to say. There seems to be little doubt, however, that some still favour a monarchical in preference to a republican system of government, while a still larger number dislikes the Kuomintang, and in appropriate circumstances would be willing to avail themselves of Japanese help to overthrow that party. A bare statement of these considerations is sufficient to make the use of the phrase home-coming in relation to Japan's transformation from an insular into a continental Power less far-fetched than it seems at first sight. The phrase does not include, of course, any suggestion that this change, which began with the establishment of Japanese control over Korea, involves a shifting of the centre of power from Japan. It is limited to the speculation whether recent events are capable of interpretation as a reflex of ancient movements, as a modern expression of old but persistent forces acting in a reverse direction, under the influence partially of racial and cultural attractions.

The racial antecedents of the modern Japanese are a matter of dispute. So also is the length of the period to which the word 'modern,' in its ethnological sense, can be said to apply. The time from which the Japanese show a blend of many racial features is set by some as far back as 1000 B.C. Others put the

time much nearer our era. From the standpoint of this article the later the ethnic fusion which the Japanese represent can be said to have been still in progress the better. For that very reason, however, one prefers to rely upon the cautious statements and conclusions of Mr. G. B. Sansom, whose cultural history of Japan is of such great interest and importance at the present time. 'It seems almost certain,' he says, 'that several centuries before the Christian era, south-eastern Korea and that part of Japan which includes Idzumo were inhabited by a people of the same stock'; and he goes on to remark that, while most European writers assume that the clans which set forth from Kyūshū to conquer Central Japan were of Malay stock, there is 'a good deal to be said for the hypothesis that the leaders of the expedition were, like the Idzumo people, of Mongolian origin, and had crossed over from Korea by the straits of Tsushima.'

The evidence for this view, though extremely interesting, must be stated in summarised form. Part of it consists of the 'curved jewels,' or *magatama*, of bone, horn and stone of various kinds, including jade, nephrite and chrysoprase, which are common in the region of Lake Baikal and the Ural Mountains but are not found in Japan, or, except possibly in small quantities, in China proper. Part is to be found in pottery and iron weapons showing a debt either to China or to peoples of Ural-Altaic stock who immigrated into Japan from north-eastern Asia through Korea, coming under Chinese influences as they did so; while part is derived from Japanese legend-cycles recounting the history of the Idzumo clan, and of the Kyūshū people who settled in Yamato, in terms which point to the superior culture of the former. This evidence does not enable any estimate to be formed of the strength of the Ural-Altaic element in the Japanese, nor does it preclude the probability that a large part of the population of Kyūshū at the inception of the eastward movement along the shores of the inland sea towards Yamato was of southern origin, possibly Malayan, possibly aboriginal Chinese from South China. But it does appear to give early Japanese history a much more northern continental environment than used to be associated with it.

Recent researches by Professor Matsui Hitoshi, Professor of Chinese History in Kokugakuin University, into the early history of Manchuria have thrown considerable light on the environment. He refers to the movements of three tribes, the Sushên, the Fuyü and the Weimo, all three mentioned in Chinese records, which, as far as one can judge, must have been contemporaneous and connected with Tungusic and Mongolian migrations referred to above. He does not assert that any of these peoples were Tungus, but he describes them as occupying territories which Mongo-Tungusic peoples at one time held, namely, the valleys of the Nonni, lower

Sungari and Ussuri rivers—in other words, Heilungkiang, northern Kirin, and the Primorsk province. The Weimo, apparently, were driven out from the Nonni-Sungari district by the Fuyü, 'lost themselves in the vast mountain zone of the eastern part of Manchuria, and finally scattered in the north-eastern part of distant Korea.' Whether this 'scattering' occurred prior to, during, or later than Chinese migrations from the Liao river plain towards the same district during the period of Yen and Ts'in (453–206 B.C.) Professor Hitoshi does not say. More important than that point, interesting though it is, is the general character of the period, which was a time of big conceptions, and of offensive and defensive operations on an immense scale. This was the period when China began her colossal wall-building—first the wall running eastward from the southern part of what is now Jehol to Hsiangping, the precursor of the modern Liaoyang, and later the Great Wall, enterprises which were followed by the establishment of the silk route to Europe, the great march of 30,000 Chinese troops into Ferghana, and the Chinese conquest of northern Korea, together with the territory north of it.

That the Chinese must have been a very fine people at that time, breeding empire-builders as lustily as the British have done, cannot be doubted. It can scarcely be doubted either that their foes were of first-rate fighting quality too. Wall building on the scale then regarded as necessary can scarcely have been conceived in the spirit of a modern political gesture. Unfortunately, so little is known of the Mongolian and Tungus tribes of that time that little can be asserted about them. Racial characteristics, however, change slowly even to-day, when they are constantly played upon by innumerable modifying influences. During the 1000 years preceding our era they must have been still more immutable. We are entitled, accordingly, to think that if early Chinese civilisation was not incompatible with heroic qualities—as obviously it was not—the peoples who migrated and warred outside its pale were every bit as splendid in their savagery as their contemporaries and successors in Northern Europe. From some immense reservoir of fighting qualities, at all events, the Mongols derived the characteristics which Matthew Paris exaggerates in the Hakluyt Society's edition of *The Journey of William Rubruck*:

Swarming like locusts over the face of the earth, they have wrought terrible devastation to the eastern parts [of Europe], laying it waste with fire and carnage. They are inhuman and beastly, rather monsters than men, thirsting for and drinking blood, tearing and devouring the flesh of dogs and men, dressed in ox-hides, armed with plates of iron, short and stout, thick-set, strong, invincible, indefatigable, their backs unprotected, their breasts covered with armour; drinking with delight the pure blood

of their flocks, with big, strong horses, which eat branches and even trees and which they have to mount by the help of three steps on account of the shortness of their thighs. They are without human laws, know no comforts, are more ferocious than lions or bears.

Douglas Carruthers in *Unknown Mongolia* says: 'For sheer bravery, blind obedience and physical endurance the Mongols have earned a recognition from all writers.'

So too have the Japanese, of whom Mr. Sansom says:

many of their qualities, much of their thought and behaviour, not only as revealed in their early legends, but even as observed to-day, marks them off very distinctly from the Chinese, despite their great intellectual and even spiritual debt to successive dynasties of Han and T'ang and Sung and Ming. No student of Japanese history can fail to be impressed by these features. The strength and prestige of a foreign culture seems as if it would overwhelm and transform Japan, but always there is a hard, non-absorbent core of individual character, which resists and in turn works upon the invading influence. It is interesting to speculate as to the source of this distinctive temperament. Doubtless it is to be sought in some special ingredient of the racial mixture.

Nobody can say what the ingredient is. Few, however, would attribute to what Mr. Sansom terms the 'warm, southern element in their composition,' which may have much to do with their gaiety and artistic qualities, the sterner, tougher qualities which make the Japanese soldier in action as fine an embodiment of bravery as the world can show. Yet those qualities are traditional, springing, it can hardly be doubted, from some definite and, did we but know enough, traceable source. Is there anything improbable in the supposition that, if nourished and developed during the formation of the *samurai* caste in the twelfth century, they were originally introduced with the people who entered Japan *viâ* Korea from the northern part of the Asiatic mainland, people who were racially connected with the Mongols and shared some of their characteristics?

Anyway, this, according to Mr. Owen Lattimore,[1] is a fact, that with Japan's conversion from an insular into a continental Power (and those who question the admissibility of that phrase must be prepared to say whether they can conceive of Japan relinquishing her recently established control over Manchuria and Jehol except under the compulsion of military defeat or domestic disaster) the Mongolian world is showing signs of new vitality. Too little is known, at all events to the present writer, whose first-hand knowledge of Outer Mongolia was acquired many years ago, to magnify this fact into one of great significance, though enough is known to make it potentially important. Part of this knowledge is the fact that Chinese colonisation of Southern

[1] 'The Unknown Frontier of Manchuria,' *Foreign Affairs*, January 1933.

or Inner Mongolia, and Russian domination at Urga and other places in Outer or Northern Mongolia, are both disliked by many Mongols, who, even if they were indifferent to them, would be alive to the opportunities for activity which these modern counterparts of ancient racial movements seem likely to give them. The Mongols, in other words, long supposed to represent one of the 'also rans' amongst the peoples of the world, are astir with new hopes and new ideas, and, while it is much too early to say what form of action the latter may dictate, only the unimaginativeness that is akin to stupidity can ignore the possibility of a Mongolian renaissance resulting from Japan's domination over the lands from which some of her people originally came.

But let us turn to the second group of facts in virtue of which the question Are the Japanese coming home? is asked. The extent to which Japanese culture is based on China's, though well known to students, is insufficiently appreciated by people in general. Most people, of course, know that written Japanese is largely composed of Chinese characters or symbols. How many realise, however, that the two official records upon which the Japanese rely for their early history, the *Kojiki* and the *Nihon Shoki*, compiled in A.D. 712 and 720 respectively, are both written entirely in Chinese script, the latter in the Chinese language and not in Japanese at all? It was not until the ninth century that a syllabary, composed of abbreviated Chinese characters selected to represent one Japanese sound each, came into existence. Thereafter where Chinese had been customary Japanese came to be increasingly used, though it was some time before any writer claiming to be a scholar felt at liberty to use his native tongue. Women, it may be added in passing, led the way—notably a lady-in-waiting, Murasaki Shikibu, whose *Genji Monogatari* is familiar to many English readers through Mr. Arthur Waley's translation. Here are the terms in which Mr. Sansom speaks of Japan's attitude towards the script she learnt from China.

> No full understanding of Japanese æsthetics can be reached by those who do not appreciate the written characters. They are symbols of ideas, but they are not pictures of things; and therefore a man who takes up his brush to trace them is not distracted by any desire to represent or even to suggest a concrete reality, but aims at making shapes whose beauty is their very own and does not depend upon their significance. He moves, as it were, in a world of pure form, and he is concerned only with abstract design. For him, to write beautifully is to solve fundamental problems of art. The line must be unerringly placed, it must be just in relation to its fellows, and though it may pass from strength to softness it may never falter, but must be alive throughout its length. The ink must merge with the soft paper, neither lying inert upon its surface nor spreading aimlessly beneath. The brush, suitably charged and directed, not as the pen by a niggling motion of the fingers but by a bold impulse of the whole

body transmitted from the shoulder to the wrist, will produce a subtle range of tones between the faintest grey and the deepest black. To a discerning eye such modulations, under the sure touch of a master, can give as profound satisfaction as the most harmonious blend of colour. In Japan, therefore, calligraphy was not a mere convenient handicraft but an art, the sister and not the handmaid of painting.

The attitude of the Chinese towards their script is every bit as sensitive and appreciative. Now, while it is easy to exaggerate the importance of this fact, it is easier still to underestimate it, as many people who have lived in China without acquiring any knowledge of the written language, and without, therefore, ever having felt any of its fascination, or shared any of the sentiments which the Chinese feel for it, often do. Yet as good a proof as any of the reality of its spell is the belief not infrequently expressed by members of the British consular service in China, or foreigners in the Chinese customs and other Chinese Government services (the only classes of men, apart from missionaries, who are obliged to study the script), that the individual who likes and becomes 'good' at it is likely to be useless at anything else. One can recall some cases in which that remark has been justified—allowing for the difference in values which, as often as not, it connotes, and some in which it has been absolutely true—true, that is to say, without reference to any such difference. As regards the latter no more need be said than that there are many pursuits amongst ourselves, literary, scientific and recreative—chess, for example, or even cross-word puzzles—which, if followed with the passion that results in absorption, tend to unfit their devotees for practical life in any form. But the other cases, those involving a difference in values, cannot be summarily dismissed. On the contrary, just because of that fact, they are worth examination. For it is precisely in respect of the aims and objects which practical life should keep before itself that East and West so frequently differ. Of course, that they are agreed as to many objects—those, for example, into which money for personal needs enters—need hardly be said. It is the case, too, that kindred aims, associated with what we call the standard of life, are rapidly coming to be regarded as desirable in China, as with certain important exceptions—hours of work, for instance—they have long been in Japan. Our standards, moreover, of military, naval, and aerial efficiency determine those of the Far East, as do the standards which may be classified as engineering. These taken together constitute a large sector of life. But they do not constitute that portion in which man does not live by bread alone, yet in which if he fails in the art of living he is extremely unhappy.

In an article such as this one cannot hope to do more than

touch upon one or two manifestations of the art as practised in China and Japan, and as our point of departure was their script, let us choose those which have been influenced thereby. The script, Mr. Sansom told us above, is to the Japanese a thing of wondrous form. In Chinese life, as all will allow, form is immensely important, form both in its visible sense and in its invisible one, which includes the sense of propriety, a sense valued in our public schools, though it would wither if called by that name. Compare with our public school variety, delicate as it appears to, say, an American, the following description of Japanese etiquette by Mr. G. C. Allen in *Modern Japan*:

> It is not an exaggeration to say that it is a social crime in Japan to give in answer to a question any reply (however true) which may displease, or to ask for any favour which will make necessary a blunt refusal. Among certain peoples the messenger of evil was rewarded with death; in Japan, unless he conveys his message with suitable circumlocutions, he is likely to be ostracized as a barbarian. Blunt negatives and direct refusals are, in fact, unknown to the code of the Japanese, and in order to convey such notions one must speak circuitously, casting hints of ones meaning here and there, half indicating one thing while ostensibly affirming the opposite. Thus the conversation of two Japanese must not be taken at its face value, for each is engaged in suggesting, not deliberately stating his meaning and in trying to discover the implications of a string of conventional phrases and vague suggestions. Japan is no place for those who pride themselves on speaking their mind.

Nor, for precisely the same reasons, is China. Yet Englishmen who regard that fact as an illustration of the lack of directness which wastes time and complicates business, and as coming therefore under the heading of Chinese impracticability, are under the obvious necessity of reclassifying it in relation to Japan, which though just as practical as their own country, just as eager to 'deliver the goods,' and just as capable of doing so (as even Lancashire now admits), yet refuses to sacrifice the conception of form which is the corner-stone of Confucian culture.

Equally unwilling has she shown herself to renounce the original Confucian conception that man is born for uprightness, and that human nature is essentially good, though, like China, she has modified it. Not that she owes her joyousness in the first instance to China.

> Much that is kindly and gracious in the life of the Japanese to-day [says Mr. Sansom] can be traced to those sentiments which caused their remote ancestors to ascribe divinity not only to the powerful and awe-inspiring, such as the sun and the moon and the tempest, or to the useful, such as the well and the cooking-pot, but also to the lovely and the pleasant, such as the rocks and streams, the trees and flowers. The worship of such

objects has its counterpart in that delicate sensibility to the beauties of Nature which is one of the most endearing characteristics of the Japanese. Beyond doubt it is a characteristic deeply rooted in the past.

But it is one which China did much to strengthen and refine, not only through the doctrine just alluded to, but through Zen Buddhism, which, while derived in the first instance from India and reputed to have been introduced into China by an Indian monk, Bodhidharma, in A.D. 520, was, to quote Mr. Sansom once more, 'the development of an Indian doctrine under the influence of Chinese thought. It is clearly,' he adds, 'a manifestation of that habit of the Chinese mind which found another and not very different expression in the mysticism of Lao-tzu, and whatever its origin it ought to be regarded as a peculiarly Far Eastern product.' Three of its characteristics only can be referred to here—*its frugality and restraint, which influenced such different* things as the style of the Golden Pavilion at Kyoto, the Nō drama, ink painting and the Tea Ceremony; and a mystic love of Nature which, unlike much of the love of Nature which inspires English literature, feels no antithesis between Nature and man. China's script, in which a large number of symbols for abstract ideas are based upon those used for fire, water, hill, stream, sun, moon, breath, sheep and other concrete objects, encouraged these characteristics, which with others have combined to produce that quite distinct and individual thing, Japanese taste. That, while differing from China's, resembles hers much more than our own, and is much more important in the daily life even of the poorest Japanese than taste is amongst ourselves. Every cultivated Englishman, no doubt, agrees that 'a thing of beauty is a joy for ever,' but few uncultivated Englishmen rely upon beauty for joy, or feel any dissatisfaction with comfort that is without beauty.

Against all this, of course, and the long years of peaceful intercourse with China which there is not room to trace, must be set, as acknowledged at the beginning of this article, not merely the hostility that has grown so steadily since 1894, but previous periods of hostility, together with psychological causes of enmity, of which the chief is a mutual contempt, China's arising from her knowledge of all Japan has borrowed from her, Japan's from her sense of obligation and her conviction that she possesses superior moral qualities of an elemental but essential character. If one could strike an accurate balance between the two groups of facts one would be able to predict with confidence what is going to happen in the Far East; and who claims to be able to do that? Certainly not myself, who claim no more than to have asked a question worth consideration. For if the answer to it is No, Japan's recently acquired position on the mainland is likely

to be incompatible with the restoration of a durable peace; if it is Yes, the West's desire for such peace is likely to be unrealisable without considerable readjustment of its interests in, and ideas regarding, the Far East.

E. M. GULL.

WAS NEWMAN A FAILURE?

Of all types of genius, the religious offers greatest difficulty to critic and historian. They are obliged, as it were, to appraise in three dimensions a subject which strays continually into four; and there is always some leakage. Last year—a year before the centenary of the Oxford Movement—Mr. Shane Leslie, in a collection which he called *Sublime Failures*, included Cardinal Newman. The essay is hostile; yet, leaving its occasional flippancy on one side, it presents a legitimate three-dimensional verdict. If we demur, it is from a sense that, historically as well as ethically, such a verdict is not enough. There has been a leakage, and the leakage has been that quality of Newman which operates in an extra dimension; probably, the essential Newman. A life such as his is like a comet, trailing after it an ever-growing tail of influence and effect. His account can be reckoned in terrestrial coinage—Mr. Leslie has reckoned it; but Newman-in-space-and-time is not necessarily the same as Newman-in-eternity; nor, in saying this, are we running beyond the principles of objective historical criticism. Tacitus, writing of Christianity after an interval much longer than that which has elapsed since the death of Newman, stated a conclusion which seemed fully justified. Actually, it was nonsense, even from the angle of the objective historian. Newman's life was spent in the service of a faith based upon what seemed to be an earthly failure, and can only be assessed as part of the history of that faith. No other test is adequate.

There is, if we call failure a misuse of powers, at least one department of life in which Newman failed—of which more presently. The failure was real and final, not a mere reverse, nor the disappointment of a project; yet, compared with the purpose to which his life was consecrated, it was of small importance. Reverses he had in plenty, and disappointments. His career after 1845 was less spectacular, less immediately influential, than before. He was frustrated in the fulfilment of various schemes by hostility of the Ultramontanes, and by jealousies among his nearer colleagues. He lost a libel action, missed a bishopric, and depended, for the work which brought to him his greatest fame,

upon the incomprehension of an Anglican divine. These circumstances, since they all ultimately worked together for his good, are so much evidence that his life is not to be assessed in terms of ordinary profit and loss. Newman himself doubted the validity of the material world. For the purposes of his own life he was right.

John Henry Newman was born in London on February 21, 1801, and baptised at the church of St. Benet Fink. His father was a banker, a Freemason of Evangelical views. The child was brought up to love music and to take delight in reading the Bible. He showed precocious ability, writing a satire and a mock drama at the age of eleven. His favourite author was Sir Walter Scott. From his earliest years he was a visionary:

> I thought life might be a dream, or I an angel, and all this world a deception, my fellow-angels by a playful device concealing themselves from me, and deceiving me with the semblance of a material world.

This view of the material world he was to expand, many years later, in his sermons:

> The exterior world, physical and historical, is but the manifestation to our senses of realities greater than itself. Nature is a parable: Scripture is an allegory: pagan literature, philosophy, and mythology, properly understood, are but a preparation for the Gospel.

Newman's childhood was spent near Richmond. He went to school at Ealing, to the Rev. George Nicholas, of Wadham College, Oxford, whence he took with him to Oxford definite Calvinistic leanings, acquired principally from his classical master there. He read hard at Trinity, and was expected to redeem the college's poor run of success in Schools; but he had overworked, tried his powers too high, and failed badly. The reverse did not daunt him. He stayed on, refreshing his mind in the practice and composition of music, and stood for a fellowship at Oriel. Contrary to all expectation, he was successful. Neither success nor failure had dimmed his visionary perception. 'I dreamed a spirit came to me and discoursed about the other world.' He was ordained deacon on Trinity Sunday, 1824, and priest a year later. He remained at Oxford, holding various posts, including that of Vicar of St. Mary's, until 1843.

Soon after taking orders Newman made a friend who had a great influence upon his life and thought. This was Hurrell Froude. In 1832 the two went for a trip to the Mediterranean, made necessary by the state of Froude's health. On the way back, becalmed in an orange boat off Caprera, Newman wrote his most famous hymn, 'Lead, kindly Light.' Returning to Oxford, he plunged heart and soul into an association to defend the

Anglican Church against Liberalism. 'Liberalism,' as he defined it, was

. . . the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word.

The party issued their *Tracts for the Times*, and Newman preached his celebrated *University Sermons*. The Oxford Movement had been born. Its influence spread like a prairie fire, and Newman suddenly found himself the object of an almost fanatical devotion.

It is difficult to gauge his importance to the Oxford Movement. Keble's Assize Sermon may have been the start of it, as Newman always believed; Pusey may have been the figurehead; but Newman did something which in the long run was probably more important than the work of either. He contributed a personality, a graciousness, and a glamour which added to those who flocked in support of the movement the last necessary touch of enthusiasm. The undergraduates (those, at least, to whom such matters gave any concern) were with him to a man. They pointed him out as he walked the streets of Oxford, and hushed their voices at the mention of his name. For a few years his influence at Oxford was paramount. He entered upon the movement with a clear purpose before him.

I had a supreme confidence in our cause; we were upholding that primitive Christianity which was delivered for all time by the early teachers of the Church, and which was registered and attested in the Anglican formularies, and by the Anglican divines. That ancient religion had well-nigh faded away out of the land, through the political changes of the last 150 years, and it must be restored. It would be in fact a second reformation:—a better reformation, for it would be a return not to the sixteenth century but to the seventeenth.

But he had started on a course from which there was to be no turning back. The investigation of certain heresies, and the reception of *Tract XC.*, in which he sought to give a Catholic interpretation to the Thirty-Nine Articles, turned the direction of his thought. '*Tempus abire tibi est*,' he quoted, and left Oxford for Littlemore.

We have no space here for an account of his sojourn at Littlemore, and the rule of life he maintained with his companions. An impression of what it meant to him later can be gauged from the picture which, of all biographers, Lytton Strachey gives best:

At about this time the Curate of Littlemore had a singular experience. As he was passing the Church he noticed an old man, very poorly dressed

in an old grey coat with the collar turned up, leaning over the lych gate, in floods of tears. He was apparently in great trouble, and his hat was pulled down over his eyes, as if he wished to hide his features. For a moment, however, he turned towards the Curate, who was suddenly struck by something familiar in the face. Could it be —— ? A photograph hung over the Curate's mantelpiece of the man who had made Littlemore famous by his sojourn there more than twenty years ago; he had never seen the original; but now, was it possible —— ? He looked again, and he could doubt no longer. It was Dr. Newman. He sprang forward, with proffers of assistance. Could he be of any use? 'Oh no, no!' was the reply. 'Oh no, no, no!' But the Curate felt that he could not turn away, and leave so eminent a character in such distress. 'Was it not Dr. Newman he had the honour of addressing?' he asked, with all the respect and sympathy at his command. 'Was there nothing that could be done?' But the old man hardly seemed to understand what was being said to him. 'Oh no, no!' he repeated, with the tears streaming down his face. 'Oh no, no!'

Newman had an extraordinary capacity for suffering, which is perhaps his strongest claim to be considered a saint. There was, too, more in his sorrows than met the eye. If we could know exactly what was in his mind when the Curate of Littlemore saw him, we should be nearer his secret than any biographer has been allowed to come. At Littlemore Newman hesitated some time over the step which had become inevitable. To the two years he spent there belong the *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, the importance of which was the application to dogma of a theory of evolution, and a consequent illumination of comparative religion.

The phenomenon, admitted on all hands, is this: That great portion of what is generally received as Christian truth is, in its rudiments or in its separate parts, to be found in heathen philosophies and religions.

'These things are in heathenism, therefore they are not Christian,' Newman represents objectors as saying; whereas he preferred to say, 'These things are in Christianity, therefore they are not heathen.'

These things are but broken lights of the truth, but such as they are, they too are from God. So far, then, from the Church's creed 'being of doubtful credit because it resembles foreign theologies,' we ever hold that one special way in which Providence has imparted divine knowledge to us has been by enabling her to draw and collect it together out of the world. . . .

On October 8, 1845, Newman made his submission to Rome. He had contested every inch of the way. 'He commenced, fifteen years ago' (wrote the *Tablet*), 'an ardent Romanist.'

During that time, with every prejudice against the truth, he has diligently laboured in his endeavour to place the Anglican theory on a sound basis in his own mind and before the public. He has tried scheme

after scheme, step by step he has fallen back before the resistless onset of truth. He has yielded slowly—reluctantly, we may say; surrendering no point gratuitously; even when defeated making use of his matchless ingenuity to discover standing-room where less keen sight would have discovered nothing but a vacuum, entrenching himself stubbornly among ruins, every moment (we may imagine) checked in his course of retreat by the anxieties of his public position, and by reflecting how many looked up to him as a guide, and sparing no pains or labour to escape, if it might honestly be done, the last great painful, satisfying change. . . .

The surprise and consternation caused by the step is sufficient evidence of his fame and influence. Lord John Russell deplored it in the House of Commons, Beaconsfield said that 'the secession of Mr. Newman dealt a blow to the Anglican Church under which it still reels.' Gladstone went further:

The ecclesiastical historian will perhaps hereafter judge that this secession was a much greater event than the partial secession of John Wesley, the only case of personal loss suffered by the Church of England since the Reformation which can at all be compared with it in magnitude.

Newman now left Littlemore for Oscott, in Warwickshire, where he and his comrades led a monastic and contemplative life. He was pressed to make a book of the reasons for his conversion, but refused. The plain reason was, as he often stated afterwards, that he saw no logical alternative between Rome and paganism. Once the submission was made, his faith never wavered.

From the day I became a Catholic, [he wrote, in a postscript to the fourth edition of his *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*] to this day, now close upon thirty years, I have never had a moment's misgiving that the Communion of Rome is that Church which the apostle set up at Pentecost . . . and in which the Anglican Communion, whatever its merits and demerits, . . . has, as such, no part.

In 1846 Newman went to Rome, and after a short interval of study was ordained priest. For some time he resided in the Collegio di Propaganda, till an unfortunate sermon, attacking tourists, cooled the temperature (which appears never to have been enthusiastically warm), and Newman provided the solution to a real difficulty by proposing to found an oratory in Birmingham. The programme was so orthodox that it was assented to with relief. 'It was not the nature of his views,' slyly says Lytton Strachey, 'it was his having views at all, that was objectionable.' The oratory was duly founded, and Newman entered upon a new phase of life. The *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*—not in his happiest style—were followed in 1850 by *The Present Position of Catholics in England*, which Mr. Birrell, in his excellent short study of Newman, praises very highly. Then came the Achilli case. Giacinti Achilli was a debauched ex-priest who had gained notoriety by making accusations against Rome. Newman

denounced him from the pulpit, alleging a number of gross sexual offences. 'You speak truly, O Achilli, . . .' he cried. 'You are an incontrovertible proof that priests may fall and friars break their vows.' Achilli retorted with a libel action, which, in the contemporary state of anti-Catholic prejudice, he won; and, although he was subsequently discredited, Newman had to pay damages, which were met by a subscription from the faithful.

The next episode in his career was a visit to Dublin, where a Catholic university was to be founded. Newman arrived, burning with enthusiasm to plant the torch of Oxford in an alien land. Not unnaturally, the alien land would have none of this English convert. Anything more calculated to put up the backs of the Irish authorities can hardly be imagined. Newman, thanks largely to the opposition of Dr. Cullen, was defeated, and the plan to make him a bishop indefinitely shelved. A further disappointment met him when an annotated translation of the Bible, which he was asked to edit, was abandoned, because a similar enterprise had been begun in America.

Newman's fortunes were now at the ebb.

> . . . He was sixty-three years of age. What had he to look forward to? A few last years of insignificance and silence. What had he to look back upon? A long chronicle of wasted efforts, disappointed hopes, neglected possibilities, unappreciated powers.

Had this been the end, Mr. Shane Leslie's classification might have been justified. To whatever degree Newman had kept faith with his vision and his conscience, a matter beyond human power to assess, we should be entitled to judge him as a religious leader by the success or failure of those actions and gestures in which he had sought to make his faith effective. Good intentions can never absolve weak practice. His Oxford endeavours he had proclaimed to be an error; his career in the faith of his adoption had been undistinguished. But it was not the end. The Rev. Charles Kingsley chose the moment to make a slighting reference to the value attached by the Roman Church to truth, and cited Newman as his authority. Newman protested. Kingsley made a disingenuous apology. Newman retorted. Kingsley, falling back on bluster, counter-attacked. Newman, in great distress of mind, laboured for seven weeks at the reply generally regarded as his masterpiece—the *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*:

> I must give the key to my whole life; I must show what I am that it may be seen what I am not, and that the phantom may be extinguished which gibbers instead of me.

The brilliant and world-wide success of the book did not diminish the jealousy which certain of his colleagues felt against him. The plan for an Oxford oratory—over which Newman was to preside,

a post he would have loved—was negatived, chiefly through the agency of Manning. 'To be Roman is to an Englishman an effort,' wrote Monsignor Talbot. 'Dr. Newman is more English than the English. His spirit must be crushed.' But Newman had learned resignation. Not long afterwards, when the *Grammar of Assent* had been published, he wrote in his diary (October 1867):

> I was never in such happy circumstances as now. . . . I am my own master—I have my time my own—I am surrounded with comforts and conveniences—I am in easy circumstances, I have no cares, I have good health—I have no pain of mind or body. . . . I am covered with blessings, and as full of God's grace as is conceivable. And I have nothing to ask for but pardon and grace, and a happy death.

In his eightieth year he received his cardinalship. Even then there was nearly a bungle, for his plea to be allowed to die in England was at first interpreted as a refusal. All went well, however, and Newman was excused from having to live at Rome. So his last years were full of honour, and he died peacefully, after a brief illness, on August 11, 1890. 'We have lost,' said Manning, 'our greatest witness for the Faith, and we are all the poorer and lower by the loss.' This verdict, from a definitely hostile source, hardly suggests failure.

Where Newman failed was as a writer. This may seem a strange verdict, in view of the success of the *Apology*, of Gladstone's tribute (' We have everywhere the man in his work . . . the words are the transparent covering of his nature '), and of Lytton Strachey's

> The success of the book, with its transparent candour, its controversial brilliance, the sweep and passion of its rhetoric, the depth of its personal feeling, was immediate and overwhelming.

Yet few who read the best of Newman's work, such as his *Idea of a University*, and the finest passages from the *Apology* and from the sermons, can resist the conclusion that, from a purely literary standpoint, he fell far short of his promise and his powers. It was, admittedly, his misfortune rather than his fault. The tragedy of Newman was that he was not born a Catholic. He was a predestined Catholic, and—again from the purely artistic point of view—a great deal of valuable time would have been saved had he been born one. To the born Catholic his faith is a part of ordinary daily life. In the highest sense of the term, he is matter-of-fact about it. This means, if he is an artist, that he takes it simply, as a child takes the facts of the world around him, and that his genius is free for other things—as Newman's never was. Newman's genius was taken up with apologetics, which is another way of saying that the greater part of his work is rhetorical. The rhetorician has to be always mindful of his audience, for his

business is to convince. The poet minds no one but himself. Such genius as Newman had was meant for better work than advocacy. From the religious point of view it will be objected that there can be no better work than such advocacy as he practised; but it is not from the religious point of view that Newman was a failure. Newman was an artist as well as a priest; and the whole point is that the artist who is obliged to consider his audience (in Newman's case it was a very wide audience) is obliged to limit his expression to what they can understand. Newman would probably never have been a great poet; but the whole trend of his life took him towards advocacy, which is the opposite of poetry.

> The physical nature lies before us, patent to the sight, ready to the touch, appealing to the senses in so unequivocal a way that the science which is founded upon it is as real to us as the fact of our personal existence. But the phenomena, which are the basis of morals and religion, have nothing of this luminous evidence. Instead of being obtruded upon our notice, so that we cannot possibly overlook them, they are the dictates either of conscience or of Faith. They are faint shadows and tracings, certain indeed, but delicate, fragile, and almost evanescent, which the mind recognises at one time, not at another—discerns when it is calm, loses when it is in agitation. The reflection of sky and mountains in the lake is a proof that sky and mountains are around it, but the twilight, or the mist, or the sudden storm hurries away the beautiful image, which leaves behind no memorial of what it was. Something like this are the Moral Law and the informations of Faith, as they present themselves to individual minds.

Here is poetry pressed into the service of rhetoric. Newman acknowledged Cicero as his master, and the influence is easily seen on the first part of the paragraph above. He was a better poet than Cicero; but he is here seen seizing upon a poetic intuition in order to score a point, and this is the way neither of poetry nor of a high imaginative prose.

Newman's style was indeed 'the transparent covering of his nature,' and that nature was very emotional. He shed tears often and easily. There are many references to them in his sermons. He wrote the *Apology* 'constantly in tears, and constantly crying out with distress.' He kissed his bed and mantelpiece on leaving Littlemore. Something of this charges his style. There is sometimes a shrillness in it; sometimes it is overelaborate. Sometimes, despite the essential truthfulness and sincerity of the man, it runs on by itself, sound with little meaning. He wrote best when he was absolutely calm and when he was moved to the depths of his being, preferably with anger, which enabled him to use sarcasm freely. But the worst condemnation comes from himself. 'I have ever felt,' he admits naïvely, 'from experience that no one would believe me in earnest if I spoke

calmly.' The great writer who is not an advocate does not worry whether he is going to be believed or not. He writes for his own ear, not for others'. In this sense, then—with an accent on the 'sublime'—we must count Mr. Shane Leslie's charge proved. Yet even here Newman slips into the fourth dimension. Even as literature, can we judge his work before we know its full effect?

The charge holds nowhere else. It does not matter that Newman failed in many of the undertakings to which he addressed himself. It does not matter that he never attained real intellectual stability, and was never in the strict sense a philosopher. Emotional and intuitive, he achieved more in philosophy by virtue of these qualities (as his *Grammar of Assent* shows) than he could have found had he been willing to submit to the discipline of logic and metaphysics. The dogma to which he held, without which he found religion meaningless, was a refuge sought in adolescence from a world the reality of which he distrusted. Intellectually a weakness (sought as he sought it), he turned it into strength. Newman's greatness arose out of his reverses and his difficulties. The fact of his birth made him spend long agonies in passing from one church to another, time that, in one sense, might be counted lost. Yet these very agonies made his pilgrimage infinitely more effective to the cause he served. His greatest work arose from the sneer of an uncomprehending mind. The bishopric that never materialised was a blessing, for it saved him from being buried in an unfriendly Ireland. 'All things work together for good to them who love God.' Newman's nature turned all his reverses into blessings; and, in the values of that world and fellowship by which his whole life can alone be judged, this is not commonly held the mark of failure.

L. A. G. STRONG.

WORDSWORTH AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS

It is worth while to recall from 1914 that Wordsworth's poetry at the outbreak of the Great War formed a rallying-point of patriotic sentiment. His greater sonnets—'It is not to be thought of that the flood,' 'When I have borne in memory what has tamed,' 'Milton! thou should'st be living at this hour,' etc.—were published at short intervals in *The Times* newspaper, and his appeal was invoked in one, or more than one, of the Oxford pamphlets. Patriotism in war-time, perhaps, is not the highest test of poetry—an uneasy memory recurs of Mr. Alfred Austin's ditty in the South African campaign; but the spontaneous return after more than a hundred years to the utterances of a long-dead poet for confidence, solace and assurance in a new war against another foe affords proof that Wordsworth's muse commanded notes neither opportune nor ephemeral which could rouse a noble and puissant nation (Milton's language is appropriate) to fresh effort under the sun.

Early in 1916, when the war was eighteen months old, Professor G. McLean Harper, who occupied the Woodrow Wilson Chair of Literature in Princetown University, published a Life of Wordsworth in two volumes, which at once became authoritative. Its gradual if unforeseen effect has been to destroy Wordsworth's freshness. Preceded in 1896 by *La Jeunesse de Wordsworth* of Professor Legouis, which drew attention to Wordsworth's early years, and followed in 1926 by Professor E. de Selincourt's variorum edition of *The Prelude*, which emphasised the significance of those years by a line-by-line examination of the text of the poem which narrated them, Harper's Life, in a phrase which fits this context, imposed 'a mute and strange declining' on the young enthusiast:

> Only one youth, and the bright life was shrouded,
> Only one morning, and the day was clouded,
> And one old age with all regrets is crowded.

Such, briefly, has been Wordsworth's fate by his new biographers. Professor Garrod, in an excellent little book on Wordsworth (Oxford, 1923), though he 'rose from the re-reading of *The Prelude* with the sense that Wordsworth understood

himself, not only better than Mr. Harper would have us suppose, but better than Mr. Harper has understood him—that he had drawn the lines of his own life with a truer emphasis' (p. 23), and though he bore testimony that 'among the commonplaces of life, environed by custom and the casual cares of the world, still to live imaginatively—this is not easy, and this, more than other poets, Wordsworth helps us to do' (p. 141), yet writes of his last forty years as 'the most dismal anti-climax of which the history of literature holds record' (p. 138); and Mr. Hugh I'Anson Fausset, in *The Lost Leader: A Study of Wordsworth*,[1] a consideration of which is the object of the present essay, quotes this dictum with approval in his preface, and adds the subjective statement that Wordsworth 'lived for forty years haunted by an uneasy conscience, a sense of faded glory, of vision darkened, and deep assurance quenched.'

It is really a curious reversal, a peripeteia, in the old Greek tragic phrase, by which the leader of a nation in arms is remanded to the outer darkness of lost leadership, old, worn-out, haunted, his glory faded and his vision dim. The more we look into it, the odder we find it, and the less convincing seems the argument. Before coming to the central feature in the new synthesis, represented to-day by a tomb in the Père-Lachaise Cemetery in Paris, brief reference is appropriate to Wordsworth's fate by his old biographers.

The first of these was his nephew, Dr. Christopher Wordsworth, who was Bishop of Lincoln from 1868 till his death in 1885. He was the son of an elder Christopher (1774–1846), the poet's brother ('my brother, the Dean,' he used to mention a little unctuously), who was appointed Master of Trinity in 1820. When he resigned in 1841 there were three candidates for the post—Dr. Whewell, Mr. Francis Martin, and the Rev. Dr. Wordsworth; and Sir Robert Peel, in his submission to the young Queen, wrote of the last of the three that he was 'a highly distinguished scholar, but his success as Headmaster of Harrow has not been such as to overcome the objection which applies on general grounds to the succession of a father by a son in an office of this description.' There was no one in 1851 to suggest that the same distinguished scholar's success as a theological writer was not such as to overcome the objection on general grounds to the biography of an uncle by a nephew and of a poet by a schoolmaster on promotion to a bishopric. Certainly, it was an unfortunate selection. Dr. Wordsworth applied himself assiduously to the production of a memoir in two volumes of the kind which the Lytton Strachey school were to break in pieces with ribald laughter. The future bishop walked delicately with the poet. 'O, my prophetic soul! Mine uncle,' he must have exclaimed as he laid some ghosts of the

[1] Jonathan Cape Ltd.: London, 1933.

past in the vain hope that they would not rise to disturb him. But they have risen—pale ghosts out of the tomb in Père-Lachaise, and the mitred ghost of Bishop Watson of Llandaff, to whom Wordsworth wrote a letter in 1793, exhumed by Dr. Grosart in 1876, on 'the extraordinary avowal of his political principles' in disfavour of the French Revolution. It was not a pamphlet to gladden a bishop's heart. Still less would its signature, 'A Republican,' and its contention that 'the office of King is a trial to which human virtue is not equal' have commended her late Poet Laureate to Queen Victoria, or confirmed his successor's description of him as a poet who 'uttered nothing base.' Dr. Wordsworth suppressed both episodes.

The poet's second biographer, William Angus Knight (1836–1916), was not less careful of the conventions. True, he was a lover of the Lake District, to which he retired from his Chair of Moral Philosophy at St. Andrew's. But he was never a man of generous taste or fine discernment, and his Life of Wordsworth in three volumes (1889) and his subsequent labours as editor of the family letters evinced more industry than interpretative skill. The ghosts still roamed in limbo. Wordsworth, after all, we must remember, was a son of the robust eighteenth century. He was eight years old when Voltaire and Rousseau died, nine or ten when the *Lives of the Poets* were published, twenty-two years older than Shelley and a few months younger than Napoleon. It was not a Victorian atmosphere, and yet, surviving till 1850, it was his misfortune to fall into the hands of decorous Victorian biographers. Neither the pedagogic son of the Master of Trinity nor the moral author of the *English Lake District* was fully qualified to write the life of a poet who had seen the Bastille in ruins, and who could declare from contemporary experience that 'Mr. Burke roused the indignation of all ranks of men when, by a refinement in cruelty superior to that which in the East yokes the living to the dead, he strove to persuade us that we and our posterity to the end of time were riveted to a constitution by the indissoluble compact of—a dead parchment.' [1]

The first Wordsworth legend, accordingly, was made by Victorian biographers of an eighteenth-century poet, and the second arose partly out of the reaction from them. Knight's three-volume Life appeared, as we noted, in 1889, and in 1896

[1] The Llandaff letter, which went unpublished for nearly a hundred years, probably in the first instance owing to Wordsworth's saving commonsense, is an exceptionally effective philippic and takes a high place among the replies to Burke's *Reflections* of 1790. It was a remarkable piece of writing and argument for a youth of twenty-three; and as an instance of the devil quoting Scripture for his own purpose compare the statement that 'the extremes of poverty and riches have a necessary tendency to corrupt the human heart' with the petition of Agur in Proverbs xxx., 8.

Professor Emile Legouis was ready with his *Jeunesse*, the heroic *roman* of Wordsworth's stormy youth. It was translated into English in the next year, with a preface by Sir Leslie Stephen, who emphasised its departure from Wordsworthian tradition, founded, as he remarked, on 'the thirty-nine articles, capital punishment, and rotten boroughs.' Professor C. H. Herford was able to use Legouis for his excellent handbook on the *Age of Wordsworth* in 1897. Sir I. Gollancz put *The Prelude* into the 'Temple Classics,' as it has recently been put into the 'Golden Treasury' series. Sir William Watson, in his stately *Wordsworth's Grave*, recalled us to his memory from 'poorer loves,' and Sir W. Raleigh's monograph appeared in 1903. The pace has quickened in the present century, but already in the last years of the old the Wordsworth legend was moving away from the consecrated Victorian version, in the midst of which Matthew Arnold, prophesying a revival, had declared that while Wordsworth was almost unknown on the Continent, it was permissible to speak of his poetry at home 'not only with ignorance but with impertinence.'

So far, so good. Arnold was right, and his Allah was borne with acclamation across the frontier of the twentieth century. But the new Wordsworthiad developed dangers in its own kind. It is the habit of a legend to grow and even to substitute for its prototype a heroic figure distorted out of verisimilitude. Charlemagne, Alexander, the Cid, have all undergone this process, and it has been Wordsworth's fate to undergo it twice. His first *épopée* made him too old, like Charlemagne entangled in his beard; his second has made him too young, the perpetual father of a natural daughter. It would ill become a *père de famille*, brought up in a Victorian household, to condone Wordsworth's sin with Annette Vallon. He seduced her, he did not marry her, and he had a baby by her, and their descendants are living in France to-day. But he was not doing it all the time, and his biographers cannot have it both ways. Either he sinned once and rode away, and both parties were satisfied to make the best of it, or he was a Byron *in petto* wearing a hypocrite's cloak. The latter picture is so obviously out of drawing as hardly to merit consideration except in relation to Mr. Fausset's new book. So we come to the facts as they were.

A tall, loose-built, Cumbrian lad, frugal, poor, an orphan with a devoted sister, bred between the mountains and the sea, with their roughness and their colour and their mystery, high-minded, romantic, a native freeman of a society ignorant of class privilege, went abroad in July 1790 with a Cambridge companion of like tastes. Their destination was Switzerland, and they landed at Calais on the 13th of the month, the day before the first anniversary of the fall of the Bastille and the first *fête* of the Federation,

when Lafayette and King Louis XVI. took the oath of the new Constitution. To these boys at twenty years of age it was all flags and flowers and dance-music, and it left a permanent impression. As Wordsworth wrote in *Prelude*, vi.:

> All hearts were open, every tongue was loud
> With amity and glee.
>
> Europe at that time was thrilled with joy,
> France standing on the top of golden hours,
> And human nature seeming born again.
>
> We saw,
> In a mean city, and among a few,
> How bright a face is worn when joy of one
> Is joy for tens of millions.

Doubtless this impression survived when he decided in November 1791, after he had taken his degree and spent some months in London, to visit France again. His object, according to Dorothy, was to improve his knowledge of the language. It was to 'qualify him,' she wrote, 'for the office of travelling-companion to some young gentleman, if he can get recommended; it will at any rate be very useful to him.' The mothering sister put the penny-plain view, as mothers of restless sons who will not settle at once to a profession have done before and will do again. But there was a twopenny-coloured side to it in the breast of the idle, eager lad, whose only certitude was *nolo episcopari*. He preferred French lessons to Hebrew, and he preferred to take them in the land of golden hours and ruddy wine. He was still only twenty-one, France was still a country of romance, life was still an adventure, and it chanced that Wordsworth's French lessons were taken from a girl about four years older than himself, Marie-Anne (Annette) Vallon. Can we be surprised and should we be shocked at the birth of Caroline on December 15, 1792?

War between France and England was declared in the following February, and the sequel was Trafalgar and Waterloo, Nelson's hate, and the legacy of anti-France, which was not exhausted till the time of King Edward VII. The war very soon enlisted Wordsworth's sympathies. He was quick, though sore, to see that,

> now, become oppressors in their turn,
> Frenchmen had changed a war of self-defence
> For one of conquest, losing sight of all
> Which they had struggled for. (*Prelude*, xi., 206.)

But, even apart from this reversal of his earlier belief in the French experiment in liberty, the boy was growing into a man, Napoleon was bestriding Europe, and in a more than literal sense Annette and her child were left behind. For the fact that they were French is essential. They belonged to that short day of golden

hours, which went down in a bath of blood. They were not only Annette and Caroline; they were youth and liberty and dawn, all inextricably mingled with dreams that receded on the horizon. He could not marry Annette and Annette could not marry him—he, because France had betrayed the hope which humanity had reposed in her; she, because neither in speech nor opinion, neither by intellect nor taste, did she ever come close to her lover. She wrote long letters to Dorothy, in whom the poet confided from the start and who smoothed his path of retreat. She longed at first for the arms of her 'Williams,' and he may have paid her a stolen visit in war-time, October 1793. Then came a long, obliterating pause. She brought Caroline to see him and Dorothy at Calais in August 1802, two months before Wordsworth's marriage to Mary Hutchinson. There was, of course, no renewal of love-making. The little foreign girl, unlike her aunt and father, was insensitive to natural phenomena,[3] and Annette was content to be her mother. An even longer pause ensued. The Wordsworths wanted to attend Caroline's marriage with Jean-Baptiste Baudouin, but the state of Europe forbade, and the wedding took place in February 1816 without the presence of the bride's father. At last, in October 1820, the Wordsworths, with Dorothy and Crabb Robinson, met Annette, the Baudouins and their children on a brief visit to Paris. It was all quite quiet and uneventful—British reserve and French commonsense. Annette died in 1841, Caroline in 1852, and her eldest daughter, Louise Marie Caroline Dorothy (the devoted aunt and great-aunt deserved this compliment), in 1869. The family is continued through her daughters.

These are the facts of the case, and, still postponing for a moment our review of Mr. Fausset's commentary, we note that Wordsworth attempted no concealment. The facts were known to his sister and his wife, to his friend Crabb Robinson, and others. True, he did not publish them broadcast. In tracing 'the growth of a poet's mind' he did not mention them specifically in *The Prelude*. But all the authorities agree that they can be read between the lines of that poem, and, since truth was satisfied ideally, the poet was faithful to his art. *The Prelude* is unique in literature, and its author is surely the only judge of how to attain its object. His own statement in 1814 was that 'he undertook to record, in verse, the origin and progress of his own powers, as far as he was acquainted with them,' and to conduct 'the history of the Author's mind to the point where he was emboldened to hope that his faculties were sufficiently matured for entering upon the arduous labour' of the uncompleted *Recluse*, of which *The*

[3] See Wordsworth's sonnet, 'It is a beauteous evening, calm and free.' The 'Dear Child, dear Girl!' whom he apostrophises is his ten-year-old French daughter.

Excursion forms the second part. Recalling, further, that he kept *The Prelude* by him for just fifty years and that it was not published till after his death, there seems less cause to expect that he would mention Annette by name. His faculties were matured by his French experience, which is recounted in three books of the poem (ix. to xi.) and which affects the remaining three, and that experience included the 'happy time of youthful lovers' (ix., 553), illustrated by the tale of *Vaudracour and Julia*, which he related in a separate poem and published, be it observed, in 1820. There are resemblances in that tale to his own adventure with Annette, so that he told enough people in his lifetime and even wrote enough round it and about it, without doing violence to the set scheme of *The Prelude*, to make the charge of concealment at least not proven. To him, as the months grew to years and the years to slow and tranquil decades, as Dorothy took the trouble off him and Annette did not complain of her lot, and France, enclosing the Annette episode, worked out an un-English destiny, the whole thing faded and changed. He had known Godwin, he had sat in the dust of the Bastille, he had read Burke's *Reflections* at the date of their appearance. But 1790 was not a lifetime. Nor was 1886 to Liberal Unionists; and who knows how Tennyson would have voted in the House of Lords on the topic of the Irish Free State?

I mentioned Matthew Arnold above. It is worth noting, in part correction of some recent Wordsworth criticism, that when Arnold, an excellent judge, made his selection from Wordsworth for the 'Golden Treasury' he remarked that 'the *Excursion* and the *Prelude* . . . are by no means Wordsworth's best work,' and that he could read 'everything of Wordsworth . . . except *Vaudracour and Julia*.' Taste has veered very much in the other direction, and its expression, though largely sincere, and though most gratefully crowned by Professor de Selincourt's labours on *The Prelude*, is partly due to the anxiety of critics to repair the biographical omissions of Bishop Wordsworth and Mr. Knight. It is a wholly just desire, but it need not be indulged to excess. Arnold's aim was as just in 1879. He wanted to relieve the poet 'of a great deal of the poetical baggage which now encumbers him.' There were 'certain special obstacles' which hindered his due fame, and which he had brought back from his 'excursion' in philosophy and his 'prelude' to the philosophic epic. It was full time that these should be removed, and Arnold proceeded to remove them in big lumps. Remembering that Tennyson at this date was the favourite poet of Victorian readers, we cannot help being reminded of the old folk-tale, dramatised by Hans Sachs, of Eve's dissimilar children (*die ungleichen Kinder Evas*). Adam and Eve are living on a farm, when the Deity, a kind of overseer,

is announced to pay them a visit. The good children are dressed and shown off and the naughty are kept in the background. When the show children have been rewarded, Eve, taking advantage of the propitious atmosphere, ventures to introduce her naughty offspring. God is amused at their unkempt appearance, but he finds some gifts for them, too, and graciously assures the bashful parents that all service is equal in his sight. So with Wordsworth and Tennyson. Homely William was brushed and tidied, and, his pockets emptied of useless baggage, was pushed by Matthew Arnold into the drawing-room after the spruce and polite young Alfred, who had already gained 'the ear and applause of the great body of poetry-lovers.' This aim was as just as the other, and the evidence that *The Prelude* once obstructed the reputation which it is employed to make to-day may warn longer lovers of great poetry that the biography of poets is not the surest guide to their appreciation.

One word more, before coming to Mr. Fausset. It may be described as an authoritative word, for it is taken from Wordsworth's own 'Letter to a Friend of Robert Burns,' dated January 1816, a month before the wedding of his French daughter. There he wrote, perhaps not without reference to domestic considerations:

> Biography, though differing in some essentials from works of fiction, is, nevertheless, like them, an *art*—an art, the laws of which are determined by the imperfections of our nature, and the constitution of society. Truth is not here, as in the sciences, and in natural philosophy, to be sought without scruple, and promulgated for its own sake, upon the mere chance of its being serviceable; but only for obviously justifying reasons, moral or intellectual.
>
> Silence is a privilege of the grave, a right of the departed: let him, therefore, who infringes that right, by speaking publicly of, for, or against those who cannot speak for themselves, take heed that he opens not his mouth without a sufficient sanction. . . . Only to philosophy enlightened by the affections does it belong justly to estimate the claims of the deceased on the one hand, and of the present age and future generations on the other; and to strike a balance between them.—Such philosophy runs a risk of becoming extinct among us, if the coarse intrusions into the recesses, the gross breaches upon the sanctities of domestic life, to which we have lately become more and more accustomed, are to be regarded as indications of a vigorous state of feeling.
>
> The general obligation upon which I have insisted [continued Wordsworth] is especially binding upon those who undertake the biography of *authors*. . . . Our business is with books,—to understand and to enjoy them. And of poets more especially it is true, that, if their works be good, they contain within themselves all that is necessary to their being comprehended and relished. . . .
>
> On the basis of his human character, [Wordsworth went on to declare of Burns] he has reared a poetic one. . . . Granting that all that has been raked up to the prejudice of Burns were literally true, and that it added, which it does not, to our better understanding of human nature and of

human life, . . . how poor would have been the compensation for the deduction made, by this extrinsic knowledge, from the intrinsic efficacy of his poetry—to please and to instruct !

Poor, indeed ! It is a long quotation, but it is probably not familiar, and, written by a poet of a poet, it is as true *of* Wordsworth to-day as it was true *by* him in 1816—just a hundred years, by the way, before Professor Harper's biography. We would not unlearn that new extrinsic knowledge, but we do complain of the deduction which it has made from the intrinsic efficacy of Wordsworth's poetry, and we could wish that Mr. Fausset had taken heed of Wordsworth's principles of biographic art before he gave the suggestive title of 'The Fall' to the section (pp. 81-118) of his book which narrates the poet's French experience and his sweet sin with Annette. For thenceforward Annette is everywhere. Mr. Fausset cannot get away from her. Wordsworth returned to England, descended on Coleridge like a *gnothi seauton* from heaven, collaborated with him in *Lyrical Ballads*, wrote *The Excursion*, lyrics, and the famous *Ode*, married, brought up a family, became Poet Laureate, and all the while, according to Mr. Fausset, he was 'deceiving himself.' 'The furies of perplexity, shame and remorse were already on his track' (p. 117) in 1793, and through the rest of his ghost-ridden life he was fleeing from the secret fears which 'haunted him whenever he remembered Annette' (p. 286). Annette was Julia, of course : hence Freudians, hunting inhibitions, as other priests hunted heresies in other epochs, read and re-read *Vaudracour and Julia*, which honest 'Mat.' found intolerably tiresome. She was Lucy, and Margaret, and the Highland Girl, the phantom of delight, and the woman who stepped westward ; she spoilt Peter Bell's taste for primroses (pp. 231–232), she was haled to the judgment-bar in *Laodamia* (p. 443), and, for all we know, she infected the calculating child who, like Chichikow, made a hobby of dead souls. Certainly she imposed an extra burden on the poet *qua* poet :

We know from Dorothy's *Journal* [writes Mr. Fausset (p. 210)] how much the composition of these poems cost her brother in the pains of travail and subsequent exhaustion. They frequently left him tired and ill. And this was not only due to the strain of creative concentration. It was due also to the fact [Mr. Fausset departs unobtrusively from the authority of the *Journal* at this 'fact'] that in many of them he was still probing the wound of his fatal passion for Annette.

Mr. Fausset's obsession by Annette, which at once dominates and vitiates his book, is curiously intertwined with a political theorem, propounded in his preface and elaborated round about p. 340. This disease, says the preface, 'which Wordsworth strove unavailingly to cure in himself, is the disease of the modern world. . . . We, too, have outgrown the state of Nature and

fallen into a state of sin'; and in the text we are warned that the symptoms spread even to the patriotic sonnets, which, as we observed above, possessed some intrinsic efficacy in the Great War. But Mr. Fausset knows better: 'Although he had achieved a splendid utterance in these sonnets,' we read, 'he had taken one more step along a path that was fatal to his true genius. . . . The patriotic sublime was ultimately to prove as stultifying as the egotistic sublime of which it was a large expression.'

Exactly what this means we cannot say, but we must remark that Mr. Fausset is not quite fair. He quotes on the same page (340) the opening verses of the sonnet, 'When I have borne in memory what has tamed Great Nations,' and deliberately underlines the six words 'When men change swords for ledgers.' Here, he contends, 'the inevitable martial note entered,' and, after presuming to remind Wordsworth that 'a poet who accepts the *rôle* of moral teacher has great responsibilities,' he works up to his indignant conclusion on p. 365 that 'the fire-eating patriot . . . had irrevocably chosen the path of decline.' It would all sound more seemly and impressive if Mr. Fausset had not forgotten to mention (not to say to underline) the next seven words in the sonnet, 'and desert the student's bower for gold.' For surely Wordsworth's emphasis is identic, and to insist on 'the inevitable martial note' while ignoring the not less inevitable note of culture (if culture is the aim of students) strikes Wordsworth's humbler admirers as an expression of egotistic sublime. After all, what Wordsworth said was no more than the obvious truism that the gentleman of the Renaissance, who was at once a soldier and a scholar, was on the whole a more complete citizen, and was more likely to keep out the invader, than the commercial magnate of the day. He admitted that his fears were 'unfilial,' that he spoke 'as a lover or a child,' and that England was still a 'bulwark for the cause of men'; and the scholar-soldiers of the generation of Rupert Brooke did not belie his faith. When they met him in the Elysian Fields we may venture to doubt if they found him an old man haunted by remorse and ravaged with incurable disease.

Mr. Fausset's trouble is the Industrial Revolution.

The future was to be with the industrialist, [he declares (p. 341)] and it might have been a far less ugly future, if such men as Wordsworth, [where were there 'such men as' he in his lifetime ?] who prized the ancient virtues, had recognized the need of co-operating with all that was true and vital in the new movement, *instead of merely acclaiming the past*, [our italics, for the phrase is so inadequate to Wordsworth's transcendentalism] in their reasonable recoil from all that was false and deathly in the present. Those, too, who, disgusted by the commercialism of the ledger, strove to revive the chivalry of the sword [and the culture of the pen ?] were particularly dangerous sentimentalists.

The future was to be with the industrialist, but he was not to be posterity's sole trustee, and at another time and with ampler space we should like to try to convince Mr. Fausset that even Wordsworth made some contribution to the correction of the material ideal which stared in the year after his death out of the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park. It may have required the Great War to demolish the Great Exhibition—we gather that this is Mr. Fausset's view; but the suggested equation between Wordsworth's 'frustrated passion' for Annette and the course of industry which went awry is unsound both as biography and as history.

Wordsworth has been unfortunate in his biographers. If his nephew had had the imagination to foresee the misunderstanding that would arise from the *suppressio veri* in his memoir, and had trusted the public with the secret which Wordsworth shared with his sister, wife and friends, and which he treated according to its final value in his narrative of the growth of a poet's mind, his Victorian occultation might have been less complete, and Professor Harper in 1916 would have seen his life in truer perspective. Certainly in 1933 Mr. Fausset would not have written a long book in order to prove, in his own words (p. 445), the poet's 'corrosive remorse' 'after his Fall in France,' thus deducting by extrinsic knowledge more and more from the intrinsic efficacy of his poetry, until the art of biography is reduced to the following statement of intention (p. 13):

> I have striven to reconstruct his life from year to year and, in its crucial period, from month to month, from within, until in 1815 the last efforts of self-transcendence ceased, and he was immured in the prison-house of which he had for so long felt the deepening shadows.

This was not the method of M. Legouis. Writing in 1896, before the tomb in Père-Lachaise had given up its ghost, that admirable critic declared that *The Prelude* is

> less the history of a man than the philosophy of a mind. . . . Not, however, that Wordsworth has said, or pretended to say, everything concerning himself. He has left neither 'Confessions' nor 'Confidences.' It is doubtful whether he had any reasons for addressing the world in an undertone like Lamartine, or for shouting to it the painful avowals of a Rousseau. But, however this may be, he thought it proper to make a selection from among the events of his own clear and tranquil life. Out of the darkness of the past he has brought to light those elements alone which, in his opinion, had effectually contributed to the development of his genius. The poet of man's moral nature would confer immortality only on the nobler and more wholesome parts of his being. . . . Scrupulously truthful, Wordsworth is always intentionally incomplete.

Always intentionally incomplete. The part is greater than the whole. Wordsworth's definitive biographer, reinvigorated and

refreshed, will go back from these morbid and haunted pages to the clear and tranquil life of the supreme poet, from whom John Stuart Mill 'seemed to learn what would be the perennial sources of happiness, when all the greater evils of life shall have been removed'; whom Sir Walter Raleigh described as 'a poet who faced the fact, and against whom the fact did not prevail. To know him is to learn courage; to walk with him is to feel the visitings of a larger, purer air, and the peace of an unfathomable sky'; and of whom Walter Pater, answering in advance Mr. Fausset's appeal to the Industrial Revolution, wrote in 1874:

> Against this predominance of machinery in our existence, Wordsworth's poetry, like all great art and poetry, is a continual protest. Justify rather the end by the means, it seems to say: whatever may become of the fruit, make sure of the flowers and the leaves. It was justly said, therefore, by one who had meditated very profoundly on the true relation of means to ends in life, and on the distinction between what is desirable in itself and what is desirable only as machinery, that when the battle which he and his friends were waging had been won, the world would need more than ever those qualities which Wordsworth was keeping alive and nourishing.

The 'lost leader' returns on shining tracks.

LAURIE MAGNUS.

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THE
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THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN DECLINE

A Socialist View

It is the way of coalitions in English politics to produce an inextricable confusion; and with whatever popularity they may begin, it is not long before they give rise to a sense of disillusionment and disappointment which brings them to an end in a return to a straight party alignment. It was so in the age of Palmerston and the early Gladstone, and again with the later Gladstone and the Liberal Unionists; while the confusion introduced upon the political scene by Mr. Lloyd George and his coalition is a recent memory with us all. This present coalition, which claims, on the strength of a majority created by a panic, to be a 'National' Government—though of the three parties in the State it has only the reluctant support of one, of an outcast quarter of another, and for the rest is a 'tesselated pavement'—this present jig-saw puzzle of a Government is no exception. As might have been expected from its diverse origins and haphazard recruitment, it has thrown up around itself and its doings an

undesirable fog in which the main issues of politics in our time comparatively clear in themselves, are enveloped.

This, in so far as it is due to personal factors, may be sai to reflect the personal alliance and understanding between Mr MacDonald and Mr. Baldwin, which, if the image is not to definite, is the keystone of the present Government. At any rate it is this alliance which is fundamental to the continuance of th coalition, and determines its character, such as it is. It would b invidious to probe too closely into the respective parts played by each of them in it, or to ask which of them calls the tune an which does the dancing; the understanding is obviously at onc so complete and so intimate. But it is clear that they have common bond in their outlook on politics; they are both of ther disillusioned men, profoundly sceptical at bottom, believing that after all, not much can be done in this weary world of conflicting strident, positive creatures; both of them by temperamen conservative, concerned with keeping things as they are rathe than planning constructively for the future; indeed, having mistrust of action, and preferring to let things work out their ow course, correcting here, or holding back there, but never drivin forward on a determined plan of action; by temperamen opposed to rationalism, and guided by a sort of muddled mysticisn that believes things work out on the whole for good. Theirs i an outlook neither reactionary (like Mr. Churchill's) nor radica (like Mr. Lloyd George's), but patriarchal, and all for standin still.

The pity of it is that you never can get leadership out of point of view like that. It discourages, and in the end it disinte grates. The only strength of the MacDonald–Baldwin alliance i that together they hold the centre of the field. The people wh really want a lead are divided as to what they want; so that th least common measure between them all remains in possession But, further, you cannot get a clear policy, a concerted line o action, unless it is based on a clear foundation—some grea interest in the community. It is the whole justification fo parties. What is it that Burke says?: 'Party is a body of me united for promoting by their joint endeavours the nationa interest upon some particular principle in which they are al agreed.' Can it be said that there is any such principle upo which Mr. Runciman and Mr. Chamberlain, or Mr. MacDonal and Lord Hailsham, are united? No, the fact that the Nationa Government was put together from such diverse origins come home to it the more the longer it lasts; such questions as th tariff, whether it is to be permanent or subject to agreements wit foreign countries, or whether we shall return to the gold standar or not, whether we are to go on paying the debt to the Unite

States, whether we are to go forward with the White Paper policy in India, obviously subject the present coalition to dangerous strain. Party loyalties, to those members of the coalition who still have a party to go to, may at some point call them out of the Government. I should venture to say that at that point where Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon become more of a liability than an asset—a point that may not be far distant—the pressure of the Conservative Party upon its leaders to rid itself of the liability and to form a purely Conservative Government may well become irresistible.

Already one can observe, towards the end of the second year of the National Government, a visible deterioration, a lack of integration in its efforts, the impression it constantly gives of not having a thought-out policy, and a widespread and growing lack of confidence in it among its own supporters. Along with this, and partly the result of the peculiar conditions set up by coalition, there is a sort of suppressed restiveness running through the rank and file of all parties—the Conservative no less than the Liberal and the Labour. But when one remembers the exaggerated hopes with which the National Government came in, to save the country from untold disasters and to restore industrial prosperity by means of tariffs, one cannot help remembering what some philosophical observers commented at the time: 'They are ringing the bells now; they will soon be wringing their hands.'

For what, of all the hopes held forth, has been achieved? What, in concrete, have they done? Mr. Baldwin, as recently as last month, claimed that 'No Government has ever done more in eighteen months than the present Government. We have restored the credit of our country, not only in the literal, narrow, financial sense; but never in the councils of the world has the voice of our country been regarded more; never have our prestige and influence been greater, and never more needed in the world.' Such speeches have, perhaps, to be made; but it is a pity. For it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the temporary credit stringency we went through in 1931; especially since it arose from no deep-rooted trouble in our own internal credit situation, but from the City's investing short-term credits on too generous a scale in Germany, where they were locked up and could not be drawn upon against the withdrawal of foreign funds from England. We were only the first to experience what most countries with too high a valuation on their currency have been through since. There was no real danger in our case. However, the election, or rather the panic, served its purpose. As for our prestige and influence, which are supposed, by Mr. Baldwin, never to have been greater in the world, nobody else supposes it, unless it be Mr. MacDonald. The unfortunate Foreign Secretary can have no

illusions on that point. It does not look as if our 'prestige and influence' have been much regarded in Ireland—does it?—where we have never been more flouted, certainly not in the days of the Labour Government, supported as it was by Mr. Lloyd George, than in the two years we have enjoyed of National Government. Can Japan be said to have shown much regard for 'the voice of our country in the councils of the world'? Or is Germany payin any more attention now? If Mr. Baldwin read German, he would find the newspapers of their upper and middle classes—the supporters of their maniac nationalism—encouraging them to think, as in the old Bismarckian days, that English policy was but a hypocrisy and a deceit, and that the bluff may be called.

On the most liberal interpretation, what is it that the National Government can claim as its record for two years of office—two clear years with an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons, backed by the most powerful classes in the community, with nothing like the difficulties the late Labour Government had to contend with, from its insecure hold in Parliament and with a union of virtually all the 'interests' in the country against it? Perhaps its most widely approved action was our going off the gold standard. But then, it must not be forgotten that the Government was formed precisely with the object of preventing our departing from it—Saving the Pound, in fact! The Labour Party was drummed out of office—in a way nc Labour man will ever forget—to this tune. They were held responsible for having imperilled the parity of the pound sterling, though everybody now knows that the fatal mistake was ever tc have returned to the forced rate of 4·86 in 1925. For that nc Labour Government can be held responsible; it was done under a respectable Conservative Ministry, with Mr. Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer. What the Labour Government should have done in 1931 was to have taken the initiative and gone off gold itself—except that the Labour Party would never have heard the last of it. It would have been held up for ever afterwards as the party which had wrecked the gold standard and sold the pound. What the electorate would have thought of it may be judged from the old lady who in the late election declared that she would never vote Labour again; and on being asked why, said, 'See what they've been and done; they've been and stolen away the gold standard.' But it was a new experience to observe so complete and so unscrupulous a tergiversation of the British Press; the very same newspapers which had for months been carrying on a campaign of undermining credit under the Labour Government, turned round with complete approval of our going off gold when it was done under the National Government. Things were going to be better, they said the morning after.

And, in fact, some things were. It gave a temporary fillip to our export trade, which affected coal favourably in the first year, and motor cars and textiles in the second. But already the advantage gained at the expense of others is disappearing, and with the departure of the United States from gold may be expected to be more than swallowed up in the abyss of the world depression.

As for any decisions on the larger issues of economic policy—what credit policy we intend to pursue, whether we intend to go back to gold, what line we are going to take about the payment of the debt to America, whether we are going to adhere to a half-hearted deflation in spite of going off gold, or whether we are going to expand credit either nationally or internationally, as Mr. Keynes suggests, with a view to ending the depression—on all these major questions the Cabinet appears to be as much in the dark as the country itself. Rumours of divisions within the Cabinet over the debt question percolate from time to time to the public ; and nobody now seems to expect anything from the much-postponed World Economic Conference. It might just as well be postponed once again. And as the time draws near when, apparently, for all our virtue last December, we are to be faced again with the awkward necessity of paying another instalment on the American debt, it looks in perspective as if the last payment failed entirely of its purpose and was yet another mistake of a too generous Baldwinism in politics.

Mr. Keynes is the only person to offer a line of action in the direction of credit expansion, both internally and internationally. In *The Means to Prosperity* he outlines ' an active policy, beginning with our own domestic affairs and proceeding to the opportunities of the World Conference.' The world, he thinks, is ' less and less disposed to wait for the miracle—to believe that things will right themselves without action on our part.' With his usual optimism, or—shall we say ?—failure to appreciate the necessary conditions of political action, he thinks that ' the remedy should be found in something which can fairly be called a *device* ' ; and that ' nothing is required and nothing will avail, except a little, a very little, clear thinking.' It is another case, evidently, of the bankers and the ninepins.[1] ' The reception of the plan has once more dashed the illusion that anything is going to be done on the basis of the present social order, or by the present leaders. He writes, a little sadly, to *The Times* (April 27) :

> Unfortunately it seems impossible in the world of to-day to find anything between a Government which does nothing at all and one which goes right off the deep end !—the former leading, sooner or later, to the latter.

[1] *Vide* my article ' Socialism and Mr. Keynes,' *The Nineteenth Century*, September 1932.

But the National Government has balanced the Budget, or almost, except for the debt; which may be taken as its second achievement. But at what a cost! At a time when economists are highly doubtful whether it would not be better to unbalance the Budget, the Government has chosen to cut down social expenditure in every direction. Almost everything that it has done, as distinct from what it has said it would do, has been to contract and restrict economic activity, instead of to encourage and expand. It came in with the idea of cutting down expenditure on the social services, on education, housing, unemployment benefit, in accordance with the recommendations of the insufferable May Report; so that the increase of misery under these headings should not be unexpected. But all the same, the total picture of working-class life, particularly in the congested industrial areas, in the circumstances of poverty and actual want that these measures have aggravated, is more wretched than it has been for several decades.[2] Nor need it have been so unalleviated; there are plenty of directions in which wise public spending would be, if not profit-making, at any rate remunerative to the community. As the sage *Economist* says (February 25):

> The real charge against the Government is not that it has failed to cure unemployment, but that almost every action it has taken since it came into office, both in the domestic and the foreign sphere, has been calculated to aggravate the distresses from which the country is suffering. . . . It has fastened on the country the Ottawa agreements, the only tangible effect of which is to increase the level of world tariffs and to prevent their being lowered by agreement; it has introduced quotas for meat and is threatening to extend them, as part of our permanent economic machinery, to other products; and it has met the only practicable attempt at lowering tariff-barriers initiated by Belgium and Holland with a sterile negation. Nor has its policy in the domestic sphere been any better calculated to increase the volume of employment. Inspired by an altogether too narrow conception of 'economy,' it has lopped off indiscriminately every form of public expenditure without any regard to its economic value. It has cut down education through the means test, abolished the housing subsidy, stopped road construction, and generally damped down capital expenditure on the part of local authorities.

Perhaps the most obvious failure of the Government to seize its opportunity has been in relation to housing and slum clearance. It is estimated that we are now about a million houses short; there are enormous areas of slum to clear and to rehouse at cheap rents. At the same time, there have been through last winter some 400,000 building operatives idle, costing the state in unemployment relief at the rate of some £20,000,000 a year. What more obvious than now to make a bold attack on the whole

[2] *Cf.* the very detailed picture given in Allen Hutt: *The Condition of the Working Class in Britain.*

problem? Various influential persons have suggested the idea of a National Building Corporation, to take advantage of the low rates of interest prevailing, to build houses and clear slums on a national scale. The idea has not interested the National Government, which has preferred, in the interests of private enterprise which cannot and will never meet the need for working-class houses of the cheapest kind, to abolish the subsidy under the Wheatley Act and, in the interests of 'economy,' to discourage local authorities from embarking on building schemes. A great authority on housing, Sir E. D. Simon, has written:

> Sir Hilton Young abolished the Wheatley Act, so that cheap houses can now only be built under the Greenwood Act. The administrative difficulties in the way of carrying out this Act are such that Sir Hilton Young quite rightly estimates that not more than 12,000 houses can possibly be built in the first year. Manchester's share of these houses is 300, lengthening the period of dealing with the slums from twenty years to two centuries. That is Sir Hilton Young's sole *action* to accelerate slum clearance.

Nor is there any more satisfaction to be derived from contemplating the results of the Government's tariff policy. It may be granted that in 1931 some measure of rectification of the balance of trade was necessary. But a combination of going off gold with something in the nature of a tariff (with excise) on luxuries should have been enough. To seize a purely temporary emergency to saddle the country with a permanent tariff system was unforgivable—at least, Liberals and Free Traders will not forgive it. And already, the moment there is a chance by way of trade agreements to lower the level of tariffs, and remove even to some little extent the barriers in the way of trade between this country and others, we are faced with an outcry from the vested interests entrenched behind the tariff, as we heard the other day from the united Birmingham representation in the House of Commons, when it was a case of our lowering the tariff on jewellery and hardware in order to obtain a larger concession for our coal in the Danish market.

What has our own protectionist policy achieved for us? The foolish electorate thought—at any rate, large masses of it—that it would cure unemployment. It must be now about disillusioned: the unemployment figures have remained obstinately where they were in 1931, and even, when you allow for those who have been thrown off unemployment benefit and on to the Poor Law through the means test, are rather higher; they must in the last two years have overtopped the three million figure. In the early days of the Government, in the first fine careless rapture of its electoral triumph, we were bidden to look to Ottawa for a new dawn; *The Times*, in particular among Government papers, kept

its courage up with the parrot-cry, 'Ottawa; wait until Ottawa!' Ottawa has come and gone, and its total effect has been to enable the Canadians to import a few million dollars' worth more goods into this country than before. As for any chance of our exporting a little more of our goods to Canada, that, as all realists knew, was quite out of the question. The irony of it is, when you think of the balance-of-trade obsession of the Empire traders, that Canada has, as the result of the Ottawa agreements, increased the balance of trade against us. An analysis of Anglo-Canadian trade in the first three months after[8] shows that 'in a period when Britain increased her purchases from Canada by three and a half million dollars, Canada diminished her purchases from Britain by, roughly, two and a quarter million dollars. This is evidence that the trade balance against Great Britain, instead of being lessened, is being increased.' Australia, having depreciated her currency, was in a position to lower the tariff on a number of commodities, without English goods entering into competition with home products any more than before. And for the rest, the Ottawa agreements succeeded in irritating opinion in the United States, making it more difficult to create an atmosphere favourable to debt remission; it has considerably restricted our latitude and tied our hands in making trade agreements with countries which do not find it so repellent to import our goods as the Canadians do; while it is an open secret that if there is a chance of a favourable reciprocity treaty with the United States, Canada herself will desert the Ottawa agreements. What a ridiculous mouse for such mountainous efforts to have brought forth!

But it is in the realm of foreign policy that the worst mistakes have been made and the greatest amount of ill-success registered. When one considers the conduct of this country towards Russia, for example—hasty, ill-considered, blind to its own best opportunities—it really looks as if the gentlemen behind this Government do not really care for trade. One would have thought that in present circumstances, with industry languishing and millions out of work, every half-pennyworth of trade was precious; and yet the Government can afford to risk an export trade of £9,000,000 a year to Russia for the sake of recommending itself to diehard opinion. For Russia, during the past three years, has been one of the only two countries to which our exports have been increasing. They have gone up from, roughly, £5,000,000 in 1930 to £7,000,000 in 1931, and £9,000,000 in 1932. And if it really is true, as the whole capitalist Press assures us, that the Five-Year Plan is breaking down, then surely now is the time to leap into Russian trade on our own terms while the Germans are engaged in suppressing the scientists who enabled them to fight

[8] *Vide Economist*, March 18.

the last war and in raising up a European coalition against them in time for the next. In every other field of our foreign policy there has been, if not an equal disaster, a similar failure. So much so that the phrase may constantly be heard on the lips of all kinds of people: 'Sir John Simon is the worst Foreign Secretary we have had for years!' But that pathetic figure is not responsible for the Irish imbroglio, where we have been, with the help of Mr. J. H. Thomas, most signally defeated. How many times in the course of his mishandling the situation, his blundering blunderbuss speeches, has one not sighed for Lord Irwin or Sir Samuel Hoare?

But the outstanding failures of the Government have been, after all, not Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Baldwin, but Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon. They have indeed made an unexpectedly bad combination; the vagueness and lack of clarity of the one have only served to bring out the narrow formalism and lack of principle of the other. The days of Mr. Henderson at the Foreign Office and at Geneva seem like a golden age, though unenterprising enough, compared with the vexatious meddlesomeness, the squalid record of addled enterprises, the unnecessary 'breaks,' under Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon. The constant peregrinating about the world, the ostentatious ascents and descents by aeroplane, have made them figures of ridicule in all the papers of Europe. One cannot conduct the foreign policy of a great country by globe-trotting.[4]

Sir John Simon began badly with the crisis in the Far East. Difficult as the situation was, there is no doubt but that if he had firmly aligned himself along with the United States on the question of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and the attack on Shanghai, the Japanese would never have dared to flout the whole of world opinion in the way they were ultimately led on to do. Nor would the prestige of the League have suffered so irremediably; the Japanese, not having gone so far, might not even have had to leave the League. The conduct of our foreign affairs in this period was abject in the extreme; it has prejudiced from the first the foreign policy of this Government, in a way that can never be remedied now—until a change of Government, in fact; and it has cast a shadow over the whole career of the present occupant of the Foreign Office. Everybody has commented on the way in which for months the English Foreign Secretary behaved as if he were the briefed advocate of Japan at Geneva. Nobody knows how much American good-will was sacrificed in the process; but at least, from the point of view of the most elementary considerations of self-interest, we ought never to have put ourselves forward as the defenders of Japanese conduct in the Far East. Japan is

[4] *Vide* Mr. Eliot's *Ash Wednesday*.

our greatest commercial rival in the East: it is Japan that is underselling us in all our cotton markets; it is Japan that is ruining Lancashire.

As the result of the disaster in the Far East, the Japanese occupation of Manchuria—an objective which they never gained even in the critical days of the war, and which, once achieved, will alter the whole development of affairs in the Far East—and of the ignominious part we played in the retreat of Western civilisation and the humiliation of the League, the development of a progressive and successful foreign policy under the present leaders has been prejudiced from the outset; so much so that even when Sir John Simon took a step which has proved to be justified, and despatched a warning Note to Germany last autumn on the subject of rearmament, it was much more widely disapproved of in this country than it need have been. But in foreign affairs, as in domestic and economic affairs, there has been no sign that this Government is following a consistent or even considered, much less a determined, course; it seems always to be improvising a policy *ad hoc*, wavering undecided as to its line of action, staggering from conference to conference, each of them more ill-prepared than the last, in the hope that something may turn up. It was apparently in this hope that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, being then at Geneva and having heard that Mussolini had a plan, flew at once post-haste to Rome; though apparently Mussolini's own estimation of the plan was not such as to warrant his making the journey from Rome to Geneva, or even to some pleasant watering-place in North Italy, for the sake of imparting it to the head of the English Government. It seems a great descent from the days of Canning or Palmerston, or even from those of Sir Edward Grey. Nor was the result of the visit such as to encourage trust in the present conduct of British policy. The Ministers came back—as if there were no such thing as an *English* policy capable of being thought out—converts to a fantastic scheme of a European directory of the four Great Powers, ready to consider the revision of the Treaty. And this—a belated Liberalism which might have been all very well ten or five or even three years ago—at a time when the triumph of militant nationalism in Germany has become a challenge to the whole European order. As things stand, the attitude of English policy has very much stiffened towards Germany—and rightly; but, after the ignominious record of the past two years, it is impossible to entertain any confidence that the policy of the Government in foreign affairs will hold to any definite line for any length of time, or will not wobble and chop and change with sentiment and the exigencies of a vain desire for publicity and popularity.

With this record of failure and gathering mistrust, it is not to be wondered at that the cohesion of its support both in the House of Commons and in the country is early giving way to restiveness and dissatisfaction. It is evident that the opposition the Government most fears in Parliament is that strong body of Conservative opinion, voiced by Mr. Churchill, which dislikes the policy of responsible government in India; and if and when at any time this purely die-hard section is reinforced by a revolt of the Protectionists, the unity of the Conservative Party must undergo serious strain and the existence of the 'National' Government will be endangered. The Liberal Party, as the result of the strain it has been through, can never again play an independent or decisive part in English politics. It has lost, with Sir John Simon and Mr. Runciman, an influential section of support to Conservatism; Mr. Lloyd George is now engaged in recapturing the leadership of a still larger section of radical (mainly Welsh) Liberalism, which will undoubtedly co-operate with the Labour Party in the next election; the remainder of the Liberals can hardly hope to retain representation in the House of Commons unless they have an understanding either with the Conservative or the Labour Party—the more three-cornered fights at the next election, the more Labour members will be returned.

Meanwhile, the Labour Party is in a very curious and undecided state too. It has not been unaffected by the political confusion introduced by the coalition. Nor can it be denied that it took very hard the defeat inflicted upon it at the election. The circumstances of the formation of the National Government dealt a very considerable blow at confidence in the leadership of the party from which it has not yet recovered. Many within it do not disguise their satisfaction at the departure of the old leaders, who had indeed long grown out of touch with the movement and no longer represented its vital impulses. But the Labour Party has by no means yet solved what is its crucial problem—the formation of a new leadership extending from the head through to all the active nuclei in the local parties and the trade unions. On the other hand, there never was such a time of stock-taking, heart-searching, and active thinking within the movement. The gruelling experience it has been through has had the effect of hardening those who are capable of profiting by any experience whatever. All kinds of activities have been set on foot, from the Policy Committees of the party which have produced the policy reports on socialisation, considered and for the most part adopted at the Leicester Conference, to the Socialist League and the New Fabian Research groups which are carrying forward research into and propaganda of socialist policy, and the

Clarion Youth Campaign which is engaged in stimulating and co-ordinating all the youth organisations of the Labour Movement. It may be that out of such a turmoil of activity a new generation and a new leadership may emerge, for there is little doubt of the continued attraction of the ideas of socialism to youth in this country. The danger that is recognised by those within the party who are thinking of the future is that the electoral opportunity may come before the new leadership is ready. For the longer the National Government lasts, the greater will be the reaction against its failure in the country; and no one can doubt that the vast mass of this dissatisfaction will accrue, not to Conservatism, with which it is identified, nor to Liberalism, which has compromised itself, but to Labour, not a single branch or local party of which has had any part or lot in it. Moreover, in these days of mob electorates, however high one estimates the turnover that overtakes Governments that fail, one never makes sufficient allowance for it. So that, since there is every likelihood of the Labour Party coming back to full power within a few years, the problem of its leadership and equipment to carry through socialism becomes the most significant problem in internal British politics.

A. L. Rowse.

CRISIS AND PEACE

ALTHOUGH there has been in recent years a continuous volume of talk, and an equally heavy output of literature, on the means of assuring European peace, it has become clearer every year that nothing short of a full-dress crisis would bring to her senses a Europe that wants peace but is unwilling to pay the price. Indeed, in the January number of this Review, I went so far as to suggest that the actual fear of impending war might be necessary to produce a saner outlook on reality, with a general attempt to face the obvious fact that sacrifices are necessary if peace is to be maintained, and thereby to dispel the fallacy that it is possible to get something for nothing and have everything both ways. The full intensity of that crisis, with the danger of war ever present on the political horizon, is being felt in Europe to-day. I also stressed the point that the principle of treaty revision should be accepted as that on which disarmament must ultimately depend, and suggested that the necessary machinery for this purpose should be set up at Geneva to replace the use of force for the redress of grievances. This view found expression in the proposed Rome Pact, which has had to be shelved—in any case, for the meantime—owing to the aggressive appearance of one of the Powers most likely to benefit therefrom; and the present net result has been an intensification of the crisis. Much talk of disarmament has usually been the forerunner of a serious crisis, and the present occasion is no exception to the rule; but, with Europe in the mental state to which I have referred, the present critical situation is such that, with all its dangers, it may well prove to be the salvation of European peace. Just as the British crisis of 1931 was sorely needed to rouse our own people to an appreciation of reality and subsequent action, so the European crisis of to-day is a possible means of compelling European statesmen to jettison academic theory and to change their course to one of practical navigation through the seas of hard political fact. A policy of drift, and of shutting one's eyes to the demands and dangers of post-war Europe, can only lead to inevitable catastrophe, while courageous action at a time like this is the only way to peace with any degree of permanence, and with a prospect

of security, confidence, and co-operation between the nations. The time for theorising, wallowing in historical sentiment, and gloating over ethnographical statistics is past. Formula-hunting and juggling with words are now as out of place as the passing of endless and worthless resolutions. We have got to act with determination and sincerity, if this crisis is to be turned into a profitable opportunity of creating in Europe a combination of Powers capable of living at peace with one another. And, above all, political dishonesty and truth-twisting must give place to that honesty of purpose and large-minded generosity which alone can enable the statesmen of to-day to overcome the difficulties with which they are confronted.

In this article I shall endeavour to show the causes of the crisis as they appear at the time of writing, the reasons for its becoming intensified during recent weeks, and the consequent reactions in certain countries, as they appear to me as the result of a visit to the Continent. The primary causes of the crisis may be stated as follows: First, the political tension caused by the situations in the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia, in Central Europe and on the Adriatic, all of which are to some extent interrelated, together with the general collapse of international confidence; secondly, the situation in Germany arising from the advent of Herr Hitler to power, with disturbing consequences to Germany's neighbours in the east and west, and increased tension on Germany's eastern frontiers between extreme and rather irresponsible elements, both German and Polish; thirdly, the bad moral effect which the world economic depression could not fail to have on those parts of Europe where calm judgment is a somewhat rare commodity; fourthly, the threatened failure of the Disarmament Conference, arising out of the now unquestionable fact that the *status quo* has been rapidly dividing Europe into two opposing groups of nations, with a desire on both sides to possess adequate armaments either for aggressive or defensive purposes, and the consequent tendency of the various delegations to see what they could get or retain rather than what they could do without or give up. Although the above factors are in varying degree responsible for the situation confronting us at the present moment, its most serious aspect arises from a strong, and not altogether unjustified, suspicion that Germany intends in principle to rely on force as a means of redressing her grievances. It has, however, been in the disarmament deadlocks that the various influences and counter-influences have been manifest. Hence, Geneva has been the pivot on which the whole complicated situation has turned.

Before the threatened failure at Geneva, efforts were being made to bring about disarmament as a means in itself of preventing

war, without any attempt being made to remove the grievances causing international tension, giving rise to armaments other than those needed for police purposes and producing the potential causes of war. These efforts were made under the delusion that international co-operation was compatible with the *status quo* of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon, and that disarmament in these circumstances was attainable, and under the mistaken idea that, with next to no armaments, the nations would favour co-operation through lack of means to settle their dispute by any more ferocious method. It is almost inconceivable that statesmen, diplomatists, and politicians of any experience or standing should participate in such a policy of putting 'the cart before the horse,' for it was only force of circumstances that led to the Rome meeting between Mr. MacDonald and Signor Mussolini, followed by a declaration to the world that treaty revision must precede any substantial degree of disarmament. This introduction of sound common-sense to international relations could only be brought about by a serious crisis in the Europe of to-day; and, although it was received in France, Poland, and the Little Entente with fear and suspicion, lest there should be an attempt by the four great Powers to supersede the League of Nations and to impose revisionist conditions upon smaller nations without their participation and consent, the Rome principles were welcomed in Germany and obtained strong support in this country. Meanwhile, among the circumstances giving rise to the crisis from which treaty revision emerged as a factor in practical politics was the revolutionary situation in Germany, one of the nations most affected by the treaty issues at stake. But, if the recent changes in the German political system helped to bring treaty revision to life, they have at the same time created a European situation unfavourable to the immediate opening of the revisionist question. No sooner had the proposed Four-Power Pact become a subject of discussion by the Governments concerned, with a reasonable prospect of the redress of legitimate grievances by peaceful means, than the policy of Herr Hitler in Germany assumed a complexion likely to become menacing to the peace of Europe, irrespective of the intentions of its originator. The aggressive speeches of Herr Hitler and Captain Göring, and later of Herr von Papen, created the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the theory of 'Might is Right' was uppermost in the German mind; while the brutal persecution of the Jews tended to confirm this impression. Whether or not the Germans were justified in deciding to eliminate Jews, Pacifists, Communists, and others from the privileges of the Reich, there is no justification whatever for premeditated cruelty in the execution of their decision. The best that can be said in favour of the Nazis' action in this respect is that these regrettable

events took place during a revolution; and that, although Herr Hitler is believed to have made every effort to prevent it, the matter got into the hands of irresponsible extremists and uncontrollable ruffians. All this created a very bad impression outside Germany, which was intensified by the apparently aggressive nature of Herr Hitler's plans for national reorganisation and the German demands at the Disarmament Conference.

Although the internal situation in Germany does not fall within the scope of this article, it is necessary to deal with one feature of Nazi policy which is largely responsible for a most unfriendly attitude towards Germany, and has caused treaty revision to be pigeonholed for the present. While Herr Hitler's plans for national reconstruction may be primarily intended solely for internal purposes, it is unfortunate that the line of action best suited to the German mind, and most likely to succeed internally, happens to be easily transformable into an aggressive organisation for external purposes. When labour has been conscripted, industry organised and rationalised on a national basis, and Herr Hitler's scheme in other directions is well under way, it will not require much time or labour to transform the whole into a formidable military organism. Indeed, it is difficult to see any reason why the economic reorganisation of Germany's man-power and reconstruction of her material should not actually form the first stages of general rearmament and gradual mobilisation. When this is taken into account in the light of Germany's attitude to the *status quo*, her demands at Geneva, and memories of 1914, as well as in consideration of the methods by which the German people have recently been hypnotised, it is not surprising that France suspects the development of military designs under the cloak of reconstruction plans. Yet, it is quite possible to attribute a wrong motive to the German Chancellor's policy, which need not assume a definite military aspect until it is far advanced, and we are perhaps over-inclined to place a sinister interpretation on any form of German organisation where man-power is concerned. Herr Hitler has emphatically pronounced his pacific intentions in the German Reichstag, and I believe that, for the present in any case, these intentions are sincere, because Germany is not now in a position to go to war with any prospect of success—a fact that is fully realised by the senior officers of the Reichswehr. Only time, however, will show whether the disciplinary and other questionable aspects of the Chancellor's reorganisation plans are ultimately intended for peace efficiency or for war preparation. If, on the one hand, Herr Hitler can convince the world that his policy is, and will continue to be, one of peace, Germany has everything to gain from the sympathy and friendship of other nations; but if, on the other hand, no material

assurance is forthcoming, then there can be no question of treaty revision as far as Germany is concerned, and Germany must expect suspicion and the closest vigilance on all sides.

Meanwhile, the external reactions to Germany's behaviour at home, along her frontiers, and at Geneva have somewhat changed the political aspect of Europe, and has forced some nations to show their hands. In France, Poland, and the Little Entente the effect has naturally been to arouse a strong feeling of apprehension, and at the same time to regard events in Germany as the fullest justification for their maintenance of strong armies. In some quarters in France and Poland there has even been talk of a preventive war, while Germany is weak, with a view to forestalling the danger of a more serious conflagration when Germany has completed her alleged preparations. In France, in any case, this attitude is confined to a comparatively small section of public opinion, and is far from being the considered opinion of the French people. Meanwhile, the aspect of German-Polish relations of most immediate concern to the Poles is the prospect of a Nazi Government in the Free State of Danzig, where Poland has important privileges. It is difficult to visualise Polish officials in Danzig submitting to the authority of Nazis under the indirect control of Herr Hitler, but inconsistency is so much the rule of human nature that there is no saying what might be the result. In any case, Danzig shares with the densely populated industrial area of Upper Silesia the position of being the most dangerous point of German-Polish contact. But one of the most interesting reactions to Nazi policy in Germany is to be found in the Austrian attitude to the obvious attempt to bring about the *Anschluss* by encouraging Austrian attempts to set up a Nazi Government in Vienna eventually subordinate to Herr Hitler. What the Austrians think of this little plan has already been made obvious by the reception given recently to the envoys of the German Nazis during their short stay in Austrian territory; and whatever may be the inclination of the Austrians to unite with their northern kinsmen, they now realise that their true interests lie in another direction. Until quite recently Italy was inclined to favour the Nazi movement in Germany, provided that it confined itself to internal reconstruction policies, and supported Germany's claim for treaty revision. When, however, Herr Hitler's influence showed signs of appearing in Austria, Signor Mussolini saw visions of Swastika flags in the Southern Tyrol, and this had the effect of disturbing former Italian policy with regard to Germany. Whereas formerly Italy had a distinct orientation towards Berlin, based chiefly on treaty revision and relations with France, recent events in Germany seem to have brought her closer to the French way of thinking; while the same circumstances have aroused in France

serious thoughts of the advisability of a Franco-Italian *rapprochement*. Moreover, German policy with regard to Austria has had the effect in Central Europe of producing a point of contact between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Marquis Pallavicini, speaking in the Hungarian Chamber at Budapest, is reported to have said,

the situation to-day is such that the interests of Italy, France, Austria and Hungary are in harmony. Hungary could become an essential factor in the Danubian region, if she favoured the Franco-Italian entente, which is desired as much in Rome as it is in Paris, and only needs a point of contact for its realisation. Now, this point of contact is the settlement of the Danubian question where we agree with Czechoslovakia in our opposition to the *Anschluss*. If we can agree on this point, we shall be able to build up an important basis of understanding that will provide a guarantee of peace in the Danubian region.

But of all the reactions during recent weeks none has been so politically important as that of our own country, and it was as surprising as it was significant. While everyone on the Continent expected to see complete calm in London while excitement reigned in Paris, it was exactly the other way round, probably owing to the fact that the German attitude at Geneva and elsewhere came as no surprise to the French, while it shocked the people of these islands. If security was the pivot on which France reacted, Britain's rapid change of feeling towards Germany may chiefly be attributed to stories of persecution and brutality towards the Jews, together with the average Englishman's uncompromising abomination of the theory that 'Might is Right.' Yet what I saw and heard in Berlin leaves little room for doubt that the situation in Germany leading up to the Nazi revolution has been the subject of much misunderstanding in this country. In England there is no Jewish question, as British Jews are for the most part loyal subjects of the King, freely participating in the privileges and obligations of British nationality. Neither do they occupy an abnormal position in public life, nor do they prosper at the expense of their compatriots of Gentile origin. In Germany the position was very different. As Herr von Papen pointed out to me in Berlin:

English people do not know what it feels like to have one's native country practically under the control of the Jews, large numbers of whom filled important posts in the State that should have been filled by Germans. If a large percentage of Government officials in England were international Jews, if a great number of the Oxford and Cambridge professors were Jews, and if local municipalities and organisations of every kind were in Jewish hands, I feel sure that the British public would in time revolt against it. I know it is unthinkable that Jews should form 60 to 80 per cent. of the medical staffs of the London hospitals, or that they should represent the great majority of the British legal profession. . . . Even in

the small country towns and villages of Germany the Jewish storekeepers and traders had the financial whip-hand of the people; and, what was perhaps one of the sorest points, these immigrants prospered when millions of Germans were unemployed.

I believe this statement of the German Vice-Chancellor to be in accordance with fact, but this is an internal affair of Germany and, as such, has practically nothing to do with the British attitude towards the Nazi treatment of the Jews. If the Germans had decided to eliminate Jews from certain positions in public life, and had taken steps gradually to replace them by Germans as vacancies occurred, nothing would have been said. It was the means used to carry out a policy, not the policy itself, that stirred up the British people. Similarly, Communism and Pacifism in Germany differ widely from their counterparts in this country. While there were in Germany at the beginning of this year 6,000,000 Communists and 8,000,000 Socialists, making a total of 14,000,000 Marxists, the German Pacifists have been for the most part active enemies of the State ever since the Great War. But here, again, it was the German methods of dealing with this matter that found the strongest disfavour in England, where justice and fair dealing are rightly regarded as a sacred duty to all members of the human race. But, let it be remembered that there has been a revolution in Germany.

Whatever resentment there has been in Germany as a result of the British reaction to Herr Hitler's policy and methods, there is no possible doubt that the British attitude has made a profound impression in Berlin. Hitherto Anglo-German relations had been steadily improving, and in her times of difficulty and distress Germany laid much store on British friendship; so that the sudden change from sympathetic interest to outbursts of hostility came as a severe blow. As usual, the Germans failed to take into account the perhaps strange characteristics of the British race. At the same time, they saw Italy drifting further away, France heavily armed and fully prepared, the Polish aviators within two hours of Berlin, active enmity or distinct coolness in South-Eastern Europe, and they felt the cold, clammy feeling of isolation coming on. This was clearly manifest during my conversation with Herr von Papen when he said:

As far as Russia is concerned, the difference between the political *régimes* of the two countries makes no difference to international relations, and in this respect Germany is much in the same position as Italy. The only change brought about by the coming to power of the present German Government, with the collapse of Communism, is that we are now able to profit by Russian friendship without fear of being infected by their system.

Although these words were significant in showing the alternativ to German co-operation with the Western Powers, there is now,

happily, reason to believe that Herr Hitler has found his feet, realising that Germany's true interests lie, not in a policy of blustering aggression at home and abroad, but in making friends with those from whom she hopes to derive benefit. Herr Hitler's reception of President Roosevelt's statesmanlike message and his able and well-considered speech in the Reichstag both point in this direction. It only remains for the Chancellor to follow up his words with action, and news from Geneva holds out a reasonably good prospect for the future, now that the political effervescence in Germany is showing definite signs of subsiding. If we in this country have in any way contributed to bringing about this change, our rudeness has been fully justified, and it will not be long before people in Germany realise that we have in reality helped them out of a very serious difficulty. It is not too much to say that the immediate future of Europe, and to a large extent of the whole world, depends on the success of the Disarmament and World Economic Conferences; and I hesitate to suspect in Herr Hitler's disarmament offer an attempt to pass on to France the responsibility for a failure at Geneva, thereby providing an excuse for German rearmament. Not so many days ago the outlook was dark indeed. Yet there is much truth in the saying that 'the darkest hour is just before the dawn,' and I am firmly convinced that in present circumstances the way to peace and prosperity lies through a period of acute tension, danger, and difficulty such as that through which we are now passing.

In present circumstances, it would neither be favourable to Germany, nor to general European interests, that such vital issues as treaty revision should be raised until the new German *régime* has sufficiently settled down to provide a genuine and stable German factor in the European composition, with a considered foreign policy calculated to contribute sincerely to the peaceful solution of Europe's political difficulties. This, however, does not alter the fact that treaty revision has got to be faced before peace can be adequately assured, disarmament promoted beyond its initial stages, or confidence fully restored. Treaty revision, moreover, can only have one meaning, and any attempt to dilute, or twist the meaning of, this simple essential principle can only indicate inability, or unwillingness, to appreciate the fundamental features of the present crisis. There can be no question of a wholesale reorganisation of frontiers in Europe, or of an attempt to supersede the League of Nations by imposing revisionist conditions upon smaller nations without their participation and consent. Such a policy is unthinkable, but it is equally unthinkable that Europe should permit the continuance of such international absurdities as must obviously lead to war, and

have already made disarmament practically impossible in the general sense of the term. But the question must be approached in the right way and at the right time. While the former implies full participation of all the interested parties, together with that sincerity of purpose and large-minded generosity which alone can lead to success, the latter excludes the opening of any particular question at a time when the political atmosphere is disturbed by the policy of any of the nations concerned. This, however, is not the only reason why the Corridor question cannot be approached at the present time. The appropriate time for the solution of that question lies in a future full of possibilities, and the following proposal is a further development of what I stated in general terms in a previous article.

Time is showing in a convincing way that frontier settlements on a mainly ethnographical basis are in many cases neither conducive to peace nor economically practical. By producing a large number of small independent nations, which become *protégés* of greater Powers, they give rise to general tension, political and economic, owing to the consequent confusion of issues. The Corridor question is at present insoluble owing to the strong determination of Germany to regain what she has lost in this area, the equally strong determination of Poland not to yield the smallest fraction of territory acquired at Versailles, and the fact that there is at present no alternative outlet to provide Poland's access to the sea. Moreover, as it is impossible to reconcile the two conflicting claims in the area now occupied by the Polish seaboard, the Free State of Danzig, and East Prussia, the question cannot be solved on a purely local basis. But the fact that no solution is possible at present does not imply that this will always be the case; for this proposal anticipates a way out of the difficulty owing to changes in Baltic policies brought about by future circumstances. I refer to the eventual realisation by the Baltic States in general that their greatest possible measure of permanent independence lies in federation with some strong Power with guaranteed local autonomy. The terms of the proposed solution are as follows:—

(*a*) Establishment of a union between Poland and certain Baltic States, each of the latter enjoying a wide measure of local autonomy guaranteed by the League of Nations.

(*b*) Poland to have an access to the sea at Riga and such other Baltic ports as fall within the Polish confederation.

(*c*) Recognition of Upper Silesia as an indivisible whole, the future of which to form part of the Corridor negotiations.

(*d*) The Free State of Danzig to be returned to Germany, together with that portion of the Corridor situated north of

54 degrees north latitude, and lying between the Free State of Danzig and the German Reich.

(*e*) The port of Gdynia to be given to Germany at a price to be settled by arbitration. Danzig and Gdynia to be free ports, and special port facilities to be given to Poland at the German ports of Stettin and Königsberg.

(*f*) Regulation of minor irregularities on the German-Polish frontiers.

(*g*) Conclusion of a German-Polish guarantee pact, supported by a customs union.

The above rearrangement would establish Poland as a strong border State between Western Europe and Russia; would safeguard such Baltic States as came under Polish protection against otherwise inevitable absorption in course of time by Russia or Germany, or both in co-operation; would tend to separate Germany from Russia; and would strengthen French security in this direction. Although such a solution cannot at present be expected to find favour in the Baltic States, the time will assuredly come when union with Poland will be found preferable to any of the other alternatives.

It cannot, however, be too clearly emphasised that the whole question of treaty revision depends on the attitude of the nations that hope to benefit therefrom, and that any attempt to force the situation by resort to arms will close the whole question once and for all, and lead to the closest co-operation between Great Britain and France for the maintenance of the *status quo*. Recent events in Germany have almost killed the proposed Rome Pact, when Great Britain and Italy were prepared to take the lead in the settlement of the legitimate grievances of Germany and other nations in a similar position. It now rests with Germany to resurrect the *status quo ante*, and to show by her deeds, as well as by her words, that she honestly intends to co-operate with the other nations for the maintenance of peace, and her own ultimate prosperity. No national policy contrary to this principle will be tolerated by France and Great Britain, or by any of the other nations with peaceful ambitions. For Germany such a policy would mean complete isolation in Western Europe, compulsory resort to the friendship of Russia and, ultimately, that communistic chaos to which Herr Hitler referred in his Reichstag speech. On the other hand, Germany can have equality, in every sense, gladly given, if she will disarm mentally, and agree to accept the good offices of others in the redress of her grievances. But some definite declaration of European policy by those working for peace is urgently needed, together with the good services of the United States.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

THE SUEZ CANAL:

BARRIER OR HIGHWAY?

The question of the Suez Canal Company's concession is a very complicated matter, which requires to be elucidated.

SIR E. GREY, in House of Commons, July 1910.

WITH the completion in 1869 of the Suez Canal the marriage of the two oceans was followed by the birth of a hydra-headed brood of problems. The passage to India and the East was shortened, but not proportionately cheapened. The Mediterranean nations were encouraged to enter into direct commercial relations with Asiatic countries, and to build vessels specially designed to pass through the canal. New factors were introduced into the perennial problem of the status of Egypt and fresh strategical needs created which threw a heavy burden on this country. These, and other aspects of the Suez Canal, are nowhere touched on in the following pages, but they exist, and underlie the commercial, financial, and legal structure of the Suez Canal Company.

This company, officially known as the *Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez*, was formally incorporated in 1858 as an Egyptian company, in virtue of a concession granted for ninety-nine years by the Viceroy of Egypt and confirmed by the Sultan as suzerain. Its headquarters are now, as always, in Paris, and it is amenable to the French courts in matters of litigation between itself and its French shareholders, but it is in all respects subject to Egyptian law and, in the ultimate resort, to the King of Egypt. The canal was opened to traffic in 1869: in 1873 a dispute arose as to the basis on which tolls were being levied under the Act of Concession. No League of Nations then existed; the diplomatic machinery of Europe worked smoothly and was not slow to find a solution. The interested maritime Powers appealed to the Viceroy, who referred the dispute to the Sultan; he invited twelve maritime Powers to send delegates to deal with the dispute in conference at Constantinople. The views of the Canal Company were put forward by the French delegate; those of Great Britain, whose flag was flown by three-quarters of the shipping using the canal, eventually prevailed, and the decision of the

Conference, with a single dissentient voice, was adopted by the Sultan and promulgated without delay. De Lesseps protested violently and refused to comply with the Sultan's commands; he threatened to close and abandon the canal. The Viceroy, under orders from the Sultan, sent 10,000 men to garrison strategic points, and posted a frigate at Port Said. De Lesseps gave way.

This incident established the principle that the maritime Powers have the right, and the duty, to regulate the amount and incidence of canal dues in the interests of international trade by means of an appeal to the sovereign Power—then Turkey, now Egypt. The basis on which tolls are levied, and the amount levied, is not a matter solely within the discretion of the Canal Company, which is in these matters not merely the *concessionaire*, but, in terms of the concession, *mandataire*, of the Egyptian Government. The recommendations of the Conference of 1873, as promulgated by the Sultan, were a compromise between the claims of commerce and the needs of the Canal Company, made with due regard to the fact that the Canal Company was not, at that time, in a position to pay its way, and needed more revenue from shipping if it was to remain solvent.

The position has for many years past been reversed. Thirty-per cent. of the gross receipts of the canal now suffice on the average to pay all expenses whatever, leaving 70 per cent. for distribution in one form or another, and there is no reason why the maritime Powers should not reopen the whole question on the ground that the present scale of dues is greater than is reasonably justified under the concession, to enable the company to 'indemnify itself' for the cost of construction and maintenance. The Suez Canal Company enjoys its privileges in virtue of an Act of Concession by the Viceroy of Egypt, confirmed by the Sultan; this Act of Concession is in law indistinguishable from what is called in this country a private Act of Parliament. When private individuals in the United Kingdom desire to embark their money, for the purpose of profit to themselves, in establishing a means of communication for the public between two points, they apply to Parliament to grant them certain powers and privileges. When such powers are sought and obtained from a foreign Government they are embodied in an 'Act of Concession.' The only essential difference between an English private Act of Parliament and a foreign 'concession' is that in England it is usual to create a company by private Act, and such a company exists theoretically in perpetuity, whilst abroad the privileges conferred are usually limited in point of time to a period which is supposed to be sufficient to enable the original adventurers to recoup themselves for their risk.

In neither case can a Government evade or disclaim the inherent duty, and consequently the right, which it possesses, as representing the nation, to alter a grant or to revoke it altogether, should the interest of the nation, or of the world, demand that such a step be taken, subject, of course, to liberal compensation. In every case of such a grant of exclusive privileges the grantee is rigorously confined by all courts of justice, both British and foreign, to the strict terms of his grant, and in case of ambiguity they are not construed in his favour to the public prejudice. Every such grant is in the nature of a monopoly, and therefore to be construed strictly against the grantee, and the greater and more universal the subject-matter of the grant, the stricter the scrutiny to which its terms should be subjected. These principles are not peculiar to England, but are universal, and it would seem to follow therefrom that the recent statement of the President of the Board of Trade (March 23, 1933) in the House of Commons that the Suez Canal Company is 'a private company working under a concession from the Egyptian Government' is wholly inadequate. In the words of an American writer,[1] the incident of 1873 already alluded to

> produced a general agreement among the Powers that while the canal was an artificial channel, it was essentially a narrow strait between two bodies of open sea, and as such was a matter of international concern. It also elicited from the Powers an admission that the Canal Company had the right to levy tolls, though subject to the concessions issued by the Khedive of Egypt and confirmed by the Sultan and in keeping with the international usage as to measurements of vessels. At the same time the operation of the canal practically, even if not formally, became subject to international law, since various Powers entered into negotiations with the company, giving that body a quasi-international status.

The onus of protecting the canal has been assumed, for political and strategical reasons, by Great Britain. This assumption of responsibility is dictated by circumstances which have existed from the outset and continue to exist. It involves us in very considerable expenditure and in still greater responsibilities. Are we not, therefore, entitled to urge upon the Government of Egypt the desirability of calling upon the Suez Canal Company (in the absence of voluntary action of its own initiative) to reduce its tolls, which have enabled it to pay dividends on a scale inconsistent with the interests of commerce between Europe and Asia and which would be permitted to no public utility company? Can we, and the Egyptian Government, allow ourselves to be influenced in considering the question by the circumstance that private French shareholders probably (though not certainly) hold a majority of the shares and that the British Government holds

[1] R. L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India*, 1928, p. 457.

26 per cent. of the shares, though by the statutes, as interpreted by the company, the possession of over 176,000 shares carries the voting power of only 250 shares in the General Assembly? Alternatively, the sovereign Power in Egypt might reasonably be urged, on grounds of general expediency, to require, and if need be to impose upon the company, such modification of its statutes as will bring them into accord with modern views as to the management of public utilities and the administration of private companies. There is no precedent in the domain of municipal or international law for many provisions of the company's statutes in their present form. They have often been altered to the advantage of the company; there is no reason in law why they should not be altered to the advantage of the public. The company has played a distinguished and a valuable part in the world, but there is no reason why its affairs should not be as closely supervised by the sovereign Power, in this case Egypt, as are banks, insurance and public utility companies in most countries in the world to-day.

Canal dues were fixed originally at 10 francs '*par tonneau de capacité du navire*,' which the canal officials at first interpreted as 'net tonnage,' but later as 'gross tonnage.' In 1874, in circumstances already mentioned, a special 'Suez Canal measurement' was agreed internationally for vessels using the canal, and the rate was fixed at 10 francs per 'Suez Canal ton' for vessels in cargo and 7.50 francs for vessels in ballast, plus a surtax of 3 francs, to be extinguished when tonnage reached 2,000,000 tons. Sir John Stokes, an expert negotiator, gifted with a foresight and a pertinacity not vouchsafed to his successors, stipulated in return for an annual expenditure of 1,000,000 francs a year on improving the canal. Before this surtax was removed, in January 1884, the question of tolls had again become acute. The canal was congested; either it must be widened, or a new canal built alongside. The latter course was at first deemed preferable, and Sir John Stokes and Sir Charles Rivers-Wilson drew up heads of agreement whereby Mr. Gladstone's Government would lend £8,000,000 at 3¼ per cent. for the purpose, and use their good offices to secure an extension of the concession. The Canal Company in return undertook to reduce dues in proportion to its increased dividends on a sliding scale, and to employ a larger proportion of British subjects in responsible positions. This arrangement was not well received on either side of the Channel, and after lengthy discussion in Parliament it was withdrawn.

Into the reasons for and merits of this decision we cannot here enter. The Canal Company was forced to seek an alternative means of meeting the demands of commerce. De Lesseps met in London the Association of Steamship Owners engaged in

Eastern Trade, and a voluntary agreement was drawn up with the unofficial assistance of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain. By its terms the company was to enlarge the old or to dig a new canal, to add seven unofficial directors to be chosen by shipowners and merchants, to employ more British subjects, and to reduce tolls on a sliding scale, which stipulated that when dividends reached 25 per cent. all further profits were to be devoted to reduction of tolls till they reached a minimum of 5 francs. The agreement was not regarded as requiring parliamentary sanction, but on January 15, 1884, was officially approved by Lord Granville, in terms which indicate that he regarded it as a formal contract, which it was not. By 1900 the surplus profits of the Canal Company had nearly doubled. Tolls, which were 9.50 francs in 1885, had dropped only to 9 francs, but the 500-franc shares, which were worth 2000 francs in 1884, were worth over 3500 francs each. It seemed likely that the company would be paying 25 per cent. per annum and be forced to reduce tolls. The South African War had just started and trade was good. The president of the Suez Canal Company discussed the question with the 'London Committee' representing British shipowners interested in the Suez Canal traffic. The latter

> were unanimous in considering that such an onerous condition as that contained in Article 8 of that arrangement, viz., that all net profits above 25 per cent. should be applied in the reduction of dues to 5 francs a ton, could not reasonably be maintained.

It is not easy, in present circumstances, to write temperately of this complacent betrayal by the London Committee of the interests of Eastern commerce. Men who regarded as 'onerous' a limitation of the profits of a monopoly to 25 per cent. should not, even in 1900, have been trusted to represent their compatriots nor to abrogate an agreement which had been officially approved by Lord Granville sixteen years before and to substitute an agreement 'that every fresh reduction of tariff should be *preceded* by an increase of dividend.' A few years later, in 1905, the Chamber of Shipping protested to the Foreign Office. Lord Lansdowne replied (November 30, 1905) that His Majesty's Government took no part in the agreement of 1883 and was not prepared to hold that the modification of 1900 was disadvantageous,

> for it affords an incentive to the company, which would not have existed under the original arrangement, to make such improvements as will tend to increase the tonnage passing through the canal.

The argument used, if it can be so described, is clearly fallacious to the point of fatuity, for there was no undertaking by the company, express or implied, to improve facilities indefinitely, nor could any action of theirs increase the tonnage. It was an invitation to the company to charge as much as the traffic would

bear. They have done so ever since, but on the strength of the unanimous opinion of the representatives of British commerce that a provisional limitation of dues to 25 per cent. was unreasonably onerous—a decision in which the British Government, not uninfluenced by the fact that it was the principal shareholder, concurred. The fundamental mistake was, however, made in 1883, when the Government, defeated in Parliament, handed over its responsibilities in the matter to an unofficial committee of London shipowners. We may legitimately criticise the Canal Company: we have no right to blame anyone but ourselves.

On September 1, 1930, dues stood at 6·65 gold francs per Suez Canal ton, and half that rate for ships in ballast: surplus profits distributed during the previous year totalled 737·5 million paper francs against a total of 381·9 million gold francs of share and loan capital outstanding. After an active agitation the rate was reduced as a temporary concession in November 1931 to 6 gold francs. The fall of sterling nullified the concession before it became effective. The dues per net ton of shipping fell from 33·14 paper francs in 1928 to 30·62 francs in 1931, but increased per ton of cargo from 32·42 to 36·26 francs. The surplus profits per net ton of shipping fell from 22·32 to 20·39 francs, but increased per ton of cargo from 21·83 to 24·17 francs. The drop in dues per ton of shipping reflects the increase in ballast traffic, and the increases in dues and in surplus profits per ton of cargo shows that in the last two years vessels were more lightly laden than in the first two. The burden on shipping was thus greatest when its earning power was least. Surplus profits were 66·10 per cent. of the dues per ton of cargo in 1928, 67·02 per cent. in 1929, 70·21 per cent. in 1930, 66·66 per cent. in 1931, and the average for the four years was 67·83 per cent. In so far, therefore, as the earnings of the Canal Company exceed expenditure plus a reasonable return on share capital, the charge represents a special tax on a particular trade, and an exceedingly onerous burden on certain bulky and low-priced commodities, such as coal, fuel oil, sisal, jute, etc.; for the smaller the cargo, the heavier the incidence of dues per ton.

It is of interest, at this point, to digress for a moment to compare the dues at Suez with those at Panama. The Panama Canal cost £75,000,000 to build, the Suez Canal £30,000,000; and the annual cost of upkeep is almost in proportion. Yet Suez Canal dues are higher by 40 per cent. per ton of shipping passing, and by 44 per cent. per ton of cargo carried. The Panama Canal pays its way, nevertheless, though the amount of tonnage passing is in each case almost the same, and the proportion of United States shipping using the Panama Canal is almost the same as that

of British shipping using the Suez Canal. The effect of this difference in tolls has been to divert tonnage to Panama. The Suez Canal dues are equivalent to over a fortnight's steaming—in the case of modern economical vessels even more; and the Asiatic trade, not only of Great Britain, but of Europe, is handicapped in proportion. The scale of the Suez Canal dues is of great importance to British shipowners and merchants, who in 1931 sent through the canal 2976 vessels of 16,624,000 net tons measurement out of a total of 5366 vessels of 30,028,000 net tons. It is even more important to producers and consumers. The British tonnage using the canal has fallen from 19,109,000 net tons in 1929 to the figure quoted above for 1931, or from 57·1 to 55·4 per cent. of the total. It may be noted, as a measure of the reduction of international trade, that the report of the company for 1931 states that the *weight* of goods carried in that year was 'slightly less than in the years 1912 and 1913'; in 1912 the vessels using the canal aggregated 20,275,000 net tons, so that the cargo per measurement ton was nearly a half greater in 1912 than in 1931. The shippers of cargo inward or outward are equally affected by the dues on shipping; the higher these are, the higher the cost of imported goods and the greater the burden on export (for example, in the competition of British goods with Japanese goods in the Far East). And further, as the comparison of 1912 with 1931 shows, in times of depression, when a vessel is, say, only two-thirds laden, the tax on the goods is proportionately raised. Moreover, to-day, when dues have to be paid on a gold basis and sterling is at a discount of about 30 per cent., the burden approaches the limits of the tolerable.

The immediate effect has been, and will continue to be, to handicap European commerce with Asia in relation to that of the United States and Japan, to stimulate the commercial self-sufficiency of Asia, to throw our African trade more into Asiatic hands. The canal to-day is not a highway, but a barrier. One condition of the restoration of world trade, and of that international carrying in which British shipping has always participated so largely, is the reduction of transport costs, and in these Suez Canal dues figure in a disproportionate degree.

The commodities carried on the canal from east to west in 1931 totalled about 18 million shipping tons (as compared with 21·5 million tons in 1929), including 3·3 million tons of mineral oils, 4 million tons of oil seeds, nuts and vegetables, 2·8 million tons of cereals, 1·8 million tons of textiles, and 1·3 million tons of minerals.

Eastward traffic was over 7 million tons, as compared with nearly 13 million tons in 1929, including nearly 2 million tons of metals and machinery, 700,000 tons of fertilisers, 340,000 tons

of cement, 300,000 tons of coal,[1] and 230,000 tons of railway material.

In order further to elucidate the incidence of the dues in practice, I append here a statement of sums actually paid (excluding passenger dues) during the past twelve months by six cargo steamers:

Steamer	Net tonnage	Suez Canal tonnage	Canal dues paid	Cargo carried (tons wt. and mt.), *i.e.*, shipping tons	Canal dues per shipping ton of cargo
			£ s. d.		s. d.
A	5,538	6,499	Out . 2,171 12 2	3,651	11 11
			Home . 2,307 2 8	6,874	6 9
B	5,540	6,512	Out . 2,181 6 9	3,872	11 3
			Home . 2,320 5 0	5,844	7 11
C	5,540	6,504	Out . 2,301 14 10	3,660	12 7
			Home . 2,272 17 8	10,578	4 3
D	5,551	6,504	Out . 2,317 13 2	2,322	19 11
			Home . 2,231 14 11	7,641	6 0
E	5,538	6,499	Out . 2,239 10 5	4,062	11 0
			Home . 2,190 2 7	8,631	5 1
F	5,540	6,512	Out . 2,239 2 3	3,613	12 5
			Home . 2,194 6 0	9,516	4 7
			Add for fuel tanks 737 3 3		
	33,247	39,030	£27,701 10 8	70,364	Average, 7*s.* 11*d.* per shipping ton carried.

The average annual receipts of the British Government on their holding of Suez Canal shares in 1926–31 was £1,527,000, or about 44 per cent. on £3,460,000, the face value of the shares purchased in 1875; if allowance be made for the amortised shares, which did not receive the 5 per cent. dividend, the return would be even greater. Had the 1883 agreement been allowed to stand, the British Government might have stood to lose in the years 1926–31 about £500,000 a year. British shipping pays 56 per cent. of the dues, but the British Government only gets 46 per cent. of 71 per cent. of the profits, so British shipowners would have been saved somewhat more than £500,000 directly, and by using the canal route instead of sending ships *viâ* the Cape a further considerable sum indirectly. No statistics are available as to the extent of this diversion of shipping, but tank steamers

[1] The steady drop in coal shipments of over 50 per cent. in four years is partly due to the replacement of Cardiff coal by the product of Natal in Eastern markets, especially Suakin and Aden. The burden is particularly heavy as colliers often have to return in ballast. The actual dues paid by a recent collier are as follows: Net registered tonnage, 2900; Suez Canal measurement, 3699; cargo carried, 7123 tons. Dues at 6 francs gold, 22,198 francs = £1261; dues paid per ton of coal, 3*s.* 6½*d.* (If the collier returns in ballast, 5*s.* 3*d.*) The average price of export coal at Cardiff is 16*s.*

from the Persian Gulf have been reaching England lately *viâ* the Cape, and wheat has been sent to Mediterranean ports from Melbourne *viâ* Gibraltar. The freight from Mombasa to England is the same *viâ* the Cape or Suez, but it is possible to charter tramp steamers for the journey *viâ* the Cape more cheaply than *viâ* Suez.

Shipowners are not, however, so deeply concerned as producers, especially of raw material, which has to pass through the canal in either direction to find its market. Shipowners, if they are not in the same boat, are in the same Conference. They pass on the dues to their clients. They have never since 1883 taken energetic steps to assert themselves. Yet, had their predecessors not betrayed their trust in 1900, dues would now be 5 gold francs, and still leave the shareholders with 28·4 instead of 44·2 per cent. on their money. Present dues could be halved, and still leave for the shareholders an annual dividend twice as great as that earned by any gilt-edged investment in the world.

The profitable character of the undertaking may be gathered from the fact that the British Government has received an average annual return on the par value of the shares during the years 1926–31 of over 44 per cent. This figure, however, does not disclose the full extent of the profits earned. On the average of the past twelve years the total income of the company was expended as follows: working and maintenance accounted for 17·3 per cent.; depreciation and other reserves for 8·3 per cent.; directors' fees and bonus to employees for 2·6 per cent.; and remuneration to capitalists in one form or another for 71·8 per cent.

There are clearly strong objections to profit-sharing by the board and the employees, even on this scale, in a purely monopolistic enterprise. The employees number over 500, the directors thirty-two. Their share is determined by the statutes, which provide for the distribution of surplus profits, after deducting 5 per cent. for a statutory reserve already of vast dimensions, as follows: shareholders, 71 per cent.; Egyptian Government (*i.e.*, Crédit Foncier), 15 per cent.; founders and their successors in law, 10 per cent.; board of directors (fees), 2 per cent.; and employees (bonus), 2 per cent. Thus the British Government as shareholder does not get 46 per cent. of the profits, but about 46 per cent. of 66 per cent. During the past twelve years the whole sum distributed as profits is equivalent to about £51,500,000, made up as follows: to shareholders, £36,610,000; to the Crédit Foncier in the name of the Egyptian Government, £7,730,000; to the holders of founders' shares, £5,160,000; to directors, £1,030,000; and to employees as bonus, £1,030,000.

Article 24 of the statutes lays down that the company is administered by a board of thirty-two members 'représentant les

principales nationalités intéressées à l'entreprise.' The chairman was to be appointed by the Egyptian Government and to be drawn from the 'shareholders most interested in the enterprise.' (This requirement has hitherto been interpreted only in one way.) The original number of directors (*administrateurs*) was thirty-two; it was at one time reduced to twenty-four, and was increased again to thirty-two in order to make room for seven British directors representing shipping and at the same time to reduce their numerical proportion. The appointment of these additional directors was the outcome of an agreement drawn up between de Lesseps and the 'London Committee,' who thus acquired seats, but not influence, on the board. Producers are almost unrepresented, yet, in present circumstances, it is not the shipper, or even the consumer, but the producer, who pays canal dues for the most part, and, contrary to the clear intention of the statutes of the company (which do not refer to shipowning interests), the nationalities principally interested (if that is the same as the principal nationalities interested) in the traffic which passes through the canal, other than France and Great Britain, are not represented at all.[3]

The incidence of canal dues on particular commodities is by no means fractional. It is often crushing. In the case of fuel oil it may be 10 per cent. of the landed cost: in the case of coal it is nearly one-third of the f.o.b. cost at Cardiff, for colliers often have to return in ballast, and tankers always. What are these nationalities? If the flag flown by shipping in transit is the criterion, then the nations and the amount of their interest, based on the figures of 1931, are: British, 55·46 per cent.; German, 10·59 per cent.; Dutch, 8·27 per cent.; French, 6·60 per cent.; Italian, 5·33 per cent.; Japanese, 3·65 per cent.; Norwegian, 2·81 per cent.; and American, 1·92 per cent.

In reality, however, the interested nationalities are equally those whose produce and passengers are wholly or mainly sent in either direction through the canal. These are, as far as can be ascertained, approximately in order of importance:—From west to east: Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia. From east to west: British India, Persia, the Dutch East Indies, the British Colonies in Asia and Africa, the French Colonies and Protectorates, Australia and New Zealand, China and Japan.

Of these countries, only Great Britain, the Netherlands, and France are represented to-day on the board of the Suez Canal. Germany, which was represented on the board before the war, has not yet been invited to return, and Italy has not yet been accorded representation. The board is, in fact, not international: saving

[3] There is, however, one representative of Holland.

a single Netherlands representative, it is Franco-British in the proportion of 22 to 10. This seems to be, constructively, a breach of the statutes, and one which deserves attention at the hands of the maritime Powers.

As to the composition of the board, a French writer, Monsieur Mimaut,[4] quoting an earlier writer, Lesage, says:

> The board rather resembles a diplomatic conference on which the nations whose flag floats most frequently above the calm waters of the canal are represented—Great Britain, France, Germany and Holland. The Administrators include Ambassadors, former Foreign Ministers, and former Presidents of the Council [or, he might have added, former Presidents of the Republic].
>
> The British, on the other hand, are represented mainly by men of business, whilst the French shareholders are represented by political figures whose connexion with the French State is in no way hidden.
>
> France has lost none of the moral prestige which she reaped from the tenacity and success of de Lesseps, which English courtesy has done nothing to diminish. The company's ambassador with the Egyptian Government is French. All the superior staff of the canal are French. A French bishop occupies the episcopal seat recently instituted in the canal zone (at Ismailiyah).
>
> As to Egypt, one is tempted to say that Anglo-French solidarity and the prosperity of the Canal Company have been secured at her expense. Still, the sale of the Khedive's shareholding saved her from bankruptcy,[5] and perhaps even from greater dangers. Her interest was not limited to the Khedive's holding. The Egyptian Government's share of profits appears in the annual balance-sheet, but here again Egypt has had to part with her rights.
>
> . . . . .
>
> The company has, however, brought fresh life to Egypt, and at the end of the concession the ownership of the canal will revert to her.

The maritime Powers might well invite the company to consider how far the council, as at present organised, is consistent with a modern interpretation of the statutes. Can the absence of Germany, Italy, and Japan from the board be justified? Is not the Egyptian Commissioner with the company entitled to a seat on the board?

As to the British representation, it is of two kinds—the three official directors, one of whom sits on the administrative council, and seven unofficial directors, of whom more hereafter. The first official representatives appointed were men of great experience in work of this kind. One was Colonel Sir John Stokes, who took an important part in the negotiations before and after the Disraeli

[4] *Les Corporations Interétatistes*, 1929.

[5] The transaction, from a financial point of view, at the time of purchase, was in effect a loan to the Khedive at 5 per cent. for nineteen years on the security of an asset of no immediate money value, as the Khedive had discounted the coupons for eighteen years in advance.

coup.; another was Sir Charles Rivers-Wilson, formerly Financial Adviser in Egypt and a specialist in work of this kind. They fought many stiff diplomatic battles and signed the agreement of 1883, which set forth in legal form reciprocal obligations which, had they been carried out by the company, would have reduced the dues now charged by at least one-fifth and would have secured other important advantages. They received a salary of £300 a year each; their colleague in Paris £800, plus in each case allowances for expenses on a scale which would be regarded as illiberal by a member of a polytechnic touring party.

The three official directors are now, in the words of an Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 'usually persons with parliamentary or official experience.' The names of those who now hold this office are: (1) Sir Ian Malcolm, for many years a member of Parliament and a private secretary to Lord Salisbury and Mr. Balfour (appointed in 1920); (2) Sir John T. Davies, for ten years private secretary to Mr. Lloyd George (1922); (3) the Earl of Cromer (1926). The first is a member of the management committee; the two last named of the finance committee. The thirty-two directors draw between them—apart from certain personal expenditures, such as the cost of journeys to visit the Suez Canal and their expenses to Paris for the meetings of the board—a sum which, calculated on 2 per cent. of the net profits, amounts on the average of the last four years to over 14,000,000 francs, which is more than double the figure for 1924, for as profits of shipping have fallen, so have profits of the Canal Company increased. How this sum of over £120,000 at present parity of exchange is divided between them is not publicly known, but, whatever the amount, it is based upon a vicious principle. Appointment is in practice for life; there is no retiring age, and it is not an office of profit under the Crown. In the exercise of their functions the directors are responsible to the Foreign Office, but are virtually immune from criticism in Parliament, and questions as to the financial position and management of the company are disallowed by the Speaker, on the very proper ground that the Ministers of the Crown are not responsible to Parliament for the proceedings of the company.

The seven unofficial directors are, in practice, chosen by shipowners, though, in theory, under the agreement of 1900, 'merchants' were eligible. Producers or consumers, at home or abroad, in British territories or in foreign countries, have no say in the matter. Only one of them, Sir John Cadman, represents production, and then only by the fortunate chance that he is chairman of both the British Tanker Company and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In the latter capacity he may be properly regarded as representing both producing and consuming interests,

as well as the transportation of a commodity which bulks more largely than any other single class of goods in the traffic of the canal. Sir Robert Horne may also properly be regarded as representing important productive interests, as well as finance. The others are interested almost exclusively in shipping.

These directors likewise draw their share of the 2 per cent. on profits allocated to the board, subject only to certain deductions if they fail to attend its deliberations. All of them are very busy men, whose normal avocations must of necessity take precedence of their duties on the Suez Canal board. Some frequently attend, others but seldom. Their votes are counted, not weighed. Disraeli's confident prediction in 1876 that the reverse would occur has been falsified. They cannot exercise a decisive influence, and have not done so. When, in 1931, the shipowners of Liverpool made public a reasoned appeal for a reduction of rates, the Suez Canal Company announced, from Paris, that 'repeated requests for reduction of dues render the company less inclined to reduce their charges.' Such is the language held by monopolists the world over, and it is not surprising that six of the great maritime Powers protested unofficially to Mr. Henderson in 1931 against the exorbitant profits of the company and the high level of dues charged. They would have done better to protest to the Egyptian Government, which, as I have shown, has power to call an international conference on the subject, as in 1873, and to insist on a reduction.

How little the present Government directors are able to interfere may be judged from other indications. The vast reserve funds of the company are understood to be invested at the discretion of the board, not for the most part in French or British Government securities, but in land in France, and quite recently, according to *Hansard* (April 22, 1931), in an industrial trust company in Luxemburg, in industries competing directly with our own. The company, according to Sir Ian Malcolm,[6] has in its service 527 employees and some 2500 *ouvriers*. Of this great army, with one officer to every five men, with a pay roll of 21,000,000 francs (including pay for holidays, sick leave and a share in profits), very few are British subjects, though Great Britain holds nearly half the capital and pays more than half the dues. The machinery, ancillary shipping, etc., used by the company is almost entirely made in France: no notification of materials needed is received by the Department of Overseas Trade (*Hansard*, May 18, 1931). But the company is, after all, French, and whatever rights minority shareholders may claim, they do not extend to questions of staff or plant. It is, moreover, common knowledge that the Suez Canal Company is, in fact,

[6] *Quarterly Review*, January 1930.

a family concern, that it is extravagantly managed, and that salaries, pensions, etc., are on a higher scale than called for by circumstances. The company holds the shipping of half the world in fee, and there is no inducement whatever to exercise economy.

Sir Ian Malcolm in his article in the *Quarterly Review* of January 1930 made the following observation:

> No foreigner who visits the canal annually can fail to note the extraordinary happy family feeling which exists between all classes of the company's servants: there is general satisfaction with the existing condition of things . . . there is a great desire in every grade to get sons and nephews taken into the service. One need not disguise one's own pleasure in sharing in so admirable a state of affairs, for which friendship, enlightened generosity, gratitude and glad co-operation are about equally responsible. Long may it continue for the advantage of all concerned.

The writer of the words quoted above is the senior representative on the board of the company of His Majesty's Government, and therefore, in present circumstances, of India, the Dominions and Colonies, as well as of British industrial interests.

Sir Arthur Michael Samuel, on the other hand, speaking in the House of Commons on April 21, 1931, as a former Parliamentary Secretary of the Department of Overseas Trade, observed that 'the methods of the Canal Company are fast becoming a matter of international friction,' and asked for a special inquiry, which was refused.

No one questions the great services which de Lesseps and his associates rendered to the world: it is, however, possible to recognise this fact, and yet to hold that the company is exacting too high a price for the foresight of its founders.

> Sooner, rather than later, [says Sir Ian Malcolm] the question of the future of the canal will come up again, although not until all parties are agreed that the question is ripe for discussion. The parties primarily concerned are Egypt, the Suez Canal Company, and the British Empire.

Sir Ian Malcolm, like the Suez Canal Company, ignores the rest of the world, and seems to place the British Empire after the Suez Canal Company. Egypt, as was proved in 1910, can look after herself, but the British Empire needs more forceful advocacy if it is to obtain a hearing; but perhaps we are relying, as at Geneva, on the smaller nations to take the lead that we have abandoned. Sir Ian Malcolm refers complacently to the harmony that has existed since 1883 in what he is pleased to call the international board-room—which shelters, besides French and British directors, only one representative of another nationality. This harmony, as remarked by Monsieur Mimaut, British courtesy has done nothing to diminish, but it is no longer consistent with the interests of Great Britain or of the world.

The Imperial Shipping Committee has had the matter on its agenda at least once. It is time to raise it again, and to secure, if need be, that British official representation on the board is allocated according to some system more in accord with the public interest. It might be possible, and it would certainly be desirable, to replace some of the ten directors, both unofficial and official, by official representatives of the Treasury and the Board of Trade (representing Great Britain), by the High Commissioners for Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India, with representatives, official or unofficial, of the Colonies, East Africa, Hongkong, Straits Settlements and Ceylon, for in present circumstances it is the producer in these countries who pays the dues. The sum that these gentlemen would receive as directors would, at present rate of exchange, probably be greater than their official salaries. The Suez Canal shares might be transferred, as Sir H. Vincent suggested years ago, to officials representing these and other countries concerned, in numbers which would enable the British Empire to count for more than at present in the assembly of shareholders.

For the moment, however, the crying need is to focus public opinion throughout Europe and Asia upon the administration of the canal, to apply thereto the rules which should govern the conduct of a great international public utility, which is, in the words of the last report of the Canal Company, 'unaffected by prices, by markets or by vicissitudes of fashion.' In March 1929 Mr. Baldwin laid down in the House of Commons certain general principles as to the duties of monopoly holders to the community:

> The public is best served by an efficient industry operating freely. But special considerations arise where a single undertaking dominates . . . [Its duty is, in such circumstances] to supply on reasonable terms; and the public have a right to be satisfied that those terms are reasonable.

It is time to apply this principle to the Suez Canal.

Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations empowers the Assembly from time to time to advise the reconsideration, by members of the League, of treaties that have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

The Acts of Concession under which the Suez Canal Company operates, as the *mandataire* of the King of Egypt, if read in the light of Article 23 (*e*) of the Covenant, seem clearly to come within the scope of Article 19. The possibility of action under this article is now widely recognised, but it would be premature to invoke it until the maritime Powers (some of whom approached Mr. Henderson in 1931) have addressed themselves to the subject, and to the Suez Canal Company.

The self-imposed task which has devolved on me (for I represent no specific interest in the matter) of drawing attention to the heavy burdens imposed upon commerce by the Suez Canal Company has not been wholly agreeable, for it has entailed overt criticism of the action, or inaction, over a period of years, of a very distinguished board, some of whom are figures of international importance. It has also entailed much research, for the relevant facts are to be found in no Government publication. The Annual Report on the Suez Canal laid before Parliament is an insult to the intelligence of that body, for if it had been designed to hide the essential financial aspects it could scarcely have done so with greater success. I have no other object than to stimulate the impartial consideration of the questions I have raised, by a body genuinely representative of the interests primarily affected by the canal, with a view to removing grievances which, unless remedied, will become increasingly apparent as a cause of international friction.

I will conclude by a quotation from Disraeli's speech in the Commons on February 9, 1876, on the question of how best pressure could be exerted, if need be, on the Suez Canal Company, whose excessive charges and somewhat high-handed methods had, at that time, as now, excited very widespread resentment.

> The government of the world [he said] is not a mere alternation between abstract right and overwhelming force. . . . The world is governed by conciliation, compromise, influence, varied interests, the recognition of the rights of others, coupled with the assertion of one's own ; and, in addition, a general conviction, resulting from explanation and good understanding, that it is for the interest of all parties that matters should be conducted in a satisfactory and peaceful manner.[7]

To do so by agreement will be the fittest tribute that we of this generation can pay to the work of the illustrious Frenchman, who has so well deserved of his country and of all civilised nations.

ARNOLD WILSON.

[7] Buckle, *Life of Disraeli*, vol. v., p. 461.

FRANCE AND THE ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

Bewilderment is the only name for the mood of the nations as they approach the fatal day of the opening of the Economic World Conference. The general feeling is that alone some new science of celestial mechanics can set things right on planet No. 3 of our absurd solar system. Matters were bad enough even before the vagabond dollar began its erring course. But, even if dollar and pound were miraculously to come to terms, agreeing reciprocally, before the opening of the Conference, as to their parity and respectability, bewilderment would still stamp the features of the London specialists behind their stoic Japanese smiles. Sporting England has already been forewarned by Mr. MacDonald that 'June 15 is to be an awkward hurdle.' What Lord Snowden thinks of the situation is no less characteristic. He has just spoken his mind to Frenchmen:

> Nobody possessing any authority [he says in the French paper *L'Information*] ventures to write dogmatically on the consequences for the world of America's abandonment of the gold-standard. This measure has muddled still a little more a situation which was already muddled quite beyond the bounds of human understanding.

None of us, I fancy, will hesitate to echo Lord Snowden's cry. The refrain will go up, 'So say we all of us.' The dovetailed perplexities of our common plight are not merely a matter of the prolonged trade depression in America. That depression, consequent on America's Monte Carlo orgy of standardised production, which neither its own market nor European markets could absorb, is not to be solved by the sole device of restoration of an international gold standard nor by the discovery of some new common international standard. Perhaps Mr. Roosevelt's apparent plan to revalue gold on a new and equitable basis can really be imposed on England and France before the fatal date in June. Perhaps his scheme is, as some believe, a stroke of genius. Perhaps, as Mr. Wade Chance picturesquely puts it in the *Bankers' Magazine*, it is virtually a move in favour of 'the most stupendous financial transaction in history—the *transfer* of an immense and incalculable total of quotable value from the present *overvalued* gold stores of the world into the ocean-like volume of *under-valued*

commodities, landed property and fixed securities now lying prostrate.' Perhaps it is really the case that—although Europe has been caught napping as to the parlous state of things in America that necessitated Mr. Roosevelt's *coup*—his initiative, in proclaiming *urbi et orbi* 'our world-currency system is faulty, not up to date,' is a wise and noble measure. Perhaps that measure will not jeopardise the success of the World Economic Conference. But, admitting that we all were to manage to agree, what would we do as regards one of the immediate corollaries of acceptance of Mr. Roosevelt's plan—namely, as to the question of gold control, Government ownership of the world's gold store? And even if that dreadful problem, too, were solved, should we be any nearer to normal international relations? Would the world's trade routes suddenly be humming with traffic? Would the ships now blocked in half a hundred ports instantly raise anchor for the Seven Seas? Would the more than 30,000,000 of unemployed march gaily back to work? No, the money problem is but one of the items of any programme of world reconstruction. Quadrature of the circle is child's play to the task of the revival of normal conditions about to torment the Governments assembled in London. And, more urgent even than the revaluation of gold, or than the lowering of the figure of the unemployed by spending millions on public works, is a firm will on the part of the several peoples to cease the reckless waste of public money; to spend only what they can afford; to balance their budgets; to embark, in a word, on an unrelenting policy of national economy—after which it may be possible to begin to talk of 'business as usual.' A dyke must be put to the demagogic drift of our time. Even in the years preceding the German war it was easy to see whither we were tending and to descry the orifice of the blind-alley where our cult of liberty, equality, and fraternity was bound to land us. Pandering to the mass, drunk with its ideal of universal suffrage, could not but plunge us into anarchy.

Ours, therefore, is no time for optimism, in spite of all the hopes raised by the World Conference. Charity begins at home, and it is quite natural that the American Secretary of State should describe world conditions as 'terrifying.' The American diplomat is right. We are morally *déracinés* and we are not even convalescent. Illusion on illusion still persist—Pelion piled on Ossa; and until, one and all, these illusions have been volatilised, no national community will begin to mend. There are doctors still who believe that matters of money determine the trend of our economics and of our finances and of our general well-being. Quite the contrary is the case. But one great illusion, an illusion that has held up the world for fourteen years, has, after all, been eliminated. The importance of that providential event we shall

see shortly. For the moment, I insist on the fact that everywhere the body politic is still being corroded by the poisonous illusion —criminal euphorie!—that we can recover our social sanity without abandoning our evil habits. Thus, hitherto, an honest man's word has been his bond. A self-respecting nation's bond was its sealed and signed word. Yet, now, even the gold clause in United States dollar contracts is becoming tinsel. If this be not default, what is it? At all events, bondholders have only to make the most of it. But the pity of it all is that when America stepped off the gold standard, with some £900,000,000 sterling in her coffers, she wantonly established a contagious precedent. Where are we, in verity, to-day? The sanctity of international contracts is no more. The principle is cynically repudiated. And although it be true that matters of money do not determine the trend of our economics and our finances, they are an inextricably integral part of what I have called the dovetailed complex of our common plight.

French reactions, in our cosmic confusion, are not exactly those either of the United States or of England. Necessarily French perspectives are other, and the difference is worth examining. In the first place, France is more closely watching Germany than are any of the other Powers. France is quite as keenly aware as a disinterested people can be that nothing is more urgent—that it may be even a matter of life or death—than that the nations should at last come to terms. But France is anxiously wondering if an efficient amphictyonic council of some sixty nations is possible before settlement of the secular preliminary matter of European Insecurity. Dr. Schacht recently rushed over to New York uninvited. He went obviously with the intention of settling certain little matters of urgent concern for his own country rather than risk running the gauntlet of half a hundred squabbling Powers in London. France has remarked that Germany has not retorted to the fall of the dollar by threat of the fall of the mark. Oh no! All Germany asks is to be relieved of the payment of her dollar debts, which amount to some ten milliards of marks. Her prayers to the Powers will be based on a pretext that has served her so often in good stead in the past. The port of Hamburg is half-stifled. Very well, Germany will argue the necessity of possessing unhampered liberty for her exports if the world really expects her to honour her multiple signatures to her Anglo-Saxon creditors. Naturally, she will fail to recall that she ingeniously managed to annul her internal debts by a scandalous inflation; that later on, owing to a complacent world, she cancelled her foreign political debts, the famous 'reparations.' And she will make no effort to point out now that, if she can only manage to cancel her international

commercial debts, in spite of the protests of American and British bankers, she will have triumphantly boxed the compass of every canny, immoral manœuvre enabling her to endow her people with the most powerful industrial equipment in Europe; to build her autostrads well up to the Belgian and French frontiers; to further all the Nazi schemes for the restoration of a stronger than Prussian hegemony on the European continent—and all this with foreign capital that she now hesitates to refund, in the disinterested interest of world reconstruction!

Thus France is wondering if Dr. Schacht's calculations are not ingeniously right. When, indeed, has Dr. Schacht ever been wrong! His mission to America is quite in the spirit and mood of the hour. Although the United States has not yet abandoned the Monroe Doctrine—I shall return to this point shortly—and although the President is rediscovering the American Constitution, and although he is terribly hampered in his attempts to come to the rescue of the world, one of his slogans is 'economic disarmament,' while Mr. Hull, his Secretary of State, is doing his best to inoculate the traditionally recalcitrant Senate with the notion that economic isolation means the paralysis of industry and the starvation of the nations. Germany would seem, therefore, to have adroitly chosen her hour for a fresh appeal to her gullible, sentimental rivals.

The risks, indeed, that we are all running of once again becoming the dupes of inveterate and unblushing Prussian malice—of what, in American idiom, would be called 'cheek'—are perhaps inadvertently revealed by Mr. Walter Lippmann. France knows that it would, at all events, be impossible to play more dangerously into the hands of German imperialism, to the dam of Continental peace, than in the following passage culled from an article by this great journalist whose influence at present on public opinion in the United States is second only to that of the President:

> The prospect of having to choose between war and a peace which rests finally upon the superior power of the nations that are prepared to defend the existing order is not an inspiring one. But the wisest view of the situation, I think, is that political progress is foreclosed, and that the only radical cure for the political tension is to end the world depression. For what the Germans need is what we all need, employment and hope and a rising standard of life. The Nazis are an army of the unemployed who, in a land where there are too few jobs to go around, are seizing jobs on any pretext that they can invent. The only real remedy is to multiply the jobs so that men will cease to covet their neighbor's job. The return of prosperity, which will mean the re-employment of the German working class, is also the only hope of a restoration of liberty. For to-day the German working man is powerless to protest because there are two hungry men waiting for his job if he raises his voice. But a re-employed Germany

> would be a different Germany. When industry needs men it becomes unprofitable and impractical to be tyrannical. Germany is being barbarised by the struggle for existence; she will return to civilization as the bitterness of that struggle is abated.

This is, really, a very tell-tale utterance, and the question arises: Is it ingenuous candour, or is it propaganda? In any case, none can contest its ingenuity and the coincidence of its plausible appeal to come once more to the rescue of German reconstruction with the militarisation of the German working classes and with German insistence at Geneva on the right to equality of armaments.

It should cause no surprise, therefore, that France, whose good-will loyally to play the game of world co-operation exceeds that of any of the Powers—this I am ready to prove, if need be, but it is not our present subject—should nevertheless be repeating over and over to herself the question we formulated a moment ago: Is an efficient amphictyonic council of the nations possible in this springtime of 1933? No doubt the fell swoop of the wand of a planetary dictator, forcing simultaneous pooling of the difficulties of the several nations—smashing, as by a Jericho blast, all custom barriers; in a word, internationalising the chaos of national difficulties, standardising them with a view to the application of a common solution—might bring a temporary peace. But no such demiurgic panacea is at present visible on any horizon. World trade, alas, must be set once more in motion without appeal to the gods. Yet what the report of the eminent doctors of the Lausanne Conference called the 'forces of disintegration' must be arrested somehow and soon, or we shall all fall into the abyss. Writing far from documents, I have not that report under my eye, but its virtual terms are vividly in my memory, and I venture to say that never were experts more discouraging. Some of them were the very persons who have recently been comparing notes at the White House in an atmosphere more heavily charged than ever with cyclonic portents. It was they, not Mr. Roosevelt nor Mr. Hull, who first recommended 'economic disarmament' as an urgent necessity if the nations would survive. They remarked that what took place a year ago at Lausanne was only the conclusion of an armistice, and that it was for the Conference of London to draw up a Treaty of Peace. That, they declared, was a 'vital' business, since, in lieu of such a treaty, the whole world would be plunged into an era of 'national autarchy' in which the very foundations of the whole system of international finance would be shattered, and in which our present social system could hardly survive. This, everyone will agree, was pessimism carried almost to the nth power. But who would venture to deny that world events since Lausanne

have admirably justified this diagnosis and these prognostics? Certainly not France.

The World Conference about to open in London has a hundred problems to solve. But, for the French, all may be summed up in a single one: restoration of respect for contracts, the one contract that chiefly interests the French being the Treaty of Versailles.

Let us consider this point a little more curiously. The happy discovery of self-sacrificing devices for the fresh mobilisation of paralysed trade will not conjure the difficulties now besetting us until the political difficulties that have tormented the world during the last fourteen years—since, that is, the Treaty of Versailles—will have been completely effaced. The 'Allies' muddled the ending of the war by their failure to deprussianise the German tribes. In consequence of this almost criminal negligence the world has been living for fourteen years in a chronic state of fear. We fell neurasthenic victims of pactomania; and that pactomania has been the barometer marking the rise and fall of our anxious temper. What is the result? We are where we are, and everything that is to take place in London is function of the carking question of war and peace.

All this the Germans know, but the British are only just now learning it. The French have been tragically aware of it ever since the miserably ambiguous end of the war. But meanwhile public opinion in France is increasingly alert to a fact that England no doubt sees, but that England can much less easily avow. The fact in question is that the United States is likely to wallow for a melancholy period still in the slough of despond into which her wild abuse of credit in the after-war period plunged her. France, steadily abandoned by the United States—first by the refusal of the America Senate to honour the signature of the American President relative to French security on the Rhine, finally by the initiative of another American President imposing a moratorium as regards German reparations, while still claiming payment of international debts!—is not particularly inclined to extend a helping hand even to the land of Washington and Franklin. But France is freer of her movements than England. England is prone, in the forlorn hope of preserving the integrity of an already non-existent 'Empire,' to humour the caprices of the independent nations she still calls 'Dominions'; and, since those 'Dominions' have many economic and geographical reasons for siding often more sincerely with the United States than with her, England fancies herself condemned to a shilly-shallying policy of compromise between the European interests, a consequence of the geographical gravitation of the Continent—interests she seeks in vain to ignore—and her 'Imperial' interests as first

among equals in the British Commonwealth of Nations. Happily, Continental events are moving with rapidity towards one of those crises of history in which, willy-nilly, nations are no longer free to choose, but have specific choice of a national policy automatically thrust upon them. England is thus slowly rediscovering the practical virtues of that ancient principle of Balance of Power which France has always extolled as the sole guarantee of peace, and which, indeed, had it been applied to the letter in the late summer of 1914, would have prevented the crime of Germany in invading Belgium and France.

Thus, Germany's happy excesses, in the thick of her political and social revolution, have justified the French thesis as to the necessity of reviving the principle of Balance of Power. But French preoccupations as to questions of war and peace are not blinding French eyes to what is taking place in America. One point Frenchmen see clearly and note with admiration. Whatever France may think of Mr. Roosevelt's repeating-rifle methods of solving the problems that beset us all—of his dictatorial hustling of Governments all round the world, particularly of his too precipitate proposal as to a tariff truce—France recognises that he is doing his best to heed some of the essentials of the recommendations of the committee of experts convened under the ægis of the League of Nations. Certain Frenchmen, M. Herriot among them, have hastily fancied that America is thereby so solemnly repudiating her traditional policy of splendid self-sufficiency that she has virtually revolutionised her conception of the Monroe Doctrine. Deplorable exageration this, although Washington is indeed, for the nonce, really a more active participant in Genevan business than any of the Powers. In fact, Theodore Roosevelt—yes, Theodore—and Woodrow Wilson are, no doubt, now shaking hands in the Shades.

But in order to perceive the exact intent of Rooseveltian diplomacy we must needs recall precisely what has happened during the last year in the councils of the Powers; and the events of these last twelve months are particularly present to a people that has been thwarted of its legitimate 'reparations,' in order that American and British banks might recover their imperilled loans and that Germany might be allowed to finance her Russian arsenals.

The Lausanne Conference, which settled so drastically the problem of reparations, while leaving so tragically confused and unsettled the question of inter-governmental debts, was held just a year ago. That Conference took the interesting step of calling upon the Council of the League of Nations to convene, at a date which it failed to fix, a World Conference, in order to determine urgent measures for the solution of all the other economic

and financial questions responsible for the present chaotic state of things in the world. The Council accepted the task and it appointed a committee of experts to prepare a programme for the projected World Conference. These experts—eighteen countries and a hundred delegates—debated at Geneva their reciprocal panaceas from October of last year to January of the present year. Finally, they submitted to the several Governments a pessimistic report. This report was taken over to the White House by the three Americans, who had taken part, not merely as 'observers' but as responsible experts, in the discussions of the League Council's Committee: Professor Day, of the Rockefeller Foundation; Professor Williams, of Harvard; and Mr. Leon Fraser, the new governor of the Bank for International Settlements. That report defined the order in which the problems were to be examined and solved by a World Conference for remedying the universal depression. It put at the head of the list the stabilisation of money. It mentioned, secondly, as urgent the adjustment of international debts. Thirdly, it recommended the abrogation of arbitrary measures for the control of exchange. And it was only in the fourth place—since tariffs are effects and not causes—that the report insisted on a progressive lowering of the existing barriers against international trade. Such was the programme placed under the eye of Mr. Roosevelt when he entered the White House some two and a half months ago. Pigeon-holed temporarily by the other Governments, this programme loomed like a pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night before the vision of the new President of the United States. Meanwhile, American banks were tottering, American farmers were rising in rebellion, the American budget was revealing hour by hour, at a sort of geometrical progression, a deficit worthy of the Danaids. Cerberus, in a word, was barking on the 'doorstep' of the majority of American homes. Victorious Nazis were frightening the entire peaceful populations, not only of the Continent, but of England. The leader of the American people was constrained to act. He bent anxious eyes over the report of the Genevan gentlemen who had forewarned the world of the fate in store for it if Governments failed quickly to follow their advice. What he clearly perceived was that their report was what, in sporting parlance, may be called a 'straight tip,' a straight tip to the Powers. But it was, at the same time, a *strait* tip, a sign-post to what French automobilists know as the *sens unique*. On the continent of Europe not a single Government, however, had budged. France was waiting patiently for the world to understand. Mr. Roosevelt decided to risk responsible action. Thus, one man alone among the statesmen of the world has had the courage to gird up his loins and to enter upon the straight and narrow path, the *sens unique*,

indicated by the Genevan experts as the only way out of the chaos in which we are all floundering. France is grateful, because she has reason to know that Mr. Roosevelt, at all events, whatever the persistent cecity of this or that pharaonic senator, has the same conception of security as she herself. France is even ready to condone Mr. Roosevelt's reckless enthusiasm in reversing the order of the Genevan experts' suggestions—his shifting of the No. 4 of their programme to the first place, thereby arousing European suspicion by his appeal for a tariff truce. But, be he right or wrong in this proposal for a premature tariff truce—and France feels that unquestionably he is disquietingly wrong—the great fact remains, the fact so extravagantly interpreted as being Washington's emancipation from the Monroe Doctrine—to wit, that for the first time, by virtue of Mr. Roosevelt's voluntary leadership, the United States has consented to acknowledge the necessity of a loyal balance of commercial exchange between America and Europe. It is pertinent to note that just at the moment when Mr. McGarrah, having reached the age limit, abandons the presidency of the Bank for International Settlements he is succeeded by the Mr. Fraser who was co-signer of the report that Mr. Roosevelt is seeking to put into practice. The Bank for International Settlements will have its own delegates at the World Conference, delegates who will be appointed by the President. Under American inspiration, in accord with Mr. Roosevelt, these delegates will lay special emphasis on the necessity of restoring currencies under a free international gold standard, on the settlement of inter-governmental debts, on a return to a reasonable degree of free trade and to a free movement of capital. France has no illusions as to all this. She knows that it is not a death-blow to the Monroe Doctrine! But she perceives, all the same, that, *Roosevelt consule*, the scales are falling from American eyes. Americans are rapidly and tragically learning that the world is one. And in this fact, France believes, lies one of the hopes of the world.

Let me sum up the situation thus. The French have been disillusionised, literally dismayed—and their dismay is a very painful impression, a sort of disenchantment—by the surprising resolution of the United States to abandon the gold standard. What! The 'almighty dollar' is no more? Once that dollar was the pride of the world. It has lost now its glorious lustre, and American prestige is so immensely diminished in the councils of Europe that it may be long years before the United States recovers that prestige. I know of but one way for Washington to undo the moral damage caused in French minds by America's mystifying flight from gold. That way is the way of wisdom for us all. The United States must recognise at last that she made in 1917 no

mistake when she discovered that France is a cosmic isthmus. And England, if England still be England, will not be long in helping her to that knowledge!

At certain moments of history a scientific induction leaps into the open: it is in the vital interest of the other Powers temporarily to subordinate their own national policies to the national policy of France. At such moments French security and French prosperity cannot be sacrificed by any of the Powers without fatal consequence for them all, and for humanity. When the King of Prussia, Frederick II., invaded Silesia in December 1740 he violated, in the good old Prussian way, every rule of international comity and of common honesty. Commenting on his exploit later on, he said: 'Know once for all that when a kingdom's interests are at stake, you take when you can, and you are never wrong if you are not compelled to restore.' In August 1914 another King of Prussia put once more into practice, this time on Germany's western frontier, the same old principle that they shall take who have the power and they shall keep who can. 'Tipperary' became a national song on both sides of the English Channel.

Now, again, the Teutonic knights are on the march. It is to be hoped that England is listening in. France, these next few weeks in London, and all the Continental nations by her side, will tackle not one of the economic or financial problems of our melancholy hour without reflecting on its relation to the overwhelmingly urgent matter of European insecurity, consequent on the god-sent Hitler revolution beyond the Vosges. Yes, if Hitler did not exist he would have to be invented as a scare-crow for our Anglo-Saxon democracies. For the last quarter of a century Prussia's potential capacity for blundering has been the sole hope and guarantee of a peaceful world. Hitler is Germany. Hitler is incandescent pan-Germanism in being. Vigilance is now, for us all, the better part of valour!

W. Morton Fullerton.

TEMPLE-ENTRY AND UNTOUCHABILITY

SANCTIONED 'Untouchability' relates to pollution of the gods. It relates to human beings only in so far as their pollution would affect the service of the gods, or the exercise of religion. The teaching on Untouchability is to be found mainly in the *Agama Shastra*, as interpreted by the pundits of orthodox Hinduism, and sanctioned by long usage and custom. This 'scripture' is unequivocal in its utterances. In popular language its injunctions amount to this: *Bhojun*, the feeding of the gods, is an important symbolical item in ceremonial worship. There are certain gods of the Hindu pantheon who are milk-feeding and abhor blood-offerings. All sacrificers of blood and all meat-eaters, especially eaters of the sacred cow or of unclean animals and carrion, are therefore abhorrent and polluting, and must be excluded from the temples of the milk-feeding gods, not only on pain of the anger of the gods, but because such contact nullifies the spiritual power and emanation of the deities. This last is the inner meaning of the rule, as orthodox Hindu priests explain it.

A Hindu temple is not a place for congregational worship. It is 'a place where a supernatural power in the shape of a particular deity is believed to be installed and maintained through a specific technique of rites, observances, rules and regulations.' The idol is, in fact, only a medium for generating, conserving, and disseminating certain spiritual powers, through the influence of *mantras* and *tanthras* (a sequence of cabalistic words known to the initiated priests who serve the gods). It is sincerely believed that these repositories of spiritual energy suffer in their efficacy under certain conditions and at the approach of certain bodies. 'It is somewhat like,' say the pundits to the inquirer, 'the reaction of certain kinds of energy to different environments in the physical world.' 'Pollution' of spiritual energy involves very serious practical consequences. The 'god,' or outward and visible symbol of spiritual force, must be discarded because reduced to a mere creation of wood or stone; and not only must the temple be purified, but the Spiritual Force must be entreated to inhabit a new dwelling; *i.e.*, a new idol must be consecrated and installed,

with rites and ceremonies punctiliously performed—a most costly business.

Now, the untouchable, as the out-of-caste man has been called, is a polluting element, because he is initially both a meat-eater (in its worst Hindu aspects including, for some low castes, the eating of carrion) and a sacrificer of blood. The outcaste worships his gods—and he has his own peculiar pantheon—with the sacrifice of pigs and cocks. He has other contacts which the orthodox Hindu regards on principle as polluting. Thus, workers in hides and leather and carriers of the dead are untouchable; so are producers and sellers of liquor, all washermen, and (sadly!) keepers of dogs and donkeys. Defilement refers to religious ceremonial, and not to physical purity. It is this fact, it will be seen, which robs it of the 'despising' intention about which the Western world has been deliberately misled by those who have used 'Untouchability' as an item in a political programme. A Brahmin himself, albeit a practising priest, may become impure—*e.g.*, the *Barna* or *Vyasokta* Brahmin who officiates at the cremation of a corpse. Even the castes he serves will not eat with such a one. The throes of death and birth are polluting, however high the caste. A woman in child-birth and through periods of menstruation is 'polluting'—she may not enter the temple; and moreover, as with all instruments of pollution, her touch pollutes others. Though these others can obtain purification by bathing in Ganges water and such like ceremonies, and although she herself is 'purified,' as a matter of course, after the necessary segregation. To persons not of the orthodox Hindu faith it is a renewed surprise every time that the wistful grandmother is seen standing outside the door of the birth-chamber, abstaining from touching the newly-born grandson whom she aches to cuddle—until the days of impurity are overpast. All the clothes used through this period (of now thirty, now forty days) are thrown away; and, indeed, the birth takes place in a specially appropriated chamber and on a bed which is scrapped, immediately after, as 'impure.'

The pious orthodox Hindu is scrupulous in observance of the *Agama Shastra*, protecting his gods not only from human pollution, but from contact with all polluting animals as well. Only last February I saw a Hindu temple being purified because a jackal had strayed into it, and another, an entire *raj bari* (palace), being subjected to like treatment because a vulture had alighted on the roof in his flight, the vulture, like the jackal (and certain untouchables), being an eater of carrion.

'Poor jackal!' had said the tender-hearted *purdahnashin* worshipper. 'Maybe he came in to worship, and, being an outcaste, brought his kill as an offering. If that were so, he will have

his reward in rebirth. But we must take care of the god. He is our first duty. . . .'

'Why are you not in your new palace?' I had asked of my *rani* client. 'It is so much more comfortable than this old one.'

'A vulture sat on the roof,' said she. 'My *puja ghar* is in one of the rooms of the *raj bari*. I had to vacate at once for the purification ceremonies.'

And this meant rewashing and repainting the entire house and installing a new idol in her private chapel. I have been acquainted with this practice for the last thirty years; but I give the instances cited, because I want to emphasise the fact that the practice is alive and in use to-day.

The gods, then, can be polluted by 'approach,' and the rules governing approach are meticulous. Not all caste men may approach the god himself, or enter the inner sanctuary. There are degrees even of private *entrée*—so many feet away for a worshipper of such and such a caste. Brahmins—but there are shades here also—may approach nearest; then come *kshtriyars*, *veishyas*, *sudras*, in the order of the original table of purity. No orthodox Hindu resents these rules. He knows that a Hindu may think as he likes, believe what he will—there is no body of Hindu doctrine, no 'Apostolic Creed' in Hinduism: there is only a body of rules relating to caste; and these must be obeyed, because upon caste is built his entire life on earth—marriage, inheritance, succession—and his hope of reincarnation after the undated lease of the body has expired.

An orthodox Hindu *purdahnashin* friend of mine, a *Maharani*, and her mother went from Bengal a winter ago on pilgrimage to Rameshwaram, the temple of the Monkey-God in South India. It was a long journey and neither lady was strong. They took with them their personal priests, their children, and all the etcetera that the journey involved: maidservants and menservants, tents in which to cook their food when they halted, Ganges water, food grains, and a multiplicity of cooking vessels. For, both ladies being widows, neither could eat from the vessels used for the other, or from the vessels used for their children and the rest of the party. They went by rail in tourist railway carriages which were attached to the material trains, and slipped when convenient, at appropriate halts, so that the tents might be pitched and the family might bathe and eat. To eat in the railway carriage would have been an act of self-pollution, rendering them unfit for worship at Rameshwaram. It must not be thought that these precautions were irksome: they were deliberately provided for and cheerfully observed even by the 'littlest one,' the *Maharajah*, aged six, who at home has his own *puja ghar*, wherein he worships with punctilious ceremony. At last they

had arrived. But, though they were Brahmins of a high order, their way into the sanctuary was barred. They were allowed thus far—the second-class limit—and no farther. The reason given by the officiating priests was that these modern pilgrims had travelled by a method unknown to the god. Who could tell the reactions upon spiritual energy of the use of a touring carriage? And not all the representations of the ladies' priests could move the temple authorities.

'Yes! Maybe they had bathed and eaten, with due precaution, outside the carriage. But there had never been such a case. The Monkey-God's attendants could run no risks!'

'And they were quite right,' said the *Maharani*, telling me the story.

'*Bap-re-bap!* [father of my father] if we had been the cause of polluting *Hanuman*, when all our lives my mother and I have longed to come on this pilgrimage to worship him!'

So, in the outer court did they leave their gifts, and in the outer court did the little widows sit in meditation, giving thanks for a pilgrimage accomplished, with never a resentful thought about their disappointment.

We saw him—though from afar!

Thus, then, pollution of the gods. Pollution of humans in their service of the gods may be by eating and drinking, for these acts are also 'worship' to an orthodox Hindu. The 'bar of food and water' is inflexible—so inflexible that not even the foot of the out-of-caste Indian or foreign meat-eater may be within the threshold of the room where the orthodox Hindu is eating or drinking. Most English women doctors are unaware of this rule, and tragedies have happened when a doctor has lingered beside her orthodox Hindu patient—say, while she drinks water after taking a pill. It is no doubt this social aspect of the problem, the rule against inter-dining, which has misled the casual observer into thinking that caste in India is a translation of the caste feeling as known to England. But never were any two conceptions sheltering under one 'alphabet' (as Mme. de Stael would say) more dissimilar. 'I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you,' says the caste man to the outcaste; 'but I may not pray with you or eat with you, because my religion forbids.' Yet he will *serve* him. Service is the privilege of the highest. And the traveller in India may at any railway station halt, throughout the country, hear the cry, 'I am a Brahmin; I water all castes.' And they may see the Brahmin even washing the feet of the outcaste. Indeed, I have seen Brahmins wash the sores of lepers—and of outcaste lepers—at a social service centre in Calcutta. It is the

impoverished Brahmin whom the well-to-do outcaste employs as his cook; nor is the Brahmin outcasted by such service, though if the Brahmin cook feeds on the premises the master dare not put his foot inside the kitchen—he would pollute it! Among Brahmins themselves this matter of cooks can be very troublesome in practice.

Brahmin sub-castes are unyielding in exclusiveness. An outstanding instance of this occurred during my official connexion with the court of wards in Orissa. His mother had consented to a Kashmiri Brahmin ward going to a public school for chiefs and princes, at which school—for that was her condition—he would be allowed his own cook and his own kitchen. But our plans were nearly wrecked, because no cook could be found of the appropriate caste. Finally the difficulty was overcome by the lad's uncle consenting to go as his cook! Another illuminating fact is the way the Brahmin takes the reverence of the lower-caste man. Some years ago a certain *Maharajah* had an appointment to see me on business at my office in the Secretariat in Calcutta. When he arrived I was giving instructions to my two Brahmin clerks. The *Maharajah* being announced, they left at once, but met him at the door. The *Maharajah* paused, and took the dust off their feet, before coming in to me. I saw this, but naturally made no comment at the time. Later in the day I said to my head clerk:

'Don't you be getting swelled head now, Gyan Babu.'

'Why, madam?' asked the clerk, who knew English very well.

'I saw the *Maharajah* salute your feet,' said I.

'Oh! *that*,' said Gyan Babu, 'that's nothing to do with me. He saluted the Brahminhood in me, because he is of the Tebi caste. But he is a very good *Maharajah*; and maybe he will be reborn a Brahmin, and I may be reborn a sweeper. His was only a ceremonial act. How could I take it to myself?'

The above summary of the implications of castehood must be modified in relation to South India. In South India, the stronghold of Hindu orthodoxy, the Brahmin has been exacting in ways unknown to other parts of India—maybe because the original Brahmins of South India, being stray foreigners living among powerful aboriginal Dravidians, were compelled to assert themselves for their protection. Whatever the reason, however, picturesque tales of 'Brahmin roads' off which the outcaste must skip and of 'pollution by shadow'—the shadow of an outcaste falling not only on food and water (that is general and understandable) but upon the Brahmin himself or on his path—have a background of truth in Travancore, Mysore, and Cochin. But a personal investigation made this winter has disclosed the

fact that the custom, however active three generations ago, does not exist to-day. The 'Brahmin roads' are there, but the out-caste—I have seen him—goes freely up and down. Neither the champions of Untouchability nor of Orthodoxy could direct me to a single place where I could see for myself this skipping out-caste. The nearest I got was in a very amusing story told me by a retired orthodox Hindu prime minister in Travancore:

'Yes, my father knew of such a case, and I can recall the tale of a friend. He was a Brahmin from North India who came south to visit a famous temple. He had bathed, and was on his way to the temple, when he heard behind him cries from someone who seemed to be pursuing him, though at a distance. He saw a south-country man gesticulating wildly as he continued to call. Being from the north, my friend could not understand one word he said; and he proceeded on his way, thinking the man was mad. Just outside the temple his pursuer caught up with him. A stander-by interpreted: "He says he is a *Pooleah*, one who causes pollution, an untouchable. He begs you not to go into the temple; he has been on the road behind you. You would pollute the god. He prays that you will go back, and bathe, and purify yourself before you worship!"'

My interrogator from Malabar had made a study of the 'off-the-road' question during his service as a Revenue officer (1914–1926) in that area. He had not himself found in practice the custom recorded by Abbé Dubois and other early travellers, and he said authoritatively that, as regards public roads, it did not now exist in any part of Malabar. If found anywhere, it might be in Palghat, among Brahmins who are, not Malayalam, but Tamil, and who represent the remnant of the original Aryan settlement in Dravidian country. His most graphic contribution to my inquiry, like that of the man in Travancore, was a surprise. One of his staff, not a tribal untouchable, had while on tour to take refuge in the huts of tribal untouchables. When the man left, the huts were burnt down by their owners. They had been polluted. The tribal untouchable respects his 'caste' and his 'separateness.' Similarly, the untouchable in Hyderabad State refuses to draw water from the same well as a sub-caste man. Nor will he take water from a pump on which a man of lower caste has laid a finger. 'I am of the sweeper caste among outcastes,' will say that individual proudly anywhere in India, refusing to eat or smoke with the *Dom* on the step below, and objecting to do the work—*e.g.*, the removal of a dead animal—of that 'caste.' The lower the 'caste,' the stricter it is in enforcing rules—such as the rule about degradation to the caste of the lower-caste man, with whom cooked food, rice, or *dal* (pulse) has been eaten. Every caste, including the 'castes' of

the outcaste, has its governing body or council and its code of prohibitions and excommunications. On caste questions its own caste is supreme. The most important questions referred to the council relate to marriage and breach of ceremonial laws. And a council meeting is conducted with due ritual, as I have seen when permitted to attend the caste council of a Marwari client. Sometimes the chairman is allowed certain privileges, such as the use of an umbrella, riding a horse, wearing a ring. The chairman of the Vellalams of Tinevelly is called *irankol*, or 'please sit down,' because he alone sits—the others stand—at council meetings. What is important to emphasise is the fact that the Brahmin is not the autocratic Hindu dictator that he is supposed to be by the ill-informed. Each caste rotates on its own axis, though any caste may elect to refer a difficulty to the Brahmins.

This is perhaps the right moment for consideration of caste itself. The word *caste* is derived from the Portuguese *casta*, and is quoted as appearing for the first time in a despatch from Goa dated 1567. It was originally applied to the four economic divisions of the Aryans—the priests and learned men, the warriors, the agriculturists, the servers. All outside these were out-of-caste men—probably aborigines and Dravidians. That is the most generally accepted theory. And to this theory the anthropologists, sponsored by Risley, give their blessing. The test of caste (as opposed to untouchable), says Risley, is *the nose*—the long nose denoting the Aryan, the squat, broad-based nose the Dravidian or aborigine or, later, the Mongolian. And bone structure would certainly seem to be more reliable as a distinctive mark than the fugitive 'sunburn' test of other Western writers on the differences between high and low caste. In course of time, and under the influence of the priests, the four economic divisions crystallised into watertight and exclusive compartments carrying unalterable 'sanctions,' which have a great deal to be said for them, not only in relation to trades guilds, but, as the orthodox Hindu claims, to purity and continuity of race. As the years passed they were bound, however, these divisions, to be encroached upon, as by inter-marriage between Aryan and Dravidian and other influences. The result was a multiplication of castes. So that in the census of 1901 (the last census which offers such statistics) we find record of 2378 tribes and castes. So very little can make a new caste—*e.g.*, during famines men eat in relief kitchens, nor know with whom they eat. The caste councils have decided that a new low sub-caste is inaugurated of 'The Eaters in Relief Kitchens.' But there are ways of rising in the scale, as well as of descending. Instances are known of sub-castes claiming a rise in status if they have followed the customs

of the higher castes in forbidding widow remarriage or adopting child marriage! As has been indicated, the gods of the outcaste were not originally the gods of the Aryan Hindus. Outcastes worshipped, and still worship, sticks and stones; and when they adopt the names or forms of gods, or supposed gods, from other religions they worship all these alike with their peculiar blood ceremonies. Thus in the Poona area, Bombay Presidency, may be found a stone slab named 'Maria,' worshipped with customary rites by the outcaste *Mahars*. And at Jujuri, on the South Maratta Railway, where the outcastes have adopted the caste god Khandoba, he is worshipped with blood in a temple far removed from the caste temple of his milk-feeding prototype. A similar tale is told of *Dharma raj*, in Bengal. The outcaste *Doms* adopted the legend of a Buddhist saint, featured him as a stone, and worshipped him with offerings of pigs and cocks.

Socially and economically the untouchable has always suffered disabilities, as being at the bottom of the ladder and less well off than the caste man. But the British Government has deliberately set itself to remove that handicap. Queen Victoria initiated this policy with her Proclamation announcement of 'equal opportunity.' This the Government has faithfully maintained (*cf.* the Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850). All professions are equally open to the lowest and highest, of whatever race or religion; and all facilities for equipment are equally so open—schools, colleges; professional, educational, vocational, industrial training institutions. The economic or trades guild 'taboos' of the ancient caste system are not enforced by the British—a man may elect to work as he pleases. Equally are public amenities open to all—roads, parks, public wells, libraries, hospitals, dispensaries, charitable institutions. Of late years special efforts have been made to remove untouchable disabilities. Programmes differ for different Provinces, but include the improvement of the economic position of these people by provision of land for house sites and cultivation,[1] and by provision of wells and drinking-water facilities. Co-operation societies have been formed for their benefit; schools have been multiplied with special inducement in the way of remission of fees and gifts of scholarships. Special departments, ministers, and advisory committees are appointed to see that the untouchable gets a fair share of employment. And, indeed, untouchables may be found everywhere, accepted and respected even in the higher Civil Service.

Politically, it is interesting to recall that our present Viceroy,

[1] During 1931, 22,770 acres of Government land were assigned to the untouchables in the Madras Presidency, free of cost, for provision of 1973 house sites, the total extent to date of Government land so assigned in the Presidency amounting to 342,611 acres.

Lord Willingdon, was the first Governor to nominate an untouchable to the Legislature of a Province. They are now nominated to all Provincial Legislatures and admitted to representation at the Centre. By the Communal Award (1931) their political status in the new Constitution was emphatically recognised; it has since been enhanced in response to the proposals under the Poona Pact—so much so, indeed, that the Hindus of Bengal complain that outcastes have secured better representation than caste men themselves. Like treatment and facilities, and a like inclusion in local bodies, is demanded for them by the Government of self-governing India—*i.e.*, of municipalities, district boards, *punchayets*. The rest is in their own hands. And to the credit of the untouchable, it must be said that he has responded splendidly to all that has been done for him, alike by the Government and by missionaries, social service organisations, and philanthropy.

Now, but for party politics and the intriguing personality and bewildering tactics of Mr. Gandhi, this would be the end of my story. As a matter of fact, a whole important chapter remains to be written. Let us look back over our shoulders for a moment at the year 1931. It is autumn, and Mr. Gandhi sits at the Second Round Table Conference. We know what followed: His repudiation of his pet *protégés*, the untouchables, in their demand that they should stand on their own feet, and his insistence that they should take shelter in the fold of the Hindus, although his own case was that the Hindus oppressed them. How the Conference broke up with the Indian political parties at loggerheads, the Prime Minister soothing them with the tale of the national spider, and the promise of help if we could not find a united demand. Of the return of the delegates to India, the renewal of civil disobedience, and Mr. Gandhi once more in his refuge at Yerowda Gaol. Of the Communal Award and Gandhi's 'epic' fast-unto-death, called off by the Poona Pact—a pact since repudiated by all the parties thereto, except Mr. Gandhi. Then for a spell a respite, and steady progress in the building of the new Westminster at Delhi. But Gandhi the spoilt child was not happy. It was now winter, 1932. Here was he in his peaceful prison retreat and out of all the fun! The Third Round Table Conference was about to meet, and soon self-government would be achieved, and not the self-government of his dreams. He went back to his early love, the Untouchable. It was iniquitous that human beings should be so named. He would call them *Harijans*—'The lives of God.' He would fight for them. Iniquitous was it that they were excluded from caste Hindu temples![2] This

[2] Untouchables have never been excluded from the temples of the 'meat-feeding' gods who accept blood sacrifices. To these they have always had access—*e.g.*, the temples of Kali and Bhawani, wherever situated.

was the heart of the situation: The untouchable must have access to the most scrupulous vegetarian in the Hindu pantheon!

A disciple gave him his cue. In Cochin there is a sacred temple of the highest caste of orthodoxy, established, as are all caste Hindu temples, under an instrument of trust—the Temple of Guruvayur. Gandhi's outcaste disciple announced his intention of sitting at the door of the Guruvayur Temple and fasting to death until he was admitted. 'I will fast with you,' said Gandhi. As, similarly, he said 'I will fast with you' to a caste disciple, a civil disobedience prisoner in Ratnagiri Gaol, who demanded of the prison authorities the work of a scavenger in order that he might be outcasted. 'And not only do I demand this for him,' said Gandhi, 'but for all my caste disciples. You shall outcaste them all. Thus only shall the untouchable be truly served.' It was the temple-entry issue which went to the country. The Guruvayur Temple authorities quoted Shastras, and refused to be moved by the threatened suicide either of Gandhi or of the outcaste sitter-at-the-gate. Other provocation had to be found. 'We will have a referendum,' said Gandhi, 'about Guruvayur, in order that not only Guruvayur but all caste temples might be open to the untouchable.' It was then, December 1932, that the orthodox Hindu priests rubbed the mist of meditation from their eyes and emerged from service of their gods to inquire about what was happening.

'The British,' said Gandhi's party, 'are going to make a law that the untouchables shall desecrate your temples.' 'We fear nothing,' was the confident answer of orthodoxy; 'have not the British always protected our religion?' 'Ah! but the present British are different. What about the Sarda Act and the Acts concerning Hindu inheritance?' they replied, taunting. This did, indeed, put the priests on their inquiry; so ignorant were they, so heedless of the passage of time, that they had not realised the creation of legislative assemblies in which Indians themselves had made the laws which troubled them. 'There *was* then a situation which might be beyond the control of the non-interfering British!' The pundits went to Gandhi. 'What are you doing?' said they, and they expounded to him the Scriptures. 'Maybe,' was Gandhi's answer, 'but I have another interpretation direct from God. God says the untouchables are to enter caste temples and to use caste wells.' Said the priestly pundits, gentle still, 'What do you want for these untouchables? More temples, more wells of their own? Tell us in what areas they lack these things. We will supply them.' 'No,' said Gandhi, 'God has spoken. They shall use caste temples and caste wells.' 'Would God make special revelations to *you*, you who have broken the law, or to us who keep it?' said the pundits. And they went forth from his

presence roused to take action. One of these pundits told me the story himself, and explained to me the implications of Gandhi's attack on orthodox Hinduism. 'It is not religious; it is political. Many a caste shrine is unguarded, and often must an untouchable, moved by piety, have entered to worship in meditation. Who would stay him? But when Gandhi demands entry as of right, we are bound to protect our gods. Gandhi is strong; his followers will overpower the lonely priest in many a caste temple. But when the temple is cleansed and the god reinstalled, the door of that temple, and of all temples in India, will be defended with our lives. There will be bloodshed such as even India has never known.'

It was from the *Maharashtra* pundits that I heard of the Congress raid on the Temple of Parvati, near Singhur, Sivaji's old fortress, and of how the untouchables themselves now live in terror of the anger of the goddess at desecration of her ancient shrine. Every cow who sickens in its byre, every infant who dies, is supposed to be express evidence of Divine retaliation. 'Temple-entry is of no use to the masses of illiterate and superstitious untouchables,' said the pundits; 'they want food, and the means of keeping alive: they do not want to fight with us for the keys of heaven.' And, indeed, this in effect is what has been said, not only at meetings of untouchables, but by their leader himself.

So the orthodox went forward, arriving forthwith at self-determination. They formed a political party, getting adherents from all over India. Many of Gandhi's supporters visited and joined the orthodox. Gandhi's influence was on the wane. But his plans also went forward: women and boys rallied to him. His referendum was taken (a curious referendum); the votes *against* temple entry were refused! Only the 'ayes' were recorded. Moreover, votes were taken from all nationals, irrespective of religion, and taken on a false issue. In some places the charming women volunteers who collected these said they were collecting votes on the question as to whether the voter wished Gandhi to live! The *Zamorin* of Calicut, the chief temple authority, was unmoved by the referendum. Guruvayur could not be desecrated. Gandhi had to look elsewhere for the buttressing of his campaign. Upon his advice two of his disciples proposed introducing private Bills in the Provincial Legislature of Madras, and one, Ranga Iyer, was to take the like course in the Assembly at Delhi. The Bills referred to temple-entry and the removal of the disabilities of the untouchables. These Bills could not be brought in without the permission of the Viceroy. On January 27 of this year the decision of the Governor-General in Council was announced. Sanction was given to the intro-

duction in the Assembly of Ranga Iyer's Bill, but refused to the Provincial Bills, 'since these latter affected the religion and practices of the Hindu community generally, and could not properly be dealt with in a Provincial Legislature.' Ranga Iyer promptly sponsored the Provincial Bills and decided to recast them for the Assembly. Ranga Iyer's Temple-Entry Bill and his Abolition of Untouchability Bill were introduced together in the Assembly on March 24 last. Both Bills are expropriatory in character.

It is hoped that enough has been said on the principles at stake to help an English public to understand for itself the enormity of the issue now before our country. Only one further word need be added in this connexion.

It is important that English people should realise that this is not an issue between Great Britain and India, nor is it an issue in the genuine programme, brought so far on its way by the British Government, for the uplift of the untouchables. Whatever may be the sincerities which line the much-exploited heart of Mr. Gandhi, leader of the Congress, it is purely a political measure. And for orthodox Hindus it is important that it should be understood that the British Government has not broken faith, has not gone back on the Proclamation promise of protection for all religions, since 'sanction to introduce' a Bill need not of necessity imply support. The position of the Orthodox Hindu Party—and this party represents at least 148 of the 149 millions listed as Hindu—is this: 'Unless the government of the country is given over subject to the trust concerning religion, we are betrayed; we can have nothing to do with Reforms, we are content with things as they are. . . .' The view of the non-political rank and file interested only in religion may be expressed in the words of an orthodox Hindu purdahnashin: 'What does this mean? Is the Government going to do away with caste? [for that is the burden of the propaganda done by the Congress Party]. If so, what will become of us—of our marriage, our property, our death ceremonies? If caste goes, what is there to keep us good? What is there to control rebirth? . . .' It is as if an Act of Parliament were to purport to nullify the Ten Commandments, with all the sanctions which have presented them as guides for conduct. I am glad to have this sweep of colour from her brush in my picture. I had missed it. One is apt to forget that to the simple and illiterate Hindu in India *caste* and its implications stand for *ethics*—for the entire tables of Moses, their only rule of conduct.

For the rest, the subject cannot be abandoned without consideration of the proposed legislation from the angle of the law. All public Hindu temples are created by deeds of trust, which

specify the beneficiaries (worshippers) and direct that the trustees shall :—

(1) Preserve the sanctity of the temple according to the Hindu religion, making due provision for the service of the Deity.

(2) Administer the trust property—*i.e.*, the temple itself—and the properties appurtenant thereto.

Shortly put, Mr. Ranga Iyer's Temple-Entry Bill empowers the trustees to widen the circle of beneficiaries so as to include persons not included as beneficiaries under the instrument of trust—namely, the untouchables—and to do this by a referendum of the voters on the electoral roll of a municipality or of local boards in the vicinity of the temple. A majority vote is to decide such references irrespective of the relationship of the voters to the temple foundation and of the real beneficiaries who, in the case of well-known temples, come from all parts of India to worship (section 3 (1)). The trustee may also act on his own initiative to admit ' an excluded caste,' provided that no objection is lodged with him within a month of publication of his intention ; and he may do this ' notwithstanding any law, custom, or usage to the contrary ' (section 4 (1)). The Bill therefore deliberately provides for a breach of trust, and, relatively to the beneficiaries, for the waiving of a privilege, under a trust, by a majority vote, and that majority not of the beneficiaries ! Mr. Ranga Iyer's Abolition of Untouchability Bill provides : (1) that no penalty, disadvantage or disability shall be imposed upon, or any discrimination made or recognised against, an untouchable ; (2) that no court shall recognise any custom of untouchability or base its adjudication on such a custom.

These provisions alone bristle with difficulties. There is no ' custom of Untouchability.' Untouchability is based on birth and occupation, and is, as we have seen, an incident of the caste system upon which the entire Hindu structure is builded. If an untouchable is to be treated as a Hindu of one of the four castes, which caste is to be allotted to him ? Is a court bound, for instance, to hold that he may contract a valid marriage with a Brahmin ? The orthodox ask for an answer to this question. The storm which these Bills have raised among the orthodox is a forecast of what may be expected if the Bills—a matter of voting—become Acts. They do not please the untouchables themselves, who either think that they do not go far enough or declare temple-entry useless when needs are solely economic. Moreover, mere levelling has its disadvantages for the backward child, who has got accustomed to special treatment, and is disinclined to take his chance in the open. Taking their chance on equal terms with caste men has indeed been proposed by an enlightened Ruler

of South India to the untouchables in his State. He was met with an indignant protest. 'What! Are we to lose the special financial help given us, our free schools and free lands, and all our privileges? We want no equality with caste men. We are untouchables.'

Yet the Bills have their uses, and their introduction for discussion is a blessing in disguise. As embodying an attack on religion they are responsible for the materialisation of the Orthodox Hindu Party, and by themselves alone they prove two things far removed from the intention of the proposer:

(1) They prove the wisdom of the policy of non-interference with religion inaugurated by Queen Victoria; and

(2) They prove the necessity and justification for the demand of the Orthodox Hindu Party, that that policy should be maintained and embodied in the new Constitution.

CORNELIA SORABJI.

LAND RECLAMATION IN ITALY

While 1933 has been ushered in amidst international fears, jealousies, and recriminations, Italy has been busily engaged in acquiring new provinces within her own frontiers for her industrious, frugal, and prolific peasantry, and, in the midst of the gravest and most widespread crisis world agriculture has ever experienced, one European country has been making an agricultural revival the keystone of her national policies. At the beginning of the first Fascist decade Mussolini announced the intention of ruralising Italy ; the success of the wheat campaign and the rapid progress made in carrying out the programme of integral land reclamation are counted among the leading achievements of the *régime*, and the tenth anniversary of the march on Rome was celebrated by an exhibition showing, with the help of diagrams, photographs, and plastic reliefs, the extent to which the physical aspect and the economic and hygienic conditions of the country are being modified.

Few who visit Italy realise what a large part man has played in creating the very soil of the peninsula, nor the great antiquity of land reclamation works in this mountainous land, heaved up by volcanic convulsions, and unprovided by Nature with the broad acres required for the sustenance of a teeming population. The rich valley of the Po is the work of its earliest inhabitants, who, by digging a bed for the waters running down from the Alpine glaciers, reclaimed a prehistoric gulf. The mysterious Etruscans who colonised so large a section of the peninsula were responsible for draining Central Italy. The Volscii, before their defeat by the Romans, had reclaimed the lands which afterwards reverted to swamps known as the Pontine Marshes, but which, in their day, provided food for the inhabitants of seven populous towns. In Magna Grecia, Hellenic settlers reclaimed and brought under cultivation the swamps of the Ionian coast. The Romans continued the work of the peoples who had preceded them, draining and reclaiming among others the Val di Chiana in Tuscany, Lake Fucino and the surrounding territory in the Abruzzi, the valley of the Diano in Campania. The power of Rome was thus gradually built by the hydraulic engineer, for the Italian peoples unified

under her rule had to build up the land on which they dwelt by draining marshes, embanking torrents, terracing and consolidatin steep and rocky mountain sides, before they were ready for foreign expansion.

After the destructive interval of the barbarian invasions, when much of the land reverted to swamps, Venice was the first to resume the never-ending task, and not only built on piles the lovely City of Lagoons, but organised the reclamation and conservation of the surrounding territory by setting up the *Officiales super Canales*, the *Officiales Paludium*, and the *Provveditorati sopra i luoghi incolti*. All through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the work continued. Leonardo da Vinci devoted much of his time to planning the irrigation and drainage system which has made the farm lands round Milan some of the richest in Europe. In 1564 Alfonso d'Este undertook the reclamation of the delta of the Po; the work he began was continued by Pope Clement VII., when the Duchy of Ferrara was transferred to the Holy See, and it was completed in the nineteenth century by the *Consorzio Bonifiche Ferrarese*. In 1496 the first artificial lake for flood control was built in the upper valley of the Bruna in Tuscany, and the work of reclaiming and improving the land in that region was continued by the Dukes of Lorraine. Nor were the Popes behindhand in pursuing the great task: Pius IV., Sixtus V., Gregory VIII. in the northern section of the States of the Church, Leo X., Sixtus V. again, Innocent XI., and more especially Pius VI. in the Pontine Marshes, all engaged in extensive schemes for land reclamation. In the kingdom of the Two Sicilies the Bourbon kings enacted much legislation for this purpose, but feudal systems of land tenure, responsible for the prevalent *latifundia*, largely thwarted their endeavours.

When in 1870 the Italian States were at last united under Victor Emmanuel II., with Rome as the capital of the new kingdom, the task was resumed. In 1882 the Baccarini Act placed land drainage in malarial districts and large-scale land improvements of national importance under State control, dividing the cost between the Treasury, the provinces, and the communes. Land reclamation works that did not come under this heading were left to the private initiative of the owners, who in North Italy, more especially in Lombardy, parts of Venetia, and Emilia, where capital and enterprise were not lacking, formed associations for the execution of important programmes, following up hydraulic works by land improvement and agricultural settlement. Experience, indeed, has shown that, when this is not done, costly drainage carried out at Government expense proves of little benefit. This accounts for the fact that until quite recently malaria continued to devitalise the scanty population

and impoverish the economic life of the Roman Campagna and the Tuscan Maremma, and that, in spite of large sums spent over a series of years on attempts at reclaiming areas in Calabria, Lucania, Sardinia, and Sicily, they continued to be national liabilities rather than assets.

Instructed by the experience of the past, the Fascist *régime*, taking up in its turn the age-long task, has adopted the policy known as Integral Land Reclamation—integral, inasmuch as the State which has always contributed largely to the cost of hydraulic reclamation now completes this work by financial assistance to ensure the execution of all the other works needed to allow of agricultural settlement on the reclaimed land. The first step in this direction was taken in 1923, when the Fascist Government introduced legislation bringing another 5,000,000 acres under the provisions of the existing Land Reclamation Acts, provisions extended to a further 3,000,000 acres in 1925. But the decision to reclaim and improve all waste lands which can profitably enlarge the productive area of the country was only taken when the Integral Land Reclamation Act (known as the Mussolini Act) of December 24, 1928, was approved by both Houses of Parliament. It is no exaggeration to describe that Act as a landmark in Mediterranean history, for its effect will be to free the peninsula of the age-long curse of malaria. Mussolini has stated the programme in a nutshell: 'Reclaim the land, and with the land the men, and with the men the race.'

The Act provides for land drainage, irrigation, land improvements, agricultural improvements, the conservation of mountain basin areas inclusive of works to prevent soil erosion and denudation, internal land settlement, the erection of villages and farm buildings in the south and islands, the building of aqueducts and provision of water supplies, the building of a road system (including farm roads) in the reclaimed areas, the improvement of mountain and other grass lands, the breaking up of new fallow lands with tractors and, when necessary, with explosives. Moreover, it is recognised that the suppression of malaria calls for a whole series of measures for the destruction of mosquitoes and the prevention of stagnant waters, now provided for by a special section of the Act.

The general principles of the Act may be summarised as follows:

(1) The Government, acting through the Under-Secretariate for Land Reclamation, fixes the boundaries of the areas in which it is desirable, in the public interest, to change the existing methods of utilising the land, and the areas on which work carried out jointly by the Government and by the owners requires to be co-ordinated with other similar undertakings under a general plan of action.

(2) The areas thus determined are described as 'First category land reclamation areas,' and all work other than that required in the exclusive interests of the owners must conform to a general plan approved by the Under-Secretariate and carried out with the assistance of the State. Supplementary works are carried out by the owners with the help of special credit facilities.

(3) The Treasury contributes in fixed ratios towards the cost of all phases of integral land reclamation by the payment of annuities extending over a period of thirty years.

The execution of the plans is entrusted to some small extent to the Ministry of Public Works, so as to enable it to exercise more effective control over the cost of execution of the bulk of the work which is contracted out. As a rule, first category land reclamation works are undertaken by the landowners themselves, organised into '*consortia*,' membership of which is compulsory for all the landowners of the district in which they are formed. There is nothing new in this; indeed, such organisations have existed for several centuries. In their present form they are registered public utility corporations empowered to levy on all the landowners of the district for which they are formed dues representing their contribution towards the cost of reclamation work as required by law. The Government annuities are payable to the *consortia*, and the National Association of Land Reclamation Consortia, established in 1929, arranges to have them discounted. The two main financing bodies are the National Life Insurance Institute and the National Institute of Social Insurances, which latter receives the payments required by law of the Government, employers, and employed for the old age, unemployment, maternity, accident, and other social insurances.

The discounting of the annuities is an absolutely safe transaction for the institutes mentioned, as they become the recipients of the Treasury annuities inscribed in the budget, while, on their side, they dispose of the necessary funds supplied by their normal receipts, which also represent legal obligations. This enables them to hold the bonds delivered to them by the *consortia*, thus avoiding the danger of hidden currency inflation which would be the result of discounting on the open market such vast sums of money. Other financing bodies are two Venetian banks, the *Federale Veneto* and the *Istituto Fondiario delle Venezie*, which assist land reclamation works in the Venetian provinces by the issue of land bonds; the savings banks of Milan and Florence, which discount annually some 50,000,000 lire worth of annuities for the Under-Secretariate for Land Reclamation with which it assists the several landowners' associations by undertaking preliminary studies of proposed plans and affording other technical help; the *Banco di Napoli*, the *Cassa Depositi e Prestiti*, which administers the Post Office

Savings Bank's deposits, Government pension funds, etc. ; and the *Consorzio Nazionale di Credito per le Opere Pubbliche*, a semi-official body established in 1926 for financing public utilities by issuing debentures on the home and foreign markets. The annuities payable by the landowners themselves are discounted by the Land Credit Banks and are financed by the issue of land bonds.

In appraising the merits of this system a special aspect of the situation deserves consideration. At the present time, and pretty nearly everywhere, the alternative seems to lie between the sterile hoarding of savings or their mobilisation through the issue of Government or Government-guaranteed securities. How high Government credit stands in Italy is shown by the public response to recent issues, including the latest, the 1,000,000,000-lire bond issue made by the Industrial Reconstruction Institute, all largely over-subscribed, in striking contrast to the indifferent reception of industrial securities. In the circumstances, the wise thing is to recognise this fact and so use it as to promote economic recovery, and this is what the Fascist Government is doing. The savings of the people, flowing through the Post Office savings banks into the coffers of the *Cassa Depositi e Prestiti*, or invested in the policies of the *National Life Insurance Institute*, the sums held by the *Social Insurance Fund*, and the amounts earmarked for pensions and other Government annuities, are thus mobilised to develop the latent wealth-producing assets of the nation. Thanks to this policy, when at long last these critical transition years come to an end, as come they must, Italy, with no oppressive external commitments, will find herself adequately equipped for economic activity, and the due preponderance of private over State-controlled enterprise will then be able to reassert itself.

The cost to the Government of integral land reclamation, to be carried out in fourteen years, beginning with the financial year 1931, has been estimated at 7,000,000,000 lire, payable over a period of thirty years. The cost of the several works contemplated is met as follows :

(1) The Treasury meets in full the cost of regulating mountain watersheds, entailing consolidation against landslips, reafforestation, the regulation of watercourses, the deepening of river beds, and embankment works in Julian Venetia, the Tuscan Maremma, Latium, South Italy, and the islands.

(2) Its contribution to other hydraulic reclamation works ranges from 75 per cent. of the cost in North Italy to 92 per cent. in Central and South Italy and the islands.

(3) The Treasury contribution to farm drainage and irrigation, the provision of water supplies to the farms, the building and improvement of farm roads, the erection of hamlets and farm

buildings, varies from 33 to 38 per cent. of the cost. A like contribution is made to the cost of breaking up new lands by machinery or with the help of explosives, the replacement of thermal by electric power in pumping stations, the improvement of mountain grasslands, the restocking of vineyards, and other similar works of recognised general utility.

(4) It meets 75 per cent. of the cost of building rural aqueducts; and

(5) 45 per cent. of the cost of installing rural electric power stations.

Plans now in course of execution provide for irrigation works in the south and islands at a total cost of 4,800,000,000 lire, to be started within the five-year period July 1, 1929–June 30, 1934, and completed within the fourteen years terminating on July 1, 1944. The rural aqueducts planned, many of which have already been built, will all be finished within the seven-year period July 1, 1930–June 30, 1937, at a total cost of 200,000,000 lire. Rural hamlets, consisting of groups of from five to fifty houses, are to be built in the eight-year period July 1, 1930–June 30, 1938, at a total cost of 500,000,000 lire. Irrigation works in North and Central Italy are to be carried out in the seven-year period July 1, 1931–June 30, 1938, at a total cost of 500,000,000 lire. The farm roads and water supply works are to be completed within the fourteen-year period July 1, 1930–June 30, 1944, at a total cost of 1,000,000,000 lire. The above expenditures are all additional to those already authorised for land reclamation works undertaken prior to 1928. The total outlay contemplated thus stands at 7,000,000,000 lire, of which the Treasury contributes 3,200,000,000, payable in thirty annuities. Inclusive of interest allowed on deferred payments, the total cost to the State will amount to 9,500,000,000 lire, spread over a period of forty-four years

The work is being pushed rapidly ahead. By June 1931 some 7,600,000 acres, coming within the purview of the Mussolini Act, had already been classified and surveyed by the Under-Secretariate for Land Reclamation, and a further 1,300,000 acres had been classified, but not yet surveyed; 215 land drainage associations are now engaged on reclaiming 6,665,000 acres, 88 associations of landowners are improving 585,000 acres, 74 associations are putting 3,500,000 acres of farm land to more profitable forms of cultivation, 550 irrigation associations are at work bringing water to the land, nine others are engaged in the regulation of mountain streams and torrents, reafforestation, and soil consolidation works. From the Upper Adige to Sicily, from the valley of the Po to Sardinia, from the Tuscan Maremma to the Pontine Marshes and the fever-stricken lands of the plain of Salerno and

districts of the far south, a whole army of men are uninterruptedly engaged in these works. Districts which for centuries have been desolate and uninhabited are now dotted with dwellings for the farming population coming in from the congested districts of Venetia, Romagna, and Emilia to settle on the newly reclaimed fields.

For the ultimate purpose of the whole plan is not only hygienic, the control of malaria, and economic, the productive use of waste lands, but also social—the provision of land for enlarging the class of small freehold farmers. With this end in view, land reclamation goes hand in hand with internal migration, for Fascism intends to deproletarise the agricultural labourer by enabling him to leave congested areas to settle on land of which he will either become in time the owner or at least enjoy security of tenure. Sardinia affords a notable example of this phase of the work. The average density of population in that island is only 39·7 per square kilometre, against an average of 132·7 for the whole kingdom, rising to 226·8 in Lombardy, 266·6 in Campania, and similar ratios for other thickly populated regions. Therefore, when hygienically and agriculturally reclaimed, Sardinia will afford considerable opportunity for internal migration.

Some photographs exhibited at the LandReclamation Exhibition gave a striking idea of what has already been achieved. One of the photographs showed a desolate landscape, the fever-stricken lands of Terralba, overgrown with underwood and briars, with no sign of life except for a passing shepherd, coming down with his flocks from the mountains for the winter season. A pendant photograph shows the same locality as now transformed, wheatfields stretching in all directions, and, in the centre of the scene, the houses of Mussolinia, built round a piazza where stands a helmeted policeman directing the traffic. No less than 45,000 acres have already been thus transformed by the joint-stock company *Bonifiche Sarde*, and in 1932 Mussolinia had a fixed population of over 3000. The death rate for the first year was 1·17 per cent.; in the fifth year it had been reduced to 0·33 per cent., while the cases of malaria, which in 1929 stood at the high figure of 7·40 per cent., fell in 1931 to 0·74 per cent., and in 1932 almost to zero. The desert has been made to blossom: vineyards, orchards, irrigated crops, grasslands, and, on the outer circle of the estates, a wooded belt (which serves as a wind-screen while providing fuel and timber for the requirements of the settlement), 2300 head of cattle, a big winery, a modern dairy plant, and up-to-date poultry farms are some of the features of this prosperous modern agricultural community.

Other areas of new civilisation are arising in the Roman

Campagna and the Pontine Marshes. So much has been written about the spectacular results obtained in these districts that it will suffice here to make a passing mention of the new agricultural centre of Littoria (the first of three planned), with its schools, cinema, *dopo-lavoro*, and fine church dedicated to St. Mark in honour of the Venetian settlers coming down from the congested areas to settle in the convenient modern farmhouses built for them. They will cultivate these wide tracts of practically virgin soil which lie within thirty miles of the capital, and in thirty-five years will become the freehold owners of their farms.

As an instance of the way in which wealth is being actually created, the achievement by which 220,000 acres in the provinces of Reggio Emilia and Modena have been reclaimed deserves mention. Ten years ago these lands, lying between the two tributaries of the Po (the Crostolo and the Secchia), were rendered valueless by stagnant waters left behind by the frequent floods of the two torrents. The landowners formed an association, and at a cost of 240,000,000 lire the enormous task of reclaiming the whole area has been carried out. Two huge pumping stations of 10,000 horse-power each suck up, at the rate of 100 cubic metres per second, the waste waters, which are discharged into a system of canals, whose total length exceeds 1200 kilometres, intersecting and irrigating the vast area in all directions. It was on October 29, 1926, that Mussolini opened the pumping station of San Siro which inaugurated these drainage works. Since then over 1000 farms have been built on the fertile fields thus reclaimed, some 120 kilometres of road have been built, and a great hydroelectric station erected to provide power for the farms. The wide plain which ten years ago, seen from the heights of the Parmigiano-Moglia embankment, displayed a swampy expanse overgrown with reeds and rushes, has been transformed into farms, held by some 12,000 owners, on which the casual labourer of the past now finds permanent occupation. When the potential yield of the main irrigation canal is fully utilised the economic returns obtained from the land will increase by 100,000,000 lire per annum. But the greatest benefit of all will be the social transformation made possible by this creation of wealth, which is fixing a larger population on the land and progressively transforming the agricultural labourer first into a permanent farm worker, then into a renter, with freehold ownership as the final aim in view.

A list of all the works carried out in the peninsula in the last three years would be a long one. It would include the completion of hydraulic works, entailing the erection of powerful pumping plants in lands lying east and west of the delta of the Po, rapidly followed up by land and agricultural improvement; agricultural

reclamation in the provinces of Rovigo, Ferrara, Bologna, and Ravenna, more especially with a view to settling on the land the mass of casual labour which for generations has been the great social problem of the Romagna; soil consolidation and reafforestation in the Apennines (in 1932 the Forestry Militia rewooded 23,000 acres, planting some 50,000,000 saplings, and sowing 270,000 kilogrammes of tree seed); the provision of water in Istria, to supply which a great aqueduct is under construction and will be partially completed by the end of 1933; the works at Coltano, near Pisa, and those at Alberese, by which the malarious Tuscan Maremma is being reclaimed and Grosseto transformed from a semi-deserted town, rising in a fever-stricken area with a population of under 50 per square kilometre, into a rising centre of what is becoming a rich farming district; the reclamation and settlement of 50,000 acres lying between Ostia, the Isola Sacra, Porto, and Maccarese, at the very gates of Rome, where six years ago herds of buffalo wallowed in the swamps, now under wheat and vines, while herds of cattle raised on the farms supply the capital with milk; the astonishingly rapid reclamation and settlement of the Pontine Marshes; the drainage of the desolate plain of Salerno, amidst which rise the majestic ruins of the Greek temples of Pæstum, by the construction of the great Dyke of Persano, 156 metres long, barring the river Sele, whose waters are carried off through an underground tunnel to irrigate the low-lying lands they used to flood, which will soon be providing farms for an industrious peasantry; the great works begun in Calabria over large areas at Sant' Eufemia, near the site of Sibari of classic fame, where a few years ago the death rate from malaria was appallingly high, and a whole series of similar important works in Apulia, Sardinia, and Sicily.

But lists are tedious reading, and it will be more to the point to close this brief account of a colossal work by a glance at the way in which Italy avails herself of her ex-service men in carrying it out. The *Opera Nazionale Combattenti*, which organises and represents this large body of men, the great majority of whom belong to the peasantry, was incorporated in 1917 as a foundation whose prime purpose was to liquidate the insurance premiums issued to Italian soldiers in the last year of the Great War. In 1919 the foundation received a first endowment of 300,000,000 lire, being the profits accruing to the Government from its war-time monopoly of marine war-risk insurance. Subsequently, by the generosity of the King and through other donations and legacies, the *Opera* has received large estates in Tuscany, Campania, and other parts of Italy, while the Government assigned it the ex-enemy properties confiscated in the Trentino. The charter defines the purposes of the *Opera*: 'To promote economic

development and raise social conditions by carrying out land improvement with a view to increasing the number of small and medium size farm holdings, stimulating production, and favouring the permanent settlement of a denser population on the land, thus improving the economic and social status of the officers and men who fought in defence of their country.' In pursuing these purposes the *Opera* is authorised to found agricultural settlements and erect new rural centres, to encourage farm and fishing industries, and the formation of associations and institutes for co-operative buying, selling, insurance, and the industrial uses of agricultural products.

The *Opera* has proved a most active and efficient organisation, and at the end of 1932 it was carrying out sixteen great reclamation programmes in different parts of the country, including that of the Pontine Marshes, and is managing twenty-five large farming estates on reclaimed lands. In year 9 of the Fascist *régime* (October 28, 1930–October 27, 1931) the *Opera* spent on these works 33,000,000 lire and gave 1,144,463 days' work to ex-service men. In October 1932, the latest date for which data are available, it had 8334 such men in its employ, apart from the other thousands permanently settled on the farms it has created. The need for absorbing the industrial unemployed caused by the economic crisis has accelerated the *tempo* at which the work is being carried out. Its value in coping with this grave problem is great, for behind every man wielding spade, or pickaxe, or hoe, stand others in the steel mills, the engineering shops, the chemical factories, the cement works, the quarries, the mines, etc., preparing the raw materials and making the machinery, the flues, the pipes, the bricks, the tiles, the farm machines and implements, the hundred and one things all this work demands, and the wages paid to this mass of men help in their turn to keep the wheels of industry and trade revolving.

The programme adopted for year 11 (October 28, 1932–October 27, 1933) provides work the cost of which is estimated at 680,000,000 lire, calculated to give daily occupation to 50,000 men, while other millions of money and thousands of men will be required for carrying out the farm and crop improvement plan. The result of all this activity is that unemployment in industry, commerce, and agriculture has been kept down in these days of deep depression to the 1,000,000 limit in the worst winter months, and this in a country of 42,000,000 inhabitants, for whom the outlet of emigration has been closed (in 1913 over 700,000 emigrated from Italy), while Italian workers have been returning by hundreds from France and other foreign countries, driven out by lack of work and the measures taken to exclude foreign wage-earners from employment.

Can a poor country like Italy afford the heavy outlays entailed by such a vast undertaking? This is the question one often hears discussed in Italy by economists and financial experts. I will leave the answer to Professor Serpieri, the expert agronomist, the long-sighted rural sociologist, the man of vision and faith who, as Under-Secretary of State for Land Reclamation, presides over the work. Writing in the *Nuova Antologia* a year ago he said:

Many now say that the mass of work contemplated exceeds the country's financial possibilities. Yet most of the funds appropriated under the Mussolini Act only serve to give a vigorous impetus to the completion of schemes already in hand for years, sometimes for decades past, while many, many other lands still wait their turn. Those who live the daily life of the land reclaimer and realise the almost limitless needs must often exclaim that the work in hand is all too little.

The fact is that in many parts of Italy, more especially in the south and islands, we have received the heavy legacy of past centuries, during which, while much was often said, little was done to retrieve whole regions from a primitive land system quite incapable of supporting vigorous and civilised standards of rural life.

Integral land reclamation is a problem of civilisation rather than of economics. If any doubt this, they need only acquaint themselves personally with the life led on vast areas yet unreclaimed, and compare it with that of the population living on the fertile lands already reclaimed in Emilia or Venetia, or on the smiling slopes of the Apennines planted with vineyards, or on the southern lands rendered so rich by irrigation and tree crops.

The prevailing hedonism of capitalistic societies only sees in integral land reclamation a problem of the ratio of costs to profits. Fascist society recognises the importance of such considerations in graduating the choice and determining the speed to be observed in the execution of the work; above all, it recognises the need of energetic reaction against the frequent tendency to limit work to that paid almost entirely by the Treasury, while failing to carry out those agricultural changes without which such expenditure is largely sterile.

But Fascist society, viewing the life of the nation as a whole, refuses to detach the moral and political aspects of the question from the economic, and definitely declines to view integral land reclamation, which goes to the very roots of the vitality and power of the race, as a mere question of debits and credits on a balance-sheet. Had past generations confined themselves to carrying out those works which seemed likely to close their accounts with a profit in the capitalistic sense of the word, whole sections of Italy now thickly populated and enjoying a vigorous rural life would be squalid, uninhabited, malarious lowlands or denuded mountain slopes.

We, in our turn, are working for our children and our grandchildren, consolidating and extending the territorial base on which the nation stands, insuring new centres of life, physically and morally sound because they are rural, for a more populous and more powerful Italy.

The vigorous sap of life is rising in the Italian people, now biologically rejuvenated by the intermingling of the several

racial strains which for long centuries had dwelt apart on the territory of the peninsula, politically divided, and geographically separated by high mountain chains and intervening stretches of malarial swamps which, in the absence of modern means of transport, well-nigh precluded travel. The generous urge of youth pulsating in the veins of the people makes no task seem too difficult, no sacrifice too heavy. Sensitive to the point of touchiness, the present generation of Italians is determined to make up for lost time. The curse of malaria, the shame of devitalised fever-stricken populations scarred with the stigmata of ancestral poverty, are to be wiped out; to the pained timidity of an ageing world, which seeks the solution of its difficulties in race suicide while trying, with the lechery of age, to couple sterility with sexual pleasure, Fascist Italy proclaims that the earth is to the young and the prolific. Fewer graves and more cradles, more acres for fertile fields, more wheat and more bread and more mouths to eat it. And thus the sandy wastes of Lybia are gradually being watered and consolidated and fertilised; the low-lying swamps of the adored motherland are drained; the nakedness of the denuded mountain slopes is being clothed once more with verdure; new provinces are won within the national frontiers; and when inaugurating the newly built Littoria in the heart of the former abomination of desolation, Mussolini was able to exclaim: 'These are the battles Fascist Italy prefers to fight: this is the way in which she desires to conquer new provinces for her people.'

OLIVIA ROSSETTI AGRESTI.

PHYSICS AND DETERMINISM

A Reply

IN the April number of *The Nineteenth Century*[1] Sir Herbert Samuel has arrested me for trying to rob the public of their most valuable beliefs, and he has placed in the witness-box three of the most eminent physicists now living to give evidence for the prosecution. I suspect that he counts more on the impression that will be produced by this array of authority than on the actual content of their evidence; for there is more protestation than argument in what they have to say. So far as authority is concerned, it would scarcely be possible to name a more formidable trio than Planck, Einstein, Rutherford; nevertheless, I trust that the jury before reaching their verdict will hear patiently what I shall say in my defence.

The occasion of the trial is that I (in common with many other modern physicists) have disseminated unbelief in the 'Principle of Causality,' better known to the public as the doctrine of Determinism. The first designation is generally used by Sir Herbert[2] and his witnesses, but I am not sure that it will be understood by the general reader. I hope the language of the indictment will not lead anyone to suppose that I deny that effects may proceed from causes. The assembly of spectators at an international football match is undoubtedly a cause of the congestion in the streets of Twickenham an hour or so later. But what the principle of causality asserts is that observed causation of this kind is analysable indefinitely, so that each minute movement in the crowd was likewise determined in advance by causes existing hours (or centuries) before. It is this exact and universal causality or predetermination that I challenge.

Of the three witnesses Professor Max Planck is the one on whom my accuser chiefly relies, and he is the only one whose evidence is in a form which admits of detailed examination.

[1] 'Cause, Effect, and Professor Eddington,' p. 469.

[2] The definition of this principle given by Sir Herbert Samuel (p. 471) seems to contain an inversion. It states (in more precise language) that different sets of causes cannot produce the same effect. Surely he meant to state that the same set of causes cannot produce different effects.

Rutherford, indeed, is too wary to enter into a discussion which might savour of philosophy and takes refuge in a platitude which, though presumably meant for a condemnation of indeterminists, can equally be read as a condemnation of determinists. Planck's views are of special interest because he is the founder of the physical theory which has led to the present crisis; and his arguments are contained in a carefully written book.

In the controversy Determinism *versus* Indeterminism it is essential to have a clear understanding on which side the onus of proof lies—which side is putting forward a *positive* doctrine which it wishes the other side to embrace? Sir Herbert quotes a letter from Lord Rutherford which says [3]:

> It seems to me unscientific and also dangerous to draw far-flung deductions from a theoretical conception which is incapable of experimental verification, either directly or indirectly.

To which side does this apply? My case against Sir Herbert Samuel and his fellow-determinists has been that they develop a far-reaching philosophical outlook based on the principle of causality—a principle which has not been experimentally verified. Here is Einstein's testimony [4]:

> Hitherto people have looked upon the Principle of Causality as a proposition which would in the course of years admit of experimental proof with an ever-increasing exactitude. Positively defined as a limiting proposition, the principle runs as follows. . . .
>
> Now Heisenberg has discovered a flaw in the proposition. . . . The principle of causality loses its significance as an empirical proposition.
>
> Causality is thus only conceivable as a *Form of the theoretical system.* Now modern physicists are mainly of the opinion that it is inadmissible to build up any sort of theory on what cannot, in principle, be tested.

Einstein, it will be seen, admits that the principle of causality is a positive proposition. He makes no pretence that it has been experimentally verified. Having lost its empirical significance, it is out of range of experimental test and is indeed only conceivable as a form of *theoretical* system. The words of Lord Rutherford recoil on the prosecution like a boomerang. Out of the mouth of their own witness the principle of causality—the valuable belief of which I am accused of robbing the public—is shown to be 'a theoretical conception which is incapable of experimental verification.'

Further, compare Planck's testimony [5]:

> Is it perfectly certain and necessary for human thought that for every event in every instance there must be a corresponding cause? . . . Of course the answer is in the negative. . . .

[3] *The Nineteenth-Century*, p. 475.

[4] From a letter to Sir Herbert Samuel, published in Sir Herbert's Presidential Address: *Philosophy and the Ordinary Man*, p. 15.

[5] *Where is Science Going?*, pp. 112, 113.

Thus from the outset we can be quite clear about one very important fact, namely, that the validity of the law of causation for the world of reality is a question that cannot be decided on grounds of abstract reasoning.

with Einstein's testimony [6]:

Look here. Indeterminism is quite an illogical concept. . . . If I say that the average life-span of such an atom is indetermined in the sense of not being caused, then I am talking nonsense.

Gentlemen of the jury, you have been assured by Planck that it is not a logical necessity of human thought that every event should have a corresponding cause, but nevertheless 'physical science, together with astronomy and chemistry and mineralogy, are all based on the strict and universal validity of the principle of causality.' [7] Einstein tells you that denial of the principle is illogical, and that it is nonsense to speak of an event as not having a cause; but the principle of causality is a theoretical proposition which, by its very nature, is incapable of experimental test. Rutherford warns you that it is unscientific to base your conclusions on a theoretical conception which is incapable of experimental verification. So now you know just what you are to think of the principle of causality, according to the voice of authority!

Since Planck's discussion is the most extensive, I will treat him as the main witness. I think it is significant of his attitude that he devotes a whole chapter of his book to a survey of the views of different schools of philosophers, whereas the results of physics are accorded less than five pages.[8] These claim to give the 'answer of physics.' The crucial paragraph is one already quoted by Sir Herbert Samuel:

In point of fact, statistical laws are dependent on the assumption of the strict law of causality functioning in each particular case. And the non-fulfilment of the statistical rule in particular cases is not therefore due to the fact that the law of causality is not fulfilled, but rather to the fact that our observations are not sufficiently delicate and accurate to put the law of causality to a direct test in each case. If it were possible to follow the movement of each individual molecule in this very intricate labyrinth of processes, then we should find in each case an exact fulfilment of the dynamical laws.

How in the world does Professor Planck know this? He speaks as though the whole course of Nature lay revealed to him. Although we cannot apply the test, he knows that the test would be exactly fulfilled if we could apply it. He omits to tell the reader that there is no mention in any modern treatise on quantum theory of the dynamical laws (*i.e.*, causal, as distinct from statis-

[6] *Where is Science Going?*, p. 202.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 147.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 143–147.

tical, laws) to which he here alludes, for the reason that they have not been discovered or even guessed at. Professor Planck is at liberty to bring this view forward as a hypothesis (if he is prepared to risk Lord Rutherford's displeasure); it is, in fact, the hypothesis usually made by determinists in order to render their doctrine tenable. But to announce it as the answer of science is surely a grave misstatement. Actually the present trend of physical science is against it. I do not mean that it has been disproved; but phenomena which were formerly thought to be a direct consequence of particular causal laws are now acknowledged to be the result of statistical laws, so that they no longer constitute support for Planck's contention. Evidence formerly trumpeted as favourable is now found to be indifferent.

Possibly Professor Planck intended to stress the first sentence in the above quotation, meaning thereby that it has been proved (mathematically or logically) that unless each individual is governed by strict causal law statistical laws for the assembly are impossible. But does he seriously expect us to believe that the regular experience of life assurance companies would be impossible if the individuals insured had any genuine free will? I think not. I think he is merely stating a practice which used to be followed —of formulating a system of causal law before deducing statistical laws—forgetting that Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Dirac, and others have abandoned this procedure, and that it is their statistical laws which are the basis of existing quantum theory.

Sir Herbert asks whether I am 'justified in saying, not that certain scientists, but that *science itself*, has abandoned determinism.' I am glad he stresses this distinction. It is illustrated by another of his quotations from Planck:

> Some essential modification seems to be inevitable; but I firmly believe, in company with most physicists, that the quantum hypothesis will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which will be a more exact formulation of the law of causality.

Thus the causal law is to be found, not in the quantum theory as it is, but in what Planck believes it will eventually become. That is just what I maintain. The law of causality does not exist in science to-day—in that body of systematic knowledge and hypothesis which has been experimentally confirmed. It exists only in the anticipations of certain scientists—anticipations which naturally are coloured by their philosophical predilections.

The philosophical chapter in Planck's book contains one feature which very much concerns our discussion. The chapter begins [8]:

> This is one of man's oldest riddles. How can the independence of

[8] *Where is Science Going?*, p. 107.

human volition be harmonised with the fact that we are integral parts of a universe which is subject to the rigid order of Nature's laws ?

At first sight these two aspects of human existence seem to be logically irreconcilable. On the one hand we have the fact that natural phenomena invariably occur according to the rigid sequence of cause and effect. This is the indispensable postulate of all scientific research. . . . But on the other hand we have our most direct and intimate source of knowledge, which is human consciousness, telling us that in the last resort our thought and volition are not subject to this causal order.

The whole chapter is occupied with the various attempts to solve this riddle.

Obviously the riddle does not arise unless we accept the law of causality in Nature. There may be other aspects of the problem of free will leading to other riddles ; but the main dilemma, which has been placed in the forefront of the problem, ceases to exist. Many writers have said that our researches into the laws of atomic physics have no bearing on the problem of free will and volition. Planck evidently is not of this way of thinking. For him, as for me, the main problem turns on whether physics does or does not assert the principle of causality.

It is on this point that a number of popular scientific writers have taken up a position that seems to me preposterous. They hold that, since strict causality has not been disproved, and is not incompatible with the new theories, there has not been any modification of the problem. But the dilemma can only be created if physics gives positive support to the principle of causality. It takes two combatants to make a fight—not one combatant and one neutral.

In the present controversy there has been a great tendency to confuse two questions—'Is the law of causality true of the physical universe ? ' and 'Is it the present basis of physical science ? ' Sir Herbert Samuel quotes my references to the belief that 'the moon is made of green cheese.' The point of my comparison was that an astronomer who wishes to be undogmatic might decline to commit himself to the assertion that the green cheese hypothesis is untrue, but he would say most assuredly that it is not the basis of present-day selenography. I have quoted Professor Planck's picture of the mechanism of Nature, which obviously goes far beyond anything warranted by existing knowledge. If I declared this picture to be untrue, I should be open to the same charge of dogmatism as he is. But I can say most assuredly that this picture is not the basis of present-day physics. Present-day physics is simply indifferent to it. We might believe in it to-day and disbelieve in it to-morrow ; not a symbol in the modern text-books of physics would be altered.

Einstein (unlike Planck) fully recognises this change. Whereas Planck holds that modern physics is still based on the law of

causality, Einstein recognises that it is not, and he deplores the change. It may be added that under this conviction Einstein has for several years been actively engaged in search for a new theory which shall restore the law of causality to its old supreme position; but hitherto he has not been successful. I need scarcely say that a writer who deals with the philosophical implications of physical science must base his assertions on the existing scheme of knowledge which has resulted from the exertions of Planck, Einstein, Rutherford and others, not on a theory which Einstein hopes some day to produce.

Having discussed the hostile (or supposedly hostile) evidence, may I now say a few words in attempt to explain my own position?[10] I am labelled an indeterminist. Indeterminism is the view which results from not accepting the principle of causality. That does not mean that I put forward another hypothesis—a Principle of Uncausality—and thereby incur Rutherford's censure of those who base their conclusions on unverified conceptions; it means that I have duly considered the hypothesis of Sir Herbert Samuel and his supporters and find no reason for accepting it. Accordingly it has no place in my current belief. So my belief about the nature of the physical universe does not include that particular tenet (the law of causality) which is the source of the philosophical conflict already discussed.

It is the tactics of the prosecution to try to turn my unbelief in their conjectures into a positive conjecture of my own. The indeterminist is supposed to postulate 'something like free will' in the individual atoms. 'Something like' is conveniently vague; the various mechanisms we use in daily life have their obstinate moods and may be said to display 'something like free will.' But if it is implied that I postulate psychological characters in the individual atoms of the kind which appear in our minds as human free will, I deny this altogether.

> To the question whether I would admit that the cause of the decision of the atom has something in common with the cause of the decision of the brain, I would simply answer that there is no cause. In the case of the brain I have a deeper insight into the decision; this insight exhibits it as volition, *i.e.*, something outside causality.[11]

The classical statement of determinism is in the writings of Laplace:

> We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence, who for a given instant should be acquainted with all the forces by which Nature is animated and with the several positions of the entities

[10] My fullest discussion is in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supplementary vol. x., 1931, p. 173.

[11] *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 312.

composing it, if further his intellect were vast enough to submit those data to analysis, would include in one and the same formula the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom. Nothing would be uncertain for him; the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes. The human mind in the perfection it has been able to give to astronomy affords a feeble outline of such an intelligence. . . . All its efforts in the search for truth tend to approximate without limit to the intelligence we have just imagined.

The last sentence gives a definition of the aim of science which was accepted without question until recent times. But the practical development of science is not always in a direct line with its ultimate aim; and about the middle of the nineteenth century there arose a branch of physics (thermodynamics) which struck out in a new direction. Whilst striving to perfect a system of law that would predict what *inevitably* will happen, physicists also became interested in a system which predicts what *probably* will happen. Alongside the super-intelligence imagined by Laplace for whom 'nothing would be uncertain' was placed an intelligence for whom nothing would be certain but many things would be exceedingly probable. If we could say of this latter being that for him *all* the events of the future were known with exceedingly high probability, it would be mere pedantry to distinguish him from Laplace's being who is supposed to know them with certainty. Actually, however, the new being is supposed to have glimpses of the future of varying degrees of probability ranging from practical certainty to entire indefiniteness, according to the particular field of study [12]; so that the aim of science to approximate to this latter intelligence is by no means equivalent to the aim set forth by Laplace. We can, of course, occupy ourselves with this secondary aim without giving up the primary aim as an ultimate goal; but a survey of the present progress of the two aims produces a startling revelation.

The formulæ given in modern text-books on quantum theory —which are continually being tested by experiment and used to open out new fields of investigation—are all concerned with probabilities and averages. This is quite explicit, and the 'unknown quantity,' which is chased from one formula to another, is a probability or averaging factor. These results therefore contribute to the secondary aim, but add nothing to the primary (Laplacian) aim. But, further, it is recognised that the laws of mechanics and astronomy—obeyed by matter consisting of enormous assemblies of atoms—arise out of these quantum formulæ for averages. So they, too, belong to the secondary aim. The laws of mechanics and astronomy apply to a domain where,

[12] This variation in the extent of his foresight is not arbitrary, but is governed by law. Naturally the new system of law which *partially* determines the future determines also the extent to which it determines it.

owing to the vast number of individuals concerned in the average, the secondary scheme is able to make predictions of exceedingly high probability, so that the predictions have been verified with unfailing regularity; for that reason they have in the past been mistaken for causal laws. Now that their statistical character is recognised, they are lost to the original causal scheme. When Laplace put forward his ideal of a completely deterministic scheme he thought he already had in the laws of astronomy and mechanics the skeleton of such a scheme. That skeleton has been obliterated. Nothing is left of the old scheme of causal law, and we have not yet found the beginnings of a new one.

Measured by advance towards Laplace's aim, the net progress of science up to the year 1933 is just *nil*. Measured by its advance towards the secondary aim, progress has been amazingly rapid. Elsewhere I have compared statistical law to the paper currency actually employed, and causal law to the gold stored in the vaults. Planck adopts the traditional economic view:

> In point of fact, statistical laws are dependent upon the assumption of the strict law of causality functioning in each particular case.

That is to say, a paper currency requires to be backed by gold. But, as physics progressed, the occasions on which the gold was actually produced became rarer and rarer, until they altogether ceased. Then it occurred to some of us to question whether there still was a hoard of gold in the vaults, or whether its existence was merely a mythical tradition. The picturesque ending of the story would be that the vaults were opened and found to be empty. The actual ending is perhaps tamer; it turns out that the key has been lost and no one knows whether there is gold in the vaults or not. But I think it is clear, with either termination, that present-day physics is off the gold standard.

I do not think that the social and political consequences of my teaching will be so terrible as Sir Herbert Samuel fears. He suggests that a student of mine, learning that if he sets light to a barrel of gunpowder an explosion, although highly probable, is not certain, may decide to put the matter to the test. The result will doubtless bear out my assertion that an explosion was exceedingly probable, so I do not see where the grievance of the relatives of the deceased comes in. Moreover, I feel sure that neither Planck nor Einstein nor Rutherford would contradict my teaching that the explosion is highly probable but not certain; for that has been a well-known result of the kinetic theory from the time of Maxwell and Boltzmann. And at least I concede to my student freedom to avoid the catastrophe by abstaining from acting in this strange manner; whereas, according to Sir Herbert Samuel and the determinists, the explosion of the barrel is the

inevitable outcome of causes which have existed from the beginning of time.

Nor do I think that the substitution of high probability for certainty in the political and economic sphere will be disastrous. It would seem that at the present moment my opportunity for destroying 'certainty' in political and economic science is rather limited. Might it not then be better to stress the other side of my conclusions—that, so far as is known, our future is not wholly prearranged by physical law? It is we who have to shape it for better or worse. I have on occasion supported Sir Herbert Samuel and voted for his political efforts for amelioration. My decision was on probability; I could not expect complete certainty that his policy would achieve its end. If any of our leaders can offer the world a solution of the present troubles, we shall not ask for certainty; let him but convince us that the probability of success is—shall we say?—a million to one, and we will follow him to the last ditch.

A. S. Eddington.

ORIEL COLLEGE AND THE OXFORD MOVEMENT

It is not with the intention of going over old ground and telling a thrice-told tale that I take up my pen. Indeed, what with Newman's *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, the most touching and beautiful autobiography in the English language, Dean Church's authoritative sketch of the Oxford Movement, *Twelve Years* 1833–1845, to which he devoted the last months of his life, and most recently an acute and masterly treatment of the subject by an observant outsider, Dean Brilioth, of Lund, *The Anglican Revival*, which I had the honour of making accessible to English readers, the course of the Oxford Movement is well known. English public opinion has long since vindicated Cardinal Newman from all imputations against his honour; men of all views and confessions have joined in respect for one who had a true genius for religion; Anglicans can only feel regret at the utter waste of his powers in his new communion, so comparatively few of whom could understand or even trust him. Thanks to the decision, which was worthy of him, to divide his life into two portions, we have the admirable Anglican life by Miss Mozley, as well as the later life by Mr. Wilfred Ward, in which a son did his best to atone for the mischief caused by his father.

But the English public has done less than justice to Dr. Pusey. His merits have been buried in a Life too enormous for anyone to read; and are now producing fresh appreciations this centenary year of the man to whom the ignorant world imputed all the blame. This was because he attached his initials to the first Tract [1] he contributed to the series. Thus for Tractarianism Puseyism became a regular synonym and passed into the languages of Europe. How ignorantly it was used is well illustrated by the following story. Pusey preached in his academic gown in St. Peter's, Pimlico. On his way to the vestry an old woman said to him: 'Ah, sir, if we had more sermons like that, there would be no Puseyism in our church.' It lasted long as a nickname and expression of contemptuous dislike. I well remember in my younger Oxford

[1] No. 18, December 21, 1833, published January 1834.

days hearing a resident teacher described as 'that Puseyite,' when Dr. Pusey himself was long dead. In anything written to-day he will assuredly receive the credit due to him, not only for taking the lead of the movement in 1834, but sustaining it under the staggering blow of Newman's secession in 1845 and continuing to direct it, as far as it was possible for one man to do, till his death in 1882. For the extravagances of some of those who joined in the movement Newman in his day disclaimed responsibility; and it would be equally unfair to blame Pusey for any of the latter-day so-called Ritualists. To do justice to Dr. Pusey is one object of this paper. The other is to trace the connexion of the movement with Oriel, which was so close that if it had been named the Oriel Movement it would have been hardly a misnomer. This is not generally realised to-day, and it is to me a matter of *pietas* to the great foundation of which I have been a fellow for the last thirty years.

When in 1781 John Eveleigh, at the age of thirty-three, became Provost of Oriel, it had sunk from a not inglorious past into perhaps the least of Oxford colleges. It had attempted to educate Bishop Butler; he had found its intellectual *pabulum* worthless, and tells us so. One single name adds a glamour to the list of fellows up to that point in the eighteenth century—the name of Gilbert White, of Selborne. Eveleigh succeeded one of whom practically nothing is known, unless it be true that his butler had generally to help him to bed. But when Eveleigh died in 1814 he had raised his college to the front rank. The credit of introducing the Honour Schools of Classics and Mathematics in 1800, though he shares it with Dean Cyril Jackson and Dr. Parsons, of Balliol, is mainly his. He was greatly assisted by the absence of limitations as to the election of fellows at Oriel College. During its history Oriel has elected fellows from every county of England except Rutland, and drawn from Wales, Scotland and Ireland, too. Few of its fellowships were tied to localities. Eveleigh never did a better stroke of work for his college than in 1795; when the county of Wiltshire produced no suitable candidate for a Frank fellowship he imported a young Devonian like himself from Corpus. Edward Copleston, also the son of a Devonshire parson, was fellow of Oriel at nineteen, public examiner at twenty-five, Professor of Poetry at twenty-six, championed the University of Oxford not unsuccessfully against the animadversions of the *Edinburgh Review* at thirty-four, was Vicar of St. Mary's for eleven years, received thanks from Lord Grenville and addressed letters to Sir R. Peel on public questions, was made Canon of St. Paul's and Dean of Chester before he left Oxford. In 1822 he was therefore a public character to an extent unusual for an Oxford don. He was a man of stately presence, accustomed to move in the

highest society, with a beautiful voice and a commanding manner. He had been provost for eight years, and had presided over a body of fellows some of whom were quite his intellectual equals. Oriel and Balliol were the reading colleges of Oxford. 'We call them the prison-houses,' said an idle young aristocrat. To Oriel in his day it has become customary to apply the expression the 'Noetic school.'

To such a common-room which besides Copleston contained John Davison, Richard Whately, John Keble, Edward Hawkins, Thomas Arnold (and I suppose I must add R. D. Hampden), and with which for a while Blanco White was associated, the term 'Noetic' is not unsuitable. Indeed, it was said that Oriel common-room 'stank of logic,' and numberless were the jokes about the Oriel teapot, supposed to have been substituted for the port bottle. But there was no school. They did not agree among themselves. Copleston was a Tory of the Canning type, inclined towards the Whigs but unable to digest the Reform Bill. Keble was an unbending Tory. Arnold and Whately were Whigs of the Reform type. But if Whately was, as Newman states, the author of the anonymous *Letters on the Church by an Episcopalian* he was decidedly not Erastian ; and Arnold's strange ideas of a national Church are well known and fantastically impossible. The whole temper of Hawkins' mind was one of legal conservatism, while Blanco White, who came to Oxford from the atmosphere of Holland House in 1826 and was a member of Oriel common-room till 1831, had few religious convictions left. Academic Liberals they may have been in the sense of desiring educational efficiency, but they were not agreed on the admission of Dissenters to the University. They were, however, agreed in this : they all wished the fellowships, eighteen in number, to be awarded upon examination to the best of all comers, without taking any account of the candidates' performance in the schools. Vacancies occurred as a rule about every two years, as marriage, failure to take holy orders (except for three fellowships reserved for Law or Medicine), or election to some *uberius beneficium* caused frequent changes.

Among the candidates for the two vacancies in 1822 was John Henry Newman, of Trinity. He had had a sore disappointment in the schools, but, according to Copleston's later testimony, showed in the examination great superiority to his competitors in mind and composition, in taste and knowledge. Great importance was then attached to the English and Latin essays. A candidate in 1833 says : 'You went in at ten and might stay till dusk, but no lights were allowed. Lunch was supplied at one o'clock, and when the second paper was brought the first was not taken away, so that you might have seven hours to elaborate your English essay in.' Newman was elected to the fellowship just

vacated by Thomas Arnold, who had married and was living at Laleham. Newman and he never saw each other till they had had brushes in print and had said hard things of one another. It is said that they met by accident once at hall dinner, the provost (Hawkins) simply saying : 'Newman, I think you know Arnold.' Newman was only twenty-one, and tells us how when Keble shook him by the hand he 'seemed desirous of quite sinking into the ground.'

Keble only published the *Christian Year* which made him universally famous, five years later; he had been elected with Whately when hardly nineteen. 'Even at an early age,' says Mr. Cornish, 'great deference was paid to Keble in the common-room; a deference which he retained throughout his life, based less upon the brilliancy of his intellectual power, though that would have accounted for it, than the purity and saintliness of his nature.' But Keble had not much opportunity of knowing Newman then, as on his mother's death in 1823 he went to live at Southrop, twenty miles away, to assist his father. Hurrell Froude, who had read with Keble in this country retirement, made the two intimate in 1828. Whately, according to Newman's testimony, gave him a cordial welcome, but he, too, went away about that time to a Suffolk living, and only returned to Oxford as Principal of St. Alban Hall in 1825. So for the first year or two Edward Hawkins took in hand the raw new fellow who had come up a devout Evangelical. His conversion at the age of fifteen was an event which he cherished to the end of his life, and which no doubt did much to sustain him in his troubles and trials. But in the years between 1822 and 1828 he passed out of Evangelicalism into a liberal phase. His acknowledgment of his debt to Hawkins strikes one as singularly generous and noble:

> I can say with a full heart that I love him, and have never ceased to love him ; . . . he provoked me very much from time to time, though I am perfectly certain that I have provoked him a great deal more. Moreover in me such provocation was unbecoming, both because he was the Head of my College, and because, in the first years that I knew him, he had been in many ways of great service to my mind. He was the first who taught me to weigh my words, and to be cautious in my statements. . . . He is a man of most exact mind himself, and he used to snub me severely, on reading, as he was kind enough to do, the first Sermons that I wrote and other compositions that I was engaged upon.

He goes on to say that Hawkins gave him Sumner's *Treatise on Apostolical Preaching*, which led him to give up his remaining Calvinism and to receive the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; he led him to anticipate coming attacks on the Bible; and he gave him his sermon on 'Tradition,' in which, before the present Bishop of London, he laid down: 'The Church,' by which he

meant the Catechism and creeds, 'to teach and the Bible to prove.' If Hawkins had ever been willing to give a little more body and content to 'the Church' he would not have become as stereotyped and hard as he did. From the moment he became Provost of Oriel his usefulness diminished. He did one good thing: he recommended Arnold as Headmaster of Rugby and made a remarkable prophecy about him. But otherwise the testimony of Mark Pattison's memoirs is damning to him. My old friend Professor Morfill would always say: 'He dragged Oriel down to the depths, having found it the first college in Oxford'; but it was Morfill who secured the inclusion of the recommendation of Arnold in the *Dictionary of National Biography*. In 1825 Whately returned to Oxford, and instantly took Newman up, made him his vice-principal, and did his best to make him his disciple. He was still much in Oriel, where he often dined, and, being a man of a hearty appetite, had special attention at high table. 'That is for the principal, sir,' said the butler when a particularly heaped-up plate was put before somebody else. He was a big, hearty, rollicking John Bull type of man without any fine feelings. 'I am afraid that I am boring you, sir,' said a timid visitor. 'Not at all,' was the reply; 'I like an anvil to hammer out my opinions upon.' That sort of person could not dominate Newman for long; yet in the *Apologia* he acknowledges considerable debt to him. He thought Newman still an Evangelical, and I suppose that is why in the course of a walk he said that *Letters on the Church by an Episcopalian* would make Newman's blood boil. What a surprise he must have had later! But Newman became a tutor in 1826 and resigned his vice-principalship of the hall. He doubtless could have kept on both, but his conscientiousness would not allow him to do so. How different Hampden's conduct when, on being made Regius Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church, he refused to resign the principalship of St. Mary Hall!

In 1826 two young Oriel men, who had read with Keble at Southrop, Richard Hurrell Froude and Robert Isaac Wilberforce, became fellows. Froude became tutor at the same time as Newman, and Wilberforce soon afterwards. They had as their senior colleague Joseph Dornford, who was of the unusually advanced age of thirty-two. Naturally the young tutors soon became intimate, and Froude made Keble know Newman for the first time. The result soon became obvious when, to Whately's great disgust, Newman opposed Peel's re-election on the Catholic emancipation question. When a small corporation like a college becomes predominantly of one side in politics great bitterness is engendered if any individual takes an independent line. It is absolutely necessary for us to take into account the part that

politics played in Newman's development. We are accustomed to-day to High Church Liberals. All the *Lux Mundi* men were, I believe, Liberals. In those days if a man was a High Churchman he was a Tory. Keble was a Tory. Froude was more than a Tory: he was a sort of belated Cavalier. Under their influence Newman came, perhaps unconsciously, ever more near to regarding political Liberalism as spelling religious Liberalism, indifferentism, or even atheism. After the publication of the *Christian Year* he began more and more to join in Keble's denunciation of those 'who halve the Gospel of God's grace,' and by 1828 he was getting into a mood to appreciate the assize sermon as a call to arms. It is quite unnecessary to-day to apologise for the violence of language indulged in by the characters of the movement. Newman often says 'I was very fierce.' So he was; but so was everybody.

Then came Copleston's long-expected and unduly-delayed preferment, and the provostship was vacant. Keble desired the post. Probably it was the only time in his life that he sought any post. Had the appointment fallen vacant a few years earlier, undoubtedly Tyler would have been unanimously elected. He knew how to manage the men, many of them aristocratic and difficult to control, and was very popular. But in 1826 he had accepted the living of St. Giles-in-the-Fields, offered to him by Lord Liverpool, and was gone. The obvious successor now was Hawkins. He was a strong man who could rule, and he had held every college office with equal efficiency. Newman, to Keble's rather ill-disguised chagrin, was strongly in favour of Hawkins for college reasons, and it did him the highest honour. So far there was little sign of any theological disagreement. But the moment the new provost was in office the rift in the lute began. The three new tutors had new ideas. They desired to make their connexion with their pupils a reality. They wished to alter the books read and to introduce English books into the course. They wished to stimulate mental power and give it exercise by constant writing of English. They were in fact, as Mark Pattison the undergraduate saw, educational reformers. But down to his election as provost Hawkins had himself been tutor, as he had been through all the ordinary college offices. When elected provost he had no intention of being overshadowed by a parcel of young men: he was only thirty-nine himself for the matter of that. So without thinking much what he was to do to carry on the work of the college he made the utterly unprecedented announcement to three of the young tutors that he would assign no further pupils to them. This meant that their college work would gradually diminish and end with the summer of 1832. As Froude's health broke down in 1832 and he would have had to resign anyhow, it

made no difference in his case; but in Newman's case it meant the abrupt cessation of his advancement in the University. Thus no doubt in 1834 his chances of the Professorship of Moral Philosophy were seriously affected by his having been thus 'dismissed.' It was not an illegal but it was an unconstitutional act.

It was bitterly resented by Newman's friends, and it created two parties in what had previously been a harmonious body.

What was the motive for so unprecedented a step? It can hardly have been *odium theologicum.* Some of Froude's daring sentiments may have already reached the provost's ears. But Newman had at the time no High Church leanings, to all appearances; he had notably failed to let that weigh with him at any rate in the recent election. It was rather jealousy on the provost's part of a pastoral relation between pupil and tutor, such as had already begun, *e.g.*, between Frederic Rogers and Froude, Tom and James Mozley, and Newman. He himself was to be the spiritual pastor and master to the whole college. By 1829 Hawkins was disinclined to get up fresh books and subjects with which he was personally unfamiliar for fear of being overshadowed by men who were his juniors by twelve years. If I have done him injustice I am sorry; but much thought on the subject has compelled me to regard this as the real explanation of the provost's extraordinary step. It had a result which he little contemplated. It gave Newman the leisure required to launch the Oxford Movement. We can therefore in a manner rejoice in the result while we cannot but criticise the action.

It is easier to dismiss tutors than to find substitutes, before the college has in the natural course of things supplied the suitable men. Dornford was left, but he could not do the work single-handed. We may, I think, dismiss Pattison's contemptuous reference to him; for he was in his way a striking personage. Suddenly as a *deus ex machina* Hampden reappeared in Oxford, after a round of country curacies, seeking work. To him the provost applied to act as a non-resident tutor, and he gladly accepted. Lord Grenville gave him a less anomalous position in 1833 as Principal of St. Mary Hall. It will perhaps be best to deal at once with this leading character in the history of the movement. Soon after he returned to Oxford he was appointed Bampton Lecturer. Very naturally in the Oriel common-room he met Blanco White, whom he found extremely useful as a fountain of information on the system in which White had been reared and about which he knew so much. It is a matter of certainty that Hampden drew on White for his Bampton Lectures, which fell flat at the time but were subsequently the subject of so much controversy. The Bishop of Oxford subsequently con-

fessed that he had condemned them without reading them. Perhaps Newman had not till he sat up a whole night in 1836 to dash off his pamphlet *Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements*. I have myself only just perused them in the copy which belonged to Mr. Gladstone. It is noticeable that he after copiously annotating the first two lectures read no further.

One knows not whether to dislike most the arrogance or the obscurantism of the book. There is one passage about Transubstantiation which may be quoted as interesting for the date at which it is written.

I do not speak of its absurdity; for it is clearly not absurd, if by that expression we mean its inconsistency with reason. It is, on the contrary, perfectly consistent with reason, if we grant the hypotheses in philosophy on which it is founded. And, even in these hypotheses themselves, there is nothing intrinsically absurd. We can only say, with our present light on physical science, that they are unphilosophical and untrue.

In this we seem to see White's view. The final lecture on 'Dogmatic Theology' is significantly based on Jeremiah xxiii. 28: 'What is the chaff to the wheat? saith the Lord.' This is a brief statement of its contents. There are simple facts divinely revealed; there are theories of divine truth formed on these facts. There are no doctrines in the Scriptures; dogmas of theology as such are human authorities. Dogmatic theology is a collection of negations and theological terms are superscriptions or labels. Everything he most objects to he describes as realism, and, while the word 'nominalism' is never mentioned throughout, it is obvious that White had been expounding to him the views, perhaps of William of Occam, with approval. Church creeds and articles are capable of improvement, of more perfect adaptation to the existing circumstances of the Church in different periods. Thus he anticipates the Gorham controversy:

It is thought by some that the question must further be decided, whether Baptism is in all cases equivalent to Regeneration. They propose a question, that is, as to the intrinsic efficiency of the rite, a difficulty which practical Christianity by no means calls upon us to decide, and the decision of which, after all, can only be speculative.

In other words, go on baptising; it cannot do any harm and may do some good. Much of what he says in the lectures must have been most offensive to Evangelicals—*e.g.*:

It is worthy of remark that those Protestants who have advanced to extremes in opposing the errors of Rome—both those who have opposed them on the ground of Superstition, and those who have been unreasonably jealous in the cause of Reason—have adopted more of the speculative method connected with these errors than the more moderate Reformers. For what is all that accuracy and positiveness, with which some persons

state their views of Justification, but the point and precision of theory? What is all that profession of Rational Religion, with which some maintain that natural efficacy of Repentance, but dogmatism founded on theory? We may learn from these extremes that the more indistinct our language is on this sacred subject, the less of theoretic principle it embodies in it, the more closely do we imbibe the spirit of Protestantism, the more faithfully we walk in the paths of that Holy Spirit 'whose ways are in the deep' and whose 'footsteps are not known.

Moreover, in Lecture VI. he totally dissevered ethics from theology. Can one wonder that Newman, in acknowledging the gift of a copy of Hampden's pamphlet *Observations on Religious Dissent* in 1834, while acknowledging 'the tone of piety which the pamphlet displays,' states that the principles in it 'tend in my opinion to make shipwreck of Christian faith,' or that Church calls him 'the writer who had just a second time seemed to lay the axe to the root of all theology'?

The Arians of the Fourth Century finished and their last pupils having graduated, Froude and Newman went to the Mediterranean in December 1832, and Newman arrived back in Oxford on July 9, 1833, having wonderfully recovered from his dangerous illness in Sicily, full of returning health and spirits and convinced that he had a work to do. Mr. Keble's assize sermon on July 14 was the match which kindled his fiery zeal. Now was the opportunity of smiting the Liberals hip and thigh.

Newman accordingly took the bit between his teeth and issued rapidly the *Tracts for the Times*. Their tone was that of a brass band: they were intended to goad and stir up people to think, to range themselves for or against. They addressed the clergy. 'Magnify your office,' they said. 'Make the formularies, which you have allowed to become dead letters, live.' They succeeded in their object. The Tracts, subsequently published in the first two volumes, had an immense circulation: they were chiefly written by Newman and his immediate circle of friends. If Keble had started the movement, Newman became its leader in Oxford. Not that he would have it called a party, as he distinctly states. But the kernel of the movement was spiritual. In his Sunday 4 p.m. sermons was the wonderful secret of the widespread influence he exercised. It may have been an exaggeration when Whately said he heard that two-thirds of the reading men were 'Rabbinists' (*i.e.*, Puseyites); but all sorts and kinds were attracted to hear him, and few came away without feeling better men. No one could analyse character or touch the heart like Newman in his early days.

At the end of 1833 Pusey gave cohesion and weight to the movement by joining it, and it was his initials appended to a Tract which made his name first widely known. He instantly set

to work to solidify the movement by changing the character of the Tracts and making them solid theological treatises on Baptism and the Eucharist and by *Catenæ Patrum*. Meanwhile the *Library of the Fathers*, begun in 1838, proceeded apace, and was followed in 1846 by the *Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology*. The movement was to be based on sound learning. It was for the future teachers. They were to know the grounds for that which they taught. Now, all this was not new. But that was the very point of the Oxford men. We have forgotten '*stare super antiquas vias*.' We have this elaborate armoury from Andrewes to Wilson to our hand, but we have forgotten all about it. Let us repolish our weapons and gird us for the fray.

All went well with the movement till 1839. 'In the spring of 1839,' says Newman, 'my position in the Anglican Church was at its height. I had suprême confidence in my controversial status, and I had a great and still growing success in recommending it to others.' His *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church* (1837) had certainly done their best to dispose of any charge of Romanising that could be brought against him. 'Nothing more specious or insidiously damaging has ever been written against the Catholic Church,' says M. Thureau-Dangin. But he had lost Hurrell Froude, who died of consumption in 1836. Though Froude had originally spurred him on, he might quite conceivably, had he lived longer, have held him back. 'The cursing and swearing' against Rome, about which Froude warned him almost on his death-bed, were probably attempts to silence scruples which would arise. Nothing did the movement more harm than the publication of Froude's *Remains*, 1837. One can only suppose that love for their friend and desire to preserve everything he had ever said or written overcame the discretion of Keble and Newman in giving the unsympathetic world occasion to sneer by admitting them to his most private and intimate thoughts. Here was a young fanatic who sowed the seeds of an incurable disease by amateur and foolish asceticism, who made no secret of his disloyalty to his own Church and hankering after Rome, and whose language was habitually outrageous and provocative. And all that seems to be roughly true; yet there is more to be said. From the testimony of his pupil Lord Blachford we seem to see a beautiful and generous spirituality, a hatred of humbug, and an intellectual zest which would have made him the first of teachers and preachers, had he lived. It is very much to be doubted whether he would have gone over. What he saw of the Roman Communion in Italy disgusted him, and his interview with Wiseman did not shake him in the least. For one thing he was only faithful to that in which he had always been brought up. Those who make one change in their religious opinions generally make

another. It was not likely, *e.g.*, that White would rest in Anglicanism on his way to infidelity, and Newman had gone too far to remain stationary. Then Froude was a disciple of Keble, and would probably have followed his master, while Keble had never been and never was Newman's master. It is mere guesswork; yet it seems far more probable that Froude, had he lived, would have continued to mediate between Keble and Newman and Pusey and Newman in such a way as to retain his friend in the post, which none could fill so well as he.

To return to Oriel in 1833. In October the indignation of his friends against the provost took shape in electing Newman as dean. In most colleges the dean is only a disciplinary officer. At Oriel he is the vicegerent. Newman had now a *locus standi* in the college, though no longer tutor. He had to read, correct, and hear publicly read the essays of the undergraduates, a duty which he punctually performed to the great benefit of those who underwent the ordeal. By now the majority of the college was on his side. There were the non-residents James and Keble; there was Froude; Davies' place was filled by Frederic Rogers, Froude's pupil; J. F. Christie, C. Greswell, C. P. Eden, T. Mozley were admirers or pupils; and last, but not least, Wilberforce's successor was that truly saintly man Charles Marriott. He long occupied Newman's college rooms, and their *aura* was just the same. Besides these George Anthony Denison had come to Oriel from Christ Church in 1828, and if he did not identify himself with the movement, at least he was not hostile. In 1836 the tide turned in the college body. The provost must have exerted himself greatly to add to his followers in 1836. Keble's fellowship was filled by W. Sheppard, Froude's by H. Shepheard, Dornford's by E. A. Litton (afterwards known as a Protestant controversialist), and Blencowe's by C. Daman, who proved an excellent and docile tutor in the provost's hand for over thirty years, long after he had ceased to be in any way efficient. The way in which Hawkins dominated the—one might have thought—intractable Burgon later illustrates the power of ascendency he possessed.

All this time Newman was making history as Vicar of St. Mary's, retiring ever more into his shell as he became more famous. One more accession, and a very important one, was made to Newman's friends in Oriel when in 1838 R. W. Church, of Wadham, came to revive failing spirits; and his account of the Oxford Movement, written mostly in the last months of his life, is absolutely authoritative and fascinating in its vividness. Church writes that Isaac Williams—who had been a disciple of Keble, though he acted as Newman's curate—was from the first conscious of a difference and divergence from him. He and his successor as curate, Copeland, also of Trinity, were almost the only non-Oriel

men who were at first closely associated with the movement in Oxford; for Palmer, of Worcester, from the first took an independent line. The catastrophe of Newman's secession of course became inevitable after Tract 90. 'Ward worried Newman into writing it,' said Tait, later archbishop; and it must be very nearly true. By this time other men, without the ballast which Keble and Pusey always supplied to the Oriel contingent, began to flock in and hover round Newman. They annoyed him extremely by imitating his manner and walk and exaggerating his teaching and methods, but they nevertheless influenced him. Newman was more susceptible to influence than he realised, and much more appreciative of praise than he thought he was. Ward was the '*enfant terrible*' of the movement. He needs all the praise he subsequently got from Tennyson, in lines so well known that they need not be quoted, to set off against the mischief he did in depriving the English Church of Newman's great gifts. No doubt the effect of one thing after another, the condemnation of Tract 90, the study of the Monophysite controversy, the article of Wiseman on the Donatists with the quotation from Augustine, '*Securus judicat orbis terrarum*,' which so stuck in Newman's mind, and finally the project of the Jerusalem bishopric, all undermined his position. Yet none of these things were comparable to the Gorham judgment, which took his old friend Wilberforce over to Rome. Even the natural restlessness of one who had gone through so many changes would not have sufficed, had it not been for the impish insistence of Ward that, after all, one might hold all Tridentine doctrine within the limits of the English Church, and that the articles were hedging and ambiguous documents. No English Churchman of to-day ought to defend Tract 90. It is mostly special pleading and quite unworthy of Newman. Yet one can quite understand the loyalty of those who saved it from condemnation—for Newman's sake. One feels that one would have done just the same in protest against a moribund hebdomadal board attempting with all its might to impose a new test of an even more impossible kind on a university which had outgrown the age of tests. Luckily the younger generation of academic liberals, Stanley and Jowett among them, saw this danger and helped to avert it. When the first reformed Hebdomadal Council was elected in 1854, among the first to be chosen was Charles Marriott, of Oriel, '*Vir reverendus atque optimus*,' the finest fruit produced on the tree of the movement, who under a somewhat grotesque exterior had the heart of a saint. Probably to part from him was harder than anything else for Newman. 'My love to Marriott,' he writes on April 3, 1845, 'and save me the pain of sending him a line.' It was characteristic of Marriott to acquire the Littlemore premises vacated by Newman and to

set up a printing press there for the *Library of the Fathers* and such undertakings.

The long delay between Newman's retirement to Littlemore from active participation in the movement and his reception into the Church of Rome was due to his scrupulous sense of honour. His relations with Dr. Bagot, Bishop of Oxford, show them both in the best light. He resigned St. Mary's when he did because of the secession of William Lockhart, and by his sole influence he held back most of his associates from following this example for three years. Full well he knew that some of them would turn most likely in the opposite direction if they lost his guiding hand, and this was an equally painful thought.

Newman's secession was a blow. But only those followed to Rome whose real spiritual home was Rome. The Kebles, Pusey, C. Marriott, Isaac Williams, and Copeland, for example, stood like rocks; James Mozley came to the fore as a leader of English Churchmanship. The only Oriel man who went over with Newman was A. J. Christie. On this sad subject it is difficult to write or even to read the story without emotion. So at the end of the twelve years we say reluctantly good-bye to one of the greatest religious geniuses of the nineteenth century.

Now I can imagine someone saying: 'As far as I can make out, you are asking the English Church to celebrate the centenary of a fanatical outburst against a reasonable and proper act of statesmanship and the subsequent wild effusions of some academic enthusiasts.' That breathes a spirit which is inconsistent with the historical sense, and unworthy of Churchmen of any complexion in the year 1933. Let us remember first that Convocation was silenced from 1717 to 1852. Hallam's remark in his *Constitutional History* (1850) that 'in the ferment of that age it was expedient for the State to scatter a little dust over the angry insects' will hardly be praised by anybody to-day, and we shall hardly blame the 'insects' for being 'angry.' The following reasons may be briefly stated for regarding 1833 as an epoch in our Church history.

Rough as has been the stranglehold of the State on the Church since the Reformation, it was never more rough and menacing than in 1833. The Oxford men secured at least this good result—that future changes were carried out for the benefit, and not for the destruction, of the Church. Moreover, Erastianism as a power is now moribund, though as an individual tenet it dies hard. The action of the State has frequently brought about what Mr. Birrell described as purges. The Oxford Movement caused a few secessions; but in an age when the force of the Evangelical Movement was largely spent and the general attitude was one of depression and even despair, it raised the courage of the clergy

and the standard of clerical duty to a level never before generally reached. In particular it compelled them to attach some meaning to the article of the Creed, 'I believe in the Holy Catholic Church,' and this was done without the 'fearful effect' prophesied by Mr. Sikes, of Guilsborough. This was because the movement was essentially a revival of religion. It is no accident that Pusey's first sermon was on the text (Hebrews, xii. 14) 'Holiness without which no man shall see the Lord,' or that Newman preached one of his early sermons on the same text, and tells us how for many years Thomas Scott's saying, 'Holiness rather than peace,' rang in his ears.

The following are some of the gains to the religion of the country directly attributable to the movement. It is no good pointing out that there were daily services in the reign of Queen Anne if they had practically ceased at the beginning of the reign of Queen Victoria. In 1849 Messrs. Masters first issued a sixpenny *Guide to the Churches where the Daily Prayers are said in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland.* In 1869 (the 37th edition) the number was: London, 139, 115 of which had weekly communion; the provinces, 1004, with weekly communion in 556.

In the cholera epidemics of 1849 and 1854 the clergy behaved nobly. Thus Charles Marriott contracted the disease by visiting in 1854. There was an enormous impetus to church building and restoration. Dr. Pusey set the example by building St. Saviour's, Leeds. On the other hand, it is not fair to charge the Oxford Movement with eccentricities in ceremonial. The critics of 'Ritualism' hardly understood more about the subject than the Ritualists themselves. No one connected with the actual movement attempted anything of the kind except F. Oakeley at Margaret Chapel. Dr. Pusey always tried to discourage efforts to force a strange ceremonial on congregations which were unwilling to have it. The organisation of sisterhoods, which began in Osnaburgh Street in 1845 and was followed at Devonport under Dr. Pusey's auspices by Miss Sellon, at East Grinstead by Dr. Neale, at Wantage by W. J. Butler, at Clewer by Canon Carter, at Oxford by Mr. Chamberlain, and at Horbury by Mr. Sharp, has enlisted women in the work of the Church and altered beyond recognition the care of the sick, the poor, and the orphan.

It may also be emphasised that the teaching 'Stir up the gift that is in you' affected the whole Church. As the result of the Oxford Movement, the evangelical section of the Church is nowhere now aloof from the general current of Church life. It no longer regards the Reformation as a catastrophic break, after which something new came into existence, but accepts the continuity of the Church in England without any fear of thereby sanctioning Roman doctrine.

Finally, though it insisted on institutional religion by breaking down narrow individualism, the movement paved the way for reunion. That acute outside observer Dr. Brilioth has, as was said above, done full justice to Pusey, though in Keble he saw a more static type of Churchmanship. But he has abundantly brought out the dynamic side of the Anglican Newman and his passionate longing for reunion. As troubles thickened round him, this desire, so happily revived in recent times, possessed him more and more. Thus he wrote on April 26, 1841: 'Protestantism, so widely spread and so long enduring, must have in it, and must be witness for, a great truth or moral truth. That I am an advocate for Protestanism you cannot suppose; but I am forced into a *via media* short of Rome as it is at present.' On September 12, 1841: 'We do not look towards Rome as believing that its communion is infallible but that union is a duty.' On November 22, 1842 (to Dr. Russell, of Maynooth): 'There is a divine life among us, clearly manifested, which is as great a note of the Church as any can be. Why should we seek our Lord's presence elsewhere, when he vouchsafes it to us, where we are? What call have we to change our communion?' The *via media* is not dead, but very much alive, and ever in our ears are our Lord's words to-day: 'Thou shalt see greater things than these.' Our Lord and His apostles were young men. These leaders of the Oxford Movement were young men. Are there any young men to-day called to a similar work?

G. C. RICHARDS.

SWEDEN AND THE RUSSIAN BOGEY

A New Light on Palmerston's Foreign Policy

For some years research work undertaken by Scandinavian historians has been going on in the Russian State archives. Results have been arrived at which prove of considerable interest, not only to the Scandinavian countries, but also to Great Britain.

In Tsarist Russia the archives were, with some exceptions,[1] more or less inaccessible to foreign scientists. This was probably not, as hinted by the Bolsheviks, due merely to political reasons, but rather to the badly trained staff of archivists, the very few hours of working, and, above all, to the fact that the various archives were scattered all over the vast empire and split into all kinds of divisions and subdivisions. It is greatly to the credit of the present rulers of Russia that as soon as they reached power energetic attempts were made to bring some order into the Russian archives, the state of which had been made still more confused by war and revolution. Already in 1918 it was decreed that the archives should henceforth form one single *fond*. Some years later—in 1922—a special board, the *Tsentr Archiv*, was, at the instigation of the Nestor of Russian Marxist research, Professor N. Pokrovskij, organised at Moscow and placed directly under the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. *Tsentr Archiv* now became the focus of extensive publications, arranged to give the Russian as well as the foreign public clear notions of the disastrous aims and methods of the former 'capitalistic' and 'imperialistic' policy. At the same time the archives were solemnly flung open to foreign research workers.

In the Scandinavian countries, whose history has for so many centuries been intimately connected with that of Russia, this invitation was hailed with vivid satisfaction. On the initiative of the well-known Danish historian, Professor Aage Friis, an 'Interscandinavian Committee for Common Research of the Russian State Archives' was constituted at Stockholm in 1928.

[1] In the 'eighties they were visited by the eminent Swedish historian Harald Hjärne, and later by Professor C. K. Webster, of Cambridge.

Considerable sums were allotted for this purpose by the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian Riksdags. It was thought that with the aid of a new photostatic apparatus, invented by the Swedish architect T. Sellman, a *dépôt* of photostatic copies from the Russian archives should be laid up at Stockholm for the future use of Scandinavian research.

The epochs to which the Swedish members of the committee devoted their main interest were, of course, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—periods when Swedish relations with Russia were particularly close; the latter century especially was exhaustively dealt with. All diplomatic documents regarding Russo-Swedish relations from 1809 up to 1870 were photographed, and, completed with British and other material, they throw, indeed, much new light on many long-discussed questions, as will be shown.

Through the loss of Finland to Russia in 1809—that crowning disaster of the old Swedish empire of the Baltic—and through the reunion with Norway in 1814, Sweden had been brought closer than ever before to her neighbours Russia and Great Britain. Gradually, as the tension grew stronger between these two formidable rivals of the time, Sweden got to feel their pressures. (This was particularly the case in 1833, when, after the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, Russia started fortifying the Åland Islands outside the Swedish archipelago—a measure highly irritating to the Cabinet of Lord Grey and Lord Palmerston, as it threatened the increasing British timber export from Swedish harbours in the Gulf of Bothnia.[2]) In spite of British offers of alliance, the King of Sweden, Charles XIV. (formerly Marshal Bernadotte), managed to maintain a policy of strict neutrality; only once, during the Oriental crisis of 1840, when Great Britain and Russia united against the France of Thiers and Louis-Philippe, did the old king show some warlike tendencies. Under the reign of his son, Oscar I., Swedish policy underwent, however, a reversion. What Harald Hjärne, the famous Swedish historian, called 'the great doctoral question of Russia's vocation to the Oceans and their dominance' now loomed on the horizon. Already in 1831 the Swedish Minister in London had warned the Government against Russian designs for seizing a harbour in northern Norway in order to erect a maritime establishment from which to threaten the coasts of Scotland and France. Soon it came to be believed that Russia was hiding her plans behind the negotiations regarding the new frontier between Finland and Norway and the migrations of the Lapp nomads, which starting in 1823 dragged on without intervals for about twenty years. The only salvation for Sweden

[2] Illuminating in this respect are, in particular, Lord Palmerston's papers at The Broadlands, Romsey, now in possession of Lord and Lady Mount Temple.

was, according to the young Liberals of the 'forties, a Scandinavian union including also Denmark and an alliance with the Western Powers, the representatives of progress and civilisation. Thus a stronger bulwark might be formed in the north capable of checking all aggressive designs of Russia.

In the 'forties the ties of economic union which, in spite of political separation, still existed between Sweden and Finland were severed by the Russian Government. This may to some extent account for the facility with which King Oscar, more easily influenced than his father, emancipated himself from the latter's Russophile policy. During the Crimean War he concluded a defensive alliance with the Western Powers, in virtue of which the latter undertook to guarantee the integrity of Sweden and Norway against Russian attacks. Were these attempted, Great Britain and France bound themselves to come to his aid with a military force. The effects of the 'November Treaty' of 1855 proved unexpected. It hastened Russia's willingness to accept the peace terms of the Allies, thereby placing Sweden in a somewhat awkward position with regard to her offended neighbour. Some reward for the change of policy was, however, given to Sweden by the pledge, wrung from Russia by Great Britain at the Peace Conference in Paris (1856), not to construct any more fortresses on the Åland Islands. The 'November Treaty' has often been regarded as the turning-point in Swedish foreign policy during the nineteenth century. Nobody doubted then that King Oscar was not right in thus trying to check Russia's advance towards the Atlantic Ocean. But did Russia nourish the sinister designs attributed to her? What did the Swedish Government really know about the matter? Indeed, not very much. At close scrutiny the apparently solid ground of Sweden's suspicions dissolves itself merely into erroneously interpreted facts and vague rumours, heard from other and prejudiced quarters.

Some instances may suffice. In 1826 a convention was concluded between Norway and Russia which settled the right of possession of some hitherto undefined 'common districts' north of both States, in which Norway got '*les rivières et les golphes les plus riches en poissons*' and Russia '*les plus beaux pâturages.*' But shortly after this arrangement, which put an end to secular disputes, the Norwegians were led to believe that Russia had tried to snatch the whole of the districts in order to possess the strip of coast allotted to Norway. The famous 'ship business' of 1825, when, owing to Russian intervention, Sweden was compelled to cancel the sale of some vessels of war to the revolutionaries in South America—a measure which caused strained relations with the Tsar—had, they suspected, only been a pretext for Russia to proceed to '*les dernières rigueurs*' in the Finmark.

The Tsar had, it was alleged, wished to extend the Russian domains over the greater part of this province, and war had been imminent when Alexander suddenly died at Taganrog. From this war Norway had been saved only by the internal troubles following the accession of Nicholas I. Nothing was more unfounded. Russian local officials, namely the Governor-General of Archangel, no doubt made proposals to annex the whole of the 'common districts.' At first the Cabinet of Petersburg listened. But Swedish diplomacy, represented by the Minister in Petersburg, Nils Fredrik Palmstierna, intervened; Alexander disavowed his too-zealous servant and ordered an officer of his general staff to verify, in common with a representative of Norway, the real state of things in the districts. 'Russia does not,' this officer was informed shortly before the Emperor's voyage to Taganrog, 'intend to acquire new territory, but only to settle, in a definite way, the conditions at the border and to clear away all reasons for disputes in the future.' This decision was confirmed by Nicholas I., and when, some years later, new complaints were heard from Archangel they were severely dealt with from Petersburg. In spite of these facts, it has been believed ever since that in 1826 Russia planned to lay hands on northern Norway. This was particularly emphasised in Gustav Lallerstedt's pamphlet *Scandinavia: Her Fears and Aspirations*, published during the Crimean War, when all weapons were used to illuminate the 'Russian peril.' After Lallerstedt this erroneous statement has reappeared innumerable times. It recurs, for example, in the latest edition (1929) of the great Swedish encyclopædia *Nordisk Familjebok.*

Still more rich in consequences were the disputes regarding the Lapp migrations between Norway and Finland, which had opened in 1828. Already in 1751 these migrations had been sanctioned by a treaty concluded between Sweden (Finland then being a Swedish domain) and Denmark, then the possessor of Norway. Russia's conquest of Finland and the union of Sweden and Norway strangely changed the parts: Russia overtook the rights of Sweden and the latter those of Denmark. But neither in 1809 nor in 1814 was any mention made of the treaty, and Russia seems to have ignored its existence until 1826. What probably actuated the disputes in 1828 was the fact that the reindeer of the Norwegian Lapps had increased in such numbers that the pastures in Norway did not suffice. They were thus forced to migrate on a larger scale to Finland. But here the nomads were, of course, not welcome. Measures were undertaken to restrict their wanderings, and these were in turn answered by corresponding steps in Norway against the Finnish Lapps taking part in the fishing on the coast. Long negotiations ensued

between commissaries from both countries, and at last in 1840 these agreed upon certain restrictions for the Norwegian nomads in Finland. The inhabitants of the Finnish border parishes were to be allowed to take part in the coast fishing in Norway, but only in Norwegian boats and in common with native fishers.

The Finnish authorities, who, contrary to the opinion of their Government, wanted to free their country from the regulations of 1751, now tried to gain their end by a subterfuge. The treaty replacing that of 1751 should, they proposed, be valid only for a space of fifteen years, after which new negotiations could be entered upon. This the Norwegian commissaries refused, and the negotiations were consequently suspended. In vain Swedish diplomacy once again intervened: the Finnish commissaries did not give way, and even threatened to close the frontier if their claims were not accepted. The unhappy issue of the negotiations made Charles XIV. think of another means of settling the unsatisfactory conditions on the border. In June 1840 he proposed to Russia an exchange of territory by which the united kingdoms, in return for some State properties in Moscow and Constantinople, should receive the strip of Finnish territory which, in the shape of an angle, separated the Swedish and Norwegian 'Lappmarks.' At first the Russian Government refused to fulfil the King's wish —'*drôle de désir*,' it was called by Nicholas I.—but after hearing the Finnish authorities and having undertaken careful investigations on the spot, the Government changed its mind; on condition that a small district on the Norwegian coast was ceded to Finland, Russia would consent to the bargain. The Finnish Lapps in this way would obtain a fishing place of their own and all conflicts with the Norwegians be avoided in the future. But the advisers of Charles XIV. found the Russian counter-proposal too risky to accept, and the bargain was politely declined. The matter might have been brought to rest but for the Russian Minister at Stockholm, Count Matuszewic, who committed a most unfortunate indiscretion. In 1841 he mentioned the matter to his British colleague, Sir Thomas Cartwright (with whom he was on particularly good terms during the Oriental crisis of these years), as a drastic illustration of the fantastic whims of the old king.

It was not known to Matuszewic (who since his stay in London as chargé d'affaires for Prince Lieven was considered one of the ablest heads of the Russian diplomatic service) that the British Government, very much alive to the danger of a Russian descent on the coast of Norway, had been eagerly listening to warnings which since 1836 had been pouring in from the British vice-consul at Hammerfest, in northern Norway, John R. Crowe. The basis of Crowe's assertions seems, indeed, very slim.

Having in his youth served in the Russian navy and even for some time been attached to the Russian Embassy in London, Crowe might, it may be admitted, have kept some Russian connexions able to furnish him with information of secret plans. It is strange, however, that he never mentions any sources. Neither can it be overlooked that Crowe had reasons of his own to figure as a clever revealer of threatening Russian designs. Involved as the chief culprit in a smuggling case in Norway, he had in 1835 been recalled from his post. With the verdict impending he then, during a stay in London in June 1836, wrote his first despatch on the danger threatening Norway and Great Britain if Russia succeeded in seizing a harbour on the coast. This speculation on Lord Palmerston's well-known Russophobia proved indeed so successful that Crowe was at once reinstalled in office, and even promoted. During the succeeding years he made the 'Russian peril' his principal means of subsistence: at least once a year he sent a detailed account of the latest symptoms of impending invasion, and even undertook a reconnoitring journey to the White Sea.

Crowe's warnings had, without hesitation, been forwarded by Palmerston to the Swedish Government. Great Britain attached, he said, 'extreme importance' to the matter and could not 'view with indifference any cession whatever of territory in that quarter by Sweden to Russia.' Palmerston also instructed the French Government of the alleged Russian designs. From Stockholm it was assured that there had never been any question of cession, and that if any such proposals were made by Russia they would instantly be rejected. But now the indiscretion of Matuszewic confirmed, in a way which excluded all doubts, the warnings of Crowe, and Palmerston pressed again for binding assurances, and even told the Russian Government itself that a Norwegian cession of territory would have a most unfavourable impression on British public opinion.

The successor of Palmerston, Lord Aberdeen, did not give the same willing ear to the warnings of Crowe. But when during the Crimean War the former—now in the capacity of Prime Minister—returned to power, Crowe resumed his activities. He asserted in May 1855 that in 1840 several Russo-Finnish officials had, under pretext of pleasure trips, been reconnoitring northern Norway. By chance their instructions had fallen into Norwegian hands and had been found to contain detailed orders to find out the best harbours for a Russian *maritime establishment* and a town, the state of the roads to Finland, and the nature of the rivers. This manifest evidence of Russia's plans of expansion was repeated in leading articles in *The Times*, written by a young Norwegian, Ole Richter, who happened to stay in London during

the summer and autumn of 1855.[1] The similarity between his and Crowe's statements is indeed striking. As the latter's reports were, of course, confidential, Richter could not have seen them, but he may have been in touch with Crowe—perhaps through his relative, Eyre Evans Crowe, editor of the *Daily News*. But the same conformity exists also between the writings of Crowe and the above-mentioned pamphlet of Lallerstedt. It may be that the latter knew Crowe's son, Henry Woodfall Crowe, principal interpreter on Admiral Napier's Baltic campaign during the same summer. Similar accounts were repeated by leading French papers—notably *Le Pays*. These articles were most likely inspired by Lallerstedt, who was attached to the Swedish Legation in Paris. Emanating from so many different quarters—Christiania, London, and Paris—all these accounts did not fail duly to impress Swedish public opinion. They became, indeed, a very important item in the agitation for Sweden taking an active part in the war against Russia. The accuracy of the statements of *The Times* was not discussed, and the French articles showed, the Press of Stockholm agreed, 'unusual knowledge of the facts,' and indicated clearly the manner in which the position of Sweden was judged in France.

Most certainly such rash conclusions would have been spared had it been known that the alarms about Russia's attitude in 1840 probably had one and the same source—namely, Crowe—and that Russia's 'mysterious preparations' so long before the Crimean War were nothing else than the investigations undertaken by the Finnish authorities at the request of Charles XIV. himself. But those who might guess the real state of things found it, for some reasons, preferable to keep silence. Russia's 'insulting behaviour' in 1840 thus became a motive for the British Government in November 1855 to make Sweden pledge herself—this time in a formal treaty—not to exchange any territory with Russia without the consent of the Western Powers.

In 1842 Finnish complaints about the damage caused by the Norwegian Lapp migrations were heard anew. The Finnish authorities proposed in 1846 and in 1850 that, should they be allowed to continue, a small district on the Norwegian coast ought to be reserved for the Finnish Lapps as a compensation, where they might fish and find pasturage for their reindeer during the summer. If this were not agreed to, the frontier had better be closed. At first the Russian Government seemed little inclined to adopt this programme, but finally, as a result of inconsiderate Norwegian opposition, it was induced to adopt the Finnish view. In 1851 Russia asked for diplomatic negotiations with Sweden,

[1] Richter later became Prime Minister of Norway (in 1887), and is the hero of Björnson's play *Paul Lange and Thora Parsberg*.

and the Russian Minister at Stockholm presented an ultimatum on the subject of Finland, demanding restriction of the pasturages open to the Norwegian Lapps, and the right for Finnish Lapps to fish on the Norwegian coast in their own boats, and to have a place reserved on the shore of Varanger Bay where they could construct huts for keeping their boats and nets during the winter. If these demands were refused, the frontier would be closed at one year's notice. This Russia had a right to do, as she considered the treaty of 1751 in no way binding on her. But Norway, fearing future complications with her powerful neighbour, firmly refused her consent. In order to soothe Norwegian suspicions Russia substantially modified her demands—even giving up her claim to the permanent fishing huts on the Varanger coast. It was all in vain. Their apprehensions once aroused, very likely from British quarters (for Lord Palmerston followed the negotiations closely and repeatedly warned them against a cession which might serve 'as a foundation for further encroachments and afford a basis of a naval station commanding the coast of Norway'), the Norwegians were inexorable. The frontier was accordingly closed by Russia in 1852. Norway answered by a prohibition against Finnish Lapps taking part in the fishing on her coasts. Concerning some minor points Russia showed scarcely more compliance, and at the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 Finnish authorities proposed to postpone the negotiations, which otherwise might have 'unpleasant results.'

Russia's lack of compliance was no doubt a diplomatic blunder. Combined with her overbearing attitude towards Swedish neutrality in 1854 it seemed to indicate aggressive tendencies towards Scandinavia. Her motive for postponing the negotiations might, it was suspected, be a wish to wait for a more favourable opportunity for 'inserting the sharp point of the wedge.' The Swedish Government accordingly hinted to Great Britain that Russia aimed at seizing one of the supposedly ice-free Norwegian harbours in order to establish a maritime arsenal from which to dominate the northern seas. This communication was received in London with the keenest interest, and when later in 1854 the Storthing at Christiania discussed a Bill on penalties for violation of the Finnish frontier, it was even suggested that Norway should appeal to foreign Powers for assistance against Russia's encroachments. (According to well-informed sources, this nervous feeling may have been kindled by no less a person than Crowe himself, since 1842 British Consul-General at Christiania.) No active interest was, however, taken by Great Britain in the matter as long as Lord Aberdeen remained in office. But in 1855 he was succeeded by the warlike Palmerston. Once again skilfully handling his well-known Russophobia, Crowe now sent the noble

lord a coloured description of all the symptoms of the impending Russian invasion in the Finmark. In a detailed historical account of the rise, progress, and present state of the border disputes from the year 800 (*sic*) onwards, the indefatigable consul, cleverly combining truth with fiction, reproduced without hesitation unfounded rumours as clear facts. 'The Russian spider,' he finished up his warnings, 'continues to spin and eventually will gain her ends—the possession of a port or ports on the shore of the Atlantic, unless vigilantly and incessantly watched.'

According to the British Minister at Stockholm, Crowe's report created 'a great sensation' in London. 'It might be well,' Lord Palmerston noted thereon, 'to enter into some agreement with the King of Sweden and Norway binding him to make no concession whatever to Russia, whether of fishery rights, pasture rights or territory, without the consent of Great Britain. Such a treaty would be a security to us and a definite support to him.' A treaty which guaranteed the integrity of Norway against Russian attacks was accordingly drafted. In case of any such aggression Great Britain and France were to assist Norway with military force. Oscar I. having obtained the extension of the treaty to Sweden also, it was signed at Stockholm in November 1855. To Crowe the King confided that it was to be considered as a prelude to his taking an active part in the war with Russia.

If the disclosure of the bargain-transaction of 1840 led to the engagement not to exchange any Norwegian territory with Russia, the nervous feeling created by the claims put forward by Russia on behalf of Finland in 1851 made Sweden and Norway pledge themselves to the Western Powers not to cede any fishery or pasture rights to her eastern neighbour. The Allies thought, indeed, that they had been able by diplomacy to check Russia's plans in the north, as they had already succeeded in doing by force of arms in the south. Particular stress was put on the (erroneous) information that only the harbours west of the Russo-Norwegian frontier were ice-free during the winter, while all fjords on the Russian side were ice-bound. This was the reason why Russia desired to expand over Norway. *The Times* and several other British papers,[4] stated that compared to Varanger and Alten the mighty bay of Sebastopol itself was only a paltry creek, and that a voyage from the Norwegian coast could bring a Russian fleet to the British Isles within a very short time. 'If you remember,' the British Foreign Secretary (Lord Clarendon) said in defence of the policy of his Cabinet in the House of Lords in 1856, 'that Russia was aiming at an occupation of Norway (!) which would have given her complete command of the northern seas, that a treaty has been signed which guarantees the posses-

[4] The *Morning Post*, the *Globe*, the *Daily News*, December 1855.

sions of Sweden and Norway from aggression on the part of Russia, I think, my lords, that you will have no reason to be dissatisfied.'

We have seen how slight the foundation was in reality for the suspicions of Russian expansion in Scandinavia in 1826, 1840, and 1851. The Finmark question was purely local, and no proofs are to be found that Russia thought of using it as a vehicle for projects of aggrandisement of her own. But in history truth is not as important as what you believe, or make others believe. With the conclusion of the November Treaty the 'Russian peril' was, for a long time to come, firmly rooted in Swedish public opinion. Every time Russian foreign policy seemed to assume a more active character these fears were, after the manner of Crowe and Palmerston, concentrated on the north, and their statements reappeared in the Swedish Press.

During the two decades following the Crimean War Russia, occupied with internal reforms, did not seem so threatening as before. But Sweden, whose policy since 1855 was dependent on the Powers that had guaranteed her integrity, watched her with nervous attention. Soon the *entente* between Great Britain and France showed signs of breaking, and Sweden's faith in the validity of the November Treaty, concluded by these Powers in common, thus necessarily grew less strong. This accounted, perhaps, for her decision in 1859 to erect a fortress in the Finmark, in order to check possible attacks from Russia. The move roused the indignation of the mild Tsar Alexander II. 'C'est un procédé aimable à notre adresse!' he exclaimed; and it seems, indeed, to have had an unexpected effect. The year before the Finnish authorities had declared themselves unsatisfied with the closing of the Norwegian frontier—that 'final blow' to the welfare of the Finnish Lapps—and had repeated their contention that the only solution would be if the latter were accorded fishing rights on the Norwegian coast. After the news of the projected Norwegian fortress the Governor-General of Finland, Prince Berg, also adopted these views. In fact, he disavowed his predecessor, Menshikov, and stated unofficially to the Swedish Minister in Petersburg, Count Wedel-Jarlsberg, that a return of the conditions prior to 1852 would be desirable. Finland might even, Berg hinted, be willing 'gratuitously' to cede the border parishes of Utsjoki and Enare to Norway.

Wedel replied that before any further steps were taken Russia ought officially to repeal her renunciation of the treaty of 1751, pointing out at the same time that the November Treaty meant an insurmountable obstacle to any negotiations. In Stockholm Berg's proposal was point-blank refused. Russia had, the Swedish Foreign Secretary held, no right to invoke a treaty

which six years earlier she had declared null and void. He found it peculiar that the question had been put forward at a moment when fissures were opening in the Anglo-French *entente*; the offer of Utsjoki and Enare proved, he added, the anxiety of Russia to return to conditions which 'would leave the field open for troubles as soon as she desired to incite them.' The Norwegian authorities found that the proposal ought to be refused even if only the interests of the Norwegian Lapps were taken into consideration, and here the matter rested.

A similar attitude was taken when shortly after (in 1861) a desire was expressed in Finland also to close the Swedish frontier, over which the Norwegian nomads had begun after 1852 to pour into their country. The Finns contented themselves with proposing a mixed commission to study the matter, but even to this Sweden would not agree; an agreement could not, Swedish authorities feared, be reached unless Russia carried all her points (November 1866). Sweden, and also Great Britain, followed the conditions in the Finmark with a somewhat nervous attention. In 1860 the former had thought fit to demand rectification of a map of Finland, lithographed by the Russian general staff, which had drawn the Russo-Norwegian frontier of 1826 in an erroneous way. Ten years later, shortly before the outbreak of the Franco-German War, the British admiralty, hearing that a Russian Grand Duke accompanied by some vessels of war would visit the Finmark, hinted to Sweden that the sending of a squadron to meet him would 'dispel fears' which otherwise 'were sure to be entertained.'

Those fears returned undiminished after the new Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. As, by the peace of San Stephano, Great Britain and Germany in common deprived Russia of the fruit of her victories—the outlet to the Mediterranean—it was feared that, checked in the south, Russia might turn her attention to the north. Swedish pamphlets—notably those of the prominent Radical A. Hedin—did not cease to repeat the statements and warnings of Lallerstedt. Russia's desire of expansion towards the Atlantic now became almost an article of faith. This was particularly the case when during the 'eighties that new factor in Baltic policy the German Empire rose to steadily greater heights of political and economical influence. A collision between Germany and Russia now began to appear on the political horizon. Such sinister prospects made Sweden turn her attention to the long-neglected problem of defence, and in the agitation for this purpose the 'Russian peril' was from the very beginning one of the most effective assets. In 1889 Count Ludvig Douglas (a man of German birth and with influential German relations, later Foreign Secretary) published a pamphlet bearing the significant title *How we Lost Norway*, which, in the way of a

vision, depicted a war between Russia and Germany, and how the former, after a separate peace with Germany, attacked Sweden in order to procure the long-desired ice-free harbour for her growing export trade. The conquest of northern Sweden could only, the author concluded, be avoided if the Swedes united all their forces to reorganise their army and navy.

It may have been *viâ* this pamphlet of Douglas that the myth of the 'Russian peril' travelled to Germany. Here it found fertile ground. We must not overlook the fact that the last years of the nineteenth century were eminently characterised by the increasing tension between Germany and Russia. In the latter empire a ruthless policy of russification was inaugurated in all non-Russian dependencies—in Poland, the Baltic provinces, and in Finland (Germany applied the same methods in Schleswig-Holstein and in her part of Poland). With growing uneasiness the Swedes watched the gradual annihilation of Finland's constitutional liberties and the 'reforms' of all kinds, introduced in order to make the obstinate Grand Duchy a mere Russian province. What frightened them even more was that in Finland railways and military roads were laid out many of which were pointing in the direction of the Norwegian fjords, that the military forces in Finland were constantly reinforced, and that spying on a large scale was undertaken in Sweden. All this—it had, moreover, a parallel on the Austro-Russian frontier—seemed to indicate 'strategic preparations' which might threaten not only Germany but also Sweden.—These signs of hectic preparation[5] could not fail to create a very favourable background for the popular belief that Russia was resuming her alleged designs of expansion towards the Atlantic. This fear the Germans were not late in exploiting. Books and pamphlets about the 'Russian peril' now poured into Sweden, and they were the more eagerly listened to as the union with Norway seemed on the point of breaking. Sweden might then, it was feared, find herself in a still more exposed position.

If King Oscar [so the Kaiser the year after the first visit of his Baltic fleet to Stockholm (in 1894) warned the Swedish Crown-Prince] cannot succeed in re-establishing order in Norway, foreign States are bound to mix in her affairs. Russia, as your neighbour, will be the first to put her finger into the pie. Under pretext of friendly assistance Russian troops will march into Norway and—as once in Hungary—restore order. Russia would then extend payment for this service by seizing the long-desired harbour in Norway with the surrounding mainland. This would, however, constitute a *casus belli* for Great Britain. But should the latter, like Falstaff, consider prudence as the better part of courage, she would, on her part, arrange with Russia to get a Norwegian harbour as a guarantee.

[5] They were followed with anxiety also in Great Britain. *Cf.* G. Drage in the House of Commons, April 26, 1898; the *Observer*, January 24, 1904; the *Spectator*, June 3, 1905; and the *Contemporary Review*, August 1912.

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

XIX- -XX

A MONTHLY REVIEW

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In such circumstances I cannot allow Slavs and Britons to share the dominance of the Teutonic North Sea without asking me or without my permission. In order to ensure my trade and my coasts I would then be compelled to possess southern Norway. The union between this State and Sweden would thus be annihilated, and what would become of the latter? Entangled from all sides by Russia she would gradually fall a victim to this colossus and be absorbed by it.*

This tactful warning made King Oscar (Douglas was then Foreign Secretary) hint that it would be very good for Sweden if Germany would follow the example of Great Britain and France in 1855 and guarantee her integrity. But the Kaiser replied in the negative: it would be better if Sweden supported the pacific aims of the Triple Alliance.

When in 1905 the union between Sweden and Norway was severed, no Russian intervention was, however, heard of. The only move to which Russia was inspired by this event was an attempt (in 1907) to get rid of the prohibition dating from 1856 against the erection of any fortresses on the Åland Islands. This plan—most likely directed against Germany—was, however, thwarted by Great Britain, and Russia contented herself with defensive measures on the south coast of Finland. But in Sweden the Russian scheme created considerable anxiety. The efforts for a more efficient defence force now became more energetic than ever, and were in 1912 crowned by two pamphlets of Professor Pontus Fahlbeck and the famous explorer Sven Hedin. These writers reimported from Germany all the former exaggerated accounts of Russia's plots against the integrity of Scandinavia. Russia's greed of conquest was, they held, no longer directed towards the bays of Varanger or Alten. No, she wanted Narvik, the Norwegian export harbour for the Swedish iron ore. 'From Torneå, the end station of the Finnish railways, to Lyngen, it is only 43 Swedish miles and to Narvik 40. But from the extreme north-western point of the Russian frontier to Lyngen Bay it is only three miles.'

In vivid colours Hedin depicted the invasion of Sweden which would be the unavoidable consequence of Russia's attempt to 'break her way to the Atlantic.' 'The fjords and districts situated north of Sweden's borders do not suffice,' Fahlbeck added, 'for suitable naval stations and the dominance of the oceans. Much more of Norway is needed, at least down to Bodö, perhaps even to Trondhjem.' In order to ensure the safety of this territory and to win the shortest way to the Atlantic Russia must also take Swedish territories which offer great riches in the iron mines and in the railways with their electrical equipment. Had

* Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, 1931, p. 103.

Russia a firm footing west of Sweden, the latter would find herself squeezed in a slowly choking embrace. To avoid this danger Sweden ought, Fahlbeck pleaded, to join the Triple Alliance as her only natural ally. Thus the Russian forces would be checked, and this would in its turn have a calming influence on the war spirit in Great Britain!

After the outbreak of the Great War similar thoughts were adopted by a Swedish minority intimately connected with German finance and science. In an anonymous work, *Swedish Foreign Policy in the Light of the Great War* (June 1915), it was stated, with all details, that the danger threatening Sweden from the east could only be averted by a 'courageous rally on the side of Germany.' Like A. Hedin in the 'seventies, the 'Activists'—this was the name given to that small but loud-voiced clique—held that Russia's desire for an outlet to the open sea, 'one of the deepest driving forces in her history,' oscillated between south and north, between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean. Checked on the former in 1856 and 1878, as also on the Pacific and the Indian Ocean in 1905 and 1907, Russia had again directed her attention towards the northern Atlantic. No feature in Sweden's geography was more ominous than that she barred Russia's road to the Atlantic. Russia's plans seemed to be confirmed by 'the strategic preparations' in Finland and by the insolent spying in Sweden herself. In this danger Sweden had better not rely on '*perfide Albion*,' which at any moment might find it convenient to distract the attention of her powerful Russian ally from Asia by leading her into other directions—for instance, towards Scandinavia. A Russian expansion over Narvik or Gothenburg would probably meet with mild resistance from Great Britain, who knew that Russia, in contrast to Germany, would be no dangerous rival on the seas; perhaps Great Britain would even welcome such an expansion as a new link of communication with Russia. Germany, placed in the same geographical position as Sweden, and, besides, master of the Baltic, would, so this propaganda maintained, protect Sweden in a much more effective way against Russian attacks. They did not overlook, though, the fact that Germany had no vital interests in safeguarding Scandinavia, or that a separate peace between Germany and Russia might involve tremendous risks to Sweden. To avert such risks Sweden ought, the Activists concluded, to take the initiative herself in siding with the Central Powers; thus she would contribute to the final defeat of Russia, and in a decisive way influence the final issue of the war.

These were the main features of a work skilfully compiled but strangely out of touch with realities. On a nation like the Swedish, for a century of undisturbed peace unused to the

intricacies of foreign policies and even without close knowledge or great interest in European conditions such a propaganda exploiting a delicate situation could not fail to exercise considerable influence. But had Swedish historical research, instead of minutely analysing with philologically refined methods petty details from the remotest ages, devoted more attention to later epochs, the unsafe ground of this propaganda would easily have been laid bare. Voices had not been lacking, however, to this effect. Already in 1905 Hjärne had tried to assure his countrymen that there was not the least economical, political, or historical necessity for Russian expansion towards the Atlantic Ocean.

In our own days the views of this great seer have been fully confirmed by the opening of the Russian State archives. None of the papers found indicate that Russia before the Great War was preparing any expansion at the cost of Sweden or Norway. Had this been the case, no more fitting opportunity would, surely, have been found than the breaking up of the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905; a military conflict between the Scandinavian peoples might then have served as a pretext for Russian interference. But instead of kindling the fire Russia, occupied as she was with seething troubles of her own, exhorted her Scandinavian neighbours to a peaceful solution of their conflict. It is of interest to note that Great Britain herself showed no fear of Russian plans of expansion in the north in 1905. No memorandum on this question is to be found in the last volume (No. VIII.) of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War* 1898–1914—only a reference to Crowe's report of 1855. No alarmed Lord Palmerston then guided British foreign policy. The recent publication of the mobilisation plans of the Russian general staff from 1880 up to 1914 [7] confirms the impression that neither before nor after 1905 was there any reason for Sweden to suspect any aggressive plans on the part of Russia. On the contrary, the latter, strange to say, feared Sweden! Aware of the existence of pro-German elements in the Swedish army, Russia feared that Sweden might be induced to invade Finland and to threaten Petersburg itself. The mobilisation plans since 1908 show how Russia, in accordance with her fears, undertook defensive measures along her western border and in the Gulf of Finland. Not without reason the Russian proverb 'fear has large eyes' may, with equal right, be applied both to Russia and to Sweden in 1914.

At close scrutiny the different statements about the 'Russian peril' in the years before the Great War thus dissolve themselves into mere rumours or vague suspicions. We are, then, obliged to revert to the accounts of Russia's threatening attitude on earlier occasions—namely, during the Finmark negotiations in

[7] A. M. Zajontchkovskij, *Russia's Preparations for the Great War*, 1926.

1826, 1840, and 1851. But, as we have already seen, these negotiations concerned, according to Hjärne, nothing but 'minor questions,' and are thus indeed no solid evidence. With a smile of recognition we discover that the exaggerated accounts of Lallerstedt have been copied and used without any reservation or discrimination.[8] When the statements of Lallerstedt and his followers have been invoked in support of the plea for a 'courageous rally on the side of Germany,' we are confronted with the strange fact that propaganda weapons used by British agents during the Crimean War to make Sweden side with the Western Powers were in 1915 turned in quite another direction, ultimately against the originator (Great Britain) herself.

Thus a bogey originally invented by a British vice-consul mainly in order to save his own skin, and set working by the British Government, had far-reaching effects long after the actual causes had disappeared. In 1915 Sweden might have fallen a prey to a policy of intimidation which, in reality, the Germans had literally copied on the policy of Lord Palmerston in 1855, and which they were carrying out even more studiously than their British predecessor. That the *post-mortem* influence of the noble lord on Swedish foreign policy during the Great War in the end proved without effects was due principally to the sound judgment of the Swedish people. Unimpressed, the Swedes stuck to the policy of strict neutrality solemnly announced in 1914. The wisdom of this attitude was made sufficiently evident when in 1917 the dead hand of Tsardom was forced to withdraw from the shores of the Baltic, and when in 1918 the collapse of the Russian Empire was followed by a perhaps even greater catastrophe—that of the Central Powers themselves.

[8] *Cf.* Lallerstedt, pp. 20–22, with P. Fahlbeck, *Swedish and Northern Foreign Policy*, p. 37; 'Russia and Scandinavia' (*Deutsche Rundschau*); S. Hedin, *A Word of Warning*, 1912, p. 19; *Deutsche Tages Zeitung*, May–June 1913; M. Schiff-Drost, *The Nordic Knot*, p. 8 (German); *Swedish Foreign Policy in the Light of the Great War*, pp. 8, 9, 28; E. Svensén, *Russia's Roads to the Oceans*, 1915, p. 184; R. Pohle, *Russia's Greed of Earth*, 1916, p. 28 (German); R. Norrlander and S. Sario (the latter Finnish Foreign Secretary in 1918), *The Nordic Bridge*, 1917, p. 28 (German); and others.

C. F. PALMSTIERNA.

STELLA, VANESSA, AND SWIFT

Many great men have been unhappy, have spent their lives in perpetual travail of spirit, but none has suffered as did Dean Swift. To live in any prolonged tranquillity of mind the world must either be transcended by the ecstatic contemplation, transformed by the poetic intelligence, kept in abeyance by a philosophical stoicism, or participated in with uncritical assent. None of these attitudes was possible for Jonathan Swift, suspicious to the marrow of his bones, resentful where there was no cause for resentment and beside himself with fury when there was; revolving between the febrile energy congenital to him, and a blighting knowledge of the utter futility of all human existence. 'Believe me, no man breathing at present has less share of happiness in life than I. I do not say I am unhappy at all, but that everything here is tasteless to me for want of being what I would be.' It is thus that he writes to Stella when he is at the very height of his fame: 'I was at Court and Church to-day . . . and am so proud to make all the lords come up to me.'

Apart from certain ambiguous statements of his, the actual circumstances of his life would lead us to believe that there was at the core of his inordinate pride some knowledge that acted as a continual goad to his nerves: 'Some kinds of frenzy give double strength to the sinews.' He was, indeed, like a mad man—a mad man who, under the cover of his common-sense logic, harbours a fearful intent, the intent of piercing through and through the quivering bowels of the whole human race: 'For swords are mad men's tongues, and tongues are mad men's swords.' 'Each line shall stab, shall blast, like daggers and like fire.'

> Damn'd poets, damn'd critics, damn'd blockheads, damn'd knaves,
> Damn'd senators bribed, damn'd prostitute slaves.

It was before he had reached the age of thirty that he wrote Varina Waring a stilted letter proposing marriage: 'Trust me, Varina, Heaven has given us nothing else worth the loss of a thought. Ambition, high appearance, friends and fortune are all tasteless and insipid when they come in competition' (with love). But a few years passed, and now when Varina hints at her willing-

ness to marry him he thrusts her from him almost savagely. What had happened in these years, or would he, had it come to the point of her accepting him earlier, have treated her in the same strange manner—or perhaps have fled away?

His neurotic horror of the human body, innocent of all knowledge of the Rabelaisian acceptance, would seem to have had some pathological origin. It is as if he was determined to expose, not only as valueless but as vile besides, the very centre of all human delight, to render it so utterly obnoxious that he would no longer feel himself singled out to be alone deprived of what even the hungriest ragpicker, the most shallow coxcomb, could enjoy to the full—'the only felicity permitted to human life,' as, in an unguarded moment, he had expressed it to Varina. In his *Journal to Stella* he refers to having helped to deprive a man of his pardon who was condemned for rape: ''Tis true the fellow had lain with her a hundred times before . . . must a woman be ravished because she is a whore?' The penalty was hanging. Is it hardly to be doubted that there must have been some personal animosity in so outrageous an action? Swift should have been a subtle plenipotentiary, a wicked and crafty diplomatist ensnaring nations to their destruction, but certainly not a minister of God. And yet how tender he was to his mother! Not Flaubert, not Thomas Carlyle, not Pope, was a more devoted son. It was an essential part of the resentment he carried to his grave, the fact that she had been forced to wear herself out in menial labour. This glaring example, so closely related to his own personal life, of the injustice of society he could never forget or forgive. At his mother's death he wrote: 'I have now lost my barrier between me and death.' Was it perhaps unnatural for him ever to love in a manner not consistent with this particular kind of devotion? Would his love always be of the kind 'which gently warms but cannot burn'?

It is singular that a man capable of such morbid sensitiveness, and with so penetrating an observation that not even the most obscure scullery maid in Sir William Temple's house (where for so many years he trembled with resentment) could escape the ferreting inquiry of his exacerbated mind, where, we feel, he would have liked to round up the very mice from the wainscots to probe into their scurrying thefts of back pantry crumbs, should have been so unobservant of the sights and sounds of Nature. It was as if he passed through the country on his prodigious walks indifferent to all but the mordacious thoughts within him, thoughts which he was for ever and ever drilling into greater and greater efficiency for attack, discovering subtler and subtler methods of exposing down to the very quick the hypocrisy and

turpitude of those whom he despised for daring to underrate him:

> And I find it answers right:
> Scorn torments them more than spite.

There is never in all his writing a single reference which could show any true appreciation of the beauty of honeysuckle hedges, the magic of the first white frosts, the peaceful assurance of fish-filled twilight streams. It was as if all existence must be viewed either under the flat light of loss or the torrid light of rage.

His careful assertions of the coldness of his nature could have been but protections against the world. How could a man so easily shaken, as proud as a palace cat, as subtle as a gipsy, have had one drop of cold blood in his veins? No, there is some explanation that eludes us, and only Stella knew what it was. It is to this ambiguous girl with her 'raven hair' and dark eyes, 'a certain naughty rogue called MD,' that he speaks out his heart. 'I can count upon nothing, nor will but upon MD's love and kindness.' 'I am never happy but when I write or think of MD.' It is as if some mountain robber chief had captured and carried away to his far retreat a gentle child, 'a dove in an eagle's nest'; and in his dangerous isolation had brought her up in his own image, only a thousand times more gracious and without his lonely, suspicious pride—a child able to look into his overbearing heart with breathless awe and with breathless understanding and to see at the same time reflected there her own pale, anxious face. His endearments are sometimes like the rough, careful strokes of a grizzly bear sporting with its cub, sometimes like a boy in the schoolroom precociously interested in the little girl sitting next to him. They are sexual, protective, but never passionate. Infinitely revealing they are, these fragments of nursery caresses, coming as they do from a man before whose glance the very gods might quake, the most dolorous man alive. Interspersed among the anecdotes of his accumulating triumphs, his days so crowded with events yet so bare of joys, they appear, these little scattered utterances of love, like dancing fortune-telling birds at a side-show of the great Vanity Fair. How well she had studied his eccentric temperament. She had been the little Scholastica of his nature, knowing where to rush forward with her sympathy, where to chide, where to wait in suspended silence, and where to be alert to danger. Who was this Mrs. Vanhomrigh whose name recurred so often in his daily jottings? 'I dined with Mrs. Vanhomrigh, to desire them to buy me a scarf'; 'for Sunday at Vanhomrigh's'; 'Friday I think at Vanhomrigh's.' She had a daughter: 'Mrs. Vanhomrigh sent me word that her eldest daughter was taken suddenly very ill, and desired I would come and see her; I went and found it was a silly trick. . . . However I rattled off the

daughter.' This was Mrs. Vanhomrigh's daughter's birthday, and 'Mr. Ford and I were invited to keep it, and we spent the evening there drinking punch.' As near as she dared she ventured one of her rare protests, and Swift's reply was: 'Sir Andrew Fountaine and I dined by invitation with Mrs. Vanhomrigh. You say they are of no consequence; why they keep as good female company as I do male.' But even so slight a reproach from Stella was evidently sufficient to trouble him; for it is to be noticed that, after this, mention of the daughter is omitted, and in any allusion to his visits to the suspected house unconsciously there creeps into his letters an apologetic tone. It could hardly be suggested, however, that these dubious diurnal visits made his love for Stella any less. Is it perhaps possible to add to one's life another friend without interfering with the quality of one's feeling for the one most dear? It is always a dangerous experiment; but only in such danger is there growth. Life multiplies with new personal intimacies. Novelty is an essential need in human beings. It is the old primitive desire for adventure taking another form. Each relationship is like a voyage into an entirely unknown country; and what voyage offers greater rewards to a man apprehensive about his years than the uncertain voyage into the mind of a young, impressionable, and attractive girl?

As a youth Swift had written out certain resolutions for his later life. One of them was, 'Not to be fond of children *or let them come near me hardly*.' The last words which he had underlined had later been almost obliterated. What could he have meant by them? In 1713, five years after he had made the acquaintance of Esther Vanhomrigh, he wrote to Archdeacon Wallis: 'The old fellow you are pleased to be so free with is a very honest gentleman, though he has not your faculty of increasing the Queen's subjects.' And what had induced him to take holy orders? Worldly ambition had certainly a great deal to do with it, but he could have been a great lawyer, a great statesman: he could have made more than enough to live on by his pen, and have been renowned as well; but he refused all remuneration for his writing, much of which appeared anonymously. Never was there anyone more devoid of a religious spirit—he who could discern in religious enthusiasm only 'hysterics or sexual excitement taking a wrong turn.' He was too downright and honest a man to be able to simulate successfully a sentiment he did not feel unless pressed on by some unconscious emotional need. Was the Church a kind of harbourage for this atheistically inclined priest who knew what he was missing?—this priest who at last became such a stickler for forms and observances, who would go stalking to his ink-pot to summon up his most annihilating eloquence, 'like a razor whetted with oil,' to cut the ground out from

under every 'false sect'? 'It is often with religion as it is with love, which, by much dissembling, at last grows real.' Was he thinking of himself when he wrote this? Where else would he be so little taunted by a certain constitutional lack of something that others freely enjoyed, but which the Church discounted?

There was surely no mischief in his mind when he began his intimacy in the Vanhomrigh household. He had a small room to himself there where he could write, not his *Journal to Stella* (this was composed in his bed), but his political pamphlets. For Esther Vanhomrigh they must have been very happy days—these early ones, when she was disturbed by no premonition of what the future held for her. Her power was in her youth, the most potent of all powers, but one that cannot be counted upon to endure. As for Swift, he was approaching dangerous ground and did not know it. He who understood society as a thief understands his jemmy, with the same grim stealth, or as a hangman knows his knots, did not comprehend so much about the heart of a girl. Esther Vanhomrigh was no child when he met her, but she was thirteen years younger than Stella, and it was with the old irregular pleasure of Moor Park that he undertook her instruction, told her what books to read, scolded and explained and returned to scold again. The bantering on her side began to take a different turn. It was a situation charged with peril. Behind the punctilious propriety of his address Swift's nature was secretive and inscrutable, yet extremely susceptible to the admiration of women, and with a golden drop of pure goodness in its awful depths. He did not forget Stella, his love for whom was as deep-set in his being as was his own parsimony; but always when he was in London he discovered himself entering the door on Bury Street, and always he found there a vivacious young woman eager to challenge and caress him.

There is no tracing the progression of a feeling that has its origin in mystery. Glances meet, evade, and meet again. The heart is ever avid when it is not already captive or restrained by fear. One advances, the other retreats; one retreats, the other advances. Strangeness spurs on the blood, familiarity breaks down barriers. Memories multiply and are made deceptive by 'that forward, delusive faculty' the imagination. It is a game of roguery and apt at any moment to lead to disillusionment or to pain. Suddenly the blood flows with a different rhythm in the body and peace has fled. For Esther it had fled never to return. A thoughtless, thoughtful, mocking girl: rebellious, vain; too sensible to be captured by society; too indolent and flighty to be a true student; living from moment to moment, and yet with something worthy of tragedy in her—something dark, passionate,

unconfined, she goes forward to her doom. For Swift the situation must, from the moment he knew the depth of the emotion he had aroused, have been fraught with intolerable uneasiness. 'I promised to write to you; . . . I will write a common letter to you all . . . but directed to you.' These words should have taught her caution. 'Now you are good beyond expression in sending me that dear voluntary from St. Albans. . . . I am very impatient to hear from you at Chester.' His next letter is addressed to her mother: 'Who will Hessy get now to chide, or Moll to tell her stories. . . ? I design to send Hessy a letter in print from Ireland. . . .' How could he have been more explicit? With tremulous anxiety she attempts repeatedly to break down his torturing silences. 'If you think I write too often your only way is to tell me so, or at least to write to me again. . . . If you are very happy it is ill-natured of you not to tell me so, except 'tis what is inconsistent with mine.' This was approaching very near to the point of danger.

He returns to London, and it must have been at about this time that *Cadenus and Vanessa* was written. In its stilted apostrophes was no knowledge of a lover's feelings, yet it showed a kind of contrite, surprised, and courtly consideration, and a certain sincere remorse. Then once more he is on his way back to Ireland, to which country she soon follows him with her sister Moll. Their mother has died and they have inherited a small property near Dublin. Neurotically touchy wherever he thought his good name was in question; very aware of his clerical position and austerely punctilious in relation to it; vulnerable to an unhappiness he knew to be genuine, yet unable to suppress his anger, ever molten under its icy surface; sensible of his obligation to this unmanageable girl—indeed, not unattracted by her—but with a love for Stella far more dependent, a love as integral as had been his love for his mother; guilty yet guiltless, he found himself in waters that seemed to be carrying him in a direction he had not the slightest intention of going. To thrust Vanessa for ever out of his life, besides being more brutal than was possible for him, was not really what he desired. Peace he wanted, of course, and not to hurt Stella. But he was fond of Vanessa and protective of her, and if she had not been so importunate, if she had asked nothing of him but his voluntary friendship, he would probably have been content at certain circumspect intervals to sit by her fireside, and in secret to continue their sophisticated relationship. But her will was almost as tenacious as was his own will, and she was past the period of correction, 'for a violent desire is little better than a distemper, and therefore men are not to blame in looking after a cure.' No one likes to be scolded, least of all a man as touchy as Jonathan Swift, a man who wrote

as if they were surgical briefs composed for the sole purpose wing up the hollow horror of existence—beneath the us smile, the 'brisk baboon,' beneath the silks and satins, nking entrails :

> Could I not through all the ermine
> Spy the strutting chattering vermin.

man required the most delicate handling, and Vanessa ncapable of the kind of sagacious reserve, philosophical m, and simulated humility that would have saved her from gic fate. Always driven on by her ardent blood, she presses too far. Sometimes for a moment the genuine anguish of peal breaks down his cold austerities. Indeed, no love are more painful to read than are those of this unfortunate During all the eight years that she lives in Ireland there surcease of her trouble. He counsels riding, walking, g ; he chides her with being romantic ; he brings suitors on her. All to no avail. The petulance and frivolity have purged away, and it is the living flame that endures, the held up to be struck and struck and struck again. 'I have out my days in sighing, and my nights with watching and ng of ——, ——, ——, who thinks not of me. . . . I was with violent passions which terminate all in one—that essible passion I have for you. Consider the killing emotions I feel from your neglect of me, and shew some tenderness , or I shall lose my senses.' And then her sister Moll, her companion, dies and she is utterly alone, and for a brief some leniency enters into the heart of her stern lover : assurée que jamais personne du monde a été aimée, e, estimée, adorée par votre ami que vous. . . . I drank no since I left you, nor intend to till I see you again.' These ns to coffee-drinking are the most ambiguous in all their ondence. 'What would you give to have the history of nd—exactly written, from the beginning to this time ? the time of spilling the coffee, to drinking of coffee ? ' ember that riches are nine parts in ten of all that is good in d health is the tenth. Drinking coffee comes long after, et it is the eleventh ; but without the two former you drink it right. . . .' Continually there are these obscure ces to coffee, and if they should mean what they seem r less obviously to mean, how characteristic that he should hosen this particular disguise for the enigmatic allusions, ns suggestive of drawing-rooms, of snatched kisses, and of es that are no embraces ; allusions with something almost ous in them, utterly lacking in emotional intensity. Indeed, Swift's letters to Vanessa it would be impossible to find a

single word inspired by any poetical transports, by any true passion :

> For what was ever understood
> By human kind but flesh and blood ?

That he was in continual conflict there can be no doubt. He who never ceased to wish to injure the world was instead bringing injury to the only two human creatures who loved him with a love embedded in the bone.

Of these three people it is difficult to know who to pity most. On Vanessa we cannot let our thoughts dwell without being deeply disturbed—this forsaken girl 'sitting moping with her elbows on her knees on a little stool by the fire' ; walking backwards and forwards over the damp garden paths watching the nights close in, while she listened, always listened, for the sound of a horse's hoofs, or a step once familiar ; and heard instead but the murmur of water rushing down to its level, or the craving wind through the laurel leaves. Afraid to write, yet unable to hold back her pen, her youthful confidence long since perished, illness beginning its sinister inroads—so much bitter anxiety and so little reward ! How the spring can tease and taunt ? Every new blossom proclaims that the secret of all joy is love ; the birds fill the heavens with the same irrefutable burden, and even in darkness there is no escape, for when all else is stilled the stricken heart groans. Her anguish teaches her to write sentences of surprising power and beauty : 'I find myself unquiet in the midst of silence, and my heart is at once pierced with sorrow and love.' How terrifying and alien can the night skies appear to one who knows not where to turn !

> The stars, sun, moon all shrink away,
> A desert vast, without abound
> And nothing left to eat or drink,
> And a dark desert all around.

What solution could there possibly be for such a situation ? For Vanessa there was but one. Whether she really wrote to Stella or not is as problematical as whether Swift, as his early biographers would have us believe, ever married Stella. It is not difficult to accept the tradition, however, that in her weakened state, and as susceptible to Swift's moods as she was, a look from his eyes could freeze the last drop of her unwarmed blood. If anyone ever could have annihilated with a glance it would have been he. The particular problem that had vexed for so long the peace of his days was now for ever at an end. In the dead there are no longer any faults, nothing to cause us anger ; there are only abject images that press upon the brain. He who was as familiar with despair as a witch with her broomstick had recourse to his usual cure. It was at this time that he wrote the *Drapier*

etters. And how much more precious must Stella have been to im now that only she was left and that there was no longer this nspoken trouble between them! For that Stella had been deeply nhappy during the years that Swift was seeing Vanessa cannot doubted. Her poem on jealousy, 'This tyrant that embitters my hours,' would alone give some index of her feelings. At ie best a husband who was no husband, a lover who let it be ipposed that they never met except in the presence of a third arty—and such a third party—and whose nervous preoccupation 'er the amenities of their relationship outweighed to so large an ktent his ardour, must have caused her to cry out on many a hill night to her 'lonely, lonely, lonely pillow'; those same ights, perhaps, when he was dreaming of her, for she was ever oming to him in his haunted sleep. She had rewards, to be sure. he had a recognised place in his life accepted by his friends; he ved her more than he had ever loved any other human being but 's mother; she could nurse him when he was ill; and her days 'ere given depth and significance by his intellectual activities. t was no mean privilege to have been the most intimate companion to so great a genius. But sensitive natures live more y their dreads than by their hopes. In the long years when she ad felt his unaccountable moods, his reticences, embarrassments, rasions, like sicknesses in her own blood, her life-illusion had ceived a serious and prolonged shock, and her strength was not eat. She outlived Vanessa by but five years.

The moment Swift had been for so long anticipating with such uddering recoil was now at last fully upon him. On hearing iat Stella's life is despaired of he writes: 'My heart has been so ink, that I have not been the same man, nor ever shall be gain; but drag on a wretched life, till it shall please God to call e away.' There are sorrows too deep to find an outlet even in e-blasting rage. They must remain for ever like weights upon ie breast. He was now truly alone. It is sad to contemplate this eadstrong man, so tetchy that if any woman passed him in the reets of Dublin without making him a curtsey he was seriously iscomposed, brought utterly to the dust. How as he sat in a oom in the deanery where the cathedral lights could not reach to mind him that it was Stella's funeral service which was the iuse of their shining he must have reviewed the long drama of is intimacy with 'This fairest soul in the world'; the days when a young man full of thwarted ambition he had gone to this rave child with his outraged pride; the frosty mornings when would run up to her room to 'turn Stella out of her chair and ke up the fire and cry uth, uth, uth!'; all the little presents he ad bought for her—'six pounds of chocolate in a little wooden ox,' 'three little volumes of Lucian in French,' a green silk

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